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Preface
This edited volume contains a selection of papers that are an outgrowth of
the Sixth International Conference on Game Theory and Management with a few
additional contributed papers. These papers present an outlook of the current de-
velopment of the theory of games and its applications to management and various
domains, in particular, ﬁnance, mechanism design, environment and economics.
The International Conference on Game Theory and Management, a three day
conference, was held in St. Petersburg, Russia in June 27-29, 2012. The conference
was organized by Graduate School of Management St. Petersburg University in col-
laboration with The International Society of Dynamic Games (Russian Chapter)
and Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control Processes SPU. More than 100
participants from 27 countries had an opportunity to hear state-of-the-art presen-
tations on a wide range of game-theoretic models, both theory and management
applications.
Plenary lectures covered diﬀerent areas of games and management applications.
They had been delivered by Professor Michele Breton, HEC Montreal (Canada);
Professor Josef Hofbauer, University of Vienna (Austria); Professor Ehud Kalai,
Northwestern University (USA); Professor Sylvain Sorin, Polytechnic University,
Paris (France) and Professor Sergey Aseev, Institute of Mathematics RAS (Russia).
The importance of strategic behavior in the human and social world is increas-
ingly recognized in theory and practice. As a result, game theory has emerged as a
fundamental instrument in pure and applied research. The discipline of game theory
studies decision making in an interactive environment. It draws on mathematics,
statistics, operations research, engineering, biology, economics, political science and
other subjects. In canonical form, a game takes place when an individual pursues
an objective(s) in a situation in which other individuals concurrently pursue other
(possibly conﬂicting, possibly overlapping) objectives and in the same time the ob-
jectives cannot be reached by individual actions of one decision maker. The problem
is then to determine each individual’s optimal decision, how these decisions inter-
act to produce equilibria, and the properties of such outcomes. The foundations of
game theory were laid more than sixty years ago by von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1944).
Theoretical research and applications in games are proceeding apace, in areas
ranging from aircraft and missile control to inventory management, market devel-
opment, natural resources extraction, competition policy, negotiation techniques,
macroeconomic and environmental planning, capital accumulation and investment.
In all these areas, game theory is perhaps the most sophisticated and fertile
paradigm applied mathematics can oﬀer to study and analyze decision making under
real world conditions. The papers presented at this Sixth International Conference
on Game Theory and Management certainly reﬂect both the maturity and the
vitality of modern day game theory and management science in general, and of
dynamic games, in particular. The maturity can be seen from the sophistication of
7the theorems, proofs, methods and numerical algorithms contained in the most of
the papers in these contributions. The vitality is manifested by the range of new
ideas, new applications, the growing number of young researchers and the expanding
world wide coverage of research centers and institutes from whence the contributions
originated.
The contributions demonstrate that GTM2012 oﬀers an interactive program on
wide range of latest developments in game theory and management. It includes
recent advances in topics with high future potential and exiting developments in
classical ﬁelds.
We thank Anna Tur from the Faculty of Applied Mathematics (SPU) for dis-
playing extreme patience typesetting the manuscript.
Editors, Leon A. Petrosyan and Nikolay A. Zenkevich
The Lexmax Rule for Bankruptcy Problems
Javier Arin1 and Juan M. Benito-Ostolaza2
1 Dpto. Ftos. A. Económico I, Basque Country University,
L. Agirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain
E-mail: franciscojavier.arin@ehu.es
2 Dpto. Economía, Universidad Pública de Navarra,
Campus Arrosadia s/n, 31006 Pampona, Navarra, Spain
E-mail: jon.benito@unavarra.es
Abstract This paper investigates the use of egalitarian criteria to select
allocations in bankruptcy problems. In our work, we characterize the sets of
Lorenz maximal elements for these problems. We show that the allocation
selected by the Proportional Rule is the only allocation that belongs to all
these Lorenz maximal sets. We prove that the Talmud Rule selects the lex-
icographic maximal element within a certain set. We introduce and analyze
a new rule for bankruptcy problems that shares strong similarities with the
Talmud Rule.
Keywords: Bankruptcy problems; Lorenz criterion; lexicographic criterion;
Proportional Rule; Talmud Rule.
1. Introduction
A bankruptcy problem consists of a set of claimants who must divide between them
an inﬁnitely divisible good (the endowment) that is not suﬃcient to satisfy their
claims in full. The aim of this paper is to introduce two egalitarian criteria for
solving bankruptcy problems.
The use of egalitarian criteria to select outcomes from a given set has been widely
analyzed in many diﬀerent settings. For example, in the literature on coalitional
games it is well-known that the most important solution concepts can be seen as
selectors of egalitarian optimal outcomes from a certain set1. This approach is not
entirely new in bankruptcy problems since it is known that the Talmud Rule, one
of the most important sharing rules for bankruptcy problems, coincides with the
nucleolus of the associated bankruptcy games and the nucleolus is a solution that
selects lexicographic maximal elements from a certain set. In this paper we consider
two egalitarian criteria: the Lorenz and lexicographic criteria.
It has been noted by various authors2 that if the set of feasible allocations of
a bankruptcy problem is considered it must be concluded that the lexicographic
 We thank W. Thomson, C. Kayi and E. Inarra for helpful comments and suggestions. J.
Arin acknowledges ﬁnancial support from Project 9/UPV00031.321-15352/2003 of the
University of the Basque Country, Projects SEJ-2006-05455 and ECO2009-11213 of the
Ministry of Education and Science of Spain and Project GIC07/146-IT-377-07 of the
Basque Goverment. Likewise, J. Benito-Ostolaza acknowledges ﬁnancial support from
Project ECO2009-12836 of the Ministry of Science and Innovation of Spain and Project
ECO2012-34202 of Ministry of Economy and Competitivity of Spain.
1 See for example Arin (2007). The paper explains the relationship between the Shapley
value and the least square criterion and the relationship between the nucleolus and the
lexicographic criterion.
2 See for example Bosmans and Lauwers (2007).
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maximal allocation coincides with the allocation selected by the sharing rule known
as Constrained Equal Awards, a rule that seeks to give the same amount to each
claimant whenever that amount does not exceed her/his claim3. Constrained Equal
Losses (a rule that seeks to divide the loss equally whenever no claimant receives a
negative payoﬀ) is also a lexicographic maximizer since it selects the lexicographic
maximal allocation from the set of vectors of losses. We prove that the Talmud Rule
selects the lexicographic maximal allocation in the set of vectors of awards/losses
considered in absolute terms. The analysis suggests the deﬁnition of a new sharing
rule: the Lexmax Rule. The deﬁnition of this rule is based on a lexicographic crite-
rion and it is a natural counterpart of the Talmud Rule, or even a kind of reverse
Talmud Rule. This fact relates the new Lexmax Rule with the Reverse Talmud Rule
introduced by Thomson (2007). We discuss the relationship between these rules.
Concerning the second egalitarian criterion, the Lorenz criterion 4, we character-
ize the sets of Lorenz maximal vectors of awards/losses. The existence of diﬀerent
Lorenz maximal sets is due to the fact that the vectors of awards/losses can be
weighted and can be considered in real terms or absolute terms (see Subsection 2.3
for details). If the intersection of the diﬀerent Lorenz sets is considered in absolute
terms it is found to contain only the allocation provided by the Proportional Rule.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces bankruptcy
problems, sharing rules and egalitarian criteria. Section 3 deals with the diﬀerent
Lorenz maximal sets. Section 4 is devoted to the lexicographic rules – the Talmud
Rule and the Lexmax Rule – and Section 5 concludes.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Bankruptcy problems
The tuple (N, d,E) is a bankruptcy problem if:
a) N is a ﬁnite nonempty set.
b)
∑
i∈N
di > E.
N represents the set of agents or claimants, E ∈ R+ represents the amount to
be divided, and d ∈ RN+ is a vector of claims whose i-th component is di. Then i  j
means that we assume di ≤ dj and d1 ≥ 0. We denote by Γ the class of bankruptcy
problems.
An allocation to the claimants is represented by a real valued vector x ∈ RN that
satisﬁes
∑
i∈N xi = E. The i-th coordinate of the vector x denotes the allocation
given to claimant i.
We say that an allocation x satisﬁes claim boundednes and non negativity if
di ≥ xi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N .
We denote by F (N, d,E) the set of allocations that satisfy claim boundednes
and non negativity.
A sharing rule φ in a set of problems Γ is a mapping that associates a vector
φ (N, d,E) ∈ F (N, d,E) with every problem (N, d,E) in Γ .
3 In Subsection 2.2 we introduce the two lexicographic criteria. The ﬁrst criterion is based
on the minmax principle and the second one is based on the maxmin principle.
4 In the literature on egalitarianism it is agreed that an allocation should be maximal
according to the Lorenz criterion as a minimal requirement for being called egalitarian.
This fact motivates the study of Lorenz maximal allocations for bankruptcy problems.
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Some well-known sharing rules are5:
Constrained Equal Awards (CEA). This solution divides the endowment
equally among the agents under the constraint that no claimant receives more than
his\her claim. Formally:
CEA(N, d,E) = (min(β, di))i∈N
where β solves the equation
∑
i∈N min(β, di) = E.
Constrained Equal Losses (CEL). This solution divides the total loss (
∑
i∈N
di−
E) equally among the agents under the constraint that no claimant receives a neg-
ative amount. Formally:
CEL(N, d,E) = (max(0, di − β))i∈N
and β solves the equation
∑
i∈N max(0, di − β) = E.
The Proportional Rule (PR). This solution divides the endowment among
the claimants proportionally to their claims. Formally:
PR(N, d,E) = β · d
where β ≥ 0 and β · (∑i∈N di) = E.
Some convenient, well-known properties of a rule φ in Γ are the following.
– φ satisﬁes order preservation for awards and losses if for each (N, d,E)
in Γ we have that φ(N, d,E) is order preserving for awards and losses. An
allocation x is order preserving for awards and losses if di ≤ dj implies that
xi ≤ xj and di − xi ≤ dj − xj .
– φ satisﬁes consistency if for any problem (N, d,E) and any S ⊂ N it holds
that φi(S, (di)i∈S ,
∑
i∈S φi(N, d,E)) = φi(N, d,E) for all i ∈ S.
– φ satisﬁes half claim boundednes (HCB) if for any (N, d,E) ∈ Γ we have
that either φi(N, d,E) ≥ dl2 for all i ∈ N or φi(N, d,E) ≤ dl2 for all i ∈ N .
– φ satisﬁes λ-claim boundednes (λ-CB) if for any (N, d,E) ∈ Γ we have that
either φi(N, d,E) ≥ λdl for all i ∈ N or φi(N, d,E) ≤ λdl for all i ∈ N .
HCB is discussed in Aumann and Maschler (1985). This property is satisﬁed by
the Talmud Rule and by the Proportional Rule. The λ-CB is clearly inspired by
HCB and is satisﬁed by the Proportional Rule for any λ ∈ [0, 1] .
2.2. Egalitarian Criteria
For any vector z ∈ Rd we denote by θ(z) the vector that results from z by permuting
the coordinates in such a way that θ1(z) ≤ θ2(z) ≤ ... ≤ θd(z). Let x, y ∈ Rd.
We say that the vector x Lorenz dominates the vector y (denoted by x L y) if
k∑
i=1
θi(x) ≥
k∑
i=1
θi(y) for all k ∈ {1, 2, ..., d} and if at least one of these inequalities is
strict. The vector x weakly Lorenz dominates the vector y (denoted by x 	L y) if
k∑
i=1
θi(x) ≥
k∑
i=1
θi(y) for all k ∈ {1, 2, ..., d}.
5 A long list of rules can be found in a survey by Thomson (2003).
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We say that the vector x lexicographically dominates the vector y (denoted by
x lex y) if either θ(x) = θ(y) or there exists k such that θi(x) = θi(y) for all
i ∈ {1, 2, ..., k − 1} and θk(x) > θk(y).
This lexicographic criterion provides Lorenz maximal allocations.
We say that the vector x lexmax dominates the vector y (denoted by x lm
y) if either θ(x) = θ(y) or there exists k such that θi(x) = θi(y) for all i ∈
{k + 1, k + 2, ..., n} and θk(x) < θk(y).
The lexmax criterion provides Lorenz maximal allocations.
The last two criteria can be considered lexicographic criteria. The ﬁrst one can
be renamed as a maximin criterion and has been widely analyzed in many diﬀerent
models. The second criterion, a minimax criterion is a natural counterpart of the
maximin criterion but has not received the same attention. The maximin criterion
is also known as the Rawlsian criterion.
2.3. The set of awards-losses vectors
Let (N, d,E) be a problem and let x be an allocation. Each agent measures xi in
two ways. In one sense xi measures how much he\she receives. In the other sense,
di−xi measures how much he\she does not receive. Given the allocation x we deﬁne
its associated ordered vector of awards-losses as follows:
xAL = (x1, ..., xn, x1 − d1, ..., xn − dn).
We also use the following notation:
xA = (x1, ..., xn) and xL = (x1 − d1, ..., xn − dn).
In this vector, awards and losses are equally weighted and equally treated. We
also consider vectors where awards and losses are not equally treated. Given the
allocation x we deﬁne its associated weighted vector of awards-losses as follows:
λ-xAL = ((1 − λ)x1, ..., (1− λ)xn, λ(x1 − d1), ..., λ(xn − dn))
where λ ∈ [0, 1] . Note that λ-xAL with λ = 12 is the vector of equal weights, which
in our study is equivalent to considering xAL or λ-xAL with λ = 12 . The following
set
|λ-AL(N, d,E)| = {∣∣λ-xAL∣∣ : x ∈ F (N, d,E)}
is the set of vectors of awards-losses taken in absolute terms. Note that we use
the notation λ-xAL instead of λ-xAL(N, d,E). We consider there is no confusion, so
we prefer the notation λ-xAL for the sake of simplicity.
3. The Lorenz criterion
The ﬁrst egalitarian criterion we consider is the Lorenz criterion. The Lorenz order
is not complete and therefore by applying this criterion we do not, in general, obtain
uniqueness. In this sense, the set of Lorenz maximal allocations (the set of Lorenz
undominated allocations) can be seen as the maximal set of fair allocations. A
Lorenz dominated allocation is not a candidate for selection when looking for fair
allocations. The set of Lorenz undominated allocations is deﬁned as follows:
L(N, d,E) =
{
x ∈ F (N, d,E); there is no y ∈ F (N, d,E)
such that yAL L xAL
}
.
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The Lorenz maximal set coincides with the set of allocations that satisfy order
preservation in both ways, awards and losses Theorem 1). Therefore, order preser-
vation emerges as a minimal requirement for a fair allocation.
The proof of this result relies on the following fact. For two elements k and l, a
vector x, and a real number α > 0, we say that (k, l, x, α) is an equalizing bilateral
transfer (of size α from k to l with respect to x) if
xk − α ≥ xl + α.
Now, Lemma 2 of Hardy, Littlewood and Polya (1952) implies that an allocation
y Lorenz dominates another allocation x only if y can be obtained from x by a ﬁnite
sequence of equalizing bilateral transfers.
Theorem 1. The Lorenz maximal set coincides with the set of all allocations that
satisfy order preservation in both ways: awards and losses.
Proof. Let x ∈ F (N, d,E) be such that x is not order preserving for awards. There-
fore, there are claimants i, j such that di ≥ dj and xi < xj. Then it also holds that
di − xi > dj − xj . Consider the following allocation z :
zl =
⎧⎨⎩xl + ε if l = ixl − ε if l = j
xl otherwise
where ε = min(xj−xi2 ,
(di−xi)−(dj−xj)
2 ).
It is not diﬃcult to check that zAL L xAL since it still holds that zi ≤ zj and
di−zi ≥ dj−zj. The proof is similar in the case where x violates order preservation
for losses.
Let x be an allocation satisfying order preservation for awards and losses. Then∑
1≤i≤n
θi(x
AL) = E −
∑
1≤i≤n
di
since the ﬁrst n elements of the vector θ(xAL) are the ordered losses (xn −
dn, ..., x1 − d1)6. Note also that
2n∑
i=n+1
θi(x
AL) =
∑
1≤i≤n
xi = E
since the last n elements of the vector θ(xAL) are the ordered awards (x1, ..., xn).
6 If there is any x1 < (xi − di) we have the following contradiction:
x1 < (xi − di) ≤ (x1 − d1) < x1.
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Therefore, if there is an allocation z such that zAL L xAL should be the case
that zL L xL and zA 	L xA or zL 	L xL and zA L xA. If zA L xA then zA
can be obtained from xA by a ﬁnite sequence of equalizing bilateral transfers.
Now consider a vector yA resulting from xA after a bilateral equalizing transfer.
Let i, j two claimants such that xi < xj
yl =
⎧⎨⎩xl + ε if l = ixl − ε if l = j
xl otherwise
where 0 < ε ≤ xj−xi2 .
It is clear that yA L xA implies that xL L yL and therefore yAL does not
Lorenz dominate xAL.
A similar consideration follows for the case where we consider Lorenz domination
with respect to the vector xL. That is, if there exists an allocation y such that
yL L xL then xA L yA and therefore yAL does not Lorenz dominate xAL. 
unionsq
Figure 1 shows the Lorenz maximal set when E moves from 0 to d1 + d2. As
we know by theorem 1, ﬁgure 1 also is representing the set of all allocations that
satisfy order preservation in awards and losses when E moves from 0 to d1 + d2.
d1 x1
x2
d2 CEL
Lorenz Set
CEA
Fig. 1: Illustration of the Lorenz maximal set when E moves from 0 to d1 + d2.
The following corollary arises immediately since a convex combination of order
preserving allocations is also order preserving.
Corollary 2. The Lorenz maximal set is convex.
Note that if an allocation x is order preserving in (N, d,E) then (xi)i∈S is also
order preserving in (S, (di)i∈S ,
∑
i∈S xi) and therefore the Lorenz set satisﬁes the
consistency principle.
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Corollary 3. Let x ∈ L(N, d,E). Then (xi)i∈S ∈ L(S, (di)i∈S ,
∑
i∈S xi).
We also deﬁne the weighted Lorenz maximal set for λ ∈ [0, 1] as follows:
λ− L(N, d,E) =
{
x ∈ F (N, d,E); there is no y ∈ F (N, d,E)
such that λ-yAL L λ-xAL
}
.
A direct consequence of the proof of Theorem 1 is that for λ ∈ (0, 1) the weighted
Lorenz maximal sets coincide. This is so because whenever λ ∈ (0, 1) it is still true
that
∑
1≤i≤n θi(λ-x
AL) = λ(E−∑1≤i≤n di) and∑n+1≤i≤2n θi(λ−xAL) = (1−λ)E.
Therefore the arguments of the proof can be repeated.
However it is immediately apparent that if we take λ = 0
L(N, d,E) =
{
x ∈ F (N, d,E); there is no y ∈ F (N, d,E)
such that y L x
}
coincides with CEA(N, d,E) and if we take λ = 1 the set
L(N, d,E) =
{
x ∈ F (N, d,E); there is no y ∈ F (N, d,E)
such that yL L xL
}
coincides with CEL(N, d,E).
The last two results were noted by Bosmans et al. (2007) when studying Lorenz
comparisons between vectors of n elements (being n the number of claimants). Many
other authors have considered Lorenz comparisons of vectors of n elements in their
works. For example, this type of analysis can be found in Thomson (2007).
This analysis points out a natural question: If we consider the vector of awards-
losses in absolute terms does the new Lorenz set coincide with the set of allocations
that satisfy order preservation in both ways? The answer is not.
We deﬁne the new Lorenz maximal set as a set of Lorenz undominated allo-
cations in the following terms:
LAT (N, d,E) =
{
x ∈ F (N, d,E); there is no y ∈ F (N, d,E)
such that
∣∣yAL∣∣ L ∣∣xAL∣∣
}
.
The new set is a subset of the Lorenz set deﬁned above.
Theorem 4. The set LAT (N, d,E) coincides with the set of all allocations that sat-
isfy half claim boundednes and order preservation in both ways: awards and losses.
Proof. Let x ∈ F (N, d,E) be such that x is not order preserving for awards. There-
fore, there are claimants i, j such that di ≥ dj and xi < xj. Then it also holds that
di − xi > dj − xj . Consider the following allocation z :
zl =
⎧⎨⎩xl + ε if l = ixl − ε if l = j
xl otherwise
where ε = min(xj−xi2 ,
(di−xi)−(dj−xj)
2 ).
It is not diﬃcult to check that
∣∣zAL∣∣ L ∣∣xAL∣∣ since it still holds that zi ≤ zj and
di−zi ≥ dj−zj. The proof is similar in the case where x violates order preservation
for losses.
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Let x ∈ F (N, d,E) be such that x does not satisfy HCB. Therefore, there are
claimants i, j such that xi < di2 and xj >
dj
2 . Then it also holds that di − xi > xi
and xj > dj − xj . Consider the following allocation z :
zl =
⎧⎨⎩
xl + ε if l = i
xl − ε if l = j
xl otherwise
where ε is such that still holds that di − zi ≥ zi and zj ≥ dj − zj.
It is not diﬃcult to check that
∣∣zAL∣∣ L ∣∣xAL∣∣ .
Assume that E ≤ 12
∑
i∈N
di and let x be an allocation satisfying HCB and order
preservation in both ways. For any two claimants i, j (assuming dl ≤ dj) it holds
that (by HCB of x) di − xi ≥ xi and dj − xj ≥ xj . Since x also satisﬁes order
preservation it also holds that xj ≥ xi and dj − xj ≥ dl − xl.
Therefore we conclude that xi is the minimum among the four numbers while
dj − xj is the maximum. Assume that allocation z results from a bilateral transfer
made by claimant i to claimant j. That implies that zi < xi and therefore
∣∣zAL∣∣
cannot Lorenz dominate
∣∣xAL∣∣ . Assume that allocation z results from a bilateral
transfer made by claimant j to claimant i. That implies that dj − zj > dj − xj
and therefore
∣∣zAL∣∣ cannot Lorenz dominate ∣∣xAL∣∣ . The proof is almost identical if
we consider E > 12
∑
i∈N
di. Therefore there is no bilateral transfer between claimants
allowing a new allocation that can be used to claim that x is not an element of the
set LAT (N, d,E). 
unionsq
Figure 2 illustrates the set LAT (N, d,E) in two-claimant problems when E moves
from 0 to d1+d2 which coincides with the set of allocations that satisfy HCB. Figure
2(a) shows the set of allocations that satisfy HCB when d22 < d2−d1, and similarly,
ﬁgure 2(b) shows the set of allocations that satisfy HCB when d22 > d2 − d1.
Following almost identical arguments as in Theorem 4, the following theorem
can be proved.
Theorem 5. The set λ-LAT (N, d,E) coincides with the set of all allocations that
satisfy λ-claim boundednes and order preservation in both ways: awards and losses.
The set λ-LAT (N, d,E) is deﬁned as follows:
λ-LAT (N, d,E) =
{
x ∈ F (N, d,E); there is no y ∈ F (N, d,E)
such that
∣∣λ− yAL∣∣ L ∣∣λ− xAL∣∣
}
.
Since the Proportional Rule is the only sharing rule satisfying λ-CB for any
λ ∈ (0, 1) the following corollary is immediate.
Corollary 6. ∩
λ∈(0,1)
λ-LAT (N, d,E) = {PR(N, d,E)} .
Proof. Let (N,E, d) be a bankruptcy problem and let λ = E∑
n≥l≥1 dl
. Then E =
λ
∑
n≥l≥1 dl and therefore λ-L(N, d,E) = {λd} = {PR(N, d,E)} . 
unionsq
The Proportional Rule is the only rule that selects Lorenz maximal outcomes
for any problem whenever awards and losses are simultaneously considered7.
7 Note that if we only consider awards or losses the only allocation that is Lorenz maximal
is the CEA allocation or the CEL allocation.
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d1 x1
x2
d2
d2
2
d1
2
d1 x1
x2
d2
d2
2
d1
2
2(a) LAT when d22 > d2 − d1 2(b) LAT when d22 < d2 − d1
Fig. 2: Illustration of the set LAT (N, d,E) in two-claimant problems when E moves from
0 to d1 + d2.
4. The Lexicographic criterion
4.1. The Maximin Principle
A central rule in the literature of bankruptcy problems is the Talmud Rule in-
troduced by Aumann and Maschler (1985). This rule explains the resolution of
three numerical examples that can be found in the Talmud. For many years was an
open problem what rule was behind these examples. Aumann and Maschler prove
that their rule prescribes the proposals of the examples in the Talmud. They also
prove that the rule coincides with the nucleolus of a TU game associated with the
bankruptcy problem. Given a bankruptcy problem (N, d,E) we deﬁne its associ-
ated bankruptcy game as a TU game (N, v) where N is the set of claimants and
v(S) = max
{
E −∑l/∈S dl, 0} . See O,Neill (1982).
The nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969) selects lexicographical maximal elements in
the set of vectors of satisfactions of the coalitions. We prove that the Talmud Rule
is also a Lexicographic rule. First we introduce the deﬁnition of the Talmud Rule.
Let (N, d,E) be a bankruptcy problem. Then
Ti(N, d,E) =
{
min
{
di
2 , α
}
if E ≤
∑
n≥l≥1 dl
2
di
2 +max
{
di
2 − α, 0
}
otherwise
where α is chosen such that
∑
n≥i≥1 Ti(N, d,E) = E.
This rule provides the allocation whose vector of awards-losses is the lexico-
graphically maximal vector in the set |AL (N, d,E)| . That is,
Theorem 7. Let (N, d,E) be a bankruptcy problem. Then
T (N, d,E) =
{
x ∈ F (N, d,E); ∣∣xAL∣∣ lex ∣∣yAL∣∣ , for all y ∈ F (N, d,E)} .
Proof. Let z = T (N, d,E). We distinguish 4 cases:
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a) E ≤
∑
n≥l≥1 dl
2 and zi <
di
2 for all i ∈ N.
Then the ﬁrst n elements of the vector θ(
∣∣zAL∣∣) are (En , ..., En ) and clearly ∣∣zAL∣∣
lexicographically dominates any other vector
∣∣yAL∣∣ where y is an allocation.
b) E ≤
∑
n≥l≥1 dl
2 and zl =
di
2 for all l ∈ {1, ..., k} . Then the ﬁrst 2k elements
of the vector θ(
∣∣zAL∣∣) are (d12 , d12 , ...., dk2 , dk2 ) and the next (n − k) elements are
(
E− 12
∑
k≥l≥1 dl
n−k , ...,
E− 12
∑
k≥l≥1 dl
n−k ). Clearly
∣∣zAL∣∣ lexicographically dominates any
other vector
∣∣yAL∣∣ where y is an allocation.
c) E >
∑
n≥l≥1 dl
2 and di > zi >
di
2 for all i ∈ N. Then the ﬁrst n elements of the
vector θ(
∣∣zAL∣∣) are (∑n≥l≥1 dl−En , ..., ∑n≥l≥1 dl−En ) and clearly ∣∣zAL∣∣ lexicographi-
cally dominates any other vector
∣∣yAL∣∣ where y is an allocation.
d) E >
∑
n≥l≥1 dl
2 and zl =
di
2 for all l ∈ {1, ..., k} . Then the ﬁrst 2k elements of
the vector θ(
∣∣zAL∣∣) are (d12 , d12 , ...., dk2 , dk2 ) and the next (n− k) elements are
(
1
2
∑
n≥l≥k+1 dl − 12E
n− k , ...,
1
2
∑
n≥l≥k+1 dl − 12E
n− k ).
Clearly
∣∣zAL∣∣ lexicographically dominates any other vector ∣∣yAL∣∣ where y is an
allocation. 
unionsq
Weighted Talmud Rules8 are introduced and studied by Moreno-Ternero and
Villar (2006). They call this family of rules the TAL-family.
Let (N, d,E) be a problem. Then
λ-Ti(N, d,E) =
{
min {λdi, α} if E ≤ λ
∑
n≥l≥1 dl
λdi +max {(1− λ)di − α, 0} otherwise
where α is chosen such that
∑
n≥i≥1 λ-Ti(N, d,E) = E.
It is not diﬃcult to check that this rule provides the allocation whose vector of
awards-losses is maximal in the set
∣∣ALλ(I (N, d,E))∣∣ . That is for λ ∈ (0, 1) we
have that
λ-T (N, d,E) =
{
x ∈ F (N, d,E); ∣∣λ-xAL∣∣ 	Lex ∣∣λ-yAL∣∣ , for all y ∈ F (N, d,E)} .
Given a bankruptcy problem (N, d,E) and λ = E∑
n≥l≥1 dl
it holds that E =
λ
∑
n≥l≥1 dl and therefore λ-Ti(N, d,E) = λdi. This fact is the proof of the following
corollary.
Corollary 8. Let (N, d,E) be a problem where E = λ
∑
n≥l≥1 dl. Then λ-
T ((N, d,E)) = PR((N, d,E)).
8 The term Weighted Talmud Rule is introduced by Hokari and Thomson (2003). In their
case the weights refer to the claimants and not to awards\losses. We keep the term since
we think there is no confusion and it is more consistent with the rest of the paper.
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Aumann and Maschler (1985) characterize the Talmud Rule as the unique consistent
rule for bankruptcy problems (Theorem A). In their work consistency is also called
CG-consistency and explained as follows:
Intuitively, a solution is consistent if any two claimants i,j use the con-
tested garment principle to divide between them the total amount xi + xj
awarded to them by the solution.
The contested garment principle is a solution used to solve two-claimant prob-
lems. The solution coincides with the Talmud Rule and the theorem can be inter-
preted as follows; the Talmud Rule is the unique solution that consistently extends
to n claimant problems the contested garment principle.
Replacing the contested garment principle by the solution prescribed by a
Weighted Talmud Rule in two claimant problems we can characterize this Weighted
Talmud Rule as the unique rule that consistently extends to n claimant problems
this solution prescribed for two claimant problems.
4.2. The Minimax Principle
This interpretation of the Talmud Rule, as a rule based in a lexicographic maximin
criterion, suggests the deﬁnition of a new rule based on the lexmax (lexicographic
minimax) criterion. In the literature of TU games this criterion inspires the deﬁ-
nition of the Lexmax rule and the antinucleolus (see Arin (2007)). See also Luss
(1999) for the application of the minimax principle in other models.
We call the new rule Lexmax Rule, and we denote it by LM, formally,
Deﬁnition 9. Let (N, d,E) be a bankruptcy problem. Then LM(N, d,E) ={
x ∈ F (N, d,E); ∣∣xAL∣∣ lm ∣∣yAL∣∣ , for all y ∈ F (N, d,E)} .
This rule satisﬁes order preservation (in both ways) and HCB since it provides
allocations that belong to the set LAT (N, d,E). It is also quite immediately apparent
that the new rule satisﬁes consistency.
The three facts can be used to deﬁne the following algorithm in order to compute
the Lexmax Rule of a bankruptcy problem.
A procedure for computing the Lexmax Rule of a bankruptcy problem
Let (N, d,E) be a problem. In order to obtain LM((N, d,E)) consider the fol-
lowing 4 cases:
a) Let E <
∑
n≥i≥1 di
2 and
dn
2 < dn − CELn(N, d,E). Then
LM(N, d,E) = CEL(N, d,E).
b) Let E <
∑
n≥i≥1 di
2 and
dn
2 ≥ dn − CELn(N, d,E). Then
LMn(N, d,E) =
dn
2
.
To obtain the allocation for the rest of the claimants consider the problem
An−1 = (N\ {n} , (di)i∈{1,...,n−1}, E − dn2 ). If dn−12 < dn−1 − CELn−1(An−1) then
LM(An−1) = CEL(An−1).
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If dn−12 ≥ dn−1 − CELn−1(An−1) then
LMn−1(An−1) =
dn − 1
2
.
To obtain the allocation for the rest of the claimants consider the problem
An−2 = (N\ {n, n− 1} , (di)i∈{1,...,n−2}, E− dn2 − dn−12 ) and continue with this pro-
cedure until an allocation for all claimants is obtained.
c) Let E ≥
∑
n≥i≥1 di
2 and
dn
2 < dn − CEAn(N, d,E). Then
LM(N, d,E) = CEA(N, d,E).
d) Let E ≥
∑
n≥i≥1 di
2 and
dn
2 ≥ dn − CEAn(N, d,E). Then
LMn(N, d,E) =
dn
2
.
To obtain the allocation for the rest of the claimants consider the problem
An−1 = (N\ {n} , (di)i∈{1,...,n−1}, E − dn2 ). If dn−12 < dn−1 − CEAn−1(An−1) then
LM(An−1) = CEA(An−1).
If dn−12 ≥ dn−1 − CELn−1(An−1) then
LMn−1(An−1) =
dn − 1
2
.
To obtain the allocation for the rest of the claimants consider the problem
An−2 = (N\ {n, n− 1} , (di)i∈{1,...,n−2}, E− dn2 − dn−12 ) and continue with this pro-
cedure until an allocation for all claimants is obtained.
In case a CEL satisﬁes HCB and losses are higher than awards. In case b CEL of
the original problem violates HCB and therefore we ﬁx the allocation of claimant n
in order to preserve HCB. The consistency of the Lexmax Rule allows us to seek the
allocation of the rest of the claimants in a new reduced problem where again losses
are higher than awards. If in the new case CEL satisﬁes HCB this is the allocation
for the rest of the claimants and otherwise we ﬁx the allocation of claimant n − 1
and we continue with a new reduced problem where again losses are higher than
awards.
Cases c and d are the reverse of cases a and b when awards are higher than
losses and the reference is CEA instead of CEL.
Figure 3 illustrates how these rules perform in two-claimant problems when E
moves from 0 to d1 + d2. Figure 3(a) shows the Lexmax Rule when d22 ≤ (d2 − d1).
Similarly, ﬁgure 3(b) shows the case d22 > (d2 − d1).
Similarly, given a bankruptcy problem (N, d,E), the λ-Lexmax Rules are deﬁned
as follows:
λ-LM(N, d,E) =
{
x ∈ F (N, d,E); ∣∣λ-xAL∣∣ lm ∣∣λ-yAL∣∣ , for all y ∈ F (N, d,E)} .
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d1 x1
x2
d2
d2
2
d1 x1
x2
d2
(d2 − d1)
d2
2
d1
2
CEL
Lexmax
CEA
2(a) LM when d2
2
≤ d2 − d1 2(b) LM when d22 > d2 − d1
Fig. 3: Illustration of the Lexmax Rule when E moves from 0 to d1 + d2.
The computation of the Weighted Lexmax Rules results from replacing the pa-
rameter 12 by λ in the procedure above. The procedure can be used to provide the
following alternative deﬁnition of the Lexmax Rule that shares similarities with the
deﬁnition of the Talmud Rule..
Let (N, d,E) be a bankruptcy problem. Then
LMi(N, d,E) =
{
max
{
min
{
di
2 , di − α
}
, 0
}
if E ≤
∑
n≥l≥1 dl
2
min
{
max
{
α, di2
}
, di
}
otherwise
where α is chosen such that
∑
n≥i≥1 LMi(N, d,E) = E.
If the Estate is less than half of the total claims the Talmud Rule provides the
CEA allocation whenever this allocation satisﬁes HCB (See Chun et al. (2001)). In
the other case the Talmud Rule assigns the CEL allocation whenever this allocation
satisﬁes HCB. The Lexmax Rule replaces CEA by CEL in the ﬁrst case and CEL
by CEA in the second case. Therefore the Lexmax Rule is a natural counterpart of
the Talmud Rule. The following table represents diﬀerent bankruptcy problems all
of them with the same set of claimants and claims ((100, 200, 300)).
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E
Talmud
Awards
Lexmax
Awards
Talmud
Losses
Lexmax
Losses
100 (33 13 , 33
1
3 , 33
1
3 ) (0, 0, 100) (66
2
3 , 166
2
3 , 266
2
3 ) (100, 200, 200)
200 (50, 75, 75) (0, 50, 150) (50, 125, 225) (100, 150, 150)
300 (50, 100, 150) (50, 100, 150) (50, 100, 150) (50, 100, 150)
400 (50, 125, 225) (100, 150, 150) (50, 75, 75) (0, 50, 150)
500 (66 23 , 166
2
3 , 266
2
3 ) (100, 200, 200) (33
1
3 , 33
1
3 , 33
1
3 ) (0, 0, 100)
The ﬁrst three problems, mentioned in the Talmud, motivate the paper by Au-
mann and Maschler (1985).
Note that if E <
∑
n≥l≥1 dl
2 then T (N, d,E) L LM(N, d,E).
If E >
∑
n≥l≥1 dl
2 then LM(N, d,E) L T (N, d,E). The situation is reversed
if we compare losses, that is, if E <
∑
n≥l≥1 dl
2 then (d − LM(N, d,E)) L (d −
T (N, d,E)) and if E >
∑
n≥l≥1 dl
2 then (d− T (N, d,E)) L (d− LM(N, d,E)).
This explanation necessarily links the new rule with a well-known rule in the
literature of bankruptcy problems, the ReverseTalmud Rule, deﬁned as follows:
RTi(N, d,E) =
{
max
{
di
2 − α, 0
}
if E ≤
∑
n≥l≥1 dl
2
di
2 +min
{
di
2 , α
}
otherwise
Arin and Benito (2010) show that the Reverse Talmud Rule is a Least Square
value9. In the following, we explain why the two rules van be seen as reverse Talmud
rules. The Talmud Rule allows two diﬀerent interpretations:
1.- If E ≤
∑
n≥l≥1 dl
2 the rule provides the CEA allocation whenever the allocation
satisﬁes HCB. If E >
∑
n≥l≥1 dl
2 the rule provides the CEL allocation whomever the
allocation satisﬁes HCB.
2.- If E ≤
∑
n≥l≥1 dl
2 the rule provides the CEA allocation of a new problem
where the claims are half of the original claims. If E >
∑
n≥l≥1 dl
2 the rule provides
to each claimant half of his\her claim plus the CEL allocation of a new problem
where the claims are half of the original claims and the Estate results E−
∑
n≥l≥1 dl
2 .
Replacing CEA by CEL and CEL by CEA the ﬁrst interpretation provides
the Lexmax rule. In the second interpretation the same replacement originates the
Reverse Talmud rule.
9 That is, RT (N, d,E) =
{
x ∈ F (N, d,E); ∣∣xAL∣∣ LS ∣∣yAL∣∣ , for all y ∈ F (N, d,E)} .
The vector x is said to least square dominate the vector y (denoted by x LS y ) if
d∑
i=1
x2i ≤
d∑
i=1
y2i (assuming x, y ∈ Rd).
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5. Conclusions
This research can be summarized with the table below. In the table rules are linked
with egalitarian criteria and sets and can be interpreted as answers to the following
two questions:
1. What egalitarian criterion is used to make egalitarian comparisons between
elements?
2. From what set are those elements taken?
Rule Criterion Set Weight : λ
CEA Lex and Lexmax A(N, d,E)
CEL Lex and Lexmax L(N, d,E)
LM lexmax |λ-AL(N, d,E)| 12
T Lex |λ-AL(N, d,E)| 12
λ-T Lex |λ-AL(N, d,E)| λ
PR Lexmax and Lex |λ-AL(N, d,E)| E∑
n≥l≥1 dl
The table gives a uniﬁed framework to place many diﬀerent rules that have been
introduced and analyzed by several authors.
The table10 also indicates how to extend this type of solutions to other diﬀer-
ent settings. In particular, in airport problems (Littlechild, 1974) it is generally
accepted that solutions must select core allocations and not merely imputations.
Therefore, the search for egalitarian maximal elements should be restricted to the
core of the airport problem. In other settings, other constraints may exist and solu-
tions are required to satisfy them. This is a restriction of the set where egalitarian
maximal elements are sought. Also in claim problems diﬀerent constraints could be
considered.
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Abstract In this paper a n-person network game theoretical model of emis-
sion reduction is considered. Each player has its own evolution of the stock of
accumulated pollution. Dynamics of player i, i = 1, ..., n depends on emis-
sions of players k ∈ Ki, where Ki is the set of players which are connected by
arcs with player i. Nash Equilibrium is constructed. The cooperative game is
considered. As optimal imputation the ES-value is supposed. The restriction
on network structure to realization the irrational behavior proof condition
is deduced.
Keywords: network game, Nash equilibrium, ES-value, imputation destri-
bution procedure, irrational behavior proof condition.
1. Introduction
The public interest in environmental problems increases recently. It leads to special
intergovermental agreements for reducing emissions. There may be disagreement
among diﬀerent parties as to the problem of allocation of costs of reducing emissions
or pollution accumulations. Considerable attention is devoted to the principles of
formation of agreements aimed to reduce the level of pollution, including conﬂict of
interest parties to the agreement, as well as game-theoretic models in the ﬁeld of
environmental protection. One example of such models is a game-theoretic model
of pollution cost reduction.
The model of pollution cost reduction is proposed in (Petrosjan and Zaccour,
2003). There is two types of costs in the model: the emission reduction cost when
limiting emission to the speciﬁed level and damage cost. The players aim is to reduce
their total costs.
In this paper the network game of emission reduction is considered. This model
is based on the model considered in (Petrosjan and Zaccour, 2003).
2. Problem statement
Let consider network diﬀerential game G = (P, L), where P is ﬁnite set of vertexes;
L is the set of pairs (i, j), which is named the set of arcs, where i ∈ P, j ∈ P . Let
call p ∈ P — vertexes of network, and the pair (p, y) ∈ P — arc, which connect
vertexes p and y.
Consider network game of emission reduction Γ (I, L), where
I is the set of players involved in the network game, I = {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Players of the set I are vertexes of network.
L — the set of arcs (i, j) ∈ L, i ∈ I, j ∈ I.
Denote the emission of player i, i = 1, 2, . . . , n at time t, t ∈ [t0,∞) as ui(t).
Network Game of Pollution Cost Reduction 25
Denote by:
Ki is the set of players, which inﬂuence the evolution of the stock of accumulated
pollution of player i; in this model Ki is the set of players, which are connected
with player i with arc,
Mi is the set of players, on which the player i inﬂuences, i.e. the set of players,
which have the connection with player i,
mj — the number of players, which have the evolution of the stock of accumulated
pollution, which depends on player j emissions, uj, |Mj | = mj , Mj = ∅, j ∈ I.
Let xi(t) be the stock of accumulated pollution of player i by time t. The evo-
lution of the stock of accumulated pollution of player i is governed by the following
diﬀerential equation:
x˙i(t) =
∑
j∈Ki
(uj
1
2mj
) +
ui
2
− δxi(t), mj = 0,
x˙i(t) =
ui
2
− δxi(t), Ki = ∅, (1)
xi(t0) = x
0
i , i = 1, ..., n,
where δ denotes the natural rate of pollution absorption.
The arc (i, j) ∈ L in network game of emission reduction, if the evolution of
the stock of accumulated pollution of player i depends on the emissions of player
j. Network is oriented, i. e. if the arc (i, j) ∈ L, then it doesn’t follow that the arc
(j, i) ∈ L.
Each player has its own evolution stock of accumulated pollution in the network
game of emission reduction, as opposed to the model in Petrosjan and Zaccour, 2003.
The evolution stock of accumulated pollution of player i can depend not only of the
player i emissions, but of other players emissions, which have the connections with
player i.
The game begins at time t0 with initial state x0 = (x01, x02, ..., x0n).
Denote by Ci(ui) the emission reduction cost incurred by country i when limiting
its emission to level ui:
Ci(ui(t)) =
γ
2
(ui(t)− u¯i)2,
0 ≤ ui(t) ≤ u¯i, γ > 0.
Suppose that the following condition is hold:
u¯i ≥ π
γ(ρ+ δ)
.
Di(xi) denotes its damage cost.
Di(xi) = πxi(t), π > 0.
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Both functions are continuously diﬀerentiable and convex, with and C′i(ui) < 0
and D′i(x) > 0. Each player seeks to minimize its total cost. The payoﬀ function of
the player i is deﬁned as:
Ki(x
0
i , t0) =
∞∫
t0
e−ρ(t−t0) (Ci(ui(t)) +Di(xi(t))) dt,
where ρ is the common social discount rate.
Example 1. Consider the example, which demonstrates the rule of constructing of
evolution the stock of accumulated pollution of player i.
Four players participate in the game I = {1, 2, 3, 4}.
Player 1 inﬂuences on the player 2 only. That is the evolutions the stock of
accumulated pollution of players 1 and 2 depend of emissions of player 1. First
player holds a half of its own emissions and the second half it gives to player 2.
Player 2 inﬂuences on the player 3 only.
Player 3 inﬂuences on the players 2 and 4. Player 3 holds a half of its own
emissions, ﬁrst quarter it gives to player 2, second quarter it gives to player 4.
Player 4 inﬂuences on the players 1 and 3.
Thus we obtain the following evolutions of the stock of accumulated pollution:
x˙1(t) =
u1
2
+
u4
4
− δx1(t),
x˙2(t) =
u1
2
+
u2
2
+
u3
4
− δx2(t),
x˙3(t) =
u2
2
+
u3
2
+
u4
4
− δx3(t),
x˙4(t) =
u3
4
+
u4
2
− δx4(t),
xi(t0) = x
0
i , i = 1, ..., 4.
3. Solution of the problem
In subsection 3.1 we calculate a feedback Nash equilibrium. Then in subsection
3.2 we minimize the total cost of grand coalition. The solution of the game in
the form of ES-value is considered in 3.3. In subsection 3.4 the time-consistent
ES-value distribution procedure is calculated. In the last subsection the irrational
behavior proof condition is veriﬁed for the network game of emission reduction,
when the time-consistent ES-value distribution procedure is used. The restriction
on the network structure necessary for the realization the irrational behavior proof
condition is deduced in the subsection 3.5.
3.1. Computation of feedback Nash equilibrium.
On the ﬁrst step we compute a Nash equilibrium. To obtain a feedback Nash equi-
librium, assuming diﬀerentiability of the value function, the system of Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equations must be satisﬁed. Denote by Fi(x) the Bellman function
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of this problem. Above mentioned system is given by the following formula:
ρFi(x) = min
ui
{γ
2
(ui − u¯i)2 + πxi +
+
∂Fi(x)
∂xi
(∑
j∈Ki
(uj
1
2mj
) +
ui
2
− δxi
)}
, i ∈ I, (2)
where x = (x1, x2, ..., xn) — is situation in the game;.
Costs of player i in any ﬁxed situation x = (x1, x2, ..., xn) depend on the stock
of accumulated pollution of player i only, and it doesn’t depend on the stocks of
accumulated pollution of another players. So we will seek the Bellman function
Fi(x) in the following form:
Fi(x) = aixi + bi. (3)
Diﬀerentiating the right hand side of formulas (2) with respect to ui and equating
to zero leads to:
uNi = u¯i −
1
2γ
∂Fi(x)
∂xi
. (4)
Substituting uNi (4) and the Bellman function Fi(x) (3) in Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equation (2) we get:
ρaixi + ρbi =
1
8γ
[∂(aixi + bi)
∂xi
]2
+ πxi +
[∑
j∈Ki
(u¯j
1
2mj
) +
1
2
u¯i −
− 1
2γ
∑
j∈Ki
(ai
1
2mj
)− 1
4γ
∂(aixi + bi)
∂xi
]∂(aixi + bi)
∂xi
− ∂(aixi + bi)
∂xi
δxi. (5)
Simplifying the right hand side of (5) leads to:
ρaixi + ρbi =
1
8γ
a2i + πxi + U
N
i ai − aiδxi,
where
UNi =
∑
j∈Ki
(u¯j
1
2mj
) +
1
2
u¯i − 1
2γ
∑
j∈Ki
(ai
1
2mj
)− 1
4γ
ai.
Rewrite the Nash strategies (4) in the following form:
uNi = u¯i −
1
2γ
ai. (6)
Let calculate the coeﬃcients ai and bi:
ai =
π
ρ+ δ
= a;
bi =
π2
8ργ(ρ+ δ)2
+
π
ρ(ρ+ δ)
UNi ,
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where
UNi =
∑
j∈Ki
(u¯j
1
2mj
) +
1
2
u¯i − π
4γ(ρ+ δ)
∑
j∈Ki
(
1
mj
)− π
4γ(ρ+ δ)
.
Substitute the coeﬃcient ai in the equation (6):
uNi = u¯i −
π
2γ(ρ+ δ)
. (7)
Cost of player i in the Nash equilibrium:
Fi(x
N
i ) =
π
ρ(ρ+ δ)
( π
8γ(ρ+ δ)
+ UNi + ρx
N
i
)
,
where xNi — noncooperative trajectory of player i.
Substituting the Nash equilibrium strategies uNi (7) into the diﬀerential equation
(1) with initial state xi(t0) = x0i , we obtain the following noncooperative trajectory:
xNi = e
−δ(t−t0)x0i +
1
δ
UNi
(
1− e−δ(t−t0)), i = 1, 2, ..., n.
3.2. Minimization the total cost of grand coalition
Minimize the total cost of the grand coalition I = {1, 2, ..., n}. We have following
system of optimization problems:
min
u1,u2,...,un
∑
i∈I
Ki(x
0
i , t0) =
∑
i∈I
∞∫
t0
e−ρ(t−t0) (Ci(ui(t)) + πxi(t)) dt, (8)
subject to equation dynamics:
x˙i(t) =
∑
j∈Ki
(uj
1
2mj
) +
ui
2
− δxi(t),
xi(t0) = x
0
i , i = 1, ..., n.
Rewrite the system for dynamic programming problem (8) in the following view:
min
u1,u2,...,un
∑
i∈I
Ki(x
0
i , t0) =
∞∫
t0
e−ρ(t−t0)
(∑
i∈I
(Ci(ui(t))) + π
∑
i∈I
xi(t)
)
dt. (9)
Denote by:
x¯ =
∑
i∈I
xi.
The minimizing functional in the right side of (9) depends only on x¯ and it
doesn’t depend on xi, i = 1, ..., n. So the minimal costs of grand coalition I
depends on x¯ and don’t depend on x1, x2, ..., xn. Therefore we can consider the
Bellman function as the function which depends only on
∑
i∈I xi = x¯.
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The solution of the problem (9) is equivalent to the solution of the following
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation:
ρF (I, x1, x2, ..., xn) = min
u1,u2,...,un
{ n∑
i=1
(γ
2
(ui − u¯i)2 + πxi
)
+
+
n∑
i=1
∂F (I, x¯)
∂xi
(
Ui − δxi
)}
, (10)
where F (I, x1, x2, ..., xn) is the Bellman function.
Diﬀerentiating the right hand side of expression (10) subject to ui, we get the
strategies uIi :
uIi = u¯i −
1
2γ
(∑
j∈Mi
1
mi
∂F (I, x1, x2, ..., xn)
∂xj
+
∂F (I, x1, x2, ..., xn)
∂xi
)
. (11)
It can be shown in the usual way that the linear function F (I, x1, x2, ..., xn)
F (I, x1, x2, ..., xn) = a
n∑
i=1
xi + b = ax¯+ b, (12)
satisﬁes the equation (10). The Bellman function depends only on
∑
i∈I xi.
By assumption,
F (I, x1, x2, ..., xn) = F (I, x¯).
Substitute the strategies uIi (11) and the Bellman function (12) in the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equation:
ρa
n∑
i=1
xi + ρb =
n∑
i=1
a2
2γ
+ π
n∑
i=1
xi +
+a
n∑
i=1
(∑
j∈Ki
(uIj
1
2mj
) +
1
2
uIi
)− aδ n∑
i=1
xi. (13)
Solving the equation (13) leads to the following expression for coeﬃcients a and
b:
a =
π
ρ+ δ
; (14)
b =
π
ρ(ρ+ δ)
( n∑
i=1
u¯i − nπ
2γ(ρ+ δ)
)
. (15)
Taking into account (14), we get the optimal strategies of the grand coalition:
uIi = u¯i −
π
γ(ρ+ δ)
. (16)
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Substituting coeﬃcients (14) and (15) into the formula (12) we get the minimal
cost of the grand coalition as follows:
F (I, x¯) =
π
ρ(ρ+ δ)
( n∑
i=1
u¯i − nπ
2γ(ρ+ δ)
+ ρ
n∑
i=1
xIi
)
, (17)
where xIi is the optimal cooperative trajectory of player i ∈ I.
Substituting the optimal strategies of the grand coalition uIi (16) and solving
equation of dynamics (1) with initial state xi(t0) = x0i we obtain the optimal coop-
erative trajectory of player i ∈ I:
xIi = e
−δ(t−t0)x0i +
1
δ
U Ii
(
1− e−δ(t−t0)), i = 1, 2, ..., n,
where
U Ii =
∑
j∈Ki
(u¯j
1
2mj
) +
1
2
u¯i − π
γ(ρ+ δ)
(∑
j∈Ki
1
2mj
+
1
2
)
.
The sum of Nash emissions of all players is equal to:∑
i∈I
uNi =
∑
i∈I
u¯i − nπ
2γ(ρ+ δ)
, ∀i ∈ I.
The sum of optimal emissions of players involved in grand coalition I is equal
to: ∑
i∈I
uIi =
∑
i∈I
u¯i − nπ
γ(ρ+ δ)
, ∀i ∈ I.
Thus the sum of emissions of all players in noncooperative case is greater than
the the sum of emissions of all players in cooperative case. The more players are
involved in the game the more emissions will be reduced in cooperative case as
compared with noncooperative case.
3.3. The ES-value.
Deﬁnition 1. The vector
ξ(t) = [ξ1(t), ξ2(t), . . . , ξn(t)],
is a ES-value (Driessen and Funaki, 1991), if the component of ES-value ξi(t) is
given by
ξi(t) = Fi(x
N
i ) +
F (I, x¯)− ∑
i∈I
Fi(x
N
i )
n
, i ∈ I, (18)
where Fi(xNi ) is the costs of player i in the Nash equilibrium;
F (I, x¯) is the the minimal cost of the grand coalition.
Let calculate ES-value in network game of emission reduction. Substitute the
costs of player i in the Nash equilibrium Fi(xNi ) and minimal cooperative costs
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F (I, x¯) (17) in the equation (18). The ﬁrst summand in right hand side of the
equation (18) is given by:∑
i∈I
Fi(x
N
i ) =
π
ρ(ρ+ δ)
(∑
i∈I
u¯i − 3nπ
8γ(ρ+ δ)
+ ρ
∑
i∈I
xNi
)
.
The second summand in right hand side of the equation (18):
F (I, x¯)−∑
i∈I
Fi(x
N
i )
n
=
= − π
ρ(ρ+ δ)
( π
8γ(ρ+ δ)
+ ρ
π
2γδ(ρ+ δ)
(
1− e−δ(t−t0))).
Therefore the component of ES-value for the player i, i ∈ I for the network
emission reduction game is equal to:
ξi(t) =
π
ρ(ρ+ δ)
(
UNi + ρ
(
e−δ(t−t0)x0i +
1
δ
(∑
j∈Ki
(u¯j
1
2mj
) +
+
1
2
u¯i − π
4γ(ρ+ δ)
∑
j∈Ki
1
mj
− 3π
4γ(ρ+ δ)
)(
1− e−δ(t−t0)))). (19)
3.4. Time-consistency
Time-consistency means that if one renegotiates the agreement at any intermedi-
ate instant of time, assuming that coalitional agreement has prevailed from initial
date till that instant, then one would obtain the same outcome. The notion of
time-consistency was introduced by Petrosjan, 1993 and was used in problems of
environmental management (Petrosjan and Zaccour, 2003).
Deﬁnition 2. The vector β(t) = (β1(t), β2(t), . . . , βn(t)) is a ES-value distribution
procedure (ESDP) (see Petrosjan, 1993) if
ξi(x0, t0) =
∞∫
t0
e−ρ(t−t0)βi(t)dt, i ∈ I.
Deﬁnition 3. The vector β(t) = (β1(t), β2(t), . . . , βn(t)) is a time-consistent ESDP
(Petrosjan, 1993) if at (xI(t), t) at any t ∈ [t0,∞) the following condition holds
βi(t) = ρξi(x
I
i (t), t)−
d
dt
ξi(x
I
i (t), t), i ∈ I.
Consider ES-value (19) that was computed in the section 3.3.
Straightforward calculations give us the following view for the time-consistent
ESDP in the network game of emission reduction:
βi(t) = π
(
e−δ(t−t0)x0i +
1
δ
(∑
j∈Ki
(u¯j
1
2mj
) +
1
2
u¯i − π
4γ(ρ+ δ)
∑
j∈Ki
1
mj
−
− 3π
4γ(ρ+ δ)
)(
1− e−δ(t−t0)
))
+
π2
2γ(ρ+ δ)2
, i ∈ I. (20)
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3.5. The irrational behavior proof condition
Consider the case where the cooperative scheme has proceeded up to time t ∈
[t0,+∞) and some players behave irrationally leading to the dissolution of the
scheme. A condition under which even if irrational behaviors appear later in the
game the concerned player would still be performing better under the cooperative
scheme is the irrational behavior proof condition (Yeung, 2006), which also is called
the D.W.K. Yeung condition.
Consider the solution of the game in the form of ES-value. The irrational behav-
ior proof condition for the problem of emission reduction is described as follows:
Fi(x
0
i ) ≥
t∫
t0
e−ρ(τ−t0)βi(τ)dτ + e−ρ(t−t0)Fi(xI(t)), i ∈ I, (21)
where Fi(xI(t)) — costs of player i in the Nash equilibrium with initial state xI(t)
on the optimal cooperative trajectory;
βi(τ) — time-consistent ES-value distribution procedure.
Verify the realization of the irrational behavior proof condition. The left hand
side of the inequality (21) is written as follows:
Fi(x
0
i ) =
=
π
ρ(ρ+ δ)
⎛⎝ π
8γ(ρ+ δ)
+Ai − π
4γ(ρ+ δ)
∑
j∈Ki
(
1
mj
)− π
4γ(ρ+ δ)
+ ρx0i
⎞⎠ . (22)
where
Ai =
∑
j∈Ki
(u¯j
1
2mj
) +
1
2
u¯i.
Consider the integral in the right hand side of inequality (21). The substitution
of βi(t) (20) leads to the following integral:
t∫
t0
e−ρ(τ−t0)βi(τ)dτ = e−ρ(t−t0)π
(
− π
2ργ(ρ+ δ)2
− e
−δ(t−t0)x0
ρ+ δ
−
−
⎛⎝Ai − π
γ(ρ+ δ)
(∑
j∈Ki
(
1
4mj
) +
3
4
)⎞⎠ 1
ρδ
+
+
⎛⎝Ai − π
γ(ρ+ δ)
(∑
j∈Ki
(
1
4mj
) +
3
4
)⎞⎠ e−δ(t−t0)
δ(ρ+ δ)
)
+
π2
2ργ(ρ+ δ)2
+
+
πx0
ρ+ δ
+
⎛⎝Ai − π
γ(ρ+ δ)
(∑
j∈Ki
(
1
4mj
) +
3
4
)⎞⎠ π
ρ(ρ+ δ)
. (23)
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The second summand in the right hand side of inequality (21) can be calculated:
e−ρ(t−t0)Fi(xI(t)) = e−ρ(t−t0)
π
ρ(ρ+ δ)
{ π
8γ(ρ+ δ)
+Ai −
− π
4γ(ρ+ δ)
∑
j∈Ki
(
1
mj
)− π
4γ(ρ+ δ)
+
+ρ
(
e−δ(t−t0)x0i +
1
δ
(
Ai − π
γ(ρ+ δ)
(∑
j∈Ki
(
1
2mj
) +
1
2
))(
1− e−δ(t−t0)))}. (24)
The substitution of integral (23) and value of e−ρ(t−t0)Fi(xI(t)), which is deﬁned
by the formula (24) into the inequality (21) leads to:
t∫
t0
e−ρ(τ−t0)βi(τ)dτ + e−ρ(t−t0)Fi(xI(t)) =
= e−ρ(t−t0)
⎛⎝ π2
8ργ(ρ+ δ)2
+
π2
4δγ(ρ+ δ)2
− π
2
4δγ(ρ+ δ)2
∑
j∈Ki
1
mj
⎞⎠+
+
π2
2ργ(ρ+ δ)2
+
⎛⎝Ai − π
γ(ρ+ δ)
(∑
j∈Ki
(
1
4mj
) +
3
4
)⎞⎠ π
ρ(ρ+ δ)
+ x0
π
ρ+ δ
. (25)
Compare the right side (25) and the left side (22) of the formula (21). It can be
shown that the inequality (21) is equivalent to the following inequality:
δ
(
e−ρ(t−t0) − 1
)
+ 2ρe−ρ(t−t0)
⎛⎝1− ∑
j∈Ki
1
mj
⎞⎠ ≤ 0. (26)
The inequality (26) get the following form at the moment t = t0:
2ρ
⎛⎝1− ∑
j∈Ki
1
mj
⎞⎠ ≤ 0. (27)
If the sum
∑
j∈Ki
1
mj
satisﬁes the following inequality:
∑
j∈Ki
1
mj
≥ 1, (28)
the inequality (27) is satisﬁed. Hence the inequality (26) is satisﬁed at time t = t0.
The ﬁrst summand in the right hand side of the inequality (26) is nonpositive
for all t ∈ [t0,+∞). If (28) is satisﬁed, than the second summand in the right hand
side of the inequality (26) will be nonpositive for all t ∈ [t0,+∞). Therefore the
inequality (26) is satisﬁed for all t ∈ [t0,+∞), if the (28) is satisﬁed. It means that
the following theorem is proved.
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Theorem 1. The irrational behavior proof condition is realized in the network game
of emission reduction for time-consistent ES-value distribution procedure if the fol-
lowing restriction to the network structure is satisﬁed:∑
j∈Ki
1
mj
≥ 1.
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Abstract In the present work we propose an original economic coopetitive
model applied to the Greek crisis. This model is based on normal form
game theory and conceived at a macro level. We aim at suggesting feasible
solutions in a super-cooperative perspective for the divergent interests which
drive the economic policies of the countries in the euro area.
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1. Introduction
In this contribution we focus on the Greek crisis, because Greece, which is a EU
member and a country that is part of the euro area, since the end of 2009 has
entered in a deep ﬁnancial and economic crisis. Although Greeces GDP reaches
only 2 per cent of total GDP of the whole euro area (IMF, 2011), the Greek crisis is
creating many troubles to the euro area and all over the world. The risk of insolvency
of Greece, mainly due to its public ﬁnance mismanagement, has represented the
extreme situation of a general sovereign debt crisis which has hit the southern
countries of the eurozone (PIIGS) and that has interested the whole euro area
in the last three years. The Greek economy, after its accession to the euro, has
lost competitiveness, due to its generous wage increases and high domestic prices
induced also by ECBs monetary policy . The lack of competitiveness has created
an heavy and increasing current account imbalance. Financial aid programs have
been devised to help Greece by the euro area authorities and IMF in May 2010
(EU Council, 2010) and again in July 2011 (EU Council, 2011). These ﬁnancial aid
programs have unfortunately proved belated and insuﬃcient. The causes of these
errors are certainly of political and institutional nature and relate to the governance
of the euro area, which we do not discuss in this work. However, the success of any
support program is conditioned to the capacity of Greek government to meet the
ﬁscal adjustment targets and also by the ability of the Greek economy of triggering
the growth (Darvas, Pisani-Ferry, Sapir, 2011; Schilirò, 2011). Germany, on the
other hand, is the most competitive economy of the euro area, it is heavily export-
oriented, in fact it is the second world’s biggest exporter, with exports accounting
for more than one-third of national output (IMF, 2011). Thus Germany has a large
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current account surplus with Greece and other euro partners; hence signiﬁcant trade
imbalances occur within the euro area. The main purpose of our contribution is to
explore win-win solutions for Greece and Germany, adopting an appropriate game
theory model in which we assume Germanys increasing demand of Greek exports.
In this work we do not analyze the causes of the ﬁnancial crisis in Greece and,
more generally, the sovereign debt crisis of the euro area with its relevant economic,
ﬁnancial and institutional eﬀects on the European Monetary Union. Rather, we
concentrate on the problem of the current account imbalances of Greece providing
a coopetitive model which shows the possible win-win solutions. So we look to the
stability and growth of the Greek economy. Such targets, in fact, should drive the
economic policy of Greece and other countries of the euro area.
Organization of the paper. The work is organized as follows:
1. section 2 examines the Greek crisis, suggesting a possible way out to reduce
the intra-eurozone imbalances through coopetitive solutions within a growth path;
2. sections from 3 to 6 provides an original model of coopetitive game applied
to the Eurozone context, showing the possible coopetitive solutions;
3. conclusions end up the paper.
Introduction and Section 2 of this paper are written by D. Schilirò, sections from
3 to 6 are written by D. Carfì conclusions are written by the two authors, however
the whole paper is written in strict joint cooperation.
Note. Baldwin and Gros (2010, p.4) maintain that in the period 2000-2007
The one-size monetary policy plainly failed to ﬁt all (the euro countries). Booming
economic performance in Greece, Ireland, and Spain was accompanied by prices that
rose much more than average. The cumulative excess inﬂation was 10 percentage
points for Ireland, and 8 points for Greece and Spain. The asymmetric development
of output and competitiveness produced massive current account imbalances. The
total current account balance of Germany has been over 5 per cent of GDP in 2011
(IMF, 2011).
Acknowledgments. We wish to thank Francesco Musolino, Albert E. Steenge
and three anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions.
2. The Greek Crisis and the coopetitive solution
The severe ﬁnancial and economic crisis of Greece has revealed the weaknesses of
Greek economy, particularly the mismanagement of the public ﬁnance, the diﬃcul-
ties of the banking sector, but above all the lack of competitiveness.
2.1. The Greek economy and the global crisis
With the outbreak of the global crisis of 2008-2009, Greece relied on state spending
to drive growth, thus the country has accumulated a huge public debt, which in
2010 amounted to 328 billion euros, that is a Debt/GDP ratio equal to 142 per
cent Ð according to IMF (2011) Ð and the debt situation has worsened in 2011.
This has created deep concerns about ﬁscal sustainability of the Greek economy,
whereas its ﬁnancial exposition has prevented the Greek government to ﬁnd capitals
in the ﬁnancial markets. In addition, since joining the European monetary union,
Greece has lost competitiveness especially compared to France and Germany, due to
the sharp increase of unit labor costs and higher domestic prices (Boone, Johnson,
2012). The austerity measures implemented by the Greek government, although
insuﬃcient, have hit hard the Greek economy, since its rate of growth has been
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negative in 2010 and 2011, with an unemployment rate soaring from 12. 4 per cent
in 2010 to 16.5 per cent in 2011 (IMF, 2011), making the ﬁnancial recovery very
problematic, as Mussa (2010) had already envisaged. Furthermore, Greek exports
are much less than imports, so the current account balance has been 10.45 per
cent of GDP in 2010 and 8.37 per cent of GDP in 2011 (IMF, 2011). Therefore,
taking for granted the need of a ﬁscal consolidation, the focus of economic policy
of Greece should become its productive system and growth must be the major goal
for the Greek economy in a medium term perspective. However, a policy-solution
that implies a greater amount of exports from Greece towards the euro countries
could help its re-equilibrium process.
2.2. The soundest European economy: Germany
Germany, on the other hand, is considered the soundest European economy. It is
the second world’s biggest exporter, its wide commercial surplus is partly origi-
nated by the exports in the euro area, that accounts just above 40 per cent of its
total exports, even if this share is declining (IMF, 2011). In fact, during the last
twenty years from 1991 ( when the freshly uniﬁed country still traded in its own
quite strong currency, the Deutsche Mark), to 2011 its export share has gradually
increased vis-Ĺ-vis industrial countries, but it has also showed a changing trend,
which reﬂects the shifting economic powers on a global scenario (see the note).
Thus Germany’s growth path has been driven by exports. We do not discuss in this
work the factors explaining Germany’s increase in export share, but we observe that
its international competitiveness has been improving, with the unit labor cost which
has been kept fairly constant, since wages have essentially kept pace with produc-
tivity. Consequently, the prices of the German products have been relatively cheap,
favoring the export of German goods towards the euro countries, but even more
towards the markets around the world, especially those of the emerging economies
(China, India, Brasil, Russia). Moreover, since 2010 Germany has recovered very
well from the 2008-2009 global crisis and it is growing at a higher rate than the
others euro partners. Therefore we share the view that Germany in particular (but
also the other surplus countries of the euro area), should contribute to overcome
the Greek crisis by stimulating its demand of goods from Greece, since Germany Ð
as some economists as Posen (2010) and Abadi (2010) underlined Ð has beneﬁted
from being the anchor economy for the euro area over the last 12 years.
Note. See also the article: EuropeÕs Economic Powerhouse Drifts East, on
New York Times July 18, 2011, that highlights the shift of German exports and
investments outside the euro area in the recent years (2006-2010).
2.3. A win-win solution for Greece and Germany
The Fiscal Compact or Fiscal Stability Treaty, the intergovernmental treaty recently
signed by almost all of the member states of the European Union in March 2012
(the treaty will enter into force on 1 January 2013, if by that time 12 members of the
euro area have ratiﬁed it) is probably too much focused on the budget discipline.We
believe, instead, that a correct economic policy for Greece (and the other southern
countries) should aim not only at adjusting government budget but also current
account imbalances and, at the same time, at improving the growth path of its real
economy in the medium and long term. This more complex policy , which requires
a set of instruments and actions to reform the Greek economy, is probably the
more suitable, although not easy to implement, for assuring a sustainable path to
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Greece over time and also to contribute to the stability of whole eurozone (Schilirò,
2011). As we have just argued, Germanys relatively modest wage increases and weak
domestic demand favored the export of German goods towards the euro countries
and all over the world. In this context, we suggest, in accordance with Posen (2010),
to look for a win-win solution (a win-win solution is the outcome of a game which is
designed in a way that all participants can proﬁt from it in one way or the other),
which entails that Germany, which still represents the leading economy in Europe,
should contribute to re-balance its trade surplus within the euro-area and thus
ease the pressure on the southern countries of the euro area, particularly Greece.
Obviously, we are aware that this is a mere hypothesis and that our framework of
coopetition represents a normative model. However, we believe that a coopetitive
behavior, that implies a cooperative attitude, despite the diverging interests, is
the most sensible and convenient strategy that the members of the euro area should
follow. A coopetitive behavior, in fact, is diﬀerent form a purely cooperative attitude
and it also avoid to transform the euro area into a sort of transfer union. Finally, our
model does not represent a test to see whether it is convenient for Greece leave the
euro or not. Therefore, we pursue our hypothesis and suggest an economic coopetive
model as an innovative instrument to analyze possible outcomes to obtain a win-win
solution involving Greece and Germany.
2.4. Our coopetitive model
The two strategic variables of our model are investments and exports for Greece,
since this country must concentrate on them to improve the structure of produc-
tion and its competitiveness, but also shift its aggregate demand towards a higher
growth path in the medium term. Thus Greece should focus on innovative invest-
ments, specially investments in knowledge (Schilirò, 2010), to change and improve
its production structure and to increase its production capacity and productivity.
As a result of that its competitiveness will improve. These investments should be
supported by the private investors and the government should make easier this pro-
cess; moreover, in an open economy this innovative investments could come from
abroad. An economic policy that focuses on investments and exports, instead of
consumptions, will address Greece towards a sustainable growth and, consequently,
its ﬁnancial reputation and economic stability will also improve. On the other hand,
the strategic variables of our model for Germany are private consumption and im-
ports. While the coopetitive variable (or shared variable) in our model is represented
by the export of Greek goods to Germany (or, if you like, by the import of Greek
goods in Germany). Thus, the idea which is driving our model to contribute to
overcome the economic crisis in Greece is based on a notion of coopetition where
the cooperative aspect is very important, since both Germany and Greece belong
to an economic and monetary union. Therefore, we are not considering a scenario
in which Germany and Greece are competing in the same European market for the
same products, rather we are assuming a situation in which Germany stimulates
its domestic demand and, in doing so, will create also a larger market for prod-
ucts coming from abroad. In this situation Germany agrees to purchase a certain
amount of goods imported from Greece, consequently Greece will increase its ex-
ports by selling more products to Germany. This shared variable, decided together
by Greece and Germany, becomes the main instrumental variable of the model. The
ﬁnal result will be that Greece ﬁnd itself in a better position, but also Germany will
get an economic advantage determined by the higher growth in the two countries.
A Model of Coopetitive Game and the Greek Crisis 39
In addition, there is the important (indirect) advantage of a greater stability within
the euro area. Finally, our model will provide a new set of tools based on the notion
of coopetition, that could be fruitful for the setting of the euro area economic policy
issues.
2.5. The coopetition in our model
The concept of coopetition was essentially devised at micro-economic level for strate-
gic management solutions by Brandenburger and Nalebuﬀ (1995, 1996), who sug-
gest, given the competitive paradigm (Porter, 1985), to consider also a cooperative
behavior to achieve a win-win outcome for both players. Brandenburger and Nale-
buﬀ maintains that coopetition means that Ç you have to compete and cooperate
at the same time. The combination makes for a more dynamic relationship than
the words competition and cooperation suggest individually (1996, pp.4-5). There-
fore, coopetition becomes, in our model, a complex theoretical construct and it is
the result of the interplay between competition and cooperation, since it represents
the synthesis between the competitive paradigm (Porter, 1985) and the cooperative
paradigm (Gulati, Nohria, Zaheer, 2000). We have already devised a coopetitive
model at a macroeconomic level (Carfì, Schilirò, 2011). In this model (2011), that
adopted the same variables of the present one (consumption and imports for Ger-
many and innovative investments and exports for Greece), we have developed a
coopetitive game by excluding the mutual inﬂuence of the actions (or strategies) for
the two players. In other words, we excluded the dependence of the payoﬀ functions
of each player on the strategies of other players. This choice has allowed us to greatly
simplify the model, secondly it has highlighted the coopetitive aspect, although at
the expense of the classical feature of game theory. In the present model, instead, we
continue to highlight the coopetitive strategy in its cooperative dimension, repre-
sented by the shared variable (identiﬁed in the export of Greek goods to Germany),
but, in addition, we reintroduce the classical strategic interaction between the two
players. Furthermore, this generalization of the model allows us to reach to compet-
itive solutions or, better still, to a family of competitive solutions Ĺ la Nash from
which to choose the win win solution. Also note that in this generalized model, com-
petitive solutions Ĺ la Nash are not equivalent to the prisoner’s dilemma solutions,
because our solutions are optimal (maximum) and not minimal as in the case of the
prisoner’s dilemma. Therefore, our new model of coopetitive games aims at oﬀering
possible solutions to the partially divergent interests of Germany and Greece in a
perspective of a cooperative attitude that should drive their policies.
3. Coopetitive games
3.1. Introduction
In this paper we develop and apply the mathematical model of a coopetitive game
introduced by David Carfì in (Carfì and Schilirò, 2011 and Carfì, 2010). The idea
of coopetitive game is already used, in a mostly intuitive and non-formalized way,
in Strategic Management Studies (see for example Brandenburgher and Nalebuﬀ).
The idea. A coopetitive game is a game in which two or more players (participants)
can interact cooperatively and non-cooperatively at the same time. Even Branden-
burger and Nalebuﬀ, creators of coopetition, did not deﬁne, precisely, a quantitative
way to implement coopetition in the Game Theory context.
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The problem to implement the notion of coopetition in Game Theory is sum-
marized in the following question:
– how do, in normal form games, cooperative and non-cooperative interactions can
live together simultaneously, in a Brandenburger-Nalebuﬀ sense?
In order to explain the above question, consider a classic two-player normal-
form gain game G = (f,>) - such a game is a pair in which f is a vector valued
function deﬁned on a Cartesian product E × F with values in the Euclidean plane
R2 and > is the natural strict sup-order of the Euclidean plane itself (the sup-order
is indicating that the game, with payoﬀ function f , is a gain game and not a loss
game). Let E and F be the strategy sets of the two players in the game G. The two
players can choose the respective strategies x ∈ E and y ∈ F
– cooperatively (exchanging information and making binding agreements);
– not-cooperatively (not exchanging information or exchanging information but
without possibility to make binding agreements).
The above two behavioral ways are mutually exclusive, at least in normal-form
games:
– the two ways cannot be adopted simultaneously in the model of normal-form
game (without using convex probability mixtures, but this is not the way sug-
gested by Brandenburger and Nalebuﬀ in their approach);
– there is no room, in the classic normal form game model, for a simultaneous
(non-probabilistic) employment of the two behavioral extremes cooperation and
non-cooperation.
Towards a possible solution. David Carfì (Carfì and Schilirò, 2011 and Carfì,
2010) has proposed a manner to pass this impasse, according to the idea of coope-
tition in the sense of Brandenburger and Nalebuﬀ. In a Carfì’s coopetitive game
model,
– the players of the game have their respective strategy-sets (in which they can
choose cooperatively or not cooperatively);
– there is a common strategy set C containing other strategies (possibly of diﬀer-
ent type with respect to those in the respective classic strategy sets) that must
be chosen cooperatively;
– the strategy set C can also be structured as a Cartesian product (similarly to
the proﬁle strategy space of normal form games), but in any case the strategies
belonging to this new set C must be chosen cooperatively.
3.2. The model for n-players
We give in the following the deﬁnition of coopetitive game proposed by Carfì in
(Carfì and Schilirò, 2011 and Carfì, 2010).
Deﬁnition (of n-player coopetitive game). Let E = (Ei)ni=1 be a ﬁnite n-
family of non-empty sets and let C be another non-empty set. We deﬁne n-player
coopetitive gain game over the strategy support (E,C) any pair G = (f,>),
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where f is a vector function from the Cartesian product ×E ×C (here ×E denotes
the classic strategy-proﬁle space of n-player normal form games, i.e. the Cartesian
product of the family E) into the n-dimensional Euclidean space Rn and > is the
natural sup-order of this last Euclidean space. The element of the set C will be
called cooperative strategies of the game.
A particular aspect of our coopetitive game model is that any coopetitive game
G determines univocally a family of classic normal-form games and vice versa; so
that any coopetitive game could be deﬁned as a family of normal-form games. In
what follows we precise this very important aspect of the model.
Deﬁnition (the family of normal-form games associated with a coopeti-
tive game). Let G = (f,>) be a coopetitive game over a strategic support (E,C).
And let
g = (gz)z∈C
be the family of classic normal-form games whose member gz is, for any cooperative
strategy z in C, the normal-form game
Gz := (f(., z), >),
where the payoﬀ function f(., z) is the section
f(., z) : ×E → Rn
of the function f , deﬁned (as usual) by
f(., z)(x) = f(x, z),
for every point x in the strategy proﬁle space ×E. We call the family g (so deﬁned)
family of normal-form games associated with (or determined by) the
game G and we call normal section of the game G any member of the family g.
We can prove this (obvious) theorem.
Theorem. The family g of normal-form games associated with a coopetitive game
G uniquely determines the game. In more rigorous and complete terms, the cor-
respondence G → g is a bijection of the space of all coopetitive games - over the
strategy support (E,C) - onto the space of all families of normal form games - over
the strategy support E - indexed by the set C .
Proof. This depends totally from the fact that we have the following natural bijec-
tion between function spaces:
F(×E × C,Rn) → F(C,F(×E,Rn)) : f → (f(., z))z∈C ,
which is a classic result of theory of sets. 
unionsq
Thus, the exam of a coopetitive game should be equivalent to the exam of a
whole family of normal-form games (in some sense we shall specify).
In this paper we suggest how this latter examination can be conducted and
what are the solutions corresponding to the main concepts of solution which are
known in the literature for the classic normal-form games, in the case of two-player
coopetitive games.
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3.3. Two players coopetitive games
In this section we specify the deﬁnition and related concepts of two-player coopet-
itive games; sometimes (for completeness) we shall repeat some deﬁnitions of the
preceding section.
Deﬁnition (of coopetitive game). Let E, F and C be three nonempty sets.
We deﬁne two player coopetitive gain game carried by the strategic triple
(E,F,C) any pair of the form G = (f,>), where f is a function from the Cartesian
product E×F ×C into the real Euclidean plane R2 and the binary relation > is the
usual sup-order of the Cartesian plane (deﬁned component-wise, for every couple of
points p and q, by p > q iﬀ pi > qi, for each index i).
Remark (coopetitive games and normal form games). The diﬀerence among
a two-player normal-form (gain) game and a two player coopetitive (gain) game is
the fundamental presence of the third strategy Cartesian-factor C. The presence of
this third set C determines a total change of perspective with respect to the usual
exam of two-player normal form games, since we now have to consider a normal
form game G(z), for every element z of the set C; we have, then, to study an entire
ordered family of normal form games in its own totality, and we have to deﬁne a
new manner to study these kind of game families.
3.4. Terminology and notation
Deﬁnitions. Let G = (f,>) be a two player coopetitive gain game carried by the
strategic triple (E,F,C). We will use the following terminologies:
– the function f is called the payoﬀ function of the game G;
– the ﬁrst component f1 of the payoﬀ function f is called payoﬀ function of
the ﬁrst player and analogously the second component f2 is called payoﬀ
function of the second player;
– the set E is said strategy set of the ﬁrst player and the set F the strategy
set of the second player;
– the set C is said the cooperative (or common) strategy set of the two
players;
– the Cartesian product E × F ×C is called the (coopetitive) strategy space
of the game G.
Memento. The ﬁrst component f1 of the payoﬀ function f of a coopetitive
game G is the function of the strategy space E×F ×C of the game G into the real
line R deﬁned by the ﬁrst projection
f1(x, y, z) := pr1(f(x, y, z)),
for every strategic triple (x, y, z) in E × F × C; in a similar fashion we proceed for
the second component f2 of the function f .
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Interpretation. We have:
– two players, or better an ordered pair (1, 2) of players;
– anyone of the two players has a strategy set in which to choose freely his own
strategy;
– the two players can/should cooperatively choose strategies z in a third common
strategy set C;
– the two players will choose (after the exam of the entire game G) their cooper-
ative strategy z in order to maximize (in some sense we shall deﬁne) the vector
gain function f .
3.5. Normal form games of a coopetitive game
Let G be a coopetitive game in the sense of above deﬁnitions. For any cooperative
strategy z selected in the cooperative strategy space C, there is a corresponding
normal form gain game
Gz = (p(z), >),
upon the strategy pair (E,F ), where the payoﬀ function p(z) is the section
f(., z) : E × F → R2,
of the payoﬀ function f of the coopetitive game - the section is deﬁned, as usual,
on the competitive strategy space E × F , by
f(., z)(x, y) = f(x, y, z),
for every bi-strategy (x, y) in the bi-strategy space E × F .
Let us formalize the concept of game-family associated with a coopetitive game.
Deﬁnition (the family associated with a coopetitive game). Let G = (f,>)
be a two player coopetitive gain game carried by the strategic triple (E,F,C). We
naturally can associate with the game G a family g = (gz)z∈C of normal-form games
deﬁned by
gz := Gz = (f(., z), >),
for every z in C, which we shall call the family of normal-form games associ-
ated with the coopetitive game G.
Remark. It is clear that with any above family of normal form games
g = (gz)z∈C ,
with gz = (f(., z), >), we can associate:
– a family of payoﬀ spaces
(imf(., z))z∈C ,
with members in the payoﬀ universe R2;
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– a family of Pareto maximal boundary
(∂∗Gz)z∈C ,
with members contained in the payoﬀ universe R2;
– a family of suprema
(supGz)z∈C ,
with members belonging to the payoﬀ universe R2;
– a family of Nash zones
(N (Gz))z∈C ;
with members contained in the strategy space E × F ;
– a family of conservative bi-values
v# = (v#z )z∈C ;
in the payoﬀ universe R2.
And so on, for every meaningful known feature of a normal form game.
Moreover, we can interpret any of the above families as set-valued paths in the
strategy space E × F or in the payoﬀ universe R2.
It is just the study of these induced families which becomes of great interest
in the examination of a coopetitive game G and which will enable us to deﬁne (or
suggest) the various possible solutions of a coopetitive game.
4. Coopetitive games for Greek crisis
Our ﬁrst hypothesis is that Germany must stimulate the domestic demand and to
re-balance its trade surplus in favor of Greece. The second hypothesis is that Greece,
a country with a declining competitiveness of its products and a small export share,
aims at growth by undertaking innovative investments and by increasing its exports
primarily towards Germany and also towards the other euro countries.
The coopetitive model that we propose hereunder must be interpreted as nor-
mative model, in the sense that:
– it imposes some clear a priori conditions to be respected, by binding contracts,
in order to enlarge the possible outcomes of both countries;
– consequently, it shows appropriate win-win strategy solutions, chosen by consid-
ering both competitive and cooperative behaviors, simultaneously;
– ﬁnally, it proposes appropriate fair divisions of the win-win payoﬀ solutions.
The strategy spaces of the model are:
– the strategy set of Germany E, set of all possible consumptions of Germany,
in our model, given in a conventional monetary unit; we shall assume that the
strategies of Germany directly inﬂuence only Germany pay-oﬀ;
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– the strategy set of Greece F , set of all possible investments of Greece, in our
model, given in a conventional monetary unit (diﬀerent from the above Germany
monetary unit); we shall assume that the strategies of Greece directly inﬂuence
only Greece pay-oﬀ;
– a shared strategy set C, whose elements are determined together by the two
countries, when they choose their own respective strategies x and y, Germany
and Greece. Every strategy z in C represents an amount - given in a third
conventional monetary unit - of Greek exports imported into Germany, by re-
specting a binding contract.
Therefore, in the model, we assume that Germany and Greece deﬁne the set of
coopetitive strategies.
5. The model
Main Strategic assumptions. We assume that:
– any real number x, belonging to the unit interval U := [0, 1], can represent a
consumption of Germany (given in an appropriate conventional monetary unit);
– any real number y, in the same unit interval U , can represent an investment of
Greece (given in another appropriate conventional monetary unit);
– any real number z, again in U , can be the amount of Greek exports which is
imported by Germany (given in conventional monetary unit).
In this model, we consider a linear aﬃne mutual interaction between Germany
and Greece, more adherent to the real state of the Euro-area.
Speciﬁcally, in opposition to the above ﬁrst model:
– we consider an interaction between the two countries also at the level of their
non-cooperative strategies ;
– we assume that Greece also should import (by contract) some German produc-
tion;
– we assume, that the German revenue, given by the exportations in Greece of
the above production, is absorbed by the Germany bank system - in order to
pay the Greece debts with the German bank system - so that this money does
not appear in the payoﬀ function of Germany (as possible gain) but only in the
payoﬀ function of Greece (as a loss).
Main Strategic assumptions. We assume that:
– any real number x, belonging to the interval E := [0, 3], represents a possible
consumption of Germany (given in an appropriate conventional monetary unit);
– any real number y, in the same interval F := E, represents a possible investment
of Greece (given in another appropriate conventional monetary unit);
– any real number z, again in the interval C = [0, 2], can be the amount of Greek
exports which is imported by Germany (given in conventional monetary unit).
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5.1. Payoﬀ function of Germany
We assume that the payoﬀ function of Germany f1 is its Keynesian gross domestic
demand :
– f1 is equal to the private consumption function C1 plus the gross investment
function I1 plus government spending (that we shall assume equal 2, constant
in our interaction) plus export function X1 minus the import function M1, that
is
f1 = 2 + C1 + I1 +X1 −M1.
We assume that:
– the German private consumption function C1 is the ﬁrst projection of the strate-
gic coopetitive space S := E2 × C, that is deﬁned by
C1(x, y, z) = x,
for every possible german consumption x in E, this because we assumed the
private consumption of Germany to be the ﬁrst strategic component of strategy
proﬁles in S;
– the gross investment function I1 is constant on the space S, and by translation
we can suppose I1 equal zero;
– the export function X1 is deﬁned by
X1(x, y, z) = −y/3,
for every Greek possible investment y in innovative technology; so we assume
that the export function X1 is a strictly decreasing function with respect to the
second argument;
– the import function M1 is the third projection of the strategic space, namely
M1(x, y, z) = z,
for every cooperative strategy z ∈ 2U , because we assume the import function
M1 depending only upon the cooperative strategy z of the coopetitive game G,
our third strategic component of the strategy proﬁles in S.
Recap. We then assume as payoﬀ function of Germany its Keynesian gross
domestic demand f1, which in our model is equal, at every triple (x, y, z) in the
proﬁle strategy set S, to the sum of the strategies x, −z with the export function
X1, viewed as a reaction function to the Greece investments (so that f1 is the
diﬀerence of the ﬁrst and third projection of the strategy proﬁle space S plus the
function export function X1).
A Model of Coopetitive Game and the Greek Crisis 47
Concluding, the payoﬀ function of Germany is the function f1 of the set S into
the real line R, deﬁned by
f1(x, y, z) = 2 + x− y/3− z,
for every triple (x, y, z) in the space S; where the reaction function X1, deﬁned from
the space S into the real line R by
X1(x, y, z) = −y/3,
for every possible investment y of Greece in the interval 3U , is the export function
of Germany mapping the level y of Greece investment into the level X1(x, y, z) of
German export, corresponding to the Greece investment level y.
The function X1 is a strictly decreasing function in the second argument, and
this monotonicity is a relevant property of X1 for our coopetitive model.
5.2. Payoﬀ function of Greece
We assume that the payoﬀ function of Greece f2 is again its Keynesian gross do-
mestic demand - private consumption C2 plus gross investment I2 plus government
spending (assumed to be 2) plus exports X2 minus imports M2), so that
f2 = 2 + C2 + I2 +X2 −M2.
We assume that:
– the function C2 is irrelevant in our analysis, since we assume the Greek private
consumptions independent from the choice of the strategic triple (x, y, z) in the
space S; in other terms, we assume the function C2 constant on the space S
and by translation we can suppose C2 itself equal zero;
– the function I2 : S → R is deﬁned by
I2(x, y, z) = y + nz,
for every (x, y, z) in S (see above for the justiﬁcation);
– the export function X2 is the linear function deﬁned by
X2(x, y, z) = z +my,
for every (x, y, z) in S (see above for the justiﬁcation);
– the function M2 is now relevant in our analysis, since we assume the import
function, by coopetitive contract with Germany, dependent on the choice of the
triple (x, y, z) in S, speciﬁcally, we assume the import function M2 deﬁned on
the space S by
M2(x, y, z) := −2x/3,
so, Greece too now, must import some German product, with value −2x/3 for
each possible German consumption x.
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So, the payoﬀ function of Greece is the linear function f2 of the space S into the
real line R, deﬁned by
f2(x, y, z) = 2− 2x/3 + (y + nz) + (z +my) =
= 2− 2x/3 + (1 +m)y + (1 + n)z,
for every pair (x, y, z) in the strategic Cartesian space S.
We note that the function f2 depends now signiﬁcantly upon the strategies x in
E, chosen by Germany, and that f2 is again a linear function.
We shall assume the factors m and n non-negative and equal respectively (only
for simplicity) to 0 and 1/2.
5.3. Payoﬀ function of the game
We so have build up a coopetitive gain game with payoﬀ function f : S → R2, given
by
f(x, y, z) = (2 + x− y/3− z, 2− 2x/3 + (1 +m)y + (1 + n)z) =
= (2, 2) + (x− y/3,−2x/3 + (1 +m)y) + z(−1, 1 + n),
for every (x, y, z) in [0, 3]2 × [0, 2].
Fig. 1: 3D representation of (f,<).
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Fig. 2: 3D representation of (f,<).
Fig. 3: 3D representation of (f,<).
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5.4. Study of the second game G = (f,>)
Note that, ﬁxed a cooperative strategy z in 2U , the section game G(z) = (p(z), >)
with payoﬀ function p(z), deﬁned on the square E2 by
p(z)(x, y) := f(x, y, z),
is the translation of the game G(0) by the “cooperative” vector
v(z) = z(−1, 1 + n),
so that, we can study the initial game G(0) and then we can translate the various
informations of the game G(0) by the vectors v(z), to obtain the corresponding
information for the game G(z).
So, let us consider the initial game G(0). The strategy square E2 of G(0) has
vertices 02, 3e1, 32 and 3e2, where 02 is the origin of the plane R2, e1 is the ﬁrst
canonical vector (1, 0), 32 is the vectors (3, 3) and e2 is the second canonical vector.
5.5. Topological Boundary of the payoﬀ space of G0
In order to determine the the payoﬀ space of the linear game it is suﬃcient to
transform the four vertices of the strategy square (the game is an aﬃne invertible
game), the critical zone is empty.
Payoﬀ space of the game G(0). So, the payoﬀ space of the game G(0) is the
transformation of the topological boundary of the strategy square, that is the par-
allelogram with vertices f(0, 0), f(3e1), f(3, 3) and f(3e2). As we show in the below
ﬁgure 4.
Fig. 4: Initial payoﬀ space of the game (f,<).
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Nash equilibria. The unique Nash equilibrium is the bistrategy (3, 3). Indeed, the
function f1 is linear increasing with respect to the ﬁrst argument and analogously
the function f2 is linear and increasing with respect to the second argument.
5.6. The payoﬀ space of the coopetitive game G
The image of the payoﬀ function f , is the union of the family of payoﬀ spaces
(impz)z∈C ,
that is the convex envelope of the union of the image p0(E2) and of its translation by
the vector v(2), namely the payoﬀ space p2(E2): the image of f is an hexagon with
vertices f(0, 0), f(3e1), f(3, 3) and their translations by v(2). As we show below.
Fig. 5: Payoﬀ space of the game (f,<).
5.7. Pareto maximal boundary of the payoﬀ space of G
The Pareto sup-boundary of the coopetitive payoﬀ space f(S) is the union of the
segments [A′, B′], [P ′, Q′] and [Q′, C′′], where P ′ = f(3, 3, 0) and
Q′ = P ′ + v(2).
Possibility of global growth. It is important to note that the absolute slopes
of the segments [A′, B′], [P ′, Q′] of the Pareto (coopetitive) boundary are strictly
greater than 1. Thus the collective payoﬀ f1+ f2 of the game is not constant on the
Pareto boundary and, therefore, the game implies the possibility of a transferable
utility global growth.
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Trivial bargaining solutions. The Nash bargaining solution on the entire pay-
oﬀ space, with respect to the inﬁmum of the Pareto boundary and the Kalai-
Smorodinsky bargaining solution, with respect to the inﬁmum and the supremum
of the Pareto boundary, are not acceptable for Germany: they are collectively (TU)
better than the Nash payoﬀ of G0 but they are disadvantageous for Germany (it
suﬀers a loss!): these solutions could be thought as rebalancing solutions, but they
are not realistically implementable.
5.8. Transferable utility solutions
In this coopetitive context it is more convenient to adopt a transferable utility
solution, indeed:
– the point of maximum collective gain on the whole of the coopetitive payoﬀ
space is the point Q′ = (2, 6).
Rebalancing win-win solution relative to maximum gain for Greece in G
Thus we propose a rebalancing win-win coopetitive solution relative to maximum
gain for Greece in G, as it follows (in the case m = 0):
1. we consider the portion s of transferable utility Pareto boundary
M := Q′ + R(1,−1),
obtained by intersecting M itself with the strip determined (spanned by con-
vexifying) by the straight lines P ′ + Re1 and C′′ + Re1, these are the straight
lines of Nash gain for Greece in the initial game G(0) and of maximum gain for
Greece in G, respectively.
2. we consider the Kalai-Smorodinsky segment s′ of vertices B′ - Nash payoﬀ of
the game G(0) - and the supremum of the segment s.
3. our best payoﬀ rebalancing coopetitive compromise is the unique point K in
the intersection of segments s and s′, that is the best compromise solution of
the bargaining problem (s, (B′, sup s)).
Figure 6 below shows the above extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solution K and
the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution K ′ of the classic bargaining problem (M,B′). It is
evident that the distribution K is a rebalancing solution in favor of Greece with
respect to the classic solution K ′.
Rebalancing win-win solution relative to maximum Nash gain for Greece
We propose here a more realistic rebalancing win-win coopetitive solution relative
to maximum Nash gain for Greece in G, as it follows (again in the case m = 0):
1. we consider the portion s of transferable utility Pareto boundary
M := Q′ + R(1,−1),
obtained by intersecting M itself with the strip determined (spanned by con-
vexifying) by the straight lines P ′ + Re1 and Q′ + Re1, these are the straight
lines of Nash gain for Greece in the initial game G(0) and of maximum Nash
gain for Greece in G, respectively.
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Fig. 6: Two Kalai win-win solutions of the game (f,<), represented with n = 1/2.
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2. we consider the Kalai-Smorodinsky segment s′ of vertices B′ - Nash payoﬀ of
the game G(0) - and the supremum of the segment s.
3. our best payoﬀ rebalancing coopetitive compromise is the unique point K in
the intersection of segments s and s′, that is the best compromise solution of
the bargaining problem (s, (B′, sup s)).
Figure 7 below shows the above extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solution K and
the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution K ′ of the classic bargaining problem (M,B′). The
new distribution K is a rebalancing solution in favor of Greece, more realistic than
the previous rebalancing solution.
Fig. 7: Two Kalai win-win solutions of the game (f,<), represented with n = 1/2.
5.9. Win-win solution
The payoﬀ extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions K represent win-win solutions,
with respect to the initial Nash gainB′. So that, as we repeatedly said, also Germany
can increase its initial proﬁt from coopetition.
Win-win strategy procedure. The win-win payoﬀK can be obtained in a prop-
erly transferable utility coopetitive fashion, as it follows:
– 1) the two players agree on the cooperative strategy 2 of the common set C;
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– 2) the two players implement their respective Nash strategies in the game G(2),
so competing à la Nash; the unique Nash equilibrium of the game G(2) is the
bistrategy (3, 3);
– 3) ﬁnally, they share the “social pie”
(f1 + f2)(3, 3, 2),
in a transferable utility cooperative fashion (by binding contract) accord-
ing to the decomposition K.
6. Conclusions
In conclusion, we desire to stress that:
– the model of coopetitive game, provided in the present contribution, is essen-
tially a normative model.
– our model of coopetition has pointed out the strategies that could bring to win-
win solutions, in a transferable utility and properly cooperative per-
spective, for Greece and Germany.
In the paper, we propose:
– transferable utility and properly coopetitive solutions, which are convenient for
Greece and also for Germany.
– a new extended Kalai-Smorodinsky method, appropriate to determine rebalanc-
ing partitions, for win-win solutions, on the transferable utility Pareto boundary
of the entire coopetitive game.
The solutions oﬀered by our coopetitive model aim at “enlarging the pie and
sharing it fairly”; more speciﬁcally:
– our model is a growth model, in the sense that it suggests solutions which imply
the increase of the GDP of Greece due to the actions of the variables: exports
(the shared variable) and investments. It also allows to ﬁnd “fair” amounts of
Greek exports which Germany must cooperatively import.
– in our analytical model, the enlargement of the “pie", which is represented in
ﬁgure 5 as the coopetitive payoﬀ space f(E×F×C), shows the set of all possible
payoﬀ shares determining reasonable (in an extended Kalai-Smorodinsky sense)
win-win solutions for both Greece and Germany.
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7. Appendix: Solutions of a coopetitive game
7.1. Introduction
The two players of a coopetitive game G - according to the general economic prin-
ciples of monotonicity of preferences and of non-satiation - should choose the coop-
erative strategy z in C in order that:
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– the reasonable Nash equilibria of the game Gz are f -preferable than the rea-
sonable Nash equilibria in each other game Gz′ ;
– the supremum of Gz is greater (in the sense of the usual order of the Cartesian
plane) than the supremum of any other game Gz′ ;
– the Pareto maximal boundary of Gz is higher than that of any other game Gz′ ;
– the Nash bargaining solutions in Gz are f -preferable than those in Gz′ ;
– in general, ﬁxed a common kind of solution for any game Gz, say S(z) the set of
these kind of solutions for the game Gz, we can consider the problem to ﬁnd all
the optimal solutions (in the sense of Pareto) of the set valued path S, deﬁned
on the cooperative strategy set C. Then, we should face the problem of selection
of reasonable Pareto strategies in the set-valued path S via proper selection
methods (Nash-bargaining, Kalai-Smorodinsky and so on).
Moreover, we shall consider the maximal Pareto boundary of the payoﬀ space
im(f) as an appropriate zone for the bargaining solutions.
The payoﬀ function of a two person coopetitive game is (as in the case of normal-
form game) a vector valued function with values belonging to the Cartesian plane
R2. We note that in general the above criteria are multi-criteria and so they will
generate multi-criteria optimization problems.
In this section we shall deﬁne rigorously some kind of solution, for two player
coopetitive games, based on a bargaining method, namely a Kalai-Smorodinsky
bargaining type. Hence, ﬁrst of all, we have to precise what kind of bargaining
method we are going to use.
7.2. Bargaining problems
In this paper, we shall propose and use the following original extended (and quite
general) deﬁnition of bargaining problem and, consequently, a natural generaliza-
tion of Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. In the economic literature, several examples of
extended bargaining problems and extended Kalai-Smorodinski solutions are already
presented. The essential root of these various extended versions of bargaining prob-
lems is the presence of utopia points not-directly constructed by the disagreement
points and the strategy constraints. Moreover, the Kalai-type solution, of such ex-
tended bargaining problems, is always deﬁned as a Pareto maximal point belonging
to the segment joining the disagreement point with the utopia point (if any such
Pareto point does exist): we shall follow the same way. In order to ﬁnd suitable new
win-win solutions of our realistic coopetitive economic problems, we need such new
kind of versatile extensions. For what concerns the existence of our new extended
Kalai solutions, for the economic problems we are facing, we remark that conditions
of compactness and strict convexity will naturally hold; we remark, otherwise, that,
in this paper, we are not interested in proving general or deep mathematical results,
but rather to ﬁnd reasonable solutions for new economic coopetitive context.
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Deﬁnition (of bargaining problem). Let S be a subset of the Cartesian plane
R2 and let a and b be two points of the plane with the following properties:
– they belong to the small interval containing S, if this interval is deﬁned (indeed,
it is well deﬁned if and only if S is bounded and it is precisely the interval
[inf S, supS]≤);
– they are such that a < b;
– the intersection
[a, b]≤ ∩ ∂∗S,
among the interval [a, b]≤ with end points aand b (it is the set of points greater
than a and less than b, it is not the segment [a, b]) and the maximal boundary
of S is non-empty.
In these conditions, we call bargaining problem on S corresponding to the
pair of extreme points (a, b), the pair
P = (S, (a, b)).
Every point in the intersection among the interval [a, b]≤and the Pareto maximal
boundary of S is called possible solution of the problem P . Some time the ﬁrst
extreme point of a bargaining problem is called the initial point of the problem
(or disagreement point or threat point) and the second extreme point of a
bargaining problem is called utopia point of the problem.
In the above conditions, when S is convex, the problem P is said to be convex
and for this case we can ﬁnd in the literature many existence results for solutions
of P enjoying prescribed properties (Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions, Nash bargaining
solutions and so on ...).
Remark. Let S be a subset of the Cartesian plane R2 and let a and b two points
of the plane belonging to the smallest interval containing S and such that a ≤ b.
Assume the Pareto maximal boundary of S be non-empty. If a and b are a lower
bound and an upper bound of the maximal Pareto boundary, respectively, then the
intersection
[a, b]≤ ∩ ∂∗S
is obviously not empty. In particular, if a and b are the extrema of S (or the extrema
of the Pareto boundary S∗ = ∂∗S) we can consider the following bargaining problem
P = (S, (a, b)), (or P = (S∗, (a, b)))
and we call this particular problem a standard bargaining problem on S (or standard
bargaining problem on the Pareto maximal boundary S∗).
7.3. Kalai solution for bargaining problems
Note the following property.
Property. If (S, (a, b)) is a bargaining problem with a < b, then there is at most
one point in the intersection
[a, b] ∩ ∂∗S,
where [a, b] is the segment joining the two points a and b.
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Proof. Since if a point p of the segment [a, b] belongs to the Pareto boundary ∂∗S, no
other point of the segment itself can belong to Pareto boundary, since the segment
is a totally ordered subset of the plane (remember that a < b). 
unionsq
Deﬁnition (Kalai-Smorodinsky). We call Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (or
best compromise solution) of the bargaining problem (S, (a, b)) the unique
point of the intersection
[a, b] ∩ ∂∗S,
if this intersection is non empty.
So, in the above conditions, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution k (if it exists) enjoys
the following property: there is a real r in [0, 1] such that
k = a+ r(b − a),
or
k − a = r(b − a),
hence
k2 − a2
k1 − a1 =
b2 − a2
b1 − a1 ,
if the above ratios are deﬁned; these last equality is the characteristic property of
Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions.
We end the subsection with the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition (of Pareto boundary). We call Pareto boundary every subset M
of an ordered space which has only pairwise incomparable elements.
7.4. Nash (proper) solution of a coopetitive game
Let N := N (G) be the union of the Nash-zone family of a coopetitive game G,
that is the union of the family (N (Gz))z∈C of all Nash-zones of the game family
g = (gz)z∈C associated to the coopetitive game G. We call Nash path of the game
G the multi-valued path
z → N (Gz)
and Nash zone of G the trajectory N of the above multi-path. Let N∗ be the Pareto
maximal boundary of the Nash zone N . We can consider the bargaining problem
PN = (N∗, inf(N∗), sup(N∗)).
Deﬁnition. If the above bargaining problem PN has a Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
k, we say that k is the properly coopetitive solution of the coopetitive game G.
The term “properly coopetitive” is clear:
– this solution k is determined by cooperation on the common strategy set C and
to be selﬁsh (competitive in the Nash sense) on the bi-strategy space E × F .
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7.5. Bargaining solutions of a coopetitive game
It is possible, for coopetitive games, to deﬁne other kind of solutions, which are not
properly coopetitive, but realistic and sometime aﬀordable. These kind of solutions
are, we can say, super-cooperative.
Let us show some of these kind of solutions.
Consider a coopetitive game G and
– its Pareto maximal boundaryM and the corresponding pair of extrema (aM , bM );
– the Nash zone N (G) of the game in the payoﬀ space and its extrema (aN , bN );
– the conservative set-value G# (the set of all conservative values of the family g
associated with the coopetitive game G) and its extrema (a#, b#).
We call:
– Pareto compromise solution of the game G the best compromise solution
(K-S solution) of the problem
(M, (aM , bM )),
if this solution exists;
– Nash-Pareto compromise solution of the game G the best compromise
solution of the problem
(M, (bN , bM ))
if this solution exists;
– conservative-Pareto compromise solution of the game G the best com-
promise of the problem
(M, (b#, bM ))
if this solution exists.
7.6. Transferable utility solutions
Other possible compromises we suggest are the following.
Consider the transferable utility Pareto boundary M of the coopetitive game G,
that is the set of all points p in the Euclidean plane (universe of payoﬀs), between
the extrema of G, such that their sum
+(p) := p1 + p2
is equal to the maximum value of the addition + of the real line R over the payoﬀ
space f(E × F × C) of the game G.
Deﬁnition (TU Pareto solution). We call transferable utility compromise
solution of the coopetitive game G the solution of any bargaining problem
(M, (a, b)), where
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– a and b are points of the smallest interval containing the payoﬀ space of G
– b is a point strongly greater than a;
– M is the transferable utility Pareto boundary of the game G;
– the points a and b belong to diﬀerent half-planes determined by M .
Note that the above fourth axiom is equivalent to require that the segment
joining the points a and b intersect M .
7.7. Win-win solutions
In the applications, if the game G has a member G0 of its family which can be
considered as an “initial game” - in the sense that the pre-coopetitive situation is
represented by this normal form game G0 - the aims of our study (following the
standard ideas on coopetitive interactions) are
– to “enlarge the pie”;
– to obtain a win-win solution with respect to the initial situation.
So that we will choose as a threat point a in TU problem (M, (a, b)) the supre-
mum of the initial game G0.
Deﬁnition (of win-win solution). Let (G, z0) be a coopetitive game with an
initial point, that is a coopetitive game G with a ﬁxed common strategy z0 (of
its common strategy set C). We call the game Gz0 as the initial game of (G, z0).
We call win-win solution of the game (G, z0) any strategy proﬁle s = (x, y, z)
such that the payoﬀ of G at s is strictly greater than the supremum L of the payoﬀ
core of the initial game G(z0).
Remark 1. The payoﬀ core of a normal form gain game G is the portion of the
Pareto maximal boundary G∗ of the game which is greater than the conservative
bi-value of G.
Remark 2. From an applicative point of view, the above requirement (to be strictly
greater than L) is very strong. More realistically, we can consider as win-win solu-
tions those strategy proﬁles which are strictly greater than any reasonable solution
of the initial game Gz0 .
Remark 3. Strictly speaking, a win-win solution could be not Pareto eﬃcient: it
is a situation in which the players both gain with respect to an initial condition
(and this is exactly the idea we follow in the rigorous deﬁnition given above).
Remark 4. In particular, observe that, if the collective payoﬀ function
+(f) = f1 + f2
has a maximum (on the strategy proﬁle space S) strictly greater than the collective
payoﬀ L1 + L2 at the supremum L of the payoﬀ core of the game Gz0 , the portion
M(> L) of Transferable Utility Pareto boundary M which is greater than L is non-
void and it is a segment. So that we can choose as a threat point a in our problem
(M, (a, b)) the supremum L of the payoﬀ core of the initial game G0 to obtain some
compromise solution.
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Standard win-win solution. A natural choice for the utopia point b is the supre-
mum of the portion M≥a of the transferable utility Pareto boundary M which is
upon (greater than) this point a:
M≥a = {m ∈M : m ≥ a}.
Non standard win-win solution. Another kind of solution can be obtained by
choosing b as the supremum of the portion of M that is bounded between the
minimum and maximum value of that player i that gains more in the coopetitive
interaction, in the sense that
max(pri(imf))−max(pri(imf0)) > max(pr3−i(imf))−max(pr3−i(imf0)).
Final general remark In the development of a coopetitive game, we consider:
– a ﬁrst virtual phase, in which the two players make a binding agreement on
what cooperative strategy z should be selected from the cooperative set C, in
order to respect their own rationality.
– then, a second virtual phase, in which the two players choose their strategies
forming the proﬁle (x, y) to implement in the game G(z).
Now, in the second phase of our coopetitive game G we consider the following 4
possibilities:
1. the two players are non-cooperative in the second phase and they do or do not
exchange info, but the players choose (in any case) Nash equilibrium strategies
for the game G(z); in this case, for some rationality reason, the two players have
devised that the chosen equilibrium is the better equilibrium choice in the entire
game G; we have here only one binding agreement in the entire development of
the game;
2. the two players are cooperative also in the second phase and they make a binding
agreement in order to choose a Pareto payoﬀ on the coopetitive Pareto bound-
ary; in this case we need two binding agreements in the entire development of
the game;
3. the two players are cooperative also in the second phase and they make two
binding agreements, in order to reach the Pareto payoﬀ (on the coopetitive
Pareto boundary) with maximum collective gain (ﬁrst agreement) and to share
the collective gain according to a certain subdivision (second agreement); in this
case we need three binding agreements in the entire development of the game;
4. the two players are non-cooperative in the second phase (and they do or do not
exchange information), the player choose (in any case) Nash equilibrium strate-
gies; the two players have devised that the chosen equilibrium is the equilibrium
with maximum collective gain and they make only one binding agreement to
share the collective gain according to a certain subdivision; in this case we need
two binding agreements in the entire development of the game.
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Abstract Dynamic game theoretic models of corruption in two- and three-
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1. Introduction
Corruption is a social-economic phenomenon that exerts an essential negative in-
ﬂuence to the society. The number of papers on dynamic models of corruption in
hierarchical control systems is quite small. Basically they are multistage game theo-
retic models in which the dynamics of controlled system is not described explicitly.
In one of the ﬁrst papers of this class (Basu et al., 1992) a recursive setting is con-
sidered in which it is supposed that if the controller makes the collusion with the
controlled person then he could be caught and should pay a bribe himself. The chain
of corruption could be both ﬁnite and inﬁnite. The authors of (Basu et al., 1992)
have shown that in some conditions an increase of the probability of punishment
has a greater eﬀect in the ﬁght with corruption than the penalty enlargement.
In the paper (Olsen and Torsvik, 1998) a two-stage model of the type principal -
controller - agent is considered in which the principal uses an illegal character of
transactions between the controller and the agent and can get a greater payoﬀ in a
long-term period than in a short-term one. In the paper (Yang, 2005) a structural
analysis of corruption in Chinese enterprises licensing is presented on the base of
a repeated bargaining model. It demonstrates that once relative bargaining powers
are correctly accounted then certain institutional features of the Chinese licens-
ing system lead to bribery as a robust outcome. Exercises in comparative statics
reveal that certain conventional anti-corruption measures may have counterintu-
itive eﬀects. If overlapping jurisdictions are introduced, the resulting bureaucratic
competition could help to ﬁght with corruption. The model of "petty corruption" in
(Lambert-Mogiliansky et al., 2007) describes the structure of bureaucratic "tracks",
and the information among the participants. Entrepreneurs apply, in sequence, to
a "track" of two or more bureaucrats in a prescribed order for approval of their
projects. The ﬁrst result establishes that in a one-shot situation no project ever
 This work is supported by RFBR, project No.12-01-00017=E0
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gets approved, so a repeated interaction setting is used. In that context the trigger-
strategy equilibria are characterized that minimize the social loss due to the sys-
tem of bribes, and those that maximize the expected total bribe income of the
bureaucrats. The results are used to shed some light on two much advocated anti-
corruption policies: the single window policy and rotation of bureaucrats. In the
paper (Bhattacharya and Hodler, 2010) it is studied how natural resources can feed
corruption and how this eﬀect depends on the quality of the democratic institu-
tions. The game-theoretic model predicts that resource rents lead to an increase
in corruption if the quality of the democratic institutions is relatively poor, but
not otherwise. The paper (Balafoutas, 2011) investigates the role of guilt aversion
for corruption in public administration. Corruption is modeled as the outcome of a
psychological game played between a bureaucrat, a lobby, and the public. It is stud-
ied how the behavior of the lobby and the bureaucrat depend on perceived public
beliefs, when these are constant and when they are allowed to vary over time. The
papers (Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio, 2010, Cerqueti and Coppier, 2011) should
be noticed separately in which the models of economic growth with corruption are
investigated.
This paper logically continues the paper (Antonenko et al., 2012) where the
static models of corruption were considered, and is concerned with the dynamic
models in this domain. In the frame of our conception the description of corruption
and the methods of struggle with it in dynamics are based on the following princi-
ples.
1. The basic modeling pattern is a hierarchical structure "principal - supervisor -
agent - object" in diﬀerent modiﬁcations and its investigation by means of the opti-
mal control theory and dynamic Stackelberg games theory. The supervisor may be
corrupted, while the principal is not corrupted and ﬁghts with corruption. So the
elements of the above structure are bribe-ﬁghter, bribe-taker, bribe-giver and object
of impact respectively. In some cases a simpliﬁed model "bribe-taker - bribe-giver
- object" (supervisor - agent - object) is used in which the non-corrupted principal
is considered implicitly (parametrically).
2. The leading player of any level (principal or supervisor) uses methods of com-
pulsion (administrative or legislative impacts) or impulsion (economic impacts) for
achievement of his/her objectives. The mathematic formalization of compulsion
means an impact of the leader to the set of admissible strategies of the follower
(as a rule, without a feed back), and impulsion means the impact to the follower’s
payoﬀ function (as a rule, with a feed back) (Ougolnitsky, 2011).
3. The cases of administrative corruption when administrative requirements or con-
straints are weakened for a bribe and the economic corruption when the economic
ones are weakened are diﬀerentiated. The model of administrative corruption is the
compulsion with a feed back on bribe, and the model of economic corruption is the
impulsion with an additional feed back on bribe.
4. Corruption exists in the form of capture and extortion. In the case of capture
a basic set of administrative or economic services is guaranteed while additional
indulgences are provided for a bribe. In the case of extortion a bribe is required
already for the basic set of services.
5. For studying corruption in hierarchical control systems with consideration of the
requirements of sustainable development both descriptive and normative approaches
are applicable. In the case of descriptive approach the functions of administrative
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and economic corruption are given, and the main problem is to identify their param-
eters on statistical data. In the case of normative approach the corruption (bribery)
function is found as the solution of an optimization or game theoretic problem.
6. The investigation of corruption in the system "principal - supervisor - agent - ob-
ject" is possible from three points of view. If the bribery function is known then from
the point of view of the agent the corruption can be described by an optimal control
model. From the supervisor’s point of view a hierarchical parametrical Germeyer
game of the class Γ2t arises which solution in the form of bribery function with
a feedback on the value of bribe is known in a general form (Gorelik et al., 1991).
From the point of view of the principal the problem of ﬁght with corruption consists
in seeking of such values of control parameters that the found optimal strategy of
the supervisor satisﬁes the requirements of homeostasis for the controlled dynamic
system (object).
7. It makes sense to build "genetic" series of sequentially complicated models that
more and more precisely describe the real phenomena of corruption in hierarchical
control systems. The principal logical pattern of this sequential complication has a
form "optimal control models - dynamic hierarchical two-person games - dynamic
hierarchical three-person games". With consideration of the possible modiﬁcations
of the models of each type the "series" become the "genetic networks".
It is the last principle that determines the structure of the paper.
2. The system of dynamic models of corruption
Let’s begin from the "genetic series" of the models of economic corruption. For the
convenience of interpretation and without loss of generality we will speak about the
problems of optimal exploitation of bioresources. In the case of harvesting strategy
the equation of dynamics of the controlled system with initial conditions has a form
x˙ = h(x(t)) − u(t)x(t), x(0) = x0 (1)
Here x(t) - a biomass of the harvested population (for example, ﬁsh); u(t) - a
catch share (in the moment t ); h - a function of local homogeneous population
dynamics (Malthus, Verhulst-Pearl, Ricker and other types); x0 - an initial value of
the biomass.
For description of the economic corruption we suppose that the catch share is
constant: u(t) ≡ u . Then the total ﬁshing income is equal to aux where a is a price
of the unit of biomass (the dependence on time is omitted for simplicity). Suppose
that a share r of that variable (where r can be treated as a tax rate) goes to the
principal (the state), and the share 1 − r goes to the agent (a ﬁsher). In turn, the
principal gives a share p from his part as a salary (or bonus) to the supervisor (an
oﬃcial of the ﬁshing control agency), and the share 1− p keeps to himself. At last,
the agent assigns a share b of his income to the bribe for the supervisor, retaining the
share 1− b. Thus, the ﬁnal income values are equal to ar(1− p)ux for the principal,
a(pr + b(1 − r))ux for the supervisor, and a(1 − b)(1 − r)ux for the agent. Using
these balance considerations, the agent’s payoﬀ functional is given in the form
JA = au
∫ ∞
0
e−αt(1− b(t))(1 − r(t))x(t)dt → max (2)
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In the case of economic corruption the tax rate is a function of the bribe. From
the point of view of the agent this function is considered as given. For example, the
linear capture function has the form
r(b(t)) = r0 − r0b(t) (3)
Here in the left side a real tax rate is situated, the ﬁrst term in the right side r0 is
its oﬃcial (normative) value, and the second term means its weakening in exchange
to the bribe. In particular, r(0) = r0, r(1) = 0.
Substituting (3) in (2) we get
JA = au
∫ ∞
0
e−αt
(
1− r0 − (1− 2r0)b(t)− r0b2(t)
)
x(t)dt → max (4)
where α is a discount factor. Adding the restrictions on control values
0 ≤ b(t) ≤ 1 (5)
we get an optimal control problem (1), (4)-(5). Certainly, other functions of eco-
nomic corruption can be used instead of (3).
From the point of view of the supervisor the function r˜(t) = r(b(t)) is sought as a
solution of the game Γ2t betweenthe supervisor and the agent (Gorelik et al., 1991).
The supervisor’s payoﬀ functional can be written in the form
JS =
∫ ∞
0
e−αt((pr(t) + b(t)(1 − r(t)))aux(t) −Kμ(r0 − r(t)))dt → max (6)
with restrictions on controls
0 ≤ r(t) ≤ r0 (7)
To avoid the consideration of projection the function r(t) is treated as a result of the
map r(b(t)). The second term in the integrand function in (6) represents a penalty
charged to the supervisor in the case of detection of the tax arrears, where K is the
penalty factor, μ - probability of detection. In general, the relations (1)-(2), (5)-(7)
deﬁne a hierarchical diﬀerential two-person game of the class Γ2t.
At last, the principal’s payoﬀ functional can be written as
JP =
∫ ∞
0
e−αt((1 − p(t))aux(t)r(t) −M(r0 − r(t)) − m
r0 − z(t))dt → max (8)
It is supposed that in general the principal can use two methods of control: impulsion
or compulsion with the control variables respectively
0 ≤ p(t) ≤ 1 (9)
0 ≤ z(t) ≤ r0 (10)
In the second case the restrictions (7) take the form
z(t) ≤ r(t) ≤ r0 (11)
i.e. the principal can restrict from below the weakening of the tax rate for a bribe.
The ﬁrst term in (8) represents the principal’s income, the second one means a
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penalty charged on him in the case of tax arrears ( M is a penalty factor), and the
third one are the principal’s expenditures for control on the supervisor’s actions (
m is the respective factor).
In general, the relations (1)-(2), (5)-(10) (where instead of (7) may be (11)
in the case of compulsion) deﬁne a diﬀerential hierarchical three-person game. Its
reglament depends on the methods of control used by the principal. If compulsion
is used then the game between the principal and the supervisor has a form Γ1t,
if impulsion then Γ1t or Γ2t depending on that whether the function p(t) depends
only on time or also on the supervisor’s control. The game between the supervisor
and the agent always has a form Γ2t (Gorelik et al., 1991) because the presence of
a feedback on bribe is the principal moment in the description of corruption.
Thus, on the example of bioresource exploitation a series of dynamic models
of economic corruption in the form "optimal control model - dynamic hierarchical
two-person game - dynamic hierarchical three-person game" is deﬁned.
Let’s deﬁne a similar series for the case of administrative corruption. Now the
catch share is a function of time, and the agent chooses two control functions,
namely catch share and bribe. If the linear function of administrative corruption is
given as
s(b(t)) = s0 + (1− s0)b(t) (12)
where s(b(t)) is a real value of the catch quota, s0 is an oﬃcial value of the quota,
(1 − s0)b(t) is its weakening in exchange for the bribe then the agent’s optimal
control problem can be written in the form
JA = a
∫ ∞
0
e−αt(1− b(t))u(t)x(t)dt → max (13)
0 ≤ u(t) ≤ s0 + (1 − s0)b(t) (14)
0 ≤ b(t) ≤ 1 (15)
where the equation of dynamics of the controlled system with initial conditions has
also the form (1). The payoﬀ functional of the supervisor has the form
JS =
∫ ∞
0
e−αt(ab(t)u(t)x(t) −Kμ(s(t)− s0))dt → max (16)
with restrictions on controls
s0 ≤ s(t) ≤ 1 (17)
Similar to (6), the second term in the integrand in (16) is a penalty charged on the
supervisor in the case of detection of excess of the oﬃcial catch quota. The relations
(1), (13)-(17) deﬁne a diﬀerential hierarchical two-person game of the class Γ2t.
At last, the principal’s payoﬀ functional has the following form (similar to (8)
but without consideration of the principal’s personal interests)
JP =
∫ ∞
0
e−αt(M(s(t)− s0) +m 1− q(t)
q(t)− s0 )dt → min (18)
with restrictions on controls
s0 ≤ q(t) ≤ 1 (19)
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If (17) is replaced by the restrictions
s0 ≤ s(t) ≤ q(t) (20)
which determine the compulsion by principal then the relations (1), (16), (18)-(20)
deﬁne a diﬀerential hierarchical three-person game. The reglament of the game
between the principal and the supervisor is Γ1t , and between the supervisor and
the agent Γ2t. In the rest of the paper some dynamic models of economic corruption
are investigated.
3. Models of optimal exploitation of bioresources considering the
economic corruption
Let’s consider a model of economic corruption in the form
J =
∫ T
0
e−αt(1 − r(b(t)) − b(t))f(u(t), x(t))dt → max
0 ≤ u(t) ≤ 1 ; 0 ≤ b(t) ≤ 1
x˙ = (1 − u(t))h(x(t)), x(0) = x0
where the variables have the same sense as earlier.
The functional describes proﬁt of a ﬁshing enterprise which may be a bribe-giver.
From the proﬁt the enterprise pays taxes and (perhaps) gives a bribe to an oﬃcial
of the ﬁshing control agency. The real tax rate is a decreasing function of the bribe.
If the bribe is equal to zero then the real tax rate coincides with the normative
(established by the law) one. Only the case of capture is considered.
The function of economic corruption r(b(t)) is taken in the exponential form
r(b(t)) = r0e
−kb(t)
where the variables have the same sense as in (3); k is a bribe sensitivity. Suppose
also that
f(u(t), x(t)) =
√
u(t)x(t)
Without loss of generality the price of ﬁsh biomass unit is supposed to be equal to
one. Assume also for simplicity that α = 0 (there is no discounting). The model
has two control functions: the biomass of caught ﬁsh (in shares) and the bribe
(also in shares). The Verhulst-Pearl model represents a natural dynamics of the ﬁsh
population:
h(x(t)) = ax(t)(K − x(t))
where a is a natural increase factor, K is an environmental capacity. Thus, the
following model is considered:
J =
∫ T
0
(1− r0e−kb(t) − b(t))
√
u(t)x(t)dt→ max
0 ≤ u(t) ≤ 1 ; 0 ≤ b(t) ≤ 1; k > 0; t ∈ [0, T ]
x˙ = (1 − u(t))ax(t)(K − x(t)), x(0) = x0
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The optimal control problem is solved by the Pontryagin maximum principle
(Grass et al., 2008). The Hamilton function has the form (the argument t is omit-
ted):
H(x, u, b, ψ) = (1− r0e−kb − b)
√
ux+ ψ(1− u)ax(K − x)
The conditions of maximum principle are supposed to be satisﬁed. Consider the
ﬁrst one. The derivative of H with respect to b is
∂H
∂b
=
√
ux(r0ke
−kb − 1)
Equating the right side of the relation to zero and solving it with respect to b we
get
b∗ =
ln(r0k)
k
(21)
Now calculate the derivative of H with respect to u:
∂H
∂u
=
(1 − r0e−kb − b)√x
2
√
u
− ψax(K − x)
Equating the derivative to zero and substituting (21) in the received expression we
get:
u∗ =
(k − 1− ln(r0k))2
4k2ψ2a2x(K − x)2 (22)
Calculate the second derivatives of the Hamilton function with respect to the control
variables considering (21):
∂2H(x, u∗, b∗, ψ)
∂u2
=
2k2ψ3a3x2(K − x)3
(k − 1− ln(r0k))2 (23)
∂2H(x, u∗, b∗, ψ)
∂b2
=
k − 1− ln(r0k)
2ψa(K − x) (24)
Calculate also the mixed derivatives; due to (21) and (22) we get:
∂2H
∂u∂b
=
√
x(r0k/(r0k)− 1)
2
√
u
≡ 0 (25)
The Hesse matrix has the form(
−k−1−ln(r0k)2ψa(K−x) 0
0 − 2k2ψ3a3x2(K−x)3(k−1−ln(r0k))2
)
and it is negative deﬁnite. Thus, the suﬃcient condition of the maximum of Hamil-
ton function with respect to the control variables is satisﬁed.
Let’s analyze the expression (21). Consider the limit case b∗ = 0 (the bribe is
not proﬁtable for the bribe-giver). It is possible when k = 1/r0 . In the model is
supposed that the value r0 (tax rate) is determined by the law, and the value k
is determined by a ﬁshing control agency oﬃcial (bribe-taker). Given r0 the bribe-
giver chooses k such that the optimal for him value b∗ takes the maximal value. It
is found that the optimal for the bribe-taker value of k is deﬁned by the formula
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k = e/r0 . For example, if r0 = 0.2 then k ≈ 13, 59 . The substitution of k to
(21) gives b∗ = r0/e . As r0 is always positive then b∗ is never equal to zero but b∗
diminishes if r0 diminishes. So, in the frame of the model the corruption cannot be
eradicated completely but it can be restricted by decreasing of the tax rate.
Let’s compose the expression for the conjugate variable ψ(t):
dψ(t)
dt
= − (k − 1− ln(r0k))
2
4k2ψa(K − x)2 − ψ(t)a(K − 2x(t)) (26)
and deﬁne a boundary condition for (26):
ψ(T ) = 0
Let’s substitute (22) into the equation for the phase coordinate and transform it:
x˙(t) = ax(t)(K − x(t)) − (k − 1− ln(r0k))
2
4k2ψ2a(K − x(t)) (27)
The equations (26) and (27) form the system{
x˙(t) = ax(t)(K − x(t)) − (k−1−ln(r0k))24k2ψ2a(K−x) ;
ψ˙ = − (k−1−ln(r0k))24k2ψa(K−x)2 − ψ(t)a(K − 2x(t))
(28)
with boundary conditions
{
x(0) = x0;
ψ(T ) = 0
Let’s solve the system by the explicit-implicit Euler method. To receive a nu-
merical result let’s give some speciﬁc values to the model parameters. Assume that
T = 3; r0 = 0, 2; x−3 = 8000; x−2 = 8800; x−1 = 9600; a = 1, 14 10−5; K =
104800; x0 = 10385, 45; k = 13, 59; b = 0, 07. A common sorting method can be
used for the determination of the initial value of ψ. It is appropriate because the
explicit-implicit Euler method in solving (28) is stable and the value of grid function
tends to zero when the number of steps grows. In this problem ψ(0) = 0, 0141.
The function of natural dynamics of the population has the form
x˜(t) =
x0K
x0 + (K − x0)e−aKt
To receive the function x(t) as an analytical expression a regression analysis is
required because the values in the grid nodes are approximate. By means of the
least squares method it is found that the function x(t) is well approximated by the
third degree polynomial
x(t) = −7961, 28t3+ 26486, 57t2− 7845, 41t+ 13484, 84
with determination factor R2 = 0, 97.
The equation (26) can be solved analytically, namely
ψ(t) =
√
Cψe−2a(K−2x(t))t − (k − 1− ln r0k)
2
4k2a2(K − x(t))2(K − 2x(t)) ,
where
Cψ =
(k − 1− ln(r0k))2e2a(K−2x(T ))T
4k2a2(K − x(t))2(K − 2x(t))
The ﬁshing enterprise proﬁt for three years is equal to 135 conditional units.
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4. Game theoretic models of economic corruption in the water quality
control systems
Let’s investigate ﬁght with corruption in a dynamic three-level water resource qual-
ity control system which includes the following control levels: top (federal agency
or principal - he), middle (regional agency oﬃcial or supervisor - she) and bottom
(enterprise or agent - he), and the controlled dynamic system (water stream or
CDS).
The agent tends to maximize his production proﬁt. In the process of production
some pollutants are thrown to the CDS. It is assumed that the supervisor can
change in a range the normative pollution fee tending to maximize her income. The
principal must ensure a stable state of the CDS (the stability is treated in the sense
of Lagrange). The principal determines which part of the fees received from the agent
goes to the supervisor and which one he keeps to himself respectively. The interests
of principal and supervisor are diﬀerent, and the supervisor may be interested to
receive bribes from the agent and to decrease the pollution fee in exchange. For the
supervisor bribes are considered as a factor, together with income from the fees, in
the general balance of her interests. The principal should create such conditions in
which to ensure the stable state of the CDS will be proﬁtable for the supervisor
even when the corruption exists.
The principal controls the supervisor by charging penalties for the bribes. The
penalty size depends on the probability of detection of the corruption and on the
deviation of the real pollution fee from the normative one. The principal’s control
costs are considered in the model. We speak about an economic corruption because
impulsion is used as the method of control (Ougolnitsky, 2011).
A case of one type of pollutants (for example, nitric) and one agent is analyzed.
It is supposed that the system is in the stable state if quality standards for river
water
0 ≤ B(t) ≤ Bmax; 0 ≤ t ≤ Δ (29)
and sewage
W (t)(1− P (t))
Q0(t)
≤ Qmax; 0 ≤ t ≤ Δ (30)
are satisﬁed, where t - time; B(t) - concentration of the pollutant in the river water
in the moment t ; Q0(t) - amount of sewage; W (t) - number of pollutant thrown to
the river before reﬁnement; P (t) - share of the pollutant eliminated from the sewage
due to the reﬁnement; Δ - length of time period; values Bmax, Qmax are given.
For description of the pollution dynamics an ordinary diﬀerential equation in
the form
dB
dt
= F (B(t), P (t), t) (31)
is used where F (B(t), P (t), t) is a given function.
Besides ensuring the stability of the system the principal tends to maximize his
personal payoﬀ functional
J0(K(t), H(t), T (t), P (t), b(t)) =
∫ Δ
0
(−CΦ(y(t)) + y(t)F (T (t))H(t)+ (32)
+y(t)K(t)μ(T0 − T (t))b(t)− MK(t)
T0 − T (t))dt → max; y(t) = (1− P (t))W (t),
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where y(t) is an amount of the pollutant thrown by the agent in the river after
reﬁnement; CΦ(y(t)) - the principal’s water quality improvement cost function (y(t)
); F (T (t)) - cost of the unit of thrown pollutant; T (t) = T (b(t)) - a real per unit
pollution fee depending on the bribe ; T0 - the normative per unit pollution fee;
H(t) - a share of the fee that goes to the supervisor; μ - a given probability of the
bribery detection (0 ≤ μ ≤ 1 ); K = K(t)- a penalty function; M = const - a factor
of the principal’s bribery control cost.
The term CΦ(y) in (32) represents the principal’s water reﬁnement cost;
y(t)H(t)F (T (t)) - an amount of the pollution fee; y(t)K(t)μ(T0 − T (t))b(t) - an
amount of penalty charged on the supervisor in the case of corruption;MK(t)/(T0−
T (t)) - the principal’s control cost. A maximum of the functional (32) is sought with
respect to two functions K(t) and H(t).
The supervisor’s payoﬀ functional has the form
J1(K(t), H(t), T (t), P (t), b(t)) =
∫ Δ
0
(−C0(y(t)) + y(t)F (T (t))(1 −H(t))− (33)
y(t)K(t)μ(T0 − T (t))b(t) + b(t)y(t))dt → max
In (33) the term C0(y) represents the supervisor’s water quality improvement cost
function; y(t)(1−H(t))F (T (t)) - a pollution fee paid by the agent to the supervisor;
y(t)K(t)μ(T0−T (t))b(t) - the supervisor’s penalty in the case of bribery detection;
y(t) = b(t) - the bribe received by the supervisor if the amount of pollutant is equal
to y(t).
The agent’s objective is to maximize his proﬁt in the presence of corruption:
J2(T (t), P (t), b(t)) =
∫ Δ
0
(zR(Φ(t))− CP (P (t))W (t)− y(t)F (T (t)− (34)
b(t)y(t))dt → max
Here CP (P ) - the agent’s per unit cost of sewage reﬁnement; Φ(t) - production funds;
R(Φ(t)) - the agent’s production function; z = const - price of the production unit.
A maximum of (34) is sought with respect to two functions: P (t) and b(t).
The term zR(Φ) represents the agent’s proﬁt from sale of R(Φ) - units of pro-
duction; y(t)F (T (t)) - the pollution fee; CP (P (t))W (t) - the agent’s cost of sewage
reﬁnement; y(t)b(t) - the bribe value.
The problems (32) - (34) are solved with the following restrictions on the control
values:
- principal
0 ≤ H(t) ≤ 1; 0 ≤ K(t) ≤ 1; 0 ≤ t ≤ Δ; (35)
- agent
0 ≤ P (t) ≤ 1− ε; 0 ≤ b(t) ≤ bmax; 0 ≤ t ≤ Δ; (36)
- supervisor
0 ≤ T (t) ≤ T0; 0 ≤ t ≤ Δ, (37)
(37) where ε is determined by the agent’s technological capacity; bmax = const is
the maximal feasible bribe value per unit of the pollutant.
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The dynamics of production funds of the agent is described by an ordinary
diﬀerential equation in the form
dΦ
dt
= −λΦ+ Y ; Φ(0) = Φ0 , (38)
(38) where λ is a depreciation factor; Y - constant production investments; a con-
stant Φ0 is given.
Suppose that the production functions are given in the form
W (t) = βR(Φ(t)); R(Φ(t)) = γΦ0.5(t); γ, β = const (39)
The algorithm of solution of the problem (29) - (39) consists in the following steps:
1) a Germeyer game of the type Γ2t (Gorelik et al., 1991) for the supervisor and the
agent is considered. The value L2t of guaranteed payoﬀ of the agent if he doesn’t
collaborate with the supervisor is determined:
L2t = sup
P,b
inf
T
J2(T (t), P (t), b(t))
The supervisor’s strategy which minimizes the agent’s payoﬀ functional is called
her punishment strategy and denoted T k(t) ;
2) the optimal control problem (33), (36), (37) with an additional condition
L2t < J2(T (t), P (t), b(t)) (40)
is solved. A maximum of (33) is sought with respect to three functions: T (t), P (t)
and b(t). The optimal strategies depend on the principal’s strategies and have the
form
PS(t) = PS(K(t), H(t), t); bS(t) = bS(K(t), H(t), t); (41)
T S(t) = T S(K(t), H(t), t);
where‘T S(t) is the supervisor’s reward strategy. Thus
T ∗(K(t), H(t), t) =⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
TK(t) if ∃t0 : 0 ≤ t0 ≤ Δ; P (t0) = PS(K(t0), H(t0), t0)
or b(t0) = bS(K(t0), H(t0), t0);
T S(K(t), H(t), t) if ∀t : 0 ≤ t ≤ Δ; P (t) = PS(K(t), H(t), t)
and b(t) = bS(K(t), H(t), t)
Due to the condition (40) the reward strategy is the most proﬁtable one for the
agent;
3) the functions (41) are substituted in (30) - (32). The optimal control problem
(32) with additional constraints (including the phase ones) (29) - (31), (35), (38),
(39) is solved. The functions which solve the problem are denoted K∗(t) and H∗(t).
4) the Stackelberg equilibrium in the Germeyer games Γ2t (between the supervisor
and the agent) and Γ1t (between the principal and the supervisor) has the form
{K∗(t), H∗(t), T S(K∗(t), H∗(t), t), PS(K∗(t), H∗(t), t), bS(K∗(t), H∗(t), t)}
In the general case the optimal control problems deﬁned on the steps 2 and 3 of
the algorithm are solved numerically after their digitization in time by the direct
ordered sorting method.
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5. Conclusion
The general principles of building the dynamic models of the ﬁght with corruption
are proposed. The "genetic series" of dynamic models of economic and administra-
tive corruption in the form "optimal control problem - dynamic hierarchical two-
person game - dynamic hierarchical three-person game" are built. Some dynamic
models of economic corruption with application to the exloitation of bioresources
and water quality control problems are investigated and solved. In the latter case a
Stackelberg equilibrium in the Germeyer games Γ1t and Γ2t is used.
It is supposed in future to analyze in more details the models of economic cor-
ruption for diﬀerent classes of bribery functions as well as investigate the dynamic
models of administrative corruption.
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Abstract Despite robust behavioral research that shows a widespread bias
towards overconﬁdence in competitive scenarios, e.g., underestimating the
competitor’s skill level, there is little research on the long term costs as-
sociated with this bias. We develop a theoretical framework that allows us
to explore systematic long-term ramiﬁcations of opponent skill estimation
bias across diﬀerent competitive contexts relevant to managers. We capture
these contexts with dynamic branching games that are parametrized by four
features. We use Monte Carlo estimation methods to test how the expected
game outcomes compare under diﬀerent types biases. The results suggest
that bias in evaluating an opponent’s skill level is less harmful when the
opponent is more skilled, and when there is greater ﬁrst-mover advantage.
Furthermore, they suggest that if there is any eﬀort cost associated with
making a decision, then a bias towards overestimating the opponent’s skill
is never advantageous, while a bias towards underestimating can be advan-
tageous in many contexts.
Keywords: bounded rationality, overconﬁdence bias, heuristics.
1. Introduction
Many ﬁrms invest heavily in competitive analysis, and proverbial advice such as
“never underestimate the competition" abounds in the popular business literature.
Yet, little has been done to formally test this stylized wisdom from a cost-beneﬁt
perspective. There is a prevailing intuition that being caught oﬀ guard by a com-
petitor who is more skilled than expected has negative consequences— but what
are the relative consequences of the opposite mistake? How much potential surplus
would be lost by routinely assuming the competition to be more skilled than it
actually is? We build a framework for exploring bounded rationality in dynamic
branching games and use it to compare the relative payoﬀ ramiﬁcations of diﬀerent
types of biases across diﬀerent competitive contexts relevant to managers.
2. Background
Traditional game theory models have generally assumed that all players are fully
rational. Recent research streams have adapted models of decision making to ﬁt
the more realistic assumptions of bounded rationality, where players act rationally
within the bounds of their constraints on information processing (see Narasimhan
et. al., 2005).
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Two primary characteristics found in bounded rationality models are that play-
ers have diﬀerent skill levels (which can lead to uncertainty about the skill levels of
their opponents) and that the eﬀort of optimizing decisions is costly. Researchers
have used paradigms such as level-k and cognitive hierarchy models to incorpo-
rate heterogeneous reasoning levels into game theoretic models for some time (e.g.,
Camerer et al., 2004; Stahl and Wilson, 1995). These models both help explain ob-
served non-equilibrium behavior in games and estimate empirical distributions of
reasoning abilities and beliefs about others’ abilities. We take a diﬀerent approach:
knowing that error is possible (and likely unavoidable) when boundedly rational
managers form beliefs about the skill levels of the opponents they encounter, we ex-
plore, from a theoretical standpoint, the payoﬀ ramiﬁcations associated with such
errors, including relative cost of eﬀort. How much does a manager stand to lose by
repeatedly overestimating or underestimating the skill levels of the diﬀerent oppo-
nents he encounters? Which features of games make one type of error better than
another?
Our approach is similar to that of researchers such who have compared av-
erage outcomes produced by diﬀerent strategy heuristics for individual decision
makers when time or eﬀort is costly or limited (e.g., Gabaix and Laibson, 2000;
Johnson and Payne, 1985; and Payne et al., 1996). These researchers employed
Monte Carlo simulation techniques to approximate the mean outcomes of diﬀer-
ent heuristic strategies when applied over a large set of normal or extensive form
payoﬀ arrangements that were generated in part using random number generation
to capture the inherent variation in real-world situations. In all these studies, it was
concluded that simplifying heuristics can perform better than rote optimization
when the decision makers are subject to some elements of bounded rationality. We
build on similar conceptual and methodological foundations, but add the complexity
of a second strategic player and bias surrounding comparative skill.
3. Model Framework
3.1. Game Structure
Our ﬁrst goal is to deﬁne a highly generalizable game structure that captures the
critical features of strategic competitive interactions faced routinely by boundedly
rational managers in a variety of settings without overﬁtting to a particular cir-
cumstance. As such, we look for general game characteristics rather than a unique
example.
We observe that when navigating complex long-term competitive relationships,
managers are often faced with decisions that have not only immediate payoﬀ rami-
ﬁcations, but also aﬀect the choices (and associated payoﬀs) that will be available
in the future. For example, a ﬁrm may be deciding between releasing a newly devel-
oped product into the market at a low price to encourage trial, or at high price in
order to obtain surplus from enthusiastic early adopters (e.g., Apple releasing the
initial Ipod). There are immediate proﬁts to be gained from the decision (in terms of
proﬁts generated from initial sales) but these diﬀerent moves may also have longer-
term strategic consequences, based in part on the actions taken by the ﬁrm’s major
competitor. For example, this competitor might be developing a competing product
(e.g., Microsoft releasing the Zune), and after observing how the ﬁrst ﬁrm priced
its product, the competitor will decide whether to release its product at a regular
or a substantially discounted price. When this happens, there will be an immediate
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shift in proﬁts for both ﬁrms, and also set up the ﬁrst ﬁrm for a counter-response
in terms of adjusting prices or promotions or investing in new development eﬀorts.
If the ﬁrst ﬁrm is myopic, then it will release its product at whatever price initially
maximizes sales, without considering what the competition will do in response. If
the ﬁrm is more sophisticated, it will consider possible competitive responses, its
own counter-response, and so on, and make its initial decision with those down-
stream implications in mind. Of course, there is a limit on how far out even the
most sophisticated manager can think, especially when the competitive horizon is
long or complex.
We use a branching tree structure to represent such real world strategic decision
situations where managers repeatedly make moves and counter moves. Thus, the
players alternate making decisions over time, and each node in the tree has a payoﬀ
associated with it (which represents the value of the state of aﬀairs at that moment
in time, e.g., current market share or proﬁts). To capture diﬀerent skill levels, we
let players vary in the time horizon over which they can optimize from any given
moment in the game.
This leads us to assume two-player alternating-move ﬁnite-horizon games of per-
fect and complete (within one’s foresight horizon1) information, where for parsimony
we limit our attention to constant-sum payoﬀs. This structure has appeal for many
reasons. Dynamic games allow foresight horizon to be used as a precise measure of
skill, capturing varying degrees of myopia that managers employ within their long-
term competitive landscapes. Games in which information is perfect and complete
(within a player’s foresight window) provide an excellent platform for studying the
research question at hand, because variation in outcome is caused solely by varia-
tion in skill and beliefs. Finite horizon games apply to situations in which managers
are competing over a set term (for example, sales over a holiday season, perfor-
mance bonuses over a ﬁscal year) or when players make several moves that lead to
a long-term stabilization of market shares. Many competitive marketing situations
are inherently constant sum (for example, employees competing over a ﬁxed bonus
pool, ﬁrms competing for market share in an inelastic market). Even if the games
are not constant sum they can be re-framed as such if the payoﬀs are normalized to
reﬂect relative competitive advantage. For convenience, we restrict all payoﬀs to the
range of 0 to 1, which corresponds nicely (but not restrictively) to market share. By
convention, P1 always seeks to maximize payoﬀs, and P2 seeks to minimize payoﬀs
(i.e., P2 seeks to maximize one minus the payoﬀ).
We note that our game structure assumes state values (interim payoﬀs) at each
non-terminal node. Though ubiquitous in computer science (e.g., see Hsu, 2002 and
Russell and Norvig, 2003), which as a ﬁeld is inherently concerned with bounded
rationality, this notion of pre-terminal state values is not widely used in the eco-
nomics and management game literature. Instead, the games studied previously are
generally deﬁned in term of the ﬁnal (terminal) payoﬀs, a paradigm appropriate for
managers with unconstrained reasoning abilities. We break from this literature since
we believe interim payoﬀs capture real-world phenomenon applicable to boundedly
rational managers. Intuitively, if a manager’s forsight constraint precludes him from
anticipating payoﬀs all the way out to the end of the game, he must use something
observable in the interim to guide his behavior. For example, employees competing
for a year-end bonus allotment may use quarterly performance reviews as a means of
1 i.e., players can see all payoﬀs that fall within their foresight horizons perfectly
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evaluating standing along the way. Or, politicians campaigning for an elected oﬃce
may use opinion polls as a measure of vote market share at various intervals before
the election takes place. Thus, the interim payoﬀ values we preserve in our game
structure can be considered to be imperfect assessments of the strategic advantage
of a state in the game (i.e., of the ﬁnal outcome to which the state will lead). Of
course, there are numerous ways to evaluate the worth of such interim states, and
devising a sophisticated method of doing so is a skill in itself. Our correlation pa-
rameter, ρ, which will be discussed in the next section, controls the reliability of
these signals in our model.
Many well-known strategy games ﬁt this structure, including Go and Chess,
which are both renowned for their strategic complexity and played in highly com-
petitive international tournaments. Like all games of complete and perfect informa-
tion, the process of solving Go or Chess is theoretically trivial—but the branching
game trees are so complex that not even the best computers in the world can model
the full game tree. Artiﬁcially intelligent players instead must be forward-looking
to build a game tree that extends as many rounds into the future as they are ca-
pable of, and then optimize play over that limited horizon. Final scoring rules or
other evaluation functions are applied to transient states of the board as a way of
assessing the value of the board, even though only the conﬁguration present when
the game ends is used to tabulate ﬁnal score (see Russell and Norvig, 2003).
By following in this tradition, we are able to explore player navigation in a
class of games that has real-world relevence for manager but for which the curse
of dimensionality precludes calculation of classically rational behavior in all but
the simplest of cases. Strategic decision making under constrained foresight can be
modeled in even the most complex of games, as it removes the link between game
complexity and calculation complexity.
3.2. Game Parametrization
As we are interested in looking at a variety of diﬀerent games that might be en-
countered by players in the real world, we abstract away the labels of the actions
that deﬁne the circumstances of any particular game, reducing each game to a
pattern of branches and payoﬀs (this is similar in method to the generalized deci-
sion structures used by Gabaix and Laibson, 2000; Johnson and Payne, 1985; and
Payne et al., 1996) that can be populated by any number of possible payoﬀ ar-
rangements. Of course, real world games vary in the patterns they create: one game
will have one arrangement of payoﬀs (based on its set of actions) and another game
will have quite a diﬀerent set of payoﬀs. Thus we create sets of games that include
all possible games a player could encounter that ﬁt certain useful pattern deﬁnitions.
By showing the eﬀects of bias conditions over entire game sets, we attempt to model
the overall eﬀects of such biased beliefs applied consistently over many situations
with many diﬀerent opponents. We allow the number of periods in the game tree
to vary by length (L). For simplicity, we restrict L to even integers, so that both
players have an equal number of moves. In this initial analysis, all decision nodes
contain a choice between exactly two actions. However, the model can be extended
in future work to allow such complexity descriptions to vary.
The payoﬀ correlation parameter ρ is used to deﬁne the relationship between
early interim payoﬀ signals and their downstream consequences. We begin by al-
lowing the initial period interim payoﬀs to be drawn randomly from some deﬁned
distribution. In our case, we use the uniform distribution U(0, 1), but this can easily
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be modiﬁed within our framework. This initial distribution is used to capture the
inherent variation of possible circumstances. The values of subsequent nodes are
determined such that vt = ρvt−1 + (1− ρ)t where vt is the value associated with a
node at period t, vt−1 is the value of the preceding node on the same path (parent
node), t is a draw from U(0, 1), and 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. In this way, ρ captures the strength
of the signal interim payoﬀs provide for future payoﬀs.
3.3. Player Parametrization
Behavioral research has shown that managers engage in a process of limited-horizon
reasoning when engaging in dynamic strategic behavior (e.g., Camerer and Johnson,
2004; Johnson et al., 2002; Stahl and Wilson, 1995). Rather than performing full
backward induction, players look forward a certain number of periods, and optimize
only over that window, as if the game truncated there. Players vary in the number
of future periods they can think though. These empirical ﬁnding drive the inclusion
of such behavior in our model.
In line with extant level of thinking models, we use the parameter ki to represent
player i’s skill, and speciﬁcally deﬁne ki as foresight horizon: the number of periods
out into the future he can think through, including the present period. Players also
have beliefs about their opponent’s skill level: we deﬁne parameter bij as player i’s
belief about kj . A player’s skill ki and belief bij map to a player type that chooses
his action at each period by considering only the subgame that starts at the current
period and ends ki periods later (even if the true game length extends beyond that
horizon). In other words, at each period in which he makes a decision, player i
(Pi) creates a truncated version of the game tree that starts at the current node
(period t) and ends after ki periods. From Pi’s point of view, he cannot think beyond
period t+ki−1 and thus this player’s objective is to optimize his outcome in period
t+ ki− 1 (eﬀectively acting as if the game ends at that point, or, equivalently, that
all future states that exist beyond this period have the same payoﬀ as the their
preceding state)2. Our motivation in this type deﬁnition is to capture the heuristic-
like behavior of players under cognitive constraints.
To describe the decision rule in more detail, we break beliefs into two categories:
bij ≥ ki−1 (i.e., Pi believes his opponent can see out at least as far in the game as he
himself can at any particular period3) and bij < ki − 1 (Pi believes his opponent is
more than one level less skilled than he himself is). When bij ≥ ki−1, Pi determines
his move based on full backward induction over this truncated game. This is because
at each period within this truncated game, Pi believes that the player in control
can see through the entire truncated game. Note that all beliefs bij that are greater
than or equal to ki− 1 map to the same decision algorithm for Pi. This is because a
player constrained by his own foresight horizon cannot anticipate what his opponent
would do outside that window, even if he believes his opponent to be looking farther
(and behavioral research supports that people do behave as if the game ends at the
2 Pi optimizes for period t + ki − 1, rather than period t + ki, as we have deﬁned ki to
include the current period.
3 The reason ki − 1 rather than ki is the critical value is due to the sequential nature of
the game. If Pi is making a decision in period 1, and is a level 4 thinker, then he can
“see through" to period 4, and nothing beyond that. Since his opponent Pj will not be
making a move until the next period, Pj can be allotted a maximum of 3 levels from
Pi’s perspective (thus reaching period 4) before P ′i s own constraint prevents him from
seeing father, even through Pj ’s eyes.
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limit of their foresight horizon, even if they are aware that it doesn’t and that other
players might be thinking farther, e.g., Johnson et al., 2002). Thus, as long at as
the more limited skill player knows his opponent has a greater skill level than he
does (or, more precisely, not more than one level less), ﬁne-tuning his estimate of his
opponent’s skill will not change his behavior. However, the higher skill level player
needs to make a more precise estimate of the less skilled player’s skill level.
On the other hand, when bij < ki − 1, Pi must ﬁrst consider the even smaller
subgames he believes his opponent (Pj) will be optimizing over at each of the periods
Pj controls that fall within Pi’s horizon. Pi must do this ﬁrst, since he believes Pj
will be using diﬀerent critera than the ﬁnal period values of Pi’s truncated game.
Only then can Pi backward induct over his full foresight horizon to determine his
own optimal move, given his beliefs about Pj ’s less sophisticated decisions. More
speciﬁcally, for each state that could occur in period t+1 (as a result of Pi’s choice
in period t), Pi creates a subgame that commences with that state and extends
to a length of bij . He backward inducts over each of these subgames to determine
what Pj will choose if found in that state in the second period. Then for each of
the potential states that could exist in period t + 1, Pi can prune oﬀ the rejected
options, as well as all the downstream branches of the tree that stem from these
rejected second period options. Pi then repeats this process for each period that Pj
controls within his foresight window, further pruning the tree each time. When he
has determined what Pj will decide at all decision sets in the foresight window, he
can backward induct over the pruned tree, and arrive at his optimal choice for the
current period.
For simplicity, we deﬁne P1 to always be the more skilled player, such that
k1 > k2. Furthermore, we do not consider cases in which Pi’s beliefs about Pj ’s
beliefs about Pi (i.e. Pi’s belief about bji) vary enough to change the decision al-
gorithm described above. For example, if Pi has belief bij = 3, then the optimal
backward induction process Pi uses over the subgames of length bij (to determine
what Pj will choose at a given decision set) would change if Pi believed that Pj
believed that Pi was a level 1 thinker vs. a level 2 thinker (note, however, that as
per the above reasoning, all beliefs of this nature that are greater than or equal
to 2 map to the same full backward induction over the subgame—so it is only
when bij ≥ 3 that these higher order beliefs could aﬀect decision processes). For
simplicity, we do not consider variation in higher order beliefs, and assume that,
for any opponent skill belief bij , Pi performs a full backward induction when hy-
pothetically selecting moves from Pj ’s perspective.4 We do this because there is
limited room for such variation within shorter foresight horizons and experimental
work suggests that people generally have quite limited levels of thinking (see, for
example, Camerer et al., 2004 and Stahl and Wilson, 1995).
For simplicity, we assume that each player holds a single value for bij and ap-
plies it with certainty (i.e., instead of specifying a distribution of possible oppo-
nent beliefs, or updating beliefs over time). This assumption is in line with be-
havioral work that ﬁnds individuals show overconﬁdence about their judgments
(e.g., Hoﬀrage, 2004), and is further justiﬁed by the limited opportunity for learn-
ing within the scope of the model. Players are not engaging in long, repeated games
with familiar opponents, but rather engaging in a large variety of short, novel one-
4 However, preliminary ﬁndings suggest that relaxing this assumption only strengthens
the results found in this paper.
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time games with novel opponents and only stochastic feedback. Empirical ﬁndings
show that people are slow to update existing beliefs, especially amid noisy signals,
and that when they do, they overweight prior beliefs (e.g., Boulding et al., 1999;
Camerer and Lovallo, 1999). Furthermore, the ﬁrst move, which must occur before
any learning is possible, has the most inﬂuence on the game, especially when ρ > 0.
Thus we believe our assumed model captures the general belief conditions found in
many sequential games.
We also note that we use foresight horizon as our singular measure of player
skill. There are, of course, many dimensions to skill when playing games in real life.
For example, players may diﬀer on their ability to accurately assess payoﬀs or to
correctly apply backward induction. For parsimony in our manipulation, we create
a level playing ﬁeld on all dimensions except foresight horizon. This follows in the
tradition of many analytic and level-k models, and allows a clean manipulation of
skill levels. However, the model can be extended in future research to account for
other such dimensions of skill—for example, by allowing players to “see" only a
variably imperfect correlate of the true payoﬀ for any given state.
Finally, we add for clariﬁcation that we assume that players do not alter their
decision rules based on the value of ρ. This is because we are attempting to cap-
ture the overall eﬀect of diﬀerent bias conditions applied heuristically by managers
repeatedly over many diﬀerent contexts and against many diﬀerent opponents. The
value of ρ in a real-world setting would be diﬃcult to observe precisely, especially
under constrained reasoning. Furthermore, knowledge of ρ would only potentially
change players’ decision rules if players were endogenously concerned with minimiz-
ing eﬀort cost. We assume that this is not the case and will explain our reasons for
this in Section 3.5..
3.4. Bias Conditions
We begin our theoretical experiment by creating three bias conditions (B) that
correspond to three “worlds" in which players all exhibit one of three types of bias
in estimating their opponent’s skill level, and are unaware that the bias is present.5
We ﬁrst consider the accurate (B = A) opponent skill estimation condition, where
bij = kj , to model a condition of no bias. This scenario is most similar to traditional
game theoretic methods. Players have exogenously deﬁned skill levels (where k1 >
k2), and we assume that these skill levels are common knowledge.
We next consider an opponent underestimation (B = U) condition, correspond-
ing to overconﬁdence bias. To model a slight population-wide opponent underesti-
mation bias, we set bij = kj − 1, such that each player believes his opponent to be
exactly one level less skilled than is actually the case. Guided by the observation
that people are often unaware of bias, we initially assume that both players think
their beliefs map to true values that are common knowledge. P1 thinks that k1 and
k2 − 1 are the common knowledge skill levels for P1 and P2, while P2 thinks that
k1 − 1 and k2 are the levels for P1 and P2 that are common knowledge. However,
we soon show in Lemma 2 that this assumption can be relaxed.
Finally, we test a condition in which players exhibit a bias towards overestimat-
ing opponent skill (B = O). Though such “underconﬁdence" does not appear to be
prevalent in nature, this test provides a useful theoretical tool for understanding
5 We later show that neither awareness of the bias nor asymmetric bias will aﬀect player
decisions or game outcome.
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overconﬁdence. This condition is deﬁned similarly to the U condition, except that
now both players believe their opponent to be exactly one level more skilled than
is actually the case (bij = kj + 1). P1 thinks that k1 and k2 + 1 are the skill levels
for P1 and P2 that are common knowledge, while P2 thinks that k1 + 1 and k2 are
the skill levels for P1 and P2 that are common knowledge.
A logical implication of this framework that simpliﬁes our analyses is that, since
P2’s actions are the same for all beliefs b21 ≥ k2−1, and since k1 > k2, then the two
bias conditions in which players misestimate opponents skill level (O and U) have no
eﬀect on P2’s decision process compared to the accurate estimation condition (A).
Even if P1 is only one level more skilled than P2, an underestimation bias on the
part of P2 will yield b21 = k1− 1 = k2, which maps to the same decision in all cases
as accurate estimation (b21 = k1 = k2+1) and overestimation (b21 = k1+1 = k2+2).
It is only when the more skilled player has biased beliefs that the game outcome is
potentially changed. This is because only the more skilled player has the opportunity
(capacity) to think further out than his opponent and this foresight can result in
changes in his decision process. This leads to the following lemma.
Lemma 1. The weaker player’s bias condition has no eﬀect on game outcome
Thus, throughout our analysis, we focus on the implications of opponent esti-
mation error from P1’s perspective. All results will hold whether or not the weaker
player exhibits bias.
Lemma 1 implies that P2’s bias doesn’t aﬀect his own behavior. Consequently,
P1’s awareness of P2’s bias does not change P1’s behavior, since P2 will behave the
same in all conditions. Nor will P2’s awareness of P1’s bias change P2’s behavior.
To see this, note that when P2 is looking hypothetically through P1’s eyes over his
truncated subgames, trying to anticipate what P1 will do, he only has k2−1 periods
to work with—which leaves only k2− 2 periods in which he can anticipate what P1
thinks about P2. In other words, all of P2’s beliefs about what P1 believes about
P2 that are ≥ k2 − 2 map to the same decision process and the same outcome. In
bias conditions U , A, and O, respectively, P1 believes k2 to be k2−1, k2, and k2+1.
All of these values are ≥ k2 − 2, and thus even if P2 is aware of P1’s bias, it does
not change his behavior, due to the limitations of his own cognitive constraints.
Lemma 2. The outcome of the game is the same whether or not players are aware
of the other player’s bias.
Note that Lemmas 1 and 2 hold in our model because we are looking as small
errors in opponent estimation, or slight biases. If we explored conditions in which
players underestimate each others’ skill to large degrees (speciﬁcally, with an un-
derestimation bias that is > 1 + k1 − k2) then player decisions would potentially
be aﬀected. Together, these lemmas show that our model holds under assumptions
that are less restrictive than we initially laid out. For logical equivalence, we need
only assume that P1 is more skilled than P2 (i.e., k1 > k2)6, that P2 believes P1
can see out at least as far as he can (i.e., b21 ≥ k2 − 1), that P1 will not underes-
timate P2 by more than three levels7, and that both players are aware of all these
6 To allow “room" for P1 to eﬀectively overestimate P2, we focus on cases in which k1 >
k2 + 1.
7 This is the minimum lower bound over all conditions for which P2’s beliefs about P1’s
beliefs about P2 might change P2’s decision behavior.
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things. In addition, to test out bias conditions, we further assume that P1 exhibits
the following condition-dependent beliefs. For B = U , P1 underestimates P2’s skill
level such that b12 = k2 − 1. For B = A, P1 accurately estimates P2’s skill level
such that b12 = k2. And for B = O, P1 overestimates P2’s skill level such that
b12 = k2 + 1.
3.5. Eﬀort Cost
Under boundedly rational paradigms, it is generally accepted that there is some
cost of information acquisition and processing, whether it be opportunity cost, er-
ror introduction, or sheer disutility of eﬀort (e.g., see Shugan, 1980). With this
noted, there is no consensus among researchers on how to precisely deﬁne such a
cost function for decision making. Moreover, in real life these costs are likely to be
highly variable across persons and contexts. Consequently, to maintain greatest ex-
ternal validity, we refrain from deﬁning any speciﬁc cost functions, and assume only
that such eﬀort cost strictly increases with the amount of information processed,
which can be represented through the number of game tree nodes a player gener-
ates when making a decision. This is consistent with behavioral traditions that use
elementary information processes as a measure of the cost of cognitive eﬀort (see
Newell and Simon, 1972 and Payne et al., 1995). We use C(B) as the cost of eﬀort
exerted by P1 under bias condition B for a set k1 and k2 where the cost is some
increasing function of nodes examined during the ﬁrst move.
We also assume that players do not account for any eﬀort cost when making
decisions. Rather, players’ decision rules are driven by their skill levels and beliefs,
and we compute comparative eﬀort costs post-hoc, to show the relative long-term
advantages of diﬀerent heuristics applied by decision makers automatically (e.g.,
see Stahl, 1993). This assumption is perhaps unusual in the game theory literature,
especially when costs are considered purely search costs, rather than optimization
costs. However, we follow in the tradition of bounded rationality paradigms and take
our players’ decision rules to be heuristic-like (based on empirical observation) rather
than strict optimization. Thus, the players within our model apply the same decision
rules (based on their own skill and their beliefs about their opponent’s skill) to each
decision they encounter, as a matter of course, without considering eﬀort cost. This
approach is in line with empirical and theoretical work on heuristics and biases and
circumvents a general problem with optimization in bounded rationality paradigms
when decision eﬀort itself costly: the act of cost-aware decision optimization becomes
impossible, as the decision of how to decide how to decide (and so forth) becomes
an inﬁnite regress where each such higher order decision exacts its own cost (e.g.,
see Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001).
3.6. Net Expected Outcome
We deﬁne net expected outcome as the gross expected outcome for a given bias
condition and parameter set minus the cost of implementing the decision rule. We
use EN(B) to refer to the net expected outcome for bias B over a ﬁxed game and
skill set, where EN(B) = E(B) − C(B). Of course, we cannot compute meaningful
numeric values for EN(B) without assigning a a shape and relative scale to the cost
function, which is outside the scope and motivation of this paper. However, with the
one assumption that cost is a strictly increasing function of information searched,
we can determine useful ordinal properties and trends. Thus, in our analysis we will
look for insights relating to the the relative net expected outcomes of the three bias
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conditions as a function of the game parameters L and ρ and the player parameters
k1 and k2. Figure 1 illustrates the structure of the model framework.
Fig. 1: Model Framework
4. Analysis
4.1. Estimating Expected Outcomes and Costs
For any speciﬁc game tree, the unique outcome of the game is entirely predictable
given k1, k2, and bias condition B. Unlike full rationality models, the players them-
selves may not accurately predict ﬁnal outcomes while in early periods, and may
make mistakes (when foresight is incomplete or there is estimation error) that lead
the game into a state they did not anticipate. However, the outcome that will be
arrived at is deterministic from an outside perspective, i.e., by someone who can
see the entire game tree and knows k1, k2, and B, and can apply the appropriate
decision algorithms from the perspective of each player to arrive at the ﬁnal out-
come. As the outcome for any single game is of little generalizable value, we focus on
estimating the expected values for the outcomes over inﬁnite sets of possible game
trees that make up game sets deﬁned by speciﬁc values of L and ρ with player skills
deﬁned by k1 and k2. We use the notation E(B) as a shorthand for the expected
outcome under bias condition B ∈ {O,A,U} for a ﬁxed parameter set.
We use Monte Carlo simulation to estimate the expected outcomes of each bias
condition over a range of parameter values that we believe are reasonable within
our general premise of bounded rationality. We test all parameter combinations that
meet the requirements of our model that fall within the range 2 ≤ k2 ≤ k1 − 2 ≤
k1 ≤ L ≤ 10 and ρ in 0.1 increments from 0 to 1 (i.e., ρ = {0, .1, .2, .3, ..., 1}).
We use the Visual Basic environment in Microsoft Excel to write a program
that builds sample game trees of any speciﬁed L and ρ, where the payoﬀs in the
ﬁrst period (v1) are drawn randomly from U(0, 1) using Excel’s random number
generator, and each child node’s payoﬀ is equal to its parent node’s value plus error
weighted by ρ such that vt = ρvt−1 + (1 − ρ)t, where t is a draw from U(0, 1).
The decision rules described in Section 3.3. are programmatically applied to ﬁnd
the unique outcome for each generated game tree according to any speciﬁed k1, k2,
and B.
We generate two thousand game trees for each unique combination of game
parameters (L and ρ) included in the range deﬁned above. For each tree generated,
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we record the outcome reached under each bias condition (B) for each combination
of player skill parameters (k1 and k2) included in the range deﬁned above. The
mean outcome over all trials of a unique parameter set is used to approximate the
expected outcome for that parameter set. For simplicity, we average the results for
consecutive values of k2 to eliminate main eﬀects of the parity of k2 which we do
no expect to be useful in terms of managerial insights. We also count the number
of nodes searched in the ﬁrst turn of P1 to use as a basis for ordinal comparisons of
eﬀort cost (which as deﬁned in Section 3.5., is considered to be some (any) strictly
increasing function of information searched.
4.2. Results
Comparing the estimates for all combinations of parameter values in the range
tested, we ﬁnd the following results.
Result 1. The expected outcome is greatest when P1 accurately estimates his op-
ponent’s skill level, followed by when he overestimates, followed by when he under-
estimates, for all otherwise ﬁxed parameter values; E(A) > E(O) > E(U) for all
ﬁxed k1, k2, L, and ρ.
Note that if the parameter range allowed k2 ≥ k1 then the inequalities would
become weak, as the search behavior (and thus outcomes) would be the same in all
three conditions from P1’s perspective.
Result 1 supports conventional wisdom and intuition. However, we expect that
the magnitude of disparity between the raw exceptions changes in diﬀerent settings.
Thus, we next investigate the relationship between opponent skill and the diﬀerences
in E(B). We ﬁrst note that an increase in k2 when k1 − k2 is held constant implies
that both players are getting more skilled, while the disparity between them stays
the same. On the other hand, an increase in k2 while k1 is held constant implies
that P2 is getting more skilled, while the disparity between the players diminishes.
In both cases, we ﬁnd that increasing k2 decreases the diﬀerences in E(B).
Result 2. The expected outcomes of all bias conditions converge as both players
become more skilled together; diﬀerences in E(B) decrease with k2 for any ﬁxed
k1 − k2, L, and ρ.
Result 3. The expected outcomes of all bias conditions converge as P2 becomes
more skilled relative to P1; diﬀerences in E(B) decrease with k2 for any ﬁxed k1, L,
and ρ.
To explain the intuition for this result, we note that as P2 becomes more skilled,
P1 has less control over the outcome, regardless of bias condition. The longer the
horizon over which P2 has full foresight, the greater P2’s ability to inﬂuence the
outcome, which limits the range of possible outcomes available to P1. Thus the range
between the worst outcome and best outcome for P1 decreases when he is playing
against more skilled opponents. As a result, there is less relative payoﬀ decrease to
P1 as a result of error. This is true both as P2 becomes more skilled in absolute
terms, as well as relative to P1. As P1’s skill advantage over P2 decreases (i.e., as
the players become more evenly matched, regardless of absolute skill level), there
are fewer periods over which P1 can use his advantage—and thus fewer periods in
which estimation error can detract from the potential outcome. As a result, the
diﬀerences in E(B) decrease whenever average opponent skill increases, regardless
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of whether both players are getting more skilled together, or whether the disparity
between them is decreasing.
As expected, we also ﬁnd that the expected outcomes of each of the three bias
conditions converge as ρ increases.
Result 4. The diﬀerence between the expected outcomes of overestimation and un-
derestimation decrease with payoﬀ correlation for any ﬁxed game and skill set.
This is intuitive because increasing ρ increases the advantage generated by the
ﬁrst move, thus decreasing the inﬂuence P2’s strategy will have on the outcome,
which thereby decreases the expected payoﬀ loss associated with opponent estima-
tion errors.
In addition to having asymmetric eﬀects on expected payoﬀs, we also ﬁne that
diﬀerent types of errors in estimating opponent skill also have asymmetric implica-
tions for eﬀort cost. When underestimating his opponent, P1 can prune oﬀ much
of the game tree without ever having to generate of process the payoﬀs associated
with those states. This results in an eﬀort cost savings. This is true to a less extent
with accurate estimation, and to an even less extent with over estimation.
Result 5. When a player’s own level of thinking is ﬁxed, it costs him the most to
overestimate his opponent, less to accurately estimate, and least to underestimate;
C(O) > C(A) > C(U) for any ﬁxed k1and k2.
Note that the strict inequality holds for the parameter range tested. If the the
range allowed k2 ≥ k1, then the inequalities would become weak, as the search
behavior (and thus costs) would be the same in all three conditions from P1’s
perspective.
From Results 1 and 5 we know that E(O) < E(A) and C(O) > C(A) for all
game and player sets that ﬁt the requirements of our model. From here one can
directly conclude that E(O)−C(O) < E(A)−C(A). In other words, overestimation
always has a lower expected net (as well as gross) return than accurate estimation,
regardless of game or player parameters. In fact, the diﬀerence between the net
expected outcomes is necessarily larger than the diﬀerence between gross expected
outcomes. This leads us to Result 6.
Result 6. The expected net payoﬀ for overestimation is always strictly less than
the expected net payoﬀ of accurate estimation for any ﬁxed parameter set: EN(O) <
EN(A).
There is no such strict dominance with underestimation. From Results 1 and 5,
we know E(U) < E(A) and C(U) < C(A), from which we cannot determine a
general ordinality for E(U)−C(U) versus E(A)−C(A). The diﬀerence in expected
net returns of under vs. accurate estimations will depend on the magnitudes of each
term, which are determined by the speciﬁc parameters of a game and player set, as
well as the speciﬁc cost functions used. It is not our goal in this paper to propose
valid cost functions. Still it is possible to gain additional insights by considering the
relationship of the parameters ρ and k2 on the diﬀerences in EN(B).
Considering ﬁrst the minimum values for k2 and ρ, we note that, depending on
the cost function, EN(U) can take any of three positions: it can be less than EN(O),
it can be greater than EN(O) but less than EN(A), or it can be greater than EN(A).
However, as either k2 or ρ increases, the expectation disadvantage of U decreases
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relative to A and O. Regardless of where EN(U) begins relative to EN(O) and EN(A),
the slope diﬀerences will cause there to be some critical value of both k2 and ρ, above
which EN(U) is the best performing condition if the trend lines are extrapolated. As
we are not deﬁning cost function scales, we cannot say if the critical value will occur
within the parameter limits imposed by a player’s own skill constraint. However,
we can say that this becomes more likely that the cost of information acquisition
and processing increases.
This brings us to Result 7.
Result 7. Underestimation can yield the greatest net expected outcome for a pa-
rameter set. This is more likely to occur when the opponent is highly skilled, when
the ﬁrst mover advantage is strong, and/or when eﬀort costs are high; EN(U) be-
comes more likely to to be higher than both EN(O) and EN(A) as k2, ρ, and eﬀort
costs increase.
5. Discussion
The ultimate goal of this paper is to provide an initial exploration into the question
of if and when overconﬁdence can be beneﬁcial to managers who make frequent
complex competitive business decisions. In order to do this we needed to develop
a new and general framework for analyzing boundedly rational players in “large
world" (Savage, 1954) complex games. Our framework uses a branching decision
tree with interim payoﬀs to represent a strategic game between two players where
players make sequential moves over time and have limited foresight. Because our
model includes a skill constraint for each player, we are able to explore branching
game structures that have real-world applicability but that can be quite diﬃcult
to manage under traditional assumptions of rationality due to the curse of dimen-
sionality. Given our interest in generalizable conclusions, we build a Monte Carlo
simulation program to estimate the expected payoﬀs over a the distribution of pos-
sible payoﬀ structures associated with any given game length, payoﬀ correlation,
players’ skill levels, and players’ beliefs about their opponent’s skill level. We be-
lieve this framework could be useful to others interested in bounded rationality and
branching sequential games.
Our results suggest that bias in evaluating an opponent’s skill is less harmful to
expected payoﬀ when the opponent is more skilled, and when there is greater ﬁrst-
mover advantage. Furthermore, they suggest that if there is any eﬀort cost associ-
ated with the making a decision, then a bias towards overestimating the opponent’s
skill is never advantageous, while a bias towards underestimating can be advanta-
geous in many contexts. Thus, the overconﬁdence bias behavioral researchers have
observed in the population may actually be helpful, rather than detrimental, as is
often suggested, and we provide initial insight into when this is more likely to be
the case.
Although these initial theoretical experiments begin to shed light on the rela-
tionships of interest, they have several limitations, and thus should be considered as
only a start to understanding the greater relationships between skill constraints, op-
ponent estimation errors, and outcomes. For example, the game contexts the model
framework covers in this initial exploration are limited, but could, in the future,
be extended to capture non-zero-sum games, games with greater complexity, and
state-dependency in the parameters. In terms of players, the extant model considers
only one dimension of skill (foresight horizon) and thus the results do not generalize
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to estimating other dimensions of competitive capabilities, such as sophistication
in estimating the interim payoﬀs (or resources of the competing ﬁrm). We believe
future research can build oﬀ this framework to address these and other limitations,
thereby providing deeper and broader insights to advise managers in their real-world
decisions.
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Abstract Repeated bidding games were introduced by De Meyer and Sa-
ley (2002) to analyze the evolution of the price system at ﬁnance markets
with asymmetric information. In the paper of De Meyer and Saley arbitrary
bids are allowed. It is more realistic to assume that players may assign only
discrete bids proportional to a minimal currency unit. This paper represents
a survey of author’s results on discrete bidding games with asymmetric in-
formation.
Keywords: multistage bidding, asymmetric information, price ﬂuctuation,
random walk, repeated game, optimal strategy.
1. Introduction
1.1. Modeling ﬁnancial markets by repeated games
Regular random ﬂuctuations in stock market prices are usually explained by eﬀects
from multiple exogenous factors subjected to accidental variations. The work of De
Meyer and Saley (2002) proposes a diﬀerent strategic motivation for these phenom-
ena. The authors assert that the Brownian component in the evolution of prices on
the stock market may originate from the asymmetric information of stockbrokers
on events determining market prices. ”Insiders” are not interested in the immediate
revelation of their private information. This forces them to randomize their actions
and results in the appearance of an oscillatory component in price evolution.
De Meyer and Saley demonstrate this idea on a model of multistage bidding
between two agents for risky assets (shares). The liquidation price of a share depends
on a random ”state of nature”. Before the bidding starts a chance move determines
the ”state of nature” and therefore the liquidation price of a share once and for all.
Player 1 is informed on the ”state of nature”, but Player 2 is not. Both players know
the probability of a chance move. Player 2 knows that Player 1 is an insider.
At each subsequent step t = 1, 2, ..., n both players simultaneously propose their
prices for one share. The maximal bid wins and one share is transacted at this price.
If the bids are equal, no transaction occurs. Each player aims to maximize the value
of his ﬁnal portfolio (money plus liquidation value of obtained shares).
 This study was partially supported by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research,
projects 04-06-80430-a, 07-06-00174-a, 10-06-00348-a and 13-01-00462-a.
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In this model the uninformed Player 2 should use informed Player 1’s history of
moves to update his beliefs about the state of nature. Thus Player 1 must maintain a
delicate balance between taking advantage of his private information and concealing
it from Player 2.
De Meyer and Saley consider a model where a share’s liquidation price takes
only two values and players may make arbitrary bids. They reduce this model to
a zero-sum repeated game with lack of information on one side, as introduced by
Aumann and Maschler (1995), but with continual action sets. De Meyer and Saley
show that these n-stage games have the values (i.e. the guaranteed gains of Player
1 are equal to the guaranteed losses of Player 2). They ﬁnd these values and the
optimal strategies of players. As n tends to inﬁnity, the values inﬁnitely grow up
with rate
√
n. It is shown that Brownian Motion appears in the asymptotics of
transaction prices generated by these strategies.
More exactly, De Meyer and Saley construct continuous time processes Πn(t)
with t ∈ [0, 1] representing these ﬁnite random sequences and prove that, as n tends
to ∞, the processes Πn converge in law to the limit process Π expressed by means
of Brownian Motion.
In De Meyer (2010) a model of a market with one risky asset and perfectly
general trading mechanism was considered. For example, transactions of arbitrary
amount of shares at any stage of a game and presence of non-zero bid-ask spread can
be implemented by means of this mechanism. The model of De Meyer and Saley is
a particular case of this general model. For this general problem the limiting prop-
erties as the number of repetitions tends to inﬁnity were investigated. It was shown
that when both players use their optimal strategies the price process (expected price
of a risky asset giving the history up to a current stage) converges after proper nor-
malization in ﬁnite dimensional distributions to a martingale adapted to the natural
Brownian ﬁltration with terminal distribution coinciding with prior distribution of
the share price. This class of price evolutions was called CMMV (continuous martin-
gales of the maximal variation). The limit of the value and “asymptotically optimal”
strategy of informed player were explicitly characterized too. Rather surprisingly, it
was found that all the limiting objects do not depend on particular trading mecha-
nism. To obtain these results a breakthrough technique to analyze repeated games
with incomplete information was developed. The main idea was to look at the game
from the point of view of informed player and to reduce it to some martingale op-
timization problem, the so-called problem of the maximal variation. This approach
then allowed to apply a broad variety of tools from theory of stochastic processes.
The ideas of De Meyer about reduction to the martingale optimization problem
were extended by Gensbittel (2010) in his thesis to a general repeated games with
incomplete information (not necessary modelling a ﬁnance market). Moreover, he
considered several improvements of the general trading mechanism of De Meyer: the
case of several risky assets and the non-zero sum case (the total amount of money
is not conserved).
It is to be mentioned that all the results of De Meyer and Gensbittel are obtained
under several assumptions on trading mechanism: invariance with respect to non-
risky part of the risky asset (i.e., shift invariance) and invariance with respect to
numeraire change (i.e., scale invariance). These assumptions signiﬁcantly simplify
the analysis because they result in very handy linear structure of a game. But both
these assumptions do not reﬂect the properties of real bidding. Indeed, only bids
A Survey on Discrete Bidding Games with Asymmetric Information 91
proportional to the minimal currency unit are allowed in real bidding. Therefore,
neither shift invariance nor scale invariance really hold.
1.2. Results on discrete bidding games with asymmetric information
De Meyer and Marino (2005), Domansky and Kreps (2005), Domansky (2007) ana-
lyze a bidding model analogous to the model of De Meyer and Moussa-Saley (2002),
where market makers have to post prices within a discrete grid. it corresponds to
prices proportional to a minimal currency unit . The n-stage games Gmn (p) are
considered with two possible values of liquidation price, an integer m > 0 with
probability p and 0 with probability 1 − p, and with admissible bids being integer
numbers.
The works mentioned above show that, unlike the model of De Meyer and Saley,
the sequence of values V mn (p) of the games Gmn (p) is bounded from above and
converges as n tends to ∞. The authors calculate its limit Hm, that is a continuous,
concave, and piecewise linear function with m domains of linearity [k/m, (k+1)/m],
k = 0, . . . ,m− 1, and the values at peak points Hm(k/m) = k(m− k)/2.
The proof in De Meyer and Marino (2005) diﬀers in essential ways from the proof
in Domansky (2007). The last proof is more concise due to exploiting a ”reasonable”
strategy of Player 2. In fact, this is his optimal strategy for the game with inﬁnite
number of steps.
As the sequence V mn (p) is bounded from above, it is reasonable to consider
the games Gm∞(p) with inﬁnite number of steps. The games Gm∞(p) are inﬁnitely
repeated, non-discounted games with non-averaged payoﬀs that diﬀers from the
classical model of Aumann and Maschler (1995). Unlike the case of n < ∞, the
existence of a value for the games Gm∞(p) has to be proved.
In section 2 following Domansky (2007) we show that the value V m∞ is equal to
Hm and construct explicitly the optimal strategies of players. The fastest optimal
strategy of Player 1 provides him the maximal possible expected gain 1/2 per step.
For this strategy the posterior probabilities perform a simple random walk over the
lattice l/m, l = 0, . . . ,m, with absorbing extreme points 0 and 1. The absorption
of posterior probabilities means revealing of the true value of share by Player 2.
For the initial probability k/m, the expected duration of this random walk before
absorption is k(m − k). The bidding terminates almost surely in a ﬁnite number
of steps, and the expected number of steps is also ﬁnite. This random time of
absorption is a time for disclosure of information. The game terminates naturally
when the posterior expectation of liquidation price coincide with its real value.
The set of all optimal strategies of Player 1 for Gm∞(p) consists of the described
fastest strategy and its slower modiﬁcations.
The results of Domansky (2007) cannot be extended to a general transaction
mechanism introduced by De Meyer (2010). As mentioned in the last paper, the
discretized mechanism does not satisfy axioms of shift- and scale-invariance. Note
that in practice a grid of possible bids is not shift- and scale-invariant simultaneously.
Obtaining exact solutions for games Gmn (p) with ﬁnite numbers of steps seems
to be a rather hard problem because of combinatorial diﬃculties as this may be
observed at the two simplest case: solutions for one-stage games (Sandomirskaya,
Domansky, 2012) and solutions for games with three admissible bids (Kreps, 2009).
In section 3 we describe the set of peak points of value function V m1 (p) and
analyze the structure of bids used in optimal strategies of both players. On the
base of this analysis we develop recurrent approach to computing optimal strategies
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of uninformed player for any probability p. Non-strictly speaking, recursion is on
the number of pure strategies used by Player 2 in his optimal mixed strategy. As
optimal strategy of insider equalizes the spectrum of optimal strategy of Player 2,
we get Player 1’ optimal strategies solving the system of diﬀerence equations arising
from equalizing conditions.
In section 4 we construct the exact solutions for games G3n(p) in the explicit
form for any number of steps n. The value function V 3n (p) and the players’ optimal
strategies are expressed using a second-order recursive sequence.
In section 5 we show that the fastest optimal strategy of Player 1 for the inﬁnitely
repeated game Gm∞(p) is a ε-optimal strategy of Player 1 for any ﬁnitely repeated
game Gmn (p) of length n, where ε = O(cosn π/m). This is not so for slower optimal
strategies of Player 1 (Sandomirskaya, 2013, unpublished).
In section 6 following Domansky and Kreps (2009) we consider a model where a
share liquidation price may take any integer value according to a probability distri-
bution p over the one-dimensional integer lattice. Any integer bids are admissible.
This n-stage model is described by a zero-sum repeated game with countable state
and action spaces. The games considered in section 2 can be reduced to particu-
lar cases of these games corresponding to probability distributions with two-point
supports.
We show that if the liquidation price of a share has a ﬁnite expectation, then
the values of n-stage games exist. If its variance is ﬁnite, then, as n tends to ∞,
the sequence of values is bounded from above and converges. The limit H is a
continuous, concave, piecewise linear function with a countable number of domains
of linearity.
As the sequence of n-stage game values is bounded from above, it is reasonable
to consider the games G∞(p) with an inﬁnite number of steps. We show that the
value V∞(p) is equal to H(p).
The optimal strategies are given in an explicit form. For constructing the optimal
strategy of Player 1 for the game G∞(p) with an arbitrary distribution having an
integer expectation, we use the solutions for the games with two-point distributions
and the symmetric representation of distributions over one-dimensional integer lat-
tice with ﬁxed integer mean values as convex combinations (probability mixtures)
of distributions with two-point supports and with the same mean values.
The insider optimal strategy generates a random walk of posterior expectations
over the one-dimensional integer lattice with absorption. The absorption may occur
at any stage t if the posterior expectation of share price at this stage coincides with
its prior expectation.
For any initial distribution with an integer mean value the expected duration
of this random walk is equal to the variance of the liquidation price of a share.
The value of inﬁnite game is equal to the expected duration of this random walk
multiplied by the constant one-step gain 1/2 of informed Player 1.
In section 7 we consider multistage bidding models where two types of risky as-
sets are traded between two agents that have diﬀerent information on the liquidation
prices of traded assets (Domansky and Kreps, 2013, submitted to RAIRO-Operation
Research). These prices are random integer variables that are determined by the ini-
tial chance move according to a probability distribution p over the two-dimensional
integer lattice that is known to both players. Player 1 is informed on the prices of
both types of shares, but Player 2 is not. The bids may take any integer value.
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The model of n-stage bidding is reduced to the zero-sum repeated game with
lack of information on one side.
If the expectations of share prices are ﬁnite, then the value of such n-stage
bidding game does not exceed the sum of values of games modeling the bidding
with one-type shares. This means that simultaneous bidding of two types of risky
assets is less proﬁtable for the insider than separate bidding of one-type shares.
This is explained by the fact that the simultaneous bidding leads to revealing more
insider information, because the bids for shares of each type provide information on
shares of the other type.
We show that, if liquidation prices of both shares have ﬁnite variances, then the
sequence of values of n-step games is bounded. This makes it reasonable to consider
the bidding of unlimited duration that is reduced to the inﬁnite game.
We begin with constructing solutions for these games with distributions p having
two- and three-point supports (elementary games). Next, using symmetric represen-
tations of probability distributions over the two-dimensional plane with given mean
values as convex combinations of distributions with supports containing not more
than three points and with the same mean values (Domansky, 2013), we build the
optimal strategies of Player 1 for bidding games G∞(p) with arbitrary distributions
p as convex combinations of his optimal strategies for elementary games.
The optimal strategies of Player 1 generate a random walk of transaction prices.
But unlike the case of one-type assets, the symmetry of this random walk is broken
at the ﬁnal stages of the game.
We demonstrate that the value V∞(p) is equal to the sum of values of corre-
sponding games with one-type risky asset. Thus, the proﬁt that Player 2 gets under
simultaneous n-step bidding in comparison with separate bidding for each type of
shares disappears in a game of unbounded duration.
In the bidding models considered in the sections 2-7 players propose only one
price for a share at each step, i.e. bid and ask prices coincide. In a more realistic
model developed in section 8 both players simultaneously propose their bid and ask
prices for one share at each step of bidding. The bid-ask spread s is ﬁxed by rules of
bidding. Transaction occurs from a seller to a buyer by a bid price. The simpliﬁed
model (sections 2-7) corresponds to the case s = 0 what is equivalent to s = 1 due
to the price discreteness.
One-step payoﬀ matrices of corresponding repeated games with incomplete in-
formation have more complicated structure than for the case s = 1 and solutions of
these games are not found.
In section 8, for any integer s > 1 and two possible states of nature, by analogy
with the zero-spread case of section 2 we construct an upper bound of value function
provided by a reasonable strategy of Player 2. We construct a lower bound provided
by a strategy of Player 1 that is the best strategy generating a simple random walk
of price expectations. The bounds have the same form and coincide for s = 1 being
equal to the value function of of the game under consideration.
By analogy with zero spread case (see section 6), for any integer s > 1 the results
are generalized to the case of countable set of possible values for a share price.
As for s > 1 the constructed Player 1’ strategy is not optimal, we conclude
that the insider’s optimal strategy does not generate simple random walk of price
expectations and leads apparently to non-symmetric price ﬂuctuations.
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2. Bidding games with two states of nature
2.1. Bidding games of ﬁnite and inﬁnite duration: Gmn (p) and G
m
∞(p)
In this section we consider the repeated games Gmn (p) modelling the bidding with
two possible random "state of nature", the state space S = {L,H}. Before bidding
starts a chance move determines the "state of nature" L or H and therefore the
liquidation value of a share once for all. This value is a positive integer m with
probability p at the state H and 0 with probability 1− p at the state L. Player 1 is
informed about the "state of nature", Player 2 is not. Both players know probability
p. Player 2 knows that Player 1 is an insider.
At each subsequent stage t = 1, . . . , n (n may be inﬁnite) of bidding both players
simultaneously propose their prices for one share, it for Player 1 and jt for Player
2. Then the pair (it, jt) is announced to both Players before proceeding to the next
stage. The maximal bid wins and one share is transacted at this price. Therefore,
if it > jt, Player 1 gets one share from Player 2 and Player 2 receives the sum of
money it from Player 1. If it < jt, Player 2 gets one share from Player 1 and Player
1 receives the sum l from Player 2. If it = jt, then no transaction occurs.
The bids may take arbitrary integer numbers, but the bids 0, 1, 2, . . . ,m− 1 are
eﬃcient only. Indeed, as the minimal value of a share is 0 and the maximal value is
m > 0, the bids k < 0 and k > m − 1 are senseless and thus k = 0, . . . ,m − 1. So
the action spaces are I = J = 0, . . . ,m− 1.
At state L, i.e. if the liquidation value of the share is equal to zero, the one-step
gains of Player 1 are given with the following matrix AL,m:⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
0 1 2 . . . m− 1
−1 0 2 . . . m− 1
−2 −2 0 . . . m− 1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
−m+ 1 −m+ 1 −m+ 1 . . . 0
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
At state H , i.e. if the liquidation value of the share is equal to m, then the matrix
AH,m of the one-step gains of Player 1 takes the form⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
0 −m+ 1 −m+ 2 . . . −1
m− 1 0 −m+ 2 . . . −1
m− 2 m− 2 0 . . . −1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1 1 1 . . . 0
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
We consider n-step games Gmn (p) with total (non-averaged) payoﬀs
Kmn (p, σ, τ) =
n∑
t=1
E(σ,τ)[(1− p)aL,m(iLt , jt) + p · aH,m(iHt , jt)]. (2.1)
Note that at step t it is enough for both Players to take into account the sequence
(i1, . . . , it−1) of Player 1’s previous actions only. Thus, a strategy σ for Player 1
(insider) is a sequence of moves
σ = (σ1, . . . , σt, . . .),
where σt : S×It−1 → Δ(I) is the probability distribution used by Player 1 to select
his action at stage t, given the state s and previous observations.
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A strategy τ for uninformed Player 2 does not depend on state s and represents
a sequence of moves
τ = (τ1, . . . , τt, . . .),
where τt : It−1 → Δ(J).
We also consider the inﬁnite games Gm∞(p). For certain pairs of strategies (σ, τ),
the payoﬀ function Km∞(p, σ, τ), given by the inﬁnite series (2.1), may be indeﬁnite.
If we restrict the set of Player 1’s admissible strategies to strategies with nonnegative
one-step gains
E(σ1,j)[(1− p)aL,m(iL, j) + p · aH,m(iH , j)].
against any action j of Player 2, then the payoﬀ function of the gameGm∞(p) becomes
completely deﬁnite (may be inﬁnite).
Observe that Player 1 has many strategies, ensuring him a nonnegative one-step
gain against any action of Player 2. In fact, any "reasonable" strategy of Player 1
should possess this property.
Remind that, due to the recursive structure of the repeated game, it is suﬃcient
to deﬁne the ﬁrst move for any prior probability p to deﬁne the whole strategy of
Player 1. Further this move will be played if the current posterior probability be-
comes equal to p. Thus, if for any prior probability p, the ﬁrst move is "reasonable",
the whole strategy is "reasonable".
The games Gmn (p) with n <∞, as games with a ﬁnite sets of actions, have values
V mn (p). The values V mn (p) are positive and do not decrease, as the number of steps
n increases.
2.2. Asymptotics of values V mn (p)
The next theorem provides an upper bound for the values Vmn (p).
Theorem 2.1. The functions V mn are bounded from above by a function Hm that
is continuous, concave, and piecewise linear with m domains of linearity [k/m, (k+
1)/m], k = 0, . . . ,m − 1. It is completely determined with its values at the peak
points k/m, k = 0, . . . ,m:
Hm(k/m) = k(m− k)/2.
To prove this theorem, we deﬁne recursively the set of inﬁnite "reasonable"
strategies τk,m, k = 0, . . . ,m − 1 of Player 2, suitable for the games Gmn (p) with
arbitrary n.
Deﬁnition 2.1. The ﬁrst move τk,m1 is the action k. The moves τ
k,m
t for t > 1
depend on the last observed pair of actions (it−1, jt−1) only:
τk,mt (it−1, jt−1) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
jt−1 − 1, for it−1 < jt−1;
jt−1, for it−1 = jt−1 ;
jt−1 + 1, for it−1 > jt−1 .
The next theorem provides a lower bound for the values V mn (p).
Theorem 2.2. The following inequalities hold:
Lmn (p) ≤ Vmn (p) ∀p ∈ [0, 1],
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where the functions Lmn are continuous, concave, and piecewise linear on the interval
[0, 1] with m domains of linearity [k/m, (k + 1)/m], k = 0, . . . ,m − 1. At the peak
points k/m, the values Lmn (k/m) are given with recursive formulas
Lmn (k/m) = 1/2 + 1/2(L
m
n−1((k − 1)/m) + Lmn−1((k + 1)/m)),
with the initial condition Lm0 (k/m) = 0, and the boundary conditions Lmn (0) =
Lmn (1) = 0.
To prove this theorem, we deﬁne the strategy σ¯m of Player 1 ensuring these
lower bounds.
Deﬁnition 2.2. For the initial probability k/m, the ﬁrst move of the strategy σ¯m
makes use of two actions k− 1 and k only. These actions occur with the same total
probabilities q(k − 1) = q(k) = 1/2.
The corresponding conditional posterior probabilities of the state H are
pH(k − 1) = (k − 1)/m,
for the action k − 1, and
pH(k) = (k + 1)/m,
for the action k.
Remark 2.1. These lower bounds have the same form as the upper bounds of
Theorem 2.1.
Remark 2.2. As all posterior probabilities belong to the set p = k/m, k = 0, . . .m,
these ﬁrst moves deﬁne the strategy σ¯m for the games Gmn (k/m) of arbitrary dura-
tion.
Corollary 2.1 (Asymptotics of values V mn (p)). The following equalities hold:
lim
n→∞V
m
n (p) = H
m(p), m = 2, 3, . . . .
2.3. Solutions for the games Gm∞(p) and random walks
As the values V mn (p) are bounded from above on the number of steps n, the con-
sideration of values for the games Gm∞(p) with inﬁnite number of steps becomes
reasonable.
We restrict the set of Player 1’s admissible strategies in these games to the set
Σ+ of strategies employing only the moves ensuring him a nonnegative one-step
gain against any action of Player 2. Consequently, the payoﬀ functions Km∞(p, σ, τ)
of the games Gm∞(p) become deﬁnite (may be inﬁnite) at all cases.
We show that the inﬁnite game Gm∞(p) has a value and this value is equal to
Hm(p).
The existence of values for these games does not follow from common consid-
erations and has to be proved. We prove it by providing the optimal strategies
explicitly.
Theorem 2.3. The game Gm∞(p) has a value V m∞ (p) equal to Hm(p). Both Players
have optimal strategies.
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For p = k/m, k = 1, . . . ,m−1, the optimal strategy of Player 1 is the strategy σ¯m,
given by Deﬁnition 2.2. For the interior points p ∈ (k/m, (k + 1)/m), the optimal
ﬁrst move of Player 1 is the convex combination of the ﬁrst moves corresponding
to the extreme points of this interval. This optimal ﬁrst move makes use of three
actions k − 1, k and k + 1, using them with total probabilities
q(k − 1) = 1/2(k + 1−mp), q(k) = 1/2, q(k + 1) = 1/2(mp− k).
Corresponding posterior probabilities are
P (H |k− 1) = (k− 1)/m, P (H |k) = (2k+1−mp)/m, P (H |k+1) = (k+2)/m.
For p ∈ (k/m, (k+1)/m), k = 0, . . . ,m− 1, the optimal strategy τ¯m of Player 2
coincides with the strategy τk,m, given by Deﬁnition 2.1. For the peak points k/m,
k = 1, . . . ,m − 1, any convex combination of the strategies τk−1,m and τk,m is
optimal.
Corollary 2.2. For the initial probabilities p = l/m, l = 0, . . . ,m, the random
sequence of posterior probabilities, generated with the optimal strategy σ¯m of Player
1, is the elementary symmetric random walk (p¯mt )∞t=1, over the points k/m, k =
0, . . . ,m with the absorbing extreme points 0 and 1, i.e. the Markov chain with the
transition probabilities
P (k/m, (k − 1)m) = P (k/m, (k + 1)/m) = 1/2, k = 1, . . . ,m− 1,
P (0, 0) = P (1, 1) = 1.
For the initial probabilities p = l/m, l = 0, . . . ,m, the random sequence of posterior
probabilities hits the set p = k/m, k = 0, . . . ,m, with probability 1/2 after each step.
Further it continues as the elementary symmetric random walk with the absorbing
extreme points 0 and 1.
Further we consider the random process {cmt }∞t=1, formed by the prices of trans-
actions cmt = max{xmt , ymt } at sequential steps of the inﬁnite game Gm∞(p). We say
that the transaction occurs at step t if xmt = ymt .
Theorem 2.4. a) For each step t = 1, 2, . . ., the probability that transaction occurs
is 1/2.
b) For pmt ∈ [k/m, (k + 1)/m], under the condition that the transaction occurs at
step t, the following random transaction prices occur:
cmt (p
m
t ) =
{
k with probability k+1-mp ;
k + 1 with probability mp-k .
In particular, for pmt = k/m, under the condition that the transaction occurs at
step t, cmt = pmt = k, and the price process reproduces the random walk of posterior
probabilities.
c) Player 1’s one-step gain is 1/2.
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3. Solution for one-stage bidding game with incomplete information
In this section we give the solution for the one-stage bidding game Gm1 (p) with
arbitrary integer m and with any probability p ∈ (0, 1) of the high share price. The
complete description is given in the paper of Sandomirskaia and Domansky (2012).
If the share price is zero (state L), then Player 1 posts the zero bid at the one-
stage game Gm1 (p) for any probability p. So the problem is to describe the optimal
strategy of Player 1 for the state H and the optimal strategy of Player 2. The latter
does not depend on the state of nature.
Thus, solving of the zero-sum game Gm1 (p) with incomplete information is re-
duced to solving the game with complete information with payoﬀ matrix
Am(i, j) =
⎧⎨⎩ (1− p)j + p(m− i), for i > j;(1− p)j, for i = j;
(1− p)j + p(−m+ j), for i < j,
here i ∈ I is the bid of insider at state H , j ∈ J is the bid of uninformed player.
We develop recurrent approach to computing optimal strategies of uninformed
player for any probability p based on analysis of structure of bids used in optimal
strategies of both players. Non-strictly speaking, recursion is on the number of pure
strategies used by Player 2 in an optimal mixed strategy.
3.1. Properties of spectra of optimal strategies.
The value Vm1 (p) of the game Gm1 (p) is a continuous concave piecewise linear func-
tion over [0, 1] with a ﬁnite number of linearity intervals. The optimal strategy of
the uninformed Player 2 is constant over linearity intervals and is unique in its
interiors.
Let xm(p) = (xm0 (p), . . . , xmm−1(p)) and ym(p) = (ym0 (p), . . . , ymm−1(p)) be opti-
mal mixed strategies of Players 1 and 2 respectively for an initial probability p.
For probabilities p ∈ [0, 1/m] and p ∈ [(m−1)/m, 1] the gameGm1 (p) has solution
in pure strategies. Out of these intervals optimal strategies of Player 1 and Player
2 for the game Gm1 (p) are mixed ones.
A change of the set Specym(p) (the set of positive components of the optimal
strategy ym(p)) takes place at a point p if and only if p is a peak point of value
function V m1 (p).
Consider the set Pm = {p1, . . . , pm−1}, 0 < p1 < . . . < pm−1:
1− p1 = m− 1
m
, 1− p2 = m− 2
m− 1 , 1− pk = (1− pk−2)
m− k
m− k + 1 .
and the set Qm = {q1, . . . , qm−1}, 1 > q1 > · · · > qm−1 = pm−1:
1− q1 = 1
m
, 1− q2 = 1
m− 1 , 1− qk =
1− pk−2
m− k + 1 .
Proposition 3.1. If p ∈ Pm ∪Qm, then p is a peak point of value function V m1 (p)
and
Vm1 (p) = m · p(1− p) for p ∈ Pm ∪Qm.
Corollary 3.1. The value of one-step bidding game with arbitrary bids being equal
to m · p(1− p) (see De Meyer, Saley, 2002) coincides with V m1 (p) for p ∈ Pm ∪Qm.
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Corollary 3.2. As the set Pm∪Qm is asymptotically everywhere dense over [0, 1],
it follows that
lim
m→∞V
m
1 (p)/m = p(1− p).
Remark 3.1. For p < pm−1 (pm−1 ≈ 1/2), the spectra of optimal strategies of
both players expand as p increase until these spectra reach the bid m − 1. For
p > pm−1 they narrow down but retaining the bid m− 1.
Remark 3.2. For m < 5 there are no other peak points of V m1 (p) but the point
1/2.
Denote by k1(xm(p)) the maximal element of the set Specxm(p) of positive
components of strategy xm(p). At a peak point p we put k1(xm(p)) equal to its
value to the right adjacent linearity interval.
Analogous notation k2(ym(p)) for strategy ym(p). The function k2(ym(p)) =
k2(p) is piece-wise constant over [0, 1].
Remark 3.3. If m ≥ 5, then the function k2(p) has no jump at p ∈ Pm ∪Qm. But
the set Pm∪Qm does not cover the set of all peak points p without a jump of k2(p).
Here we describe an ordering of two subset of peak points such that the function
k2(p) has a jump at these points:
Sm = {s3, . . . , sm−1}, p2 < s3 < p3, ..., pm−2 < sm−1 < pm−1.
At the point si the bid i appears at the spectrum of the optimal strategy of Player
2.
Tm = {t4, . . . , tm−1} q3 > t4 > q4, ..., qm−2 > tm−1 > qm−1 = pm−1.
At the point tm−r, r = 2, . . . ,m−4 the bid m− r quits the spectrum of the optimal
strategy of Player 2.
Remark 3.4. For m = 5 the combination P 5 ∪ Q5 ∪ S5 ∪ T 5 coincides with the
whole set of peak points V 51 (p).
Deﬁnition 3.1. We call a lacuna of a strategy spectrum the set of successive bids
that player does not use in this strategy, while using greater and smaller bids with
positive probability.
Note that for m ≤ 5 there are no lacunas in the optimal strategy spectra except
of either {1} or {2}. For m > 5 the structure of spectra of optimal strategies is more
complicated having various lacunas.
Lemma 3.1. A spectrum of optimal strategies of any player has no lacunas such
that the number of its elements is more than 1 and the ﬁrst element of the spectrum
after the lacuna is less than m− 1.
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3.2. Solutions for games Gm1 (p)
Here we restrict ourselves to description solutions of games Gm1 (p) for p ∈ (0, pm−1).
The solutions for the interval (pm−1, 1) are analogues and (not strictly speaking)
mirror-like with respect to the point pm−1.
We use the following numeration for the linearity intervals of value function
V m1 (p):
I0 = I1,0 = [0, p1], I1 = I1,1 = I2,0 = [p1, p2] and I2 = I2,1 = [p2, s3];
Ik,0 = [sk, pk], Ik,1 = [pk, sk+1] and Ik = Ik,0 ∪ Ik,1, k = 3, . . . ,m− 1.
The following proposition describes the spectra of optimal strategies over intervals
Ik.
Proposition 3.2. For p ∈ I0, Player 2 uses the bid 0. Player 1 uses the bid 1.
For p ∈ I1 ∪ I2, Player 1 uses the bids 1 and 2. For p ∈ I1 = I2,0, Player 2 uses the
bids 0 and 1. For p ∈ I2 = I2,1, Player 2 uses the bids 0 and 2.
For p ∈ Ik, k > 2, Player 1 uses the bids 1, 2, 3, . . . , k. The maximal bid of Player
2 is k.
For p ∈ Ik,0, k = 3, . . . ,m− 1, Player 2 uses the bids 0, 2, 3, . . . , k, if the number
k is odd, and the bids 0, 1, 3, . . . , k, if k is even.
For p ∈ Ik,1, k = 3, . . . ,m− 2, Player 2 uses the bids 0, 1, 3, . . . , k, if the number
k is odd, and the bids 0, 2, 3, . . . , k, if k is even.
Let vHk,i and v
L
k,i be the gains of Player 1 for the state H and for the state L
corresponding to the best reply of Player 1 to the optimal strategy of Player 2 for
p ∈ Ik,i.
The following theorem provides the recurrent description of value function V m1 (p)
for any linearity domain.
Theorem 3.1. For p ∈ Ik,i,
V m1 (p) = v
L
k,i(1 − p) + vHk,ip,
where
vL1,0 = 0, v
H
1,0 = m− 1, vL2,0 =
1
m− 1 , v
H
2,0 = m− 2,
vL2,1 =
2
m− 1 , v
H
2,1 =
(m− 2)2
(m− 1) ,
and for k = 3, . . . ,m − 2, i = 0, 1, payoﬀs vHk,i and vLk,i are given by the recurrent
formulas
vHk,i =
(m− k)2
vHk−1,i+1
, vLk,i = (v
L
k−1,i+1 − k)
(
m− k
vHk−1,i+1
)
+ k,
Here i+ 1 is calculated modulo 2.
Corollary 3.3. For any point p ∈ (0, 1) the inequality
V m1 (p) ≤ m · p(1− p) (3.1)
holds. According to Proposition 3.1 for any p ∈ Pm∪Qm it turns to be the equality.
Remark 3.5. As the value of one-stage bidding game with arbitrary bids is equal
to m · p(1 − p), see De Meyer, Saley (2002), the inequality (3.1) implies that this
value exceeds the value of one-stage bidding game with discrete bids.
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4. Solutions for games G3n(p) and recursive sequences
The problem of solution for the n-step games Gmn (p) still remains open. The case
of two admissible bids (m = 2) is trivial: the optimal strategy of Player 1 for any a
priori probability p is to choose at the ﬁrst step action 0 in the state L and action
1 in the state H , The both actions of Player 1 are "revealing" and the true price of
a share is revealed by Player 2 at the ﬁrst step.
At the ﬁst step an optimal strategy of Player 2 is to post 1 for p < 1/2, and to
post 1 for p > 1/2. For p = 1/2 any of the possible actions or any their probabilistic
mixture is optimal. Thus, after the ﬁrst move the insider’s payoﬀ is stabilized, and
V 2n (p) = V
2
1 (p) = min{p, 1− p}.
In this section we consider the qualitatively more complicated case of three
reasonable bids 0, 1 and 2 (m = 3). Even the solution for the one-step game G31(p)
is nontrivial (see the previous section).
For m = 3 the one-step gains of Player 1 are given with the following matrices:
AL = [aLij ] =
⎡⎣ 0 1 2−1 0 2
−2 −2 0
⎤⎦ ,
AH = [aHij ] =
⎡⎣0 −2 −12 0 −1
1 1 0
⎤⎦ .
We construct the exact solutions for games G3n(p) in the explicit form for any
number of steps n. The value function V 3n (p) and the optimal players’ strategies are
expressed using the second-order recursive sequence δn, n = 0, 1, 2, . . ., determined
by the recurrence relations
δn+1 = 2(δn + δn−1), δ0 = 0, δ1 = 2. (4.1)
The theory of recursive sequences can be used to obtain the analytical expression
for the sequences δn:
δn =
(1 +
√
3)n − (1−√3)n√
3
.
We show that the piecewise linear continuous concave value function V 3n (p) of the
game G3n(p) has three non-smoothness points on the interval (0, 1): 1/3, pn ∈
(1/3, 2/3) and 2/3, where
pn = (δn−1 + δn)/(δn−1 + 2δn).
The values of the function V 3n (p) at these points are also determined using the
recursive sequence δn.
We demonstrate that
V 3n (pn) = max
0≤p≤1
V 3n (p),
i.e. the maximal payoﬀ from private information is obtained by the insider in the
case of the largest initial uncertainty of the partner which for the one-step game
takes place for the prior probability of high price p = 1/2, and for the n-step game
with three admissible bids for p = pn.
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The insider controls the sequence of posterior probabilities of high stock price,
which are calculated with help of his strategies at the preceding steps. We show
that the optimal strategy of the insider in the n-step game generates the posterior
probability equal to pn−1 after the ﬁrst step, and the posterior probability equal
to pn−2 after the second step, etc., and ﬁnally, before the last step the probability
equal to 1/2.
The optimal ﬁrst move of Player 2 for n-step game G3n(p) is independent of
the exact value of p. It depends only on the fact which linearity interval the prior
probability p belongs to. The optimal move of Player 2 at the step t = 2,′ ldots, n
depends only on the interval which the corresponding posterior probability belongs
to.
When n → ∞ the sequences of values V 3n (1/3), V 3n (pn) and V 3n (2/3) converge
to 1. Thus, in the limit, the non-smoothness point pn disappears and the functions
V 3n (p) converge to the value V 3∞(p) of the game with unbounded duration G3∞(p)
calculated in section 2.
The next theorem gives the exact formulation of the result.
Theorem 4.1. The piecewise linear continuous value function V 3n (p) of the game
G3n(p) on the interval [0, 1] has three non-smoothness points: 1/3, pn, 2/3. The
function V 3n (p) is determined by its values at the ends of the interval V 3n (0) =
V 3n (1) = 0 and the peak points:
V 3n (p) =
⎧⎨⎩1− 2/3δn for p = 1/3,1− 1/(2δn + δn−1) for p = pn,
1− 1/3δn−1 for p = 2/3,
and
V 3n (p) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎩
(3− 2/δn)p, if p ∈ [0, 1/3],
(1− 1/δn)(1 − p) + p, if p ∈ [1/3, pn],
(1 + 1/δn−1)(1 − p) + (1− 1/δn−1)p, if p ∈ [pn, 2/3],
(3− 1/δn−1)(1 − p), if p ∈ [2/3, 1].
Both players have the optimal strategies σ∗n è τ∗n, which on the four corre-
sponding linearity intervals of the function V 32 , enumerated by the Roman ﬁgures
I, II, III, IV, have the following structure:
I. The interval p ∈ [0, 1/3]. The ﬁrst move of the strategy σ∗n(p, I) is
σ∗n1 (L, p, I) = (1− 2pδn−1/(1− p)δn, 2pδn−1/(1− p)δn, 0), σ∗n1 (H, p, I) = (0, 1, 0).
The ﬁrst move τ∗n1 (I) of the strategy τ∗n(I) is (1, 0, 0).
The continuation τ∗n(·|i, I) of the strategy τ∗n(I) after observation of the bid i
is determined by the relations
τ∗n(·|i, I) =
{
τ∗(n−1)(I), if i = 0,
(τ∗(n−1)(II)δn−1 + τ∗(n−1)(III)δn−2)/(δn−1 + δn−2), if i = 1.
II. The interval p ∈ [1/3, pn]. The ﬁrst move of the strategy σ∗n(p, II) is
σn1 (L, p, II) = (1−δn−1/δn, δn−1/δn, 0), σn1 (H, p, II) = (0, (1−p)/2p, (3p−1)/2p).
The ﬁrst move τ∗n1 (II) of the strategy τ∗n(II) is (1/δn, 1− 1/δn, 0).
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The continuation τ∗n(·|i, II) of the strategy τ∗n(II) after observation of the bid
i is determined by the relations
τ∗n(·|i, II) =
⎧⎨⎩
τ∗(n−1)(I), if i = 0,
(τ∗(n−1)(II)δn−1 + τ∗(n−1)(III)δn−2)/(δn−1 + δn−2), if i = 1,
τ∗(n−1)(IV ), if i = 2.
III. The interval p ∈ [pn, 2/3]. The ﬁrst move of the strategy σ∗n(p, III) is
σn1 (L, p, III) = ((2− 3p)/(1− p), (2p− 1)/(1− p), 0),
σn1 (H, p, III) = (0, (2p− 1)δn/2pδn−1, 1− (2p− 1)δn/2pδn−1).
The ﬁrst move τ∗n1 (III) of the strategy τ∗n(III) is (0, 1− 1/δn−1, 1/δn−1).
The continuation τ∗n(·|i, III) of the strategy τ∗n(III) after observation of the
bid i is determined by the relations
τ∗n(·|i, III) =
⎧⎨⎩
τ∗(n−1)(I), if i = 0,
τ∗(n−1)(II), if i = 1,
τ∗(n−1)(IV ), if i = 2.
IV. The interval p ∈ [2/3, 1]. The ﬁrst move of the strategy σ∗n(p, IV ) is
σn1 (L, p, IV ) = (0, 1, 0), σ
n
1 (p,H) = (0, (1− p)δn/2pδn−1, 1− (1− p)δn/2pδn−1).
The ﬁrst move τ∗n1 (IV ) of the strategy τ∗n(IV ) is (0, 0, 1).
The continuation τ∗n(·|i, IV ) of the strategy τ∗n(IV ) after observation of the
bid i is determined by the relations
τ∗n(·|i, IV ) =
{
τ∗(n−1)(II), if i = 1,
τ∗(n−1)(IV ), if i = 2.
5. Analysis of lower bounds for values V mn (p) of games G
m
n (p).
In section 2 we constructed the Player 1’ fastest optimal strategy σ¯m for the bidding
game Gm∞(p) of unlimited duration (see Deﬁnition 2.2.). The strategy σm provides
Player 1 the maximal possible expected gain 1/2 per step. For this strategy the pos-
terior probabilities perform a simple random walk over the grid l/m, l = 0, . . . ,m,
with absorbing extreme points 0 and 1. At the random time Θm of absorption of
posterior probabilities revealing the true share value by Player 2 occurs. For the
initial probability k/m, the expected duration βm∞(k) = Ek[Θm] of this random
walk before absorption is k(m − k), where Ek is the expectation for the random
walk starting at the point k/m.
For the n-stage game Gmn (p) the strategy σ¯m ensures the Player 1’ gain that
does not exceed Lmn (p). The Player 1’ guaranteed gain is equal to Lmn (p) if he uses
the strategy σ¯m.
The continuous, concave, and piecewise linear lower bound Lmn (p) for value
V mn (p) at its peak points k/m is given with recursive formulas (section 2, Theo-
rem 2.2).
In this section we obtain an explicit formula for Lmn (p), i.e. for the guaranteed
gain of Player 1 in the n-stage game if he applies his optimal strategy σm for the
game Gm∞(p) of unlimited duration. Let Wmn (σ, τ |p) be the payoﬀ function of the
game Gmn (p).
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Theorem 5.1. If Player 1 exploits the strategy σm in the game Gmn (k/m), then his
guaranteed gain Lmn (k/m) = infτ Wmn (σm, τ |k/m) is given with the formula
Lmn (k/m) =
(m− k)k
2
− εmn (k), (5.1)
where
εmn (k) =
1
2m
[m/2]∑
l=1
cosn
π(2l − 1)
m
sin
πk(2l− 1)
m
ctg
π(2l − 1)
2m
(
1 + ctg2
π(2l − 1)
2m
)
,
(5.2)
with [α] being the integer part of α.
Sketch of the proof. Let βmn (k) = Ek[Θm ∧ n] denote the average number of
steps of the simple random walk of posterior probabilities starting at the point
k/m in the n-stage game Gmn (p). Then the expected insider’s proﬁt is given by
Wmn (k) =
1
2β
m
n (k).
The recursive equations for βmn (k) hold βmn+1(k) =
1
2β
m
n (k+1)+
1
2β
m
n (k− 1)+1
with the boundary conditions βmn (0) = βmn (m) = 0 and with the initial condition
βm0 (k) = 0.
The values βm∞(k) satisfy the equations βm∞(k) =
1
2β
m
∞(k + 1) +
1
2β
m
∞(k − 1) + 1
with the boundary conditions βm∞(0) = βm∞(m) = 0.
Thus the diﬀerences εmn (k) =
1
2 (β
m
∞(k)− βmn (k)) satisfy the homogeneous re-
cursive equations
εmn+1(k) =
1
2
εmn (k + 1) +
1
2
εmn (k − 1)
with the boundary conditions εmn (0) = εmn (m) = 0 and with the initial condition
εm0 (k) = β
m
∞(k)/2.
Solving these equations we obtain the representation (5.2) for εmn (k).
Corollary 5.1. The strategy σm is a εmn -optimal strategy of Player 1 for the ﬁnitely
repeated game Gmn (p) of length n, where εmn = O(cosn π/m), i.e. the “error term”
εmn (k) decreases exponentially.
This is not so for slower optimal strategies of Player 1.
The case m=3.
For m = 3 the above result means
ε3n(k) =
1
2n
, k = 1, 2.
As the exact solutions for the n-stage games G3n(p) are known (see section 4), we
may reﬁne the values of the “error term” estimating the diﬀerence between the value
V 3n (p) and the lower bound L3n(p), not only (V 3∞(p)− L3n(p)).
In section 4 the value functions V 3n (p) are expressed by means of a second-order
recursive sequence. They converge to the value V 3∞(p) of the game with unbounded
duration G3∞(p). Using the theory of recurrent sequences it is easy to estimate
function V 3n (p) at the peak points p = 1/3 and p = 2/3,
V 3n (1/3) ≈ 1−
2√
3(1 +
√
3)n
, V 3n (2/3) ≈ 1−
1 +
√
3√
3(1 +
√
3)n
,
A Survey on Discrete Bidding Games with Asymmetric Information 105
and to get the reﬁned values
ε¯3n(1) = (V
3
n (1/3)− L3n(1/3)) ≈
1
2n
− 2√
3(1 +
√
3)n
,
ε¯3n(2) = (V
3
n (2/3)− L3n(2/3)) ≈
1
2n
− 1 +
√
3√
3(1 +
√
3)n
.
So for suﬃciently large n the optimal strategy of the insider for the bidding game
of inﬁnite duration is a rather good approximation of his optimal strategy for the
n-stage game.
6. Bidding games Gn(p) and G∞(p) with countable state space
In this section we consider the model where any integer non-negative bids are ad-
missible and the liquidation price of a share Cp may take any nonnegative integer
values k = 0, 1, 2, . . . according to a probability distribution p = (p0, p1, p2, . . .).
At stage 0 a chance move determines the liquidation value of a share for the whole
period of bidding n according to the probability distribution p = (p0, p1, p2, . . .) over
the one-dimensional integer lattice, S = ZZ+. Structure of information and trading
mechanism are the same as in section 2 for the case of two possible states of nature.
This n-stage model is described by a zero-sum repeated game Gn(p) with in-
complete information of Player 2 and with countable state space S = ZZ+ and with
countable action spaces I = ZZ+ and J = ZZ+. One-step gains of Player 1 are given
with the matrices As = [as(i, j)]i∈I,j∈J , s ∈ S,
as(i, j) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
j − s, for i < j ;
0, for i = j ;
−i+ s, for i > j .
At the end of the game Player 2 pays to Player 1 the sum
n∑
t=1
as(it, jt).
This description is common knowledge to both Players. The games Gmn (p) consid-
ered in section 2 represent particular cases of these games corresponding to proba-
bility distributions with two-point supports, p0 = 1− p and pm = p.
Theorem 6.1. If the random variable Cp, determining the liquidation price of a
share has a ﬁnite mathematical expectation E[Cp], then the values Vn(p) of n-stage
games Gn(p) exist The values Vn(p) are positive and do not decrease, as the number
of steps n increases.
The theorem follows from the fact that for this case the payoﬀ of game Gn(p)
can be approximated by payoﬀs of games Gn(pk) with probability distributions pk
having ﬁnite support.
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6.1. Upper bound for values Vn(p)
If the varianceD[Cp] is inﬁnite, then, as n tends to ∞, the sequence Vn(p) diverges.
The next theorem demonstrates that on the contrary, if the variance D[Cp] is
ﬁnite, then, as n tends to ∞, the sequence of values Vn(p) of the games Gn(p) is
bounded from above.
Theorem 6.2. For p such that D[Cp] < ∞, the values Vn(p) are bounded from
above by a continuous, concave, and piecewise linear function H(p). Its domains of
linearity are
L(k) = {p : E[p] ∈ [k, k + 1]}, k = 0, 1, . . . .
Its domains of non-smoothness are
Θ(k) = {p : E[p] = k}.
The equality holds
H(p) = (D[p]− α(p)(1 − α(p)))/2, (6.1)
where α(p) = E[p]− ent[E[p]] and ent[x], x ∈ R1 is the integer part of x.
The result is provided by a ”reasonable” strategy of Player 2. The strategy is
analogous to his optimal strategy for two-states game Gmn (p) (see section 2): at the
ﬁrst move Player 2 posts ent[E[p]] and then his moves depend on the last observed
pair of actions only.
6.2. Solutions for games G∞(p) with arbitrary p
As the sequence Vn(p) is bounded from above, it is reasonable to consider the games
G∞(p) with inﬁnite number of steps. We show that the value V∞(p) is equal to
H(p). We get solutions for these games in the explicit form.
The optimal strategy of Player 2 is his ”reasonable” strategy mentioned above.
We construct the optimal strategy of Player 1 for the game G∞(p) with an arbitrary
distribution having an integer expectation on the base of the solutions for the games
with two-point distributions obtained in section 2. The result is due to the symmetric
representation of distributions over the one-dimensional integer lattice with ﬁxed
integer mean values as convex combinations (probability mixture) of distributions
with two-point supports and with the same mean values (see, e.g. Obloy, 2004).
Symmetric representation of distributions over the one-dimensional in-
teger lattice. Let p be a probability distribution over the set of integers ZZ1 with
mean value equal to an integer r. Then
p = pr · δr +
∞∑
k=1
∞∑
l=1
k + l∑∞
t=1 t · pr+t
pr−lpr+k · prr+k,r−l, (6.2)
where prr+k,r−l is the probability distribution with the two-point support r − l, r + k
and with mean value equal to r.
We treat coeﬃcients
Pp(p
r
r+k,r−l) =
k + l∑∞
t=1 t · pr+t
pr−lpr+k
of decomposition (6.2) as probabilities of corresponding distributions with two-point
supports (r + k), (r − l) in this probability mixture.
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Given one point z (equal to r + k or to r − l) in the support of two-point
distribution, the conditional probability of complementary point (r − l or r + k)
may be calculated
Pp(r + k|r − l) = k · pr+k∑∞
t=1 t · pr+t
, Pp(r − l|r + k) = l · pr−l∑∞
t=1 t · pr+t
. (6.3)
Player 1’ optimal strategy σ∗.We construct Player 1’ optimal strategy σ∗ for the
game G∞(p) making use of the obtained decomposition for the initial distribution
p with mean value equal to an integer r (the prior expectation of share price is r).
a) If the state chosen by chance move is r, then Player 1 stops the game (Player 1’
informational advantage disappears).
b) If chance move chooses z = r + k (or z = r − l), where k, l are integer positive
numbers, then Player 1 chooses a point z2 = r − l (or z2 = r + k) by means of
lottery with probabilities (6.3) and plays his optimal strategy for the state z in the
two-point game G(prr+k,r−l) (see section 2).
The described optimal strategy of Player 1 generates a symmetric random walk
of posterior mathematical expectations of liquidation price with absorption. The
absorption may occur at any stage if the posterior expectation of share price at
this stage coincides with its prior expectation. If the liquidation price chosen by the
chance move coincides with its prior expectation, then the absorption occurs at the
ﬁrst stage. Note that it is impossible for two-point support distributions.
The expected duration of this random walk is equal to the initial variance of
liquidation price. The guaranteed total gain of Player 1 (the value of the game) is
equal to this expected duration multiplied with the ﬁxed gain per step.
7. Repeated games with asymmetric information modeling ﬁnancial
markets with two risky assets
In this section we consider multistage bidding models where two types of risky
assets are traded. Two players with opposite interests have money and two types
of shares. The liquidation prices of both share types may take any integer values x
and y. At stage 0 a chance move determines the ”state of nature” s and therefore
the liquidation prices of shares (s1, s2) for the whole period of bidding n according
to the probability distribution p over the two-dimensional integer lattice known to
both Players. Player 1 is informed about the result of chance move z, Player 2 is
not. Player 2 knows that Player 1 is an insider.
At each step of bidding both players simultaneously make their integer bids,
i.e. they post their prices for each type of shares. The player who posts the larger
price for a share of a given type buys one share of this type from his opponent at
this price. Any integer bids are admissible. Players aim to maximize the values of
their ﬁnal portfolios, calculated as money plus obtained shares evaluated by their
liquidation prices.
The described model of n-stage bidding is reduced to the zero-sum repeated
game Gn(p) with lack of information on one side and with two-dimensional one-
step actions with components corresponding to bids for each type of assets. The
countable state space is S = ZZ2 and the countable action spaces are I = ZZ2
and J = ZZ2. The one-step gain a(s, i, j) of Player 1 corresponding to the state
s = (s1, s2) and the actions i = (i1, i2) and j = (j1, j2) is given with the sum
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e=1 a
e(se, ie, je), where
ae(se, ie, je) =
⎧⎨⎩ j
e − se, for ie < je;
0, for ie = je;
−ie + se, for ie > je.
At the end of the game Player 2 pays to Player 1 the sum
n∑
t=1
a(s, it, jt),
where s is the result of a chance move. This description is a common knowledge of
both Players.
It is easy to show that if the expectations of share prices are ﬁnite, then the
value of such n-stage bidding game does not exceed the sum of values of games
modeling the bidding with one-type shares. This means that simultaneous bidding
of two types of risky assets is less proﬁtable for the insider than separate bidding of
one-type shares. This is explained by the fact that the simultaneous bidding leads to
revealing more insider information, because the bids for shares of each type provide
information on shares of the other type.
We show that, if liquidation prices of both shares have ﬁnite variances, then the
value Vn(p) of n-stage bidding games does not exceed the function H(p) which is
the smallest piecewise linear function equal to the one half of the sum of share price
variances for distributions with integer expectations of both share prices.
This makes it reasonable to consider the bidding of unlimited duration that is
reduced to the inﬁnite game G∞(p). We give the solutions for these games with ar-
bitrary probability distributions over the two-dimensional integer lattice with ﬁnite
component variances.
Both players have optimal strategies. The optimal strategy for Player 2 is a
direct combination of his optimal strategies for the games with one-type of risky
asset (see section 6).
We begin with constructing Player 1’ optimal strategies for games G∞(p) with
distributions p having two- and three-point supports – elementary games. Next, us-
ing symmetric representations of probability distributions over the two-dimensional
plane with given mean values as convex combinations of distributions with supports
containing not more than three points and with the same mean values (Domansky,
2013), we build the optimal strategies of Player 1 for bidding games G∞(p) with
arbitrary distributions p as convex combinations of his optimal strategies for ele-
mentary games.
The optimal strategy of Player 1 generates a random walk of transaction prices.
But unlike the case of one-type assets, the symmetry of this random walk is broken
at the ﬁnal stages of the game.
We show that this game terminates naturally when the posterior expectations
of both liquidation prices come close enough to their real values. We demonstrate
that the value V∞(p) coincides with H(p). So it is equal to the sum of values of
corresponding games with one-type risky asset. Thus, the proﬁt that Player 2 gets
under simultaneous n-step bidding in comparison with separate bidding for each
type of shares disappears in a game of unbounded duration.
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7.1. Solutions for games G∞(p) with p having two-point supports
For games G∞(p) with the support of distribution p containing two states, we show
that the value V∞(p) is equal to H(p).
To construct optimal strategies σ∗ of Player 1 for games G∞(p) with two states
we use the results for games with one-type assets and with two states. But the
fastest optimal strategy of Player 1 described in section 2 is not suﬃcient for this
purpose. We use Player 1’ slower optimal strategies.
Without loss of generality we assume that one of support points is (0, 0). Thus
there are two states 0 = (0, 0) and z = (x, y), where x and y are integers and x > 0.
The distribution p can be depicted with a scalar parameter p ∈ [0, 1] being the
probability of state z. For deﬁniteness set y > 0.
The strategy σ∗ of Player 1 generates an asymmetric random walk of posterior
probabilities by adjacent points of the irregular lattice
Lat(x, y) = {k/x, k = 0, . . . , x} ∪ {l/y, l = 0, . . . , y}
formed with those probabilities where at least one of the price expectations has
an integer value. The probabilities of jumps provide martingale characteristics of
posterior probabilities and with absorption at extreme points 0 and 1.
7.2. Solutions for games G∞(p) with p having three-point supports
We construct optimal strategies σ∗ of Player 1 that ensure H(p) for games G∞(p)
with three states z1, z2, z3 ∈ Z2.
Denote (z1, z2, z3) the triangle spanned across the support points of distri-
bution. A distribution p with the support z1, z2, z3 is uniquely determined with a
vector w = (u, v) ∈ (z1, z2, z3) of expectations of coordinates (the barycenter of
distribution p). Denote it pwz1,z2,z3 .
For pwz1,z2,z3 the ﬁrst step of optimal strategy σ
∗ may eﬃciently use the actions
(u−1, v−1), (u, v−1), (u−1, v) and (u, v). With the help of these actions Player 1 can
perform moves such that the modulus of diﬀerence between posterior expectations
of each coordinate and its initial expectation is not more than one.
There are several types of optimal ﬁrst moves of Player 1, in particular, the
ﬁrst moves σNE−SW1 (north-east – south-west), σ
NW−SE
1 , and their probabilistic
mixtures. Denote e = (1, 1), e¯ = (1,−1). The ﬁrst move σNE−SW1 exploits only two
actions w−e and w with posterior expectations w−b ·e and w+a ·e. The ﬁrst move
σNW−SE1 makes use of actions (u− 1, v) and (u, v − 1) with posterior expectations
w − be¯ and w + ae¯.
The martingale of posterior expectations generated by the optimal strategy of
Player 1 for the gameG∞(pwz1,z2,z3) represents a symmetric random walk over points
of integer lattice lying within the triangle (z1, z2, z3).
The symmetry is broken at the moment that the walk hits the triangle boundary.
From this moment, the game turns into one of games with distributions having two-
point supports.
7.3. Solutions for games G∞(p) with arbitrary p
We construct Player 1’s optimal strategy for the game G∞(p) with an arbitrary
distribution p having an integer expectation vector (k, l), as a convex combination
(a probability mixture) of his optimal strategies for games with distributions having
not more than three-point supports and the same expectation vector (k, l).
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To realize the idea we use symmetric representations of probability distributions
over the two-dimensional plane with given mean values as convex combinations of
elementary distributions – distributions with supports containing not more than
three points and with the same mean values (Domansky, 2013).
This decomposition is a generalization of the analogous decomposition of one-
dimensional distributions into a convex combination of distributions with no more
than two-point supports and with the same expectation that was used in section 6
for constructing solutions for bidding games with a one-type risky asset.
The coeﬃcient at an elementary distribution may be regarded as its probability
in this probability mixture. Given one point z in the support of elementary distri-
bution, the conditional probability of any elementary distribution having z in its
support may be calculated. Then we obtain the conditional probabilityPp(2|z) of el-
ementary two-point support distributions and the conditional probabilityPp(3|z) of
elementary three-point support distributions. For constructing the optimal Player 1’
strategy we use also conditional probabilities Pp(z2|z, 2) of a complementary point
z2 for the two-point support (z, z2) and conditional probabilities Pp(z2, z3|z, 3) of
complementary points z2, z3 for the three-point support (z, z2, z3).
The optimal strategy of Player 1 is given by the following algorithm:
1. If the state z = (x, y) chosen by chance move coincides with the price expec-
tation vector, (x, y) = (k, l), then Player 1 stops the game. In this case he cannot
receive any proﬁt from his informational advantage.
2. If not, z = (x, y) = (k, l), then Player 1’ optimal strategy is constructed with
help of a two-stage lottery.
a) To choose between two-point and three-point distributions Player 1 realizes
the Bernoulli trial with probabilities Pp(2|z) and Pp(3|z).
b) If two-point distributions are chosen, then Player 1 plays his optimal strategy
in a game with two-point support (z, z2) choosing a complementary point z2 by
means of the lottery with conditional probabilities Pp(z2|z, 2).
If three-point distributions are chosen, then Player 1 plays his optimal strategy
in a game with three-point support (z, z2, z3) choosing two complementary points
by means of the lottery with conditional probabilities Pp(z2, z3|z, 3).
8. Bidding models with non-zero bid-ask spread
We generalize bidding models with one-type risky assets investigated in the previous
sections where players proposed only one price for a share at each step, i.e. bid and
ask prices coincide. Here we drop this restriction. We assume that at each step of
bidding both players simultaneously propose their bid and ask prices for one share.
The bid-ask spread s is ﬁxed by rules of bidding. Transaction occurs from seller
to buyer by bid price. The simpliﬁed model (sections 2-7) corresponds to the case
s = 0 what is equivalent to s = 1 due to the price discreteness.
The model is reduced to a repeated game with incomplete information. De-
pending on bid-ask spread s one-step payoﬀ matrices for these games have more
complicated structure to compare with the case s = 1.
As for the zero bid-ask spread models we start with the case of two possible
states of nature (two possible values for a share price). We generalize the results of
section 2 for multistage games: we construct the upper and lower bounds for the
values of n-stage games as n →∞. The bounds coincide for s = 1.
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We generalize the developed in section 3 recursive approach to solutions of one-
stage bidding games (see Sandomirskaya, 2012). The spectrum structure of optimal
strategies becomes more complicated as lacunas longer than in the case s = 1 ap-
pear. The idea of equalizing insider’s spectrum and obtaining recurrent relations on
weights in the Player 2’s optimal strategy remain applicable, however the diﬃculties
concerned with explicit weight representation increase enormously.
Here we go to the case of two-point state of nature and generalize the results
of sections 2 for bidding games with bid-ask spread. After this we make necessary
comment on how to extend results for two-point state of nature to the case of
countable one.
8.1. The model of bidding with two possible values for a share price
As for the zero bid-ask case we start with bidding games with two states of nature:
the state m (integer positive) with probability p and the state 0 with probability
1 − p. In this model any integer bids are admissible. For the sake of simplicity
we assume that mmods = 0. A chance move and an information structure of its
outcome are the same as for models with zero bid-ask spread.
At each subsequent stage t = 1, . . . , n of bidding both players simultaneously
propose their integer bid prices and integer ask prices for one share. The bid-ask
spread s is ﬁxed by rules of bidding. It is the same for both players. Denote it a bid
price for Player 1 at stage t and jt a bid price for Player 2 at stage t. Then it + s
and jt + s are ask prices for Player 1 and for Player 2 at stage t.
At stage t transaction of one share occurs if and only if an ask price of one player
does not exceed a bid price of his opponent, i.e. either it + s ≤ jt, or jt + s ≤ it.
If so, then a player-buyer gets one share from his opponent-seller according to his
(buyer) bid price.: if it+ s ≤ jt, then at stage t Player 2 buys one share from Player
1 for the price jt; if jt+ s ≤ it, then at stage t Player 1 buys one share from Player
2 for the price it. Thus, at stage t there is no transactions if and only if |it− jt| < s.
This n-stage model with the bid-ask spread equal to s is described by a zero-sum
repeated game Gm,sn (p) with incomplete information of Player 2 and with countable
state and action spaces. The corresponding games Gm,sn (p) are given by the two
matrices of one-step payoﬀs.
aL,m,s(i, j) =
⎧⎨⎩−i, if i ≥ j + s,0, if |i− j| < s,
j, if j ≥ x+ s,
aH,m,s(i, j) =
⎧⎨⎩
m− i, if i ≥ j + s,
0, if |i− j| < s,
−m+ j, if j ≥ i+ s.
For s = 0, zero elements of the matrices appear at the principal diagonal only.
For s > 1, zero elements ﬁll a ”band of s-range” along the principal diagonal. For
s > 1 the more complicated structure of payoﬀ matrices makes an analysis of games
Gm,sn (p) more diﬃcult.
8.2. Upper and lower bounds for the game value V m,sn (p)
Following the guideline of section 2 we get upper and lower bounds for for value
function V m,sn (p) provided by a ”reasonable” strategy of Player 2 and a ”reasonable”
strategy of Player 1.
Upper bound for V m,sn (p).
112 Victor Domansky, Victoria Kreps, Marina Sandomirskaia
Theorem 8.1. For any number of steps n functions V m,sn are bounded from above
by a function Hm,s that is continuous, concave, and piecewise linear with m/s lin-
earity domains [sk/m, s(k+1)/m], k = 0, 1, . . . ,m/s−1. The function Hm,s is com-
pletely determined with the values at its peak points pk = sk/m, k = 0, 1, . . . ,m/s:
Hm,s(pk) =
m2
2s
pk(1− pk). (8.1)
To prove the theorem we construct the following ”reasonable” strategy τm,s of
Player 2 that is an analogue of his optimal strategy in the game of inﬁnite duration
with s = 1 (see section 2).
For the initial probability p ∈
[
sk
m ,
s(k+1)
m
)
the ﬁrst move of Player 2 strategy
τm,s is to propose the bid price sk. Then at step t, t = 2, 3, . . ., Player 2 shifts his
bid price by s upwards or downwards depending on the insider’s bid at the previous
step:
τm,st (it−1, jt−1) =
⎧⎨⎩ jt−1 − s, if it−1 ≤ jt−1 − s;jt−1, if |it−1 − jt−1| < s
jt−1 + s, if it−1 ≥ jt−1 + s;
As the values V m,sn are bounded from above as n → ∞, the consideration of
games with inﬁnite number of steps becomes reasonable.
Lower bound for V∞(p).
Theorem 8.2. The function V m,s∞ is bounded from below by a function Lm,s that is
continuous, concave, and piecewise linear with m/s linearity domains [sk/m, s(k+
1)/m], k = 0, 1, . . . ,m/s−1. The function Lm,s has the following values at the peak
points pk = sk/m, k = 0, 1, . . . ,m/s:
Lm,s(pk) = V1(s)
m2
s2
pk(1− pk). (8.2)
Value V1(s) is a guaranteed insider’s gain per step, explicit formula will be given a
few below.
Remark 8.1. The obtained upper and lower bounds have the same form.
Sketch of the proof for Theorem 8.2. As for the case s = 1 the Player 1’ optimal
strategy in the game of inﬁnite duration generates the simple random walk (SRW)
on the lattice of posterior probabilities of share prices, for the case s > 1 it is
natural to investigate the classΣSRW of strategies with SRW-property on the lattice{
sk
m | k = 0, ..m/s
}
corresponding to the case s > 1.
Below we construct the best strategy in the class ΣSRW and show that this
strategy provides the result of Theorem 8.2.
To determine this strategy we use the following notation,
g(d) =
1
s
+
1
s− 1 + . . .+
1
s− d ,
d∗ = max{d | g(d) ≤ 1},
ε∗ = 1− g(d∗).
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For probability pk = sk/m the ﬁrst move of insider’s strategy σk,m,s is to mix
bid prices {sk − 2s} and {sk, sk + 1, . . . , sk + d∗, sk + d∗ + 1} in accordance with
total probabilities
σk,m,s1 (sk − 2s|H) = 12 ,
σk,m,s1 (sk + d|H) = 12(s−d) , d = 0, 1, . . . , d∗,
σk,m,s1 (sk + d
∗ + 1|H) = 12ε∗.
Conditional probabilities of these bids are calculated so that corresponding pos-
terior probabilities of high share price will be the following
p(i = sk − 2s) = s(k − 1)/m = pk−1,
p(i = sk + d) = s(k + 1)/m = pk+1, d = 0, 1, . . . , d
∗, d∗ + 1.
At the next step insider must apply the same strategy, but for the posterior
probability calculated at the previous step.
This strategy generates the simple random walk over the lattice sk/m with
absorption at extreme points, insider’s proﬁt per step being equal to V (1) given by
V1(s) =
1
2
(d∗ + 1 + ε∗(s− d∗ − 1)) . (8.3)
It is the best strategy in the class ΣSRW .
Remark 8.2. For the minimal nontrivial case s = 2 the constructed ”reasonable”
strategy of insider is not his optimal strategy for the game of inﬁnite duration.
Therefore, we conclude that the insider’s optimal strategy does not generate
simple random walk of price expectations and leads apparently to non-symmetric
price ﬂuctuations.
Relationships between upper and lower bounds. For the case s = 1, the
obtained upper and lower bounds coincide and give the value function of bidding
game of unlimited duration at its peak points pk = k/m:
Hm,1(pk) = L
m,1(pk) =
m2
2
pk(1 − pk) = V m,1∞ (pk).
For the case of minimal nontrivial bid-ask spread s = 2 the following equality
holds at the points pk = 2k/m,
Lm,2(pk) = 3/4H
m,2(pk).
As s →∞ the ratio between L and H decreases and in the limit yields
Lm,s(pk) ≈ 0, 63 ·Hm,s(pk).
As shown above, bid-ask spread plays a role of regulator for transaction activity
on stock market. As bid-ask spread increases transactions occur less frequently and
expected insider’s proﬁt falls at least by s times to compare with the model without
spread.
Generalization of the model with non-zero bid-ask spread to the case
of countable set of possible values for a share price The results above are
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generalized to the case of countable set of possible values for a share price. We
analyze the model where this price can take values on the lattice sk, k ∈ ZZ by
analogy with section 6. The principal idea is to represent distributions on the integer
lattice with given ﬁrst moment as convex combinations (probability mixtures) of
two-point distributions with the same ﬁrst moments. It is shown that upper and
lower bounds obtained above preserve their form with replacement of the term
sk(m − sk) by the variance D(p) for distributions with mean values E(p) = sk,
k ∈ ZZ. We construct the insider’s strategies for these games as probability mixtures
of strategies for two-point games implementing a preliminary additional lottery for
the choice of two-point distribution.
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Abstract Since the seminal work of John Maynard Smith (1982), a vast
literature has developed on evolution analysis through game theoretic tools.
Among the most popular evolutionary systems is the Replicator Dynamics,
based in its classical version on the combination between a standard non
cooperative matrix game and a dynamic system which evolution depends on
the payoﬀs of the interacting species.
Despite its weaknesses, in particular the fact that it does not take into
account emergence and development of species that did not initially exist,
the Replicator Dynamics has the advantage of proposing a relatively simple
model that analyzes and tests some core features of Darwinian evolution.
Nevertheless, the simplicity of the model reaches its limits when one needs
to predict accurately the conditions for reaching evolutionary stability. The
reason for it is quite obvious: it stems from the possible diﬃculties to ﬁnd
an analytical solution to the system of equations modelling the Replicator
Dynamics.
An alternative approach has been developed, based on matrix games of a
diﬀerent kind, called Games of Deterrence. Matrix Games of Deterrence are
qualitative binary games in which selection of strategic pairs results for each
player in only two possible outcomes: acceptable (noted 1) and unacceptable
(noted 0). It has been shown (Rudnianski, 1991) that each matrix Game
of Deterrence can be associated in a one to one relation with a system of
equations called the playability system, the solutions of which determine the
playability properties of the players’ strategies.
Likewise, it has been shown (Ellison and Rudnianski, 2009) that one could
derive evolutionary stability properties of the Replicator Dynamics from the
solutions of the playability system associated with a symmetric matrix Game
of Deterrence on which the Replicator Dynamics is based.
Thus, it has been established that (Ellison and Rudnianski, 2009):
– To each symmetric solution of the playability system corresponds an
evolutionarily stable equilibrium set (ESES)
– If a strategy is not playable in every solution of the playability system,
the proportion of the corresponding species in the Replicator Dynamics
vanishes with time in every solution of the dynamic system
Keywords: evolutionary games, Games of Deterrence, playability, Replica-
tor Dynamics, species, strategies.
Based on these results, the proposed paper will ﬁrst extend the analysis already
undertaken and propose new results in terms of relations between the solutions of
the Game of Deterrence playability system and the solutions of the dynamic system.
116 David Ellison, Michel Rudnianski
The paper will then provide a method for systematically modelling standard ma-
trix games as Games of Deterrence, allowing the previous results to be extended to
any standard matrix game. In particular, in certain situations where the standard
methods for analyzing dynamic systems do not work, the above bridging between
standard games and Games of Deterrence will enable to determine the systems’
asymptotic behaviour.
More precisely, in a ﬁrst part, after having brieﬂy recalled the deﬁnition of the
Replicator Dynamics, the paper will recall the deﬁnitions and basic properties of
Games of Deterrence.
A second part will distinguish between three categories of strategies in the Game of
Deterrence under consideration, and will associate speciﬁc evolutionary properties
with each one.
The third and last part will then develop an algorithm associating a Game of De-
terrence with any standard quantitative symmetric matrix game in a way that will
enable to generalize the method to the analysis of quantitative evolutionary games.
1. Replicator Dynamics and Games of Deterrence
1.1. Replicator Dynamics
The Replicator Dynamics is a classical dynamic system describing the evolution
of a population broken down into several species. The outcome of the interaction
between two individuals is given by a symmetric matrix game G.
Moreover, if θ = (θ1, θ2, ..., θn) represents the population’s proﬁle (i.e. θi is the
proportion of species i in the population), then the Replicator Dynamics associated
with G is the dynamical system D(G) deﬁned by θ′i = θi(ui − uT )
where:
– ui =
∑
k
θkuik where uik represents the payoﬀ of species i when interacting with
species k
– uT =
∑
i
θiui
ui deﬁnes the ﬁtness of species i, and it then stems straightforwardly from the above
system of diﬀerential equations that the evolution of the proportion of a species i
in the population depends on the relative ﬁtness of i with respect to the average
ﬁtness of the entire population.
The above classical representation of the Replicator Dynamics is equivalent to the
following:
– Let Θ be the space of population proﬁles
– Let f be a vector ﬁeld on Θ such that θ′ = f(θ) with fi(θ) = θi(ui − uT )
An equilibrium of the Replicator Dynamics is then deﬁned as a ﬁxed point of f .
In the following, we will always consider that all species are present in the initial
state, i.e. ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n}, θi(0) = 0
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1.2. Games of Deterrence basic properties
Games of Deterrence consider only two possible states of the world:
– Those which are acceptable for the player under consideration (noted 1)
– Those which are unacceptable for that same player (noted 0)
Given that the players’ objective is to be in an acceptable state of the world, Games
of Deterrence analyze the strategies’ playability.
For the sake of simplicity, in the following we shall only consider matrix games,
but the deﬁnitions that will be introduced extend straightforwardly to N-player
games.
Let E and R be two players with respective strategic sets SE (card SE = n) and
SR (card SR = p).
We shall consider ﬁnite bi-matrix games (SE , SR, U, V ) in normal form where pos-
sible outcomes are taken from the set {0, 1}. More precisely, for any strategic pair
(i, k) ∈ SE × SR, uik and vik deﬁne the outcomes for player E and R respectively.
A strategy i of E is said to be safe iﬀ ∀k ∈ SR, uik = 1.
A non-safe strategy is said to be dangerous.
Let JE(i) be an index called index of positive playability, such that:
If i is safe then JE(i) = 1
If not, JE(i) = (1− jE)(1 − jR)
∏
k∈SR
[1− JR(k)(1 − uik)]
With jE =
∏
i∈SE
(1 − JE(i)) ; and jR =
∏
k∈SR
(1− JR(k))
If JE(i) = 1, strategy i ∈ SE is said to be positively playable.
If there are no positively playable strategies in SE , that is if jE = 1, all strategies
i ∈ SE are said to be playable by default.
Similar deﬁnitions apply by analogy to strategies k of SR.
A strategy in SE ∪ SR is playable iﬀ it is either positively playable or playable
by default.
The system P of all equations of JE(i), i ∈ SE , JR(k), k ∈ SR, jE and jR is called
the playability system of the game.
{0, 1}n+p+2 is called the playability set of P
The playability system P may be considered as a dynamic system J = fˆ(J) on
the playability set.
A solution of the matrix Game of Deterrence is an element of the playability set
which is a solution of P .
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It has been shown in (Rudnianski, 1991) that any matrix Game of Deterrence
has at least one solution, and that in the general case, there is no uniqueness of the
solution.
Given a strategic pair (i, k) ∈ SE × SR, i is said to be a deterrent strategy vis-
à-vis k iﬀ the three following conditions apply:
– i is playable
– vik = 0
– ∃k′ ∈ SR : JR(k′) = 1
It has been shown (Rudnianski, 1991) that a strategy k ∈ SR is playable iﬀ there
is no strategy i ∈ SE deterrent vis-à-vis k. Thus, the study of deterrence properties
amounts to analyzing the playability properties of the strategies.
A symmetric Game of Deterrence is a Game of Deterrence (SE , SR, U, V ) such
that SE = SR and U = V t (i.e. ∀i, k, uik = vki)
In the case of symmetric games, the strategic set will be noted S.
A symmetric solution is a solution in which ∀i ∈ S, JE(i) = JR(i)
It has been shown (Ellison and Rudnianski, 2009) that in a symmetric Game of
Deterrence, jE = jR
1.3. Deterrence and evolution
It has been shown (Ellison and Rudnianski, 2009) that for a symmetric Game of
Deterrence G with playability system P and Replicator Dynamics D(G), if:
– P has a symmetric solution for which no strategy is playable by default
– at t = 0, the proportion of each positively playable strategy is greater than the
sum of the proportions of the non-playable strategies,
then, whatever the initial proﬁle:
– The proportion of each non-playable strategy decreases exponentially towards
zero
– The proportion of each playable strategy has a non-zero limit
This result can be interpreted as follows: each symmetric solution of the playability
system is associated with an Evolutionarily Stable Equilibrium Set of the Replicator
Dynamics, i.e. the union of the attraction basins of the equilibria is a neighbourhood
of the equilibrium set.
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2. Further properties of evolutionary Games of Deterrence
2.1. Equivalent strategies and evolution
Deﬁnition 1. Two strategies i and j are equivalent if ∀k ∈ S, uik = ujk
Lemma 1. If i and j are equivalent, then:
– θiθj is constant in every solution of the Replicator Dynamics
– i and j have the same playability in every solution of the playability system
Proof. Since strategies i and j are equivalent, ui = uj
hence (ln θiθj )
′ = (lnθi)′ − (lnθj)′ = (ui − uT )− (uj − uT ) = 0
Deﬁnition 2. Given a subset X of the strategic set S, let i, k ∈ S,
k is said to be X-dominant vis-à-vis i if ∀l ∈ X, uil ≤ ukl.
Likewise, i and k are said to be X-equivalent if i is X-dominant vis-à-vis k and k
is X-dominant vis-à-vis i.
X-dominance is a reﬂexive and transitive relation.
2.2. Categorization of playability system solutions
Let G be a symmetric Game of Deterrence with playability system P .
Let Ψ be a function which associates with any given solution σ of P a partition
(A,B,C) of the strategic set S of G such that:
– A = {i ∈ S| i is positively playable for both players}
– B = {i ∈ S| i is either positively playable for exactly one player or playable by
default for both players}
– C = {i ∈ S| i is non-playable for both players}
Proposition 1. If a partition (A,B,C) of S veriﬁes:
i ∈ A ⇔ (uik = 0 ⇒ k ∈ C)
i ∈ C ⇔ ∃k ∈ A : uik = 0
}
(C1)
then (A,B,C) ∈ ImΨ
Conversely if (A,B,C) ∈ ImΨ , then (A,B,C) veriﬁes:
i ∈ A ⇔ (uik = 0 ⇒ k ∈ C)
∃k ∈ A : uik = 0 ⇒ i ∈ C
}
(C2)
Proof. Let (A,B,C) be a partition of S verifying (C1)
-if A = ∅,
Let us consider the following element of the playability set deﬁned by:
– ∀i ∈ A, JE(i) = JR(i) = 1
– ∀i ∈ B, JE(i) = 1 and JR(i) = 0
– ∀i ∈ C, JE(i) = JR(i) = 0
– jE = jR = 0
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Let us now verify that this element is a solution of P :
It stems from (C1) that:
∀i ∈ A, (1 − jE)(1 − jR)
∏
k∈S
(1 − JR(k)(1 − uik)) = 1 and (1 − jE)(1 − jR)
∏
k∈S
(1 −
JE(k)(1− uik)) = 1
∀i ∈ C, (1 − jE)(1 − jR)
∏
k∈S
(1 − JR(k)(1 − uik)) = 0 and (1 − jE)(1 − jR)
∏
k∈S
(1 −
JE(k)(1− uik)) = 0
It also stems from (C1) that ∀i ∈ B, ∃k ∈ B : uik = 0.
Indeed, if i ∈ B, i /∈ A and i /∈ C, so ∃k /∈ A ∪ C : uik = 0
Hence ∀i ∈ B,
(1− jE)(1− jR)
∏
k∈S
(1−JR(k)(1−uik)) = 1 and (1− jE)(1− jR)
∏
k∈S
(1−JE(k)(1−
uik)) = 0
Also
∏
k∈S
(1− JR(k)) = 0 and
∏
k∈S
(1 − JE(k)) = 0
The chosen values indeed deﬁne a solution σ of P , and (A,B,C) = Ψ(σ)
-if A = ∅,
it stems from the second part of (C1) that C = ∅
Hence B = S
Also, it stems from the ﬁrst part of (C1) that no strategy in S is safe.
Therefore, there is a solution σ0 of P in which all strategies are playable by default,
and (A,B,C) = (∅, S, ∅) = Ψ(σ0)
Let τ be a solution of P and (A,B,C) = Ψ(τ),
-if jE = jR = 1 in τ ,
then (A,B,C) = (∅, S, ∅)
and since no strategy is safe, ∀i ∈ S, ∃k ∈ S : uik = 0
Hence (A,B,C) veriﬁes (C1).
-if jE = jR = 0,
A = {i ∈ S|JE(i) = JR(i) = 1} = {i ∈ S|
∏
k∈S
(1 − JR(k)(1 − uik)) =
∏
k∈S
(1 −
JE(k)(1− uik)) = 1}
= {i ∈ S|uik = 0 ⇒ JE(k) = JR(k) = 0} = {i ∈ S|uik = 0 ⇒ k ∈ C}
similarly, C = {i ∈ S|∃k ∈ A : uik = 0}
Hence (A,B,C) veriﬁes (C1).
Let σ be a solution of P and (A,B,C) = Ψ(σ)
let i ∈ S,
i ∈ A⇔ JE(i) = JR(i) = 1
⇔ i is safe or (1 − jE)(1 − jR)
∏
k∈S
[1 − JR(k)(1 − uik)] = (1 − jE)(1 − jR)
∏
k∈S
[1 −
JE(k)(1− uik)] = 1
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⇔ i is safe or (je = jR = 0 and (uik = 0 ⇒ JE(k) = JR(k) = 0))
Yet i is safe ⇒ (je = jR = 0 and (uik = 0 ⇒ JE(k) = JR(k) = 0))
so i ∈ A⇔ (je = jR = 0 and (uik = 0 ⇒ JE(k) = JR(k) = 0))
i ∈ A⇔ (uik = 0 ⇒ k ∈ C)
If ∃k ∈ A : uik = 0,
then k is deterrent vis-à-vis i for both players.
Hence i ∈ C
2.3. Categorization of the solutions of the Replicator Dynamics
Let G be a symmetric Game of Deterrence and D(G) its Replicator Dynamics.
Let Γ be a function which associates with any given solution σ of D(G) a partition
(A′, B′, C′) of the strategic set S of G such that:
– A′ = {i ∈ S| θi does not have a zero limit}
– B′ = {i ∈ S| lim θi = 0 and θ(i) is not integrable}
– C′ = {i ∈ S| θi is integrable}
Proposition 2. If a solution σ of D(G) veriﬁes
∫∞
0 1− uT < ∞,
then (A′, B′, C′) = Γ (σ) veriﬁes:
A′ = ∅
i ∈ A′ ⇔ (uik = 0 ⇒ k ∈ C′)
∃k /∈ C′ : k is (A′ ∪B′)-dominant vis-à-vis i and uik < ukk ⇒ i ∈ C′
∃k ∈ C′ : k is (A′ ∪B′)-dominant vis-à-vis i ⇒ i ∈ C′
⎫⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭ (C3)
Proof. Let σ be a solution of D(G) such that
∫∞
0 1− uT <∞,
and let (A′, B′, C′) = Γ (σ).
A′ = ∅ because ∑
i∈S
θi = 1
Let i ∈ S,
θ′i
θi
= ui − uT = (1− uT )− (1− ui)
hence θi(t) = θi(0)e
∫
t
0
1−uT e−
∫
t
0
1−ui
θi(0)e
∫
t
0
1−uT has a non-zero ﬁnite limit,
and e−
∫
t
0
1−ui has a ﬁnite limit, since it is positive and decreasing
so θi has a limit.
This being true for all i ∈ S, the solution σ converges towards an equilibrium.
Also lim θi = 0 ⇔ lim
∫ t
0
1− ui = +∞
1− ui = 1−
∑
k∈S
θkuik =
∑
k∈S
θk(1 − uik) =
∑
k|uik=0
θk
hence lim θi = 0 ⇔ ∃k ∈ S : uik = 0 and θk is not integrable
i ∈ A′ ⇔ (∀k ∈ S, uik = 0 ⇒ k ∈ C′)
Let i, k ∈ S such that k is (A′ ∪B′)-dominant vis-à-vis i,
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let θC′ =
∑
c∈C′
θc,
By deﬁnition of C′, θC′ is integrable.
ui − uk =
∑
l∈S
θl(uil − ukl) =
∑
l∈C′
θl(uil − ukl) +
∑
l/∈C′
θl(uil − ukl) ≤ θC′
θi
θk
(t) = θiθk (0)e
∫
t
0
ui−uk ≤ θiθk (0)e
∫
t
0
θC′ ≤ θiθk (0)e
∫∞
0
θC′ < +∞
θi
θk
is upper-bounded.
Hence, if k ∈ C′, then i ∈ C′
Now if k /∈ C′ and uik < ukk,
ui − uk ≤ θC′ + (uik − ukk)θk = θC′ − θk
so ( θiθk )
′ = θiθk (ui − uk) ≤ θiθk (θC′ − θk) = θiθk θC′ − θi
0 ≤ θiθk (t) ≤ θiθk (0) +
∫ t
0
θi
θk
θC′ −
∫ t
0 θi
hence
∫ t
0
θi ≤ θiθk (0) +
∫ t
0
θi
θk
θC′
Since θiθk is upper-bounded and θC′ is integrable,
θi
θk
θC′ is integrable
hence θi is integrable, and i ∈ C′
Corollary 1. For any solution σ of D(G), let Γσ : S → {A′, B′, C′} be such that
∀i ∈ S, i ∈ Γσ(i) in the partition Γ (σ). Let us equip the set {A′, B′, C′} with the
alphebetical order: A′ ≥ B′ ≥ C′.
Let (i, k) ∈ S2. If k is (A′ ∪B′)-dominant vis-à-vis i, then Γσ(k) ≥ Γσ(i)
Also if i and k are (A′ ∪B′)-equivalent, then Γσ(i) = Γσ(k)
Proof. Let k be (A′ ∪B′)-dominant vis-à-vis i,
If k ∈ C′, then it stems from proposition 2 that i ∈ C′
If k ∈ B′, then k /∈ A′, hence ∃l /∈ C′ : ukl = 0
and since uil ≤ ukl, uil = 0
whence i /∈ A′
If k ∈ A′, then A′ ≥ Γσ(i)
Hence Γσ(k) ≥ Γσ(i)
If i and k are (A′ ∪B′)-equivalent,
then Γσ(k) ≥ Γσ(i) and Γσ(i) ≥ Γσ(k)
Hence Γσ(i) = Γσ(k)
3. Bridging binary and quantitative games
In a ﬁrst part, the present section will proceed to a classical analysis of the Replicator
Dynamics associated with an elementary example of 2x2 standard game. In a second
part, an alternative approach based on the transformation of the standard game
into a Game of Deterrence will be developed. The third part will generalize the new
approach, which will be applied in the fourth part to a case which the standard
approach cannot solve comprehensively.
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3.1. Example 1: the standard approach
Let us consider the following symmetric matrix game G in which 0 < a < 1:
G
i k
i (1, 1) (1, a)
k (a, 1) (0, 0)
Let θ = (θi, θk) ∈ Θ be the proﬁle of the population.
The average payoﬀs of the two species are:
ui = 1
uk = aθi
and uT = θi + aθiθk
Hence θ′ = f(θ) = (θi(1− θi − aθiθk), θk(aθi − θi − aθiθk)
It can be seen by the classical analysis of the Replicator Dynamics that in every
solution of D(G), θk decreases exponentially, leading to the equilibrium θ = (1, 0).
Indeed, in this simple example, the classical approach enables to completely deter-
mine the trajectories, and the equilibria.
3.2. Alternative approach
Let us now introduce the following alternative approach the rationale of which will
be justiﬁed later.
A possible interpretation of player Column receiving payoﬀ a when the strategic
pair (i, k) is selected, is that species i can be divided into two sub-species i1 and i2,
such that player Column, when playing species k, gets a payoﬀ of 1 against species
i1, and 0 against species i2, provided that the proportion in species i of i1 and i2 is
given by (a, 1− a).
This in turn implies that the dynamics associated with G may be considered equiv-
alent to the dynamics of the following game G′ when the ratio of the two sub-species
equals a1−a .
G′
i1 i2 k
i1 (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1)
i2 (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 0)
k (1, 1) (0, 1) (0, 0)
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Let ζ = (ζi1 , ζi2 , ζk) be the proﬁle of the population.
The average payoﬀs of the three species are:
vi1 = 1
vi2 = 1
vk = ζi1
and vT = ζi1 + ζi2 + ζi1ζk
Hence the Replicator Dynamics ζ′ = g(ζ) is such that:
ζ′i1 = ζi1(1− ζi1 − ζi2 − ζi1ζk)
ζ′i2 = ζi2(1− ζi1 − ζi2 − ζi1ζk)
ζ′k = ζk(ζi1 − ζi1 − ζi2 − ζi1ζk)
As it stems from the matrix of G′ that strategies i1 and i2 are equivalent,
ζi1
ζi2
is constant (lemma 1).
Let H be the subset of the set of proﬁles of D(G′) such that (1− a)ζi1 = aζi2 .
Since the ratio is constant, H is stable under the dynamics D(G′).
Let us then denote by DH(G′) the restriction of D(G′) to H
let us then deﬁne the splitting maps h and h˜ as follows:
h : Θ → H
(θi, θk) → (aθi, (1 − a)θi, θk)
and h˜ : R2 → R3
(x, y) → (ax, (1 − a)x, y)
It can be easily seen from the above that h˜ ◦ f = g ◦ h
h generates the breakdown of species i into i1 and i2 on the set of proﬁles, while h˜
does the same on the tangent space of Θ
This relation translates in terms of ﬂows as follows:
Let φtf and φ
t
g be the ﬂows associated with f and g.
h ◦ φtf (θ) = h(θ +
∫ t
0
f(θ)) = h(θ) +
∫ t
0
h˜ ◦ f(θ) = h(θ) + ∫ t
0
g ◦ h(θ) = φtg(h(θ))
h ◦ φtf = φtg ◦ h
Hence, since h is bijective, D(G) and DH(G′) are topologically conjugate.
In other words, the dynamics of G is equivalent to the dynamics of G′ restricted to
H .
The playability system P ′ of G′ has a unique solution in which strategies i1 and i2
are positively playable while k is not playable for both players. Indeed, strategies i1
and i2 are safe and i2 is deterrent vis-à-vis k.
It then stems from (Ellison and Rudnianski, 2009) that whatever the initial proﬁle:
ζ11 and ζ12 have a non-zero limit
ζ2 has a zero limit
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Since f and g|H are topologically conjugate, whatever the initial proﬁle θ(0) in
G:
θ1 has a limit equal to 1
θ2 has a zero-limit
These conclusions match exactly those drawn from the standard approach.
3.3. Generalization
Let G˜ be a standard symmetric matrix game,
Let M = max uik and m = min uik
Through replacing all the payoﬀs uik by their images via the aﬃnity x → x−mM−m , we
obtain a game G with payoﬀs comprised between 0 and 1.
It is well known (Weibull, 1995) that the Replicator Dynamics is invariant under
positive aﬃne transformation of payoﬀs. In this case, it is accelerated by a factor
1
M−m . If f˜ and f denote the vector ﬁelds of D(G˜) and D(G) respectively, the asso-
ciated ﬂows satisfy the following relation:
φt
f˜
= φ
(M−m)t
f
Proposition 3. Given a standard symmetric game G with payoﬀs comprised be-
tween 0 and 1, there is a binary symmetric matrix game G′ and a subset H of
its set of proﬁles such that the restriction DH(G′) of D(G′) to H and D(G) are
topologically conjugate.
Proof. This demonstration will use an algorithmic construction of the game G′.
Let G be a standard symmetric matrix game with strategic set S = {1, ..., n}
Let i ∈ S,
let p = card({uki, k ∈ S} ∪ {0, 1})− 1,
let (a0, ..., ap) be such that:
0 = a0 < a1 < ... < ap = 1 and {a0, ..., ap} = {uki, k ∈ S} ∪ {0, 1}
Let Gi be the game obtained from G by replacing strategy i with p equivalent
strategies i1, ..., ip and by setting the following payoﬀs:
vkl = ukl, for k, l ∈ S − {i}
viml = uil, for 1 ≤ m ≤ p, l ∈ S − {i}
vkim = 1 if m ≤ r, where r is such that uki = ar ; and vkim = 0 otherwise, for
k ∈ S − {i}, 1 ≤ m ≤ p
vimim′ = 1 if m
′ ≤ r, where r is such that uii = ar ; and vimim′ = 0 otherwise, for
1 ≤ m,m′ ≤ p
Let Hi be the subset of the set of proﬁles Θi of Gi deﬁned by the following equa-
tions:
∀1 ≤ m ≤ p, θim = (am − am−1)
p∑
m′=1
θim′
The strategies i1, ..., ip are equivalent.
Hence, it stems from lemma 1 that Hi is stable under the dynamics D(Gi)
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Let hi be the splitting map:
hi : Θ → Hi
θ → (θ1, ..., θi−1, (a1 − a0)θi, ..., (ap − ap−1)θi, θi+1, ..., θn)
and h˜i : Rn → Rn+p−1
(x1, ..., xn) → (x1, ..., xi−1, (a1 − a0)xi, ..., (ap − ap−1)xi, xi+1, ..., xn)
Let θ ∈ Θ and k ∈ S − {i},
vk(hi(θ)) = vk(θ1, ..., θi−1, (a1 − a0)θi, ..., (ap − ap−1)θi, θi+1, ..., θn)
=
∑
l 	=i
θlvkl +
p∑
m=1
(am − am−1)θivkim
=
∑
l 	=i
θlukl +
r∑
m=1
(am − am−1)θi where r is such that ar = uki
=
∑
l 	=i
θlukl + arθi
= uk(θ)
hence ∀k ∈ S − {i}, vk ◦ hi = uk
Similarly, for k ∈ {i1, ..., ip}, vk ◦ hi = ui
hence, by linearity vT ◦ hi = uT
and if f and fi denote the vector ﬁelds of the Replicator Dynamics of G and Gi
respectively,
h˜i ◦ f = fi ◦ hi
Hence the ﬂows are conjugate via hi, i.e. hi ◦ φtf = φtfi ◦ hi
And since hi is a one-to-one correspondance between Θ and Hi,
D(G) and DHi(Gi) are topologically conjugate via hi.
Also, {vkim , k ∈ S − {i} ∪ {i1, ..., ip}, 1 ≤ m ≤ p} ⊂ {0, 1}
Hence, the splitting of species i reduces by 1 the number of species which, when
selected by one player, may generate a non-binary payoﬀ for the other player, un-
less strategy i already veriﬁes that property, in which case the algorithm does not
modify the game.
Let G′ = G12...n be the game obtained from G by successively applying the above
transformation for each strategy of S,
and let H be the corresponding subset of the set of proﬁles Θ′ of G′,
G′ is a binary matrix game and D(G) and DH(G′) are topologically conjugate.
Consequence: the asymptotic properties of G can be analyzed through G′ and its
playability system.
As the algorithm is applied to G, each strategy is split into up to n equivalent
strategies. Hence, G′ may have up to n2 strategies which can be grouped into n
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sets of equivalent strategies. Now, it is generally useful to reduce the size of the
playabily system. In the case of G′, the fact that equivalent strategies have the
same playability in every solution (cf. lemma 1) allows us to reduce the playability
system. Indeed:
Proposition 4. Let G′ be a symmetric Game of Deterrence with strategic set S′ =
{1, ..., i− 1,
i1, ..., ip, i+1, ..., n}, where i1, ..., ip are equivalent strategies, and let G′′ be the game
obtained from G′ by replacing strategies i1, ..., ip by a strategy i0 and by setting:
wkl = vkl, ∀k, l = i1, ..., ip
wi0k = vi1k∀k = i1, ..., ip
wki0 =
p∏
m=1
vkim , ∀k = i1, ..., ip
wi0i0 =
p∏
m=1
vi1im
Let H ′ = {(JE(1), ..., JE(i−1), JE(i1), ..., JE(ip), JE(i+1), ..., JE(n), JR(1), ..., JR(i−
1), JR(i1), ..., JR(ip),
JR(i + 1), ..., JR(n), jE , jR)|JE(i1) = ... = JE(ip) and JR(i1) = ... = JR(ip)} ⊂
{0, 1}2n+2p,
let P ′ and P ′′ be the playability systems associated with G′ and G′′ respectively,
H ′ is stable under P ′, and the restriction P ′H′ of P
′ to H ′ is topologically conjugate
to P ′′.
Proof. Let fˆ : {0, 1}2n+2p → {0, 1}2n+2p and ˆˆf : {0, 1}2n+2 → {0, 1}2n+2 be the
playability systems P ′ and P ′′ respectively.
Since, i1, ..., ip are equivalent, the components of fˆ corresponding to JE(i1), ..., JE(ip)
are equal, as are those corresponding to JR(i1), ..., JR(ip).
Hence H ′ is stable under fˆ . (In fact, Imfˆ ⊂ H ′.)
So P ′ can be restricted to H ′.
Let hi : H ′ → {0, 1}2n+2 be such that:
hi : (JE(1), ..., JE(i− 1), JE(i1), ..., JE(ip), JE(i+ 1), ..., JE(n), JR(1), ..., JR(i− 1),
JR(i1), ..., JR(ip), JR(i+1), ..., JR(n), jE , jR) → (JE(1), ..., JE(i− 1), JE(i1), JE(i+
1), ..., JE(n), JR(1), ..., JR(i − 1),
JR(i1), JR(i + 1), ..., JR(n), jE , jR)
hi is a bijection.
In order to prove the topological conjugacy, we must verify that hi ◦ fˆ |H′ = ˆˆf ◦ hi
Let (JE(1), ..., JE(i− 1), JE(i1), ..., JE(ip), JE(i+ 1), ..., JE(n), JR(1), ..., JR(i− 1),
JR(i1), ..., JR(ip), JR(i + 1), ..., JR(n), jE , jR) ∈ H ′, let k = i1, ..., ip,
It stems from the construction of G′′ that k is safe in G′′ iﬀ it is safe in G′
So if k is safe, the components of hi ◦ fˆ |H′ and ˆˆf ◦ hi corresponding to JE(k) and
JR(k) are all equal to 1.
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Similarly, i0 is safe iﬀ i1, ..., ip are all safe.
Let us now suppose that strategy k is dangerous.
The component of ˆˆf(JE(1), ..., JE(i−1), JE(i1), JE(i+1), ..., JE(n), JR(1), ..., JR(i−
1), JR(i1),
JR(i+ 1), ..., JR(n), jE , jR) corresponding to JE(k) is:
(1− jE)(1 − jR)
∏
l 	=i0
(1− JR(l)(1 − wkl))× (1 − JR(i1)(1 − wki0 ))
= (1 − jE)(1− jR)
∏
l 	=i0
(1 − JR(l)(1− vkl))× (1− JR(i1)(1−
p∏
m=1
vkim ))
= (1 − jE)(1− jR)
∏
l 	=i0
(1 − JR(l)(1− vkl))×
p∏
m=1
1− JR(i1)(1 − vkim)
= (1 − jE)(1− jR)
∏
l∈S′
(1− JR(l)(1 − vkl)),
which is exactly the same component of hi◦ fˆ(JE(1), ..., JE(i−1), JE(i1), ..., JE(ip),
JE(i+ 1), ..., JE(n),
JR(1), ..., JR(i− 1), JR(i1), ..., JR(ip), JR(i+ 1), ..., JR(n), jE , jR)
Similarly, all other components match.
Hence P ′H′ and P
′′ are topologically conjugate.
Corollary 2. Let G′ be a symmetric Game of Deterrence with a strategic set con-
taining several subsets of equivalent strategies.
Let G′′ be the game obtained by replacing each subset of equivalent strategies by a
single strategy as in proposition 4.
Let H ′ be the subset of the playability set of elements such that any two equivalent
strategies have the same playability for both players.
Then, using the notations of proposition 4, P ′H′ and and P
′′ are topologically con-
jugate.
Proof. The result stems straightforwardly from the application of proposition 4 to
each subset of equivalent strategies.
Remark 1: Since Imfˆ ⊂ H ′, all the solutions of the playability system P ′ are in
H ′, and restricting P ′ to H ′ does not reduce the number of solutions. Thus, solving
P ′′ is equivalent to solving P ′.
Remark 2: The above simpliﬁcation of the playability system also works in the
case of non symmetric Games of Deterrence, when either player E or player R has
equivalent strategies.
Remark 3: Let G be a symmetric game with payoﬀs comprised between 0 and 1,
and let G′′ be the game obtained by ﬁrst transforming G into G′ as in proposition
3, then transforming G′ into G′′ as in proposiiton 4. If G does not have equivalent
strategies in its strategic set, then the strategic set of G′′ contains the same number
of strategies as that of G. Indeed, each strategy is ﬁrst replaced by a set of equivalent
strategies, which is in turn replaced by a single strategy. If there are equivalent
strategies in the strategic set of G, we will choose not to regroup those strategies
when building G′′, so as to maintain the number of strategies.
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3.4. Example 2
Let us consider the following example deriving from the one developped in (Elli-
son and Rudnianski, 2009), in which individuals may adopt one of three possible
behaviours:
– A: aggressive
– D: defensive
– N : neutral
Furthermore, let us assume that:
– when two individuals of the same type interact, the outcome for each one is
1, which means that an aggressive individual will not try to attack another
aggressive individual (maybe because of the fear of the outcome)
– a defensive type, when encoutering an aggressive individual, will respond by
inﬂicting damages, represented by a payoﬀ 0 ≤ x < 1 for the aggressor, and will
get a 0
– when meeting a defensive or a neutral type, the defensive type does not attack,
and the outcome pair is (1, 1)
– a neutral type never responds agressively, and receives a payoﬀ 0 ≤ y < 1 when
attacked.
G
A D N
A (1, 1) (x, 0) (1, y)
D (0, x) (1, 1) (1, 1)
N (y, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1)
It has been shown (Ellison and Rudnianski, 2009) that in the extreme case where
x = y = 0, the proﬁle (1, 0, 0), which corresponds to the whole population being
aggressive, is an evolutionarily stable equilibrium, and the set of proﬁles {(0, t, 1−
t), 0 < t < 1}, which are not individually evolutionarily stable, is an evolutionarily
stable equilibrium set.
Let us now consider the case where 0 < x, y < 1.
Let G′ and G′′ be the following matrix games:
G′
A1 A2 D1 D2 N
A1 (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 0) (0, 0) (1, 1)
A2 (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 0) (0, 0) (1, 0)
D1 (0, 1) (0, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1)
D2 (0, 0) (0, 0) (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1)
N (1, 1) (0, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1)
G′′
A0 D0 N
A0 (1, 1) (0, 0) (1, 0)
D0 (0, 0) (1, 1) (1, 1)
N (0, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1)
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Let H be the set of proﬁles in G′ such that (1−x)θA1 = xθA2 and (1−y)θD1 = yθD2 .
By proposition 3, D(G) and DH(G′) are topologically conjugate.
Let H ′ be the subset of the playability set of G′ comprised of elements such that A1
and A2 on one hand, and D1 and D2 on the other hand, have the same playability
for both players.
By proposition 4, P ′H′ and P
′′ are topologically conjugate.
It can be easily seen from the matrix of G′′ that P ′′ has three solutions:
– (1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0) (A0 is positively playable while D0 and N are not playable
for both players)
– (0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0) (D0 and N are positively playable while A0 is not playable
for both players)
– (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1) (all the strategies are playable by default for both players)
Hence, it stems from the topological conjugacy that P ′ also has three solutions:
– (1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) (A1 and A2 are positively playable while D1, D2 and
N are not playable)
– (0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0) (D1, D2 and N are positively playable while A1 and
A2 are not playable)
– (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1) (all the strategies are playable by default for both
players)
The ﬁrst two of these solutions satisfy the conditions described in section 1.3. Hence
D(G′) has two evolutionarily stable equilibrium sets:
– ESES1 = {(t, 1− t, 0, 0, 0), 0 < t < 1} where only species A1 and A2 remain
– ESES2 = {(0, 0, t1t2, (1−t1)t2, 1−t2), 0 < t1, t2 < 1} where only species D1,D2
and N remain
Hence ESES1 ∩ H and ESES2 ∩ H are asymptotically stable equilibrium sets in
DH(G
′)
ESES1∩H = {(x, 1−x, 0, 0, 0)} and ASES2∩H = {(0, 0, yt2, (1−y)t2, 1− t2), 0 <
t2 < 1}
Now DH(G′) is topologically equivalent to D(G),
hence (1, 0, 0) is an evolutionarily stable equilibium and {(0, t, 1− t), 0 < t < 1} is
an evolutionarily stable equilibrium set in D(G).
The results previously established for the game G in the case where x = y = 0
have been extended to all 0 < x, y < 1. The bridging between binary and quantita-
tive games allows us to establish asymptotic properties of evolutionary quantitative
games via playability properties of associated Games of Deterrence.
Also, if a solution σ of D(G) tends towards the equilibrium (1, 0, 0), then θD and
θN decrease exponentially. So Γ (σ) = ({A}, ∅, {D,N}).
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And if σ tends towards {(0, t, 1− t), 0 < t < 1}, then θA decreases exponentially.
So Γ (σ) = ({D,N}, ∅, {A}).
It can be easily seen from the matrix of G that these two partitions are the only
ones which verify condition (C3). In this case, ImΓ is exactly the set of partitions
of S which verify (C3).
3.5. Shortcut
Proposition 5. Let G˜ be a symmetric matrix game.
Let M and m be the maximal and minimal payoﬀs in G˜.
Let G be the game obtained by applying the aﬃnity x → x−mM−m to all the payoﬀs of
G˜. Let G′ be deﬁned as in proposition 3, and G′′ as in proposition 4.
Then G′′ is the game obtained by replacing the maximum payoﬀ by 1 and all other
payoﬀs by 0 in the matrix of G˜.
Proof. Using the previous notations (uik, vik and wik represent the payoﬀs in the
games G,G′ and G′′ respectively), we have:
wki0 =
p∏
m=1
vkim , ∀k = i1, ..., ip
wi0i0 =
p∏
m=1
vi1im
and:
vkim = 1 if m ≤ r, where r is such that uki = ar ; and vkim = 0 otherwise, for
k ∈ S − {i}, 1 ≤ m ≤ p
vimim′ = 1 if m
′ ≤ r, where r is such that uii = ar ; and vimim′ = 0 otherwise, for
1 ≤ m,m′ ≤ p
Hence:
wki0 = 1 if uki = 1 and wki0 = 0 otherwise
wi0i0 = 1 if uii = 1 and wi0i0 = 0 otherwise
As payoﬀ 1 in game G is the image of payoﬀ M in game G˜, it follows that G′′
is obtained by replacing the maximum payoﬀ by 1 and all other payoﬀs by 0 in the
matrix of G˜.
Proposition 6. Let G˜ be a symmetric matrix game, and let G′′ be the game ob-
tained by replacing the maximum payoﬀ by 1 and all other payoﬀs by 0 in the matrix
of G˜. Let σ be a solution of D(G). If:
– the playability system P ′′ of G′′ has a symmetric solution for which no strategy
is playable by default
– σ is such that at t = 0, the proportion of each strategy of G˜ corresponding to a
positively playable strategy in G′′ is greater than the sum of the proportions of
the strategies of G˜ corresponding to non-playable strategies in G′′,
then:
– The proportion of each strategy of G˜ corresponding to a non-playable strategy
in G′′ decreases exponentially towards zero
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– The proportion of each strategy of G˜ corresponding to a playable strategy in G′′
has a non-zero limit
Proof. Let M and m be the maximal and minimal payoﬀs in G˜.
Let G be the game obtained by applying the aﬃnity x → x−mM−m to all the payoﬀs
of G˜. Let G′ andH be deﬁned as in proposition 3, andG′′ andH ′ as in proposition 4.
P ′′ is topologically conjugate to P ′H′ , so the symmetric solution of P
′′ is conju-
gate to a solution τ of P ′, which is also symmetric.
By applying the result of section 1.3 to τ , we obtain that if at t = 0, the proportion
of each strategy which is positively playable in τ is greater than the sum of the
proportions of the non-playable strategies, then the proportion of each positively
playable strategy has a non-zero limit, and the proportion of each non-playable
strategy decreases exponentially towards zero.
Then, the conclusions about G˜ follow from the topological conjugacy between D(G)
and DH(G′) and the invariance by aﬃne transformation linking D(G˜) and D(G).
4. Conclusion
Starting from a symmetric quantitative game G˜, we have established the following
construction:
G˜ −→ G −→ G′ −→ G′′
such that:
– the payoﬀs of G are comprised between 0 and 1 and φt
f˜
= φ
(M−m)t
f
– G′ is binary and DH(G′) and D(G) are topologically conjugate
– G′′ has the same size as G˜ and P ′H′ and P
′′ are topologically conjugate
Now, G′′ can be constructed directly from G˜ without computing G and G′.
The results obtained in the previous sections thus enable to:
1. overcome the possible diﬃculties of solving analytically the Replicator Dynamics
2. establish asymptotic properties of solutions of the Replicator Dynamics associ-
ated with any standard symmetric matrix game
3. bridge standard quantitative games with Games of Deterrence, thus paving the
way for a treatment of optimality issues through acceptability analysis.
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Abstract In the classical game space, Evans (1996) introduced a procedure,
such that the solution of a game determined endogenously as the expected
outcome of a reduction of the game to a two-person bargaining problem, is
just the Shapley value. This approach is not suitable for games in general-
ized characteristic function form, in which the order of players entering into
the game aﬀects the worth of coalitions. Based on Evans’s approach, in this
paper we propose a new procedure which induces the generalized Shapley
value deﬁned by Sanchez and Bergantinos (1997). Moreover, this general-
ized procedure can be adapted to characterize the class of values satisfying
eﬃciency, linearity and symmetry, for games in generalized characteristic
function form.
Keywords: cooperative game, orders, value, consistency, procedure
1. Introduction
In the classical case, a cooperative game with transferable utility, or shortly, a TU
game, is an ordered pair 〈N, v〉, where N is a nonempty, ﬁnite set of players, and
v : 2N → R is a characteristic function satisfying v(∅) = 0. An element i ∈ N is
called a player, and a subset S ⊆ N is called a coalition. The associated real number
v(S) is called the worth of coalition S. The size of coalition S is denoted by |S|, or
shortly by s if no ambiguity arises. Particularly |N |, or equivalently n denotes the
size of the grand coalition N . We denote by GN the set of all cooperative TU games
with player set N and by G the space of all cooperative TU games with arbitrary
player set. A value φ = (φi)i∈N on G is a mapping which assigns to every TU game
〈N, v〉 exactly one element φ(N, v) ∈ RN . One of the most well-known values is the
Shapley value (Shapley, 1953a).
Evans (1996) introduced the following procedure: given an n-player cooperative
game and a feasible “wage” n-vector, suppose that the players in a cooperative game
are randomly split into two coalitions, each with a randomly chosen leader; the two
leaders bargain bilaterally and each pays, out of his share, a wage to each member
of his coalition as speciﬁed by the wage vector. More precisely for an arbitrary
cooperative game 〈N, v〉 in G, the following procedures are done sequentially:
(A) the players in the grand coalition N are randomly split into two coalitions, say
S and N \ S (S = ∅, N);
(B) each coalition generates randomly a leader, say leader i represents S and leader
j represents N \ S, i ∈ S, j ∈ N \ S;
(C) player i and j play a two-person bargaining process based on coalition S and
N \ S separately. The rule is that each leader pays to each member of his
coalition, an certain part of what he gets in the two-person bargaining process.
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A value is said to be consistent with the above procedure if it is equal to the
expected payoﬀ. Under such consistency condition, Evans proved that the Shapley
value is the unique solution, if all randomly chosen processes are with respect to the
uniform distribution, and the two-person bargaining result is standard according to
Hart and Mas-Colell (1989). Remind that a value φ on G is standard for two-person
game, means for an arbitrary two-person game 〈{i, j}, v〉,
φk({i, j}, v) = v({k}) + 1
2
(v({i, j})− v({i})− v({j})) for k ∈ {i, j}. (1.1)
The above results are derived in the classical game space, where the characteris-
tic function assigns to each group of players a ﬁxed single number, regardless of how
players are ordered in the group. However, in modeling some economic situations or
some special relationships among players, the earning of a group of players may de-
pend not only on its members, but also on the sequential ordering of players joining
the game. So a better approximation to some real life situation is to consider games
where the so-called characteristic function is deﬁned on all possible orders for coali-
tions of players. Such generalized model is introduced ﬁrst by Nowak and Radzik
(1994). They redeﬁned the eﬃciency, null player property and strong monotonicity
in this new game space, and axiomatized an adapted Shapley value by using two
groups of redeﬁned properties. The ﬁrst group of properties contains eﬃciency, null
player property and additivity, and the uniqueness proof follows the approach given
by Shapley (1953a). The second group of properties are eﬃciency and strong mono-
tonicity, and the proof proceeds according to the one given by Young (1985). The
symmetry property compared to the classical case, was included in the deﬁnition
of the null player in the null player property as well as the marginal contribution
in the strong monotonicity. Sanchez and Bergantinos (1997) found the inaccuracy
of the symmetry property, and gave more “suitable” deﬁnitions for the null player,
symmetric player and marginal contribution, in the new game space. In this way, a
new Shapley value was characterized, by using these new deﬁned properties. Later
such Shapley value was generalized to games with a priori unions in the same way
that Owen (1977) did for the classical Shapley value, by Sanchez and Bergantinos
(1999), who also characterized the weighted Shapley value in the new game space
(Bergantinos and Sanchez, 2001), based on the results in the classical game space
given by Shapley (1953b) as well as Kalai and Samet (1987).
In our point of view, the properties used in Sanchez and Bergantinos’ papers
are more fair and attractive, since it considered all possibilities (positions) how a
single player joining into a coalition. We follow the notation given by Sanchez and
Bergantinos (1997).
For any subset S ⊆ N , denote by H(S) the set of all orders of players in S. The
element S′ ∈ H(S) is called an ordered coalition. For notational convenience, we
use S to represent a general coalition with size s regardless of order and S′ ∈ H(S)
to represent an ordered coalition with the same player set. Note that H(∅) = ∅ as
well as H({i}) = {{i}} for all i ∈ N . Denote by Ω the set of all ordered coalitions,
that is,
Ω = {S′|S′ ∈ H(S), S ⊆ N,S = ∅}.
Obviously, the total number of ordered coalitions in Ω equals
m :=
n∑
s=1
s!Csn where C
s
n =
(
n
s
)
= s!(n−s)!n! for all 1 ≤ s ≤ n. (1.2)
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Deﬁnition 1.1. A game in generalized characteristic function form, or a general-
ized game is an ordered pair 〈N, v〉, where N is a non-empty, ﬁnite set of players
and v : Ω → R is a generalized characteristic function that assigns to each S′ ∈ Ω,
the real-valued worth v(S′) as the utility obtained by players in S according to the
order S′, such that v(∅) = 0.
Denote by G′N the set of all generalized cooperative games with player set N ,
and G′ the set all generalized cooperative games with arbitrary player set. A value
φ on G′N is a mapping assigning exactly one element (φi(N, v))i∈N ∈ RN to every
v ∈ G′N . The following deﬁnition will play an important role in our solution theory
for generalized TU games.
Deﬁnition 1.2. Let S′ ∈ H(S), S  N be given. A set T ′ is called an extension of
S′ of size t, t > s if a set of t− s players in N \ S is inserted among the players of
S′ in such a way that the players in S appear in T ′ in the same order as in S′. We
denote by V (S′) the set of all extensions of S′.
As a special case we deﬁne an extension T ′ = (S′, ih) with i ∈ S, t = s + 1
as follows. Given player i ∈ N , coalition S ⊆ N \ {i} of size s, ordered coalition
S′ ∈ H(S), and height h ∈ {1, 2, . . . , s + 1}, then (S′, ih) denotes the (s + 1)-
person ordered coalition with player i inserted in the h-th position, that is, if S′ =
(i1, . . . , is), then (S′, i1) = (i, i1, . . . , is); (S′, is+1) = (i1, . . . , is, i); and (S′, ih) =
(i1, . . . , ih−1, i, ih, . . . , is) for all 2 ≤ h ≤ s.
Deﬁnition 1.3. (Sanchez and Bergantinos, 1997) For any generalized TU game
〈N, v〉, the generalized Shapley value Sh′(N, v) = (Sh′i(N, v))i∈N is given by
Sh′i(N, v) =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
pns
(s+ 1)!
∑
S′∈H(S)
s+1∑
h=1
[
v(S′, ih)− v(S′)] for all i ∈ N .
We can rewrite the equation above in view of the extension (see Deﬁnition 1.2)
in the following way:
Sh′i(N, v) =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
pns
∑
S′∈H(S)
(s!)−1
∑
T ′∈V (S′),T ′i,
t=s+1
v(T ′)− v(S′)
s+ 1
. (1.3)
Shapley (1953a) introduced pns as the classical probability measure over the col-
lection of (unordered) coalitions not containing any ﬁxed player. The diﬀerence
compared with the classical case is that in this new setting, any player i ∈ N has
(s + 1) ways to join any ordered coalition S′ of size s, S′ ∈ H(S), S ⊆ N \ {i},
yielding various marginal contributions v(T ′)− v(S′) for all T ′ ∈ V (S′) containing
player i, of size t = s+ 1. The expected payoﬀ to any player i with respect to the
underlying classical probability measure is obtained through averaging over all the
player’s marginal contributions as well as over all s! possible ordered coalitions with
player set S.
Deﬁnition 1.4. (Nowak and Radzik, 1994; Sanchez and Bergantinos, 1997) A value
φ on G′ satisﬁes the
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(i) eﬃciency, if∑
i∈N
φi(N, v) =
1
n!
∑
N ′∈H(N)
v(N ′) for all generalized game 〈N, v〉; (1.4)
(ii) symmetry, if φi(N, v) = φj(N, v) for all symmetric players i and j. Two players
i, j ∈ N are symmetric in 〈N, v〉 if for every ordered coalition S′ such that
S′  i, j, we have that v(S′, ih) = v(S′, jh) for all h ∈ {1, 2, . . . , s+ 1};
(iii) null player property, if φi(N, v) = 0 for every generalized game 〈N, v〉, and
every null player i ∈ N . Player i is called a null player in 〈N, v〉 if for every
ordered coalition S′ not containing i, we have that v(S′, ih) = v(S′) for every
h ∈ {1, 2, . . . , s+ 1}.
Denote by v¯(N) the average sum of the worths for all permutations N ′ ∈ H(N),
i.e.,
v¯(N) =
1
n!
∑
N ′∈H(N)
v(N ′),
then the eﬃciency condition (1.4) is equivalent to
∑
i∈N φi(N, v) = v¯(N). Sanchez
and Bergantinos (1997) proved that the Shapley value is the unique value on G′
satisfying eﬃciency, additivity, symmetry and null player property.
Deﬁnition 1.5. Let S′ ∈ H(S), S ⊆ N be given. A set T’ is called an restriction12
of S′ if T ′ ∈ H(T ), T ⊆ S, and the order of players in T ′ is in accordance with that
in S′. We denote by R(S′) the set of all restrictions of S′.
Although Evans’s procedure proceeds well on the classical game space G, it
is not suitable to characterize a solution on the generalized game space G′. The
problem is that, when players are randomly split into two coalitions, there is no
order information about the two subcoalitions, so the leader does not know what he
actually owns to bargain with his opponent. In Section 2 we will give a generalized
procedure, based on Evans’s approach, to characterize the generalized Shapley value
of form (1.3). In Section 3, the procedure we derived in section 2 is modiﬁed to
characterize a class of values satisfying eﬃciency, linearity and symmetry on the
generalized game space G′.
2. Generalization of Evans’s procedure
Following Evans’s procedure, we assume that for a set of ﬁxed players, each player
has the same probability to be chosen as a leader in all possible permutations of the
1 Sanchez and Bergantinos (1997) use the notation T ′ = S′/T ′ to express the restriction
T ′ of S′. We change the notation to avoid the possible confusion with the set-minus sign
“\”.
2 In order to explain such ‘restriction set’, we introduce the notion of predeces-
sors and successors. Consider an arbitrary ordered coalition S′ ∈ Ω, S′ =
{i1, . . . , ik−1, ik, ik+1, . . . , is}. For any k ∈ {2, . . . , s}, denote the predecessors of ik ac-
cording to S′ by pre(ik, S′). For any k ∈ {1, . . . , s − 1}, denote the successors of ik
according to S′ by suc(ik, S′). Then pre(ik, S′) = {i1, . . . ik−1} as well as suc(ik, S′) =
{ik+1, . . . is} hold. For any two player i, j ∈ T ′ where T ′ ∈ H(T ), T ⊆ N , the restriction
set T ′ ∈ R(S′) means T ⊆ S, and if i ∈ pre(j, S′) then i ∈ pre(j, T ′), or if i ∈ suc(j, S′)
then i ∈ suc(j, T ′).
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set of players, i.e. for any S ⊆ N , S′, S′′ ∈ H(S), the probability of i to be chosen
as a leader in S′ is the same as that in S′′ for all i ∈ S. Remind the problem lying
in Evans’s procedure for the generalized case is the lack of order information for the
two partitioned coalitions in (A). In order to ﬁx the orders of the two coalitions in
the two-person bargaining process, we ﬁrst ﬁx one permutation N ′ ∈ H(N) with
some probability, then a partition {S′, N ′ \ S′} can be chosen based on N ′ where
S′, N ′ \ S′ ∈ R(N ′), S′ ∈ H(S), S  N and S = ∅.
Let θ : G′ → R2 be the payoﬀ of the two-person bargaining process between S′
and N ′ \ S′, say S′ gets θN ′S′ (v) and N ′ \ S′ gets θN
′
N ′\S′(v). According to Evans’s
procedure, the leader of each ordered coalition is then obliged to pay to each member
of his coalition a prespeciﬁed feasible allocation x = (xi)i∈N ∈ RN . If i is chosen as
the leader of S′, then what he gets is
θN
′
S′ (v) −
∑
k∈S\{i}
xk.
Similarly if j is the leader of N ′ \ S′ then he gets
θN
′
N ′\S′(v)−
∑
k∈N\(S∪{j})
xk.
Denote by f the probability distribution that determines the choice of the permuta-
tion N ′, the partition {S′, N ′ \ S′}, and which two players are the leader of S′ and
N ′ \ S′ respectively. Given the triple (f, θ, x), denote by Ef (Πi|θ, x) the expected
payoﬀ to player i. We generalize in the following the consistency concept deﬁned by
Evans:
Deﬁnition 2.1. Given a pair (f, θ), a feasible payoﬀ vector x = (xi)i∈N ∈ RN
satisﬁes Evans’s consistency with respect to (f, θ) if xi = Ef (Πi|θ, x) for i ∈ N .
We assume that the distribution f is uniform. Then the whole procedure under the
uniform distribution can be described as follows:
(i) Choose a permutation N ′ from the set H(N) with probability 1/n!;
(ii) Choose the size of the ﬁrst coalition S′ with each possible size {1, 2, . . . , n−1}
being equally likely, hence with probability 1/(n− 1). Suppose s is the chosen
size;
(iii) Choose an ordered coalition S′ of size s in R(N ′). Since the positions of players
in N ′ are all ﬁxed, we only need to ﬁx s players with probability 1/Csn. Once
S′ is ﬁxed, its complement N ′ \ S′ according to N ′ is also ﬁxed;
(iv) Choose a leader i from S′ (already ﬁxed in (iii)) with probability 1/s, and a
leader j from its complement N ′ \ S′ (already ﬁxed in (iii)) with probability
1/(n− s);
(v) Leader i and j play a two-person bargaining game based on coalition S′ and
N ′ \ S′ respectively. Coalition S′ gets θN ′S′ (v) while N ′ \ S′ gets θN
′
N ′\S′(v);
(vi) Leader i gets θN
′
S′ (v)−
∑
k∈S\{i} xk after assigning each of his member xk for
all k ∈ S′ \ {i}, meanwhile leader j gets θN ′N ′\S′(v) −
∑
k∈N\(S∪{j}) xk after
assigning each of his member xk for all k ∈ N \ (S ∪ {j}).
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According to the above procedure the probability that player i will ﬁnd himself
leader of coalition S′ according to N ′ is
1
n!
· 1
n− 1 ·
1
Csn
· 1
s
· 2,
and the probability of being a follower in S′ according to N ′ is
1
n!
· 1
n− 1 ·
1
Csn
· s− 1
s
· 2.
Player i could be either in the ﬁrst coalition or in the second one, hence we add
the factor 2 in the probability. Now everything is well-deﬁned except for θ in the
generalized case.
In contrast to the standard two-person bargaining solution (1.1), we give the
following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 2.2. For any two-person generalized game 〈{i, j}, v〉, the generalized
standard bargaining solution φ : G′ → R2 is deﬁned by
φk({i, j}, v) = v({k}) + 1
2
(v¯({i, j})− v({i})− v({j})) for k ∈ {i, j}.
Clearly φ satisﬁes the eﬃciency condition (1.4). Hence the solution θ of the two-
person bargaining process between S′ and N ′ \ S′ in game 〈N, v〉 is
θN
′
S′ (v) = v(S
′) +
1
2
(v¯(N)− v(S′)− v(N ′ \ S′)) ;
θN
′
N ′\S′(v) = v(N
′ \ S′) + 1
2
(v¯(N)− v(N ′ \ S′)− v(S′)) .
(2.5)
Lemma 2.3. The generalized Shapley value of form (1.3) for any generalized game
〈N, v〉 is equivalent to:
Sh′i(N, v) =
∑
S′∈Ω,
S′i
(s− 1)!(n− s)!
n!
(
v(S′)
s!
− v(S
′ \ {i})
(s− 1)!
)
for all i ∈ N. (2.6)
The proof of this lemma can be found in the appendix.
Theorem 2.4. A feasible payoﬀ vector x ∈ RN is consistent with (f, θ) for the
generalized game 〈N, v〉 if and only if x is the generalized Shapley value of form
(1.3).
Proof. According to the procedure, player i’s expected payoﬀ xi is
xi =
∑
N ′∈H(N)
∑
S′∈Ω,S′∈R(N′),
S′i,|S′|=n
2· 1
n!
· 1
n− 1 ·
1
Csn
·
⎡⎣1
s
⎛⎝θN ′S′ (v) − ∑
k∈S\{i}
xk
⎞⎠+ s− 1
s
xi
⎤⎦ .
(2.7)
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We ﬁrst show that x satisﬁes the eﬃciency condition (1.4):
∑
i∈N
xi =
∑
N ′∈H(N)
∑
S′∈Ω,S′∈R(N′),
s =n,0
∑
i∈S
2 · 1
n!
· 1
n− 1 ·
1
Csn
·
[
1
s
(
θN
′
S′ (v)− x(S)
)
+ xi
]
=
∑
N ′∈H(N)
1
n!
∑
S′∈Ω,S′∈R(N′),
s =n,0
1
n− 1 ·
1
Csn
· 2 · θN ′S′ (v)
=
∑
N ′∈H(N)
1
n!
n−1∑
s=1
Csn ·
1
n− 1 ·
1
Csn
· 2 · 1
2
· v¯(N) = v¯(N).
Note that (2.7) is equivalent to
0 =
∑
N ′∈H(N)
∑
S′∈Ω,S′∈R(N′),
S′i,|S′|=n
2 · 1
n!
· 1
n− 1 ·
1
Csn
· 1
s
(
θN
′
S′ (v)− x(S)
)
, (2.8)
since
∑
N ′∈H(N)
∑
S′∈Ω,S′∈R(N′),
S′i,|S′|=n
2 · 1
n!
· 1
n− 1 ·
1
Csn
=
∑
N ′∈H(N)
n−1∑
s=1
Cs−1n−1 · 2 ·
1
n!
· 1
n− 1 ·
1
Csn
= 1.
We now simplify the formula for xi given by (2.8). Note that x(S) = xi+x(S \{i}).
Then the coeﬃcient of xi on the right hand side of (2.8) is
−
∑
N ′∈H(N)
∑
S′∈Ω,S′∈R(N′),
S′i,|S′|=n
2· 1
n!
· 1
n− 1 ·
1
Csn
·1
s
= −
∑
N ′∈H(N)
n−1∑
s=1
Cs−1n−1·2·
1
n!
· 1
n− 1 ·
1
Csn
·1
s
= − 2
n
,
while the item concerning x(S \ {i}) on the right hand side of (2.8) is
−
∑
N ′∈H(N)
∑
S′∈Ω,S′∈R(N′),
S′i,|S′|=n
1
n!
· 1
n− 1 ·
1
Csn
· 2 · 1
s
· x(S′ \ {i})
=−
∑
N ′∈H(N)
∑
j∈N\{i}
xj
∑
S′∈Ω,S′∈R(N′),
S′i,j,|S′|=n
1
n!
· 1
n− 1 ·
1
Csn
· 2 · 1
s
=−
∑
N ′∈H(N)
∑
j∈N\{i}
xj
n−1∑
s=2
Cs−2n−2 ·
1
n!
· 1
n− 1 ·
1
Csn
· 2 · 1
s
=− n− 2
n(n− 1)
∑
j∈N\{i}
xj = − n− 2
n(n− 1) (v¯(N)− xi) .
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The latter equation is because of the eﬃciency of x. The only thing that is not
treated yet on the right hand side of (2.8) is∑
N ′∈H(N)
∑
S′∈Ω,S′∈R(N′),
S′i,|S′|=n
1
n!
· 1
n− 1 ·
1
Csn
· 2 · 1
s
· θN ′S′
=
∑
N ′∈H(N)
∑
S′∈Ω,S′∈R(N′),
S′i,|S′|=n
1
n!
· 1
n− 1 ·
1
Csn
· 1
s
· v(S′) (2.9)
−
∑
N ′∈H(N)
∑
S′∈Ω,S′∈R(N′),
S′i,|S′|=n
1
n!
· 1
n− 1 ·
1
Csn
· 1
s
· v(N ′ \ S′) (2.10)
+
∑
N ′∈H(N)
∑
S′∈Ω,S′∈R(N′),
S′i,|S′|=n
1
n!
· 1
n− 1 ·
1
Csn
· 1
s
· v¯(N). (2.11)
In is easy to derive that the result of (2.11) is v¯(N)/n. By changing the order of
summations, (2.9) is equivalent to∑
S′∈Ω,S′i,
s =n
∑
N′∈H(N),
N′∈V (S′)
1
n!
· 1
n− 1 ·
1
Csn
· 1
s
· v(S′) =
∑
S′∈Ω,S′i,
s =n
n!
s!
· 1
n!
· 1
n− 1 ·
1
Csn
· 1
s
· v(S′)
=
1
n− 1
∑
S′∈Ω,S′i,
s =n
(s− 1)!(n− s)!
n!
· 1
s!
· v(S′).
Let T ′ = N ′ \ S′, then (2.10) is equivalent to
−
∑
N ′∈H(N)
∑
T ′∈Ω,T ′∈R(N′),
T ′ i,|T ′|=0
1
n!
· 1
n− 1 ·
1
Cn−tn
· 1
n− t · v(T
′)
=−
∑
T ′∈Ω,
T ′ i
∑
N′∈H(N),
N′∈V (T ′)
1
n!
· 1
n− 1 ·
1
Cn−tn
· 1
n− t · v(T
′)
=− 1
n− 1
∑
T ′∈Ω,
T ′i
(t− 1)!(n− t)!
n!
· 1
(t− 1)! · v(T
′ \ {i}).
In summary we derive that
xi =
∑
S′∈Ω,
S′i
(s− 1)!(n− s)!
n!
·
(
v(S′)
s!
− v(S
′ \ {i})
(s− 1)!
)
. (2.12)
Then by Lemma 2.3, we have x = Sh′(N, v) for all generalized game 〈N, v〉.
In fact Theorem 2.4 can be restated as follows, where κ (which was deﬁned above
as the “uniform” distribution over two-conﬁguration for the given game 〈N, v〉) is
to be understood now as a function from games to such probability distributions.
Corollary 2.5. The generalized Shapley value is the unique value on G′ that is both
consistent with κ and standard on two-person games.
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3. Consistency to the class of generalized values
Remind in the classical game space, a value φ on G is said to satisfy
(i) eﬃciency, if
∑
i∈N φi(N, v) = v(N) for all v ∈ GN ;
(ii) linearity, if φ(N, a · v + b · w) = a · φ(N, v) + b · φ(N,w) for all a, b ∈ R, all
v, w ∈ GN ;
(iii) symmetry, if φi(N, v) = φj(N, v) for all symmetric players i and j in game
v ∈ GN . Players i and j are called symmetric players in 〈N, v〉 if v(S ∪ {i}) =
v(S ∪ {j}) for all S ⊆ N \ {i, j}.
The ELS value is denoted to the class of values on GN satisfying eﬃciency, linearity
and symmetry. Since additivity can be deduced from linearity, and additivity is
equivalent to linearity for continuous values, the Shapley value clearly belongs to
this class of values. The ELS value was ﬁrstly characterized by Ruiz, Valenciano and
Zarzuelo (1998). Later Driessen (2002; 2010) gave the following characterization for
the ELS value:
Theorem 3.1. (Driessen and Radzik, 2002; Driessen, 2010) A value Φ on GN
satisﬁes the eﬃciency, linearity and symmetry if and only if there exists a (unique)
collection of constants B = {bns | n ∈ N \ {0, 1}, s = 1, 2, . . . , n} with bnn = 1 such
that, for every n-person game 〈N, v〉 with at least two players,
Φi(N, v) =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
pns · (bns+1 · v(S ∪ {i})− bns · v(S)) for all i ∈ N. (3.13)
Whenever bns = 1 for all s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, the expression on the right hand of (3.13)
reduces to the Shapley value payoﬀ of player i in the n-person game 〈N, v〉 itself.
We now generalize the ELS value on the classical game space G to the generalized
game space G′ by considering all possible orders of coalitions.
Theorem 3.2. There is a unique value Φ′ : G′N → RN satisfying the generalized
eﬃciency, linearity and the generalized symmetry, such that for all v ∈ G′N and all
i ∈ N ,
Φ′i(N, v) =
∑
S⊆N,
Si
(
pns−1 · bns
)· 1
s!
∑
S′∈H(S)
v(S′)−
∑
S⊆N,
S i
(pns · bns )·
1
s!
∑
S′∈H(S)
v(S). (3.14)
The proof of this theorem is postponed to the appendix. Remind the procedure we
used in the latter section to characterize the generalized Shapley value on G′. If we
change the standard two-person bargaining solution (2.5) by
ηN
′
S′ (v) = b
n
s · v(S′) +
1
2
(
bnn · v¯(N)− bns · v(S′)− bnn−s · v(N ′ \ S′)
)
;
ηN
′
N ′\S′(v) = b
n
n−s · v(N ′ \ S′) +
1
2
(
bnn · v¯(N)− bnn−s · v(N ′ \ S′)− bns · v(S′)
)
,
then by a similar arguments as in the proof of Theorem 2.4, we can derive the
following result:
Theorem 3.3. A feasible payoﬀ vector x ∈ RN is consistent with (f, η) for the
generalized game 〈N, v〉 if and only if x is the generalized ELS value of form (3.14).
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4. Conclusions
In this paper all characterizations are done in the generalized game space. The dif-
ference compared with the classical game space is that, the order of players entering
into the game inﬂuences the worth of coalitions. So for a ﬁxed set of players, diﬀerent
permutations of this set may take diﬀerent worths, which makes the characterization
more complicated.
In the classical game space, Evans (1996) introduced an approach, such that the
solution of the game determined endogenously as the expected outcome of a reduc-
tion of the game to a two-person bargaining problem, is just the Shapley value. How-
ever this approach is not suitable for the generalized games. So we modify Evans’s
approach in the following way: for any generalized game 〈N, v〉, ﬁrstly choose one
permutation N ′ ∈ H(N), secondly choose two subcoalitions S′ and N ′ \ S′ accord-
ing to N ′, and then choose two leaders from these two subcoalitions separately. The
two leaders play a two-person bargaining game and promise to give the left players
some part of his earning. We prove if all the choosing processes are under uniform
distribution, and the standard solution on two-person games is used, then the ex-
pectation under the procedure is the generalized Shapley value. This also means,
the generalized Shapley value can be axiomatized by Evans’s consistency and the
standardness on two-person games.
The class of values satisfying eﬃciency, linearity and symmetry on the gener-
alized game space is well-deﬁned. By a simple change to the standard two-person
bargaining solution, the procedure we used to characterize the generalized Shapley
value can be further used to characterize the class of values.
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Appendix A: Proof of Lemma 2.3
Proof. We will show the value deﬁned by (2.6) satisﬁes additivity, together with
eﬃciency, symmetry, null player property (see Deﬁnition 1.4), since Sanchez and
Bergantinos (1997) proved the Shapley value in Deﬁnition 1.3 is the unique value
on G′ satisfying these four properties. Additivity is clear. Denote by φ the value
deﬁned by (2.6), then
∑
i∈N
φi(N, v) =
∑
i∈N
∑
S′∈Ω,
S′i
(s− 1)!(n− s)!
n!
(
v(S′)
s!
− v(S
′ \ {i})
(s− 1)!
)
=
∑
S′∈Ω
∑
i∈S
(s− 1)!(n− s)!
n!
v(S′)
s!
−
∑
S′∈Ω,
s =n
∑
i	∈S
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
v(S′)
s!
=
∑
S′∈Ω
s!(n− s)!
n!
v(S′)
s!
−
∑
S′∈Ω,
s =n
s!(n− s)!
n!
v(S′)
s!
= v¯(N).
This proves the eﬃciency. Now suppose player i is a null player in 〈N, v〉, that
is, v(S′, ih) = v(S′) for all S′ ∈ Ω,S′  i, h ∈ {1, 2, . . . , s + 1}, then we have
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φi(N, v) = 0 since ∑
S′∈Ω,
S′i
v(S′) =
∑
S′∈Ω,
S′i
s · v(S′ \ {i}).
In order to explain the above equality, we consider a coalition S ⊆ N , S  i. Fix
S′\{i} ∈ H(S\{i}), then (S′\{i}, ih), h ∈ {1, 2, . . . , s} results s diﬀerent S′ ∈ H(S).
This proves the null player property. To prove the symmetry, consider two symmetric
players i, j ∈ N , i = j, that is, v(S′, ih) = v(S′, jh) for all S′ ∈ Ω,S′  i, j,
h ∈ {1, 2, . . . , s+ 1}. We can rewrite (2.6) in the following way:
φi(N, v) =
⎛⎜⎝ ∑
S′∈Ω,
S′i,j
+
∑
S′∈Ω,
S′i,S′ j
⎞⎟⎠ (s− 1)!(n− s)!
n!
(
v(S′)
s!
− v(S
′ \ {i})
(s− 1)!
)
=
⎛⎜⎝ ∑
S′∈Ω,
S′i,j
+
∑
S′∈Ω,
S′j,S′ i
⎞⎟⎠ (s− 1)!(n− s)!
n!
(
v(S′)
s!
− v(S
′ \ {j})
(s− 1)!
)
= φj(N, v).
This proves the symmetry.
Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 3.2
Proof. Linearity is clear. Suppose the pair i, j ∈ N are symmetric players. Then
v(S′, ih) = v(S′, jh) for all S′ ∈ Ω, S′  i, j, h ∈ {1, 2, . . . , s+ 1} gives∑
S⊆N,
Si,S j
∑
S′∈H(S)
v(S′) =
∑
S⊆N,
Sj,S i
∑
S′∈H(S)
v(S′).
Hence
Φ′i(N, v) − Φ′j(N, v) =
⎛⎜⎝ ∑
S⊆N,
Si,S j
−
∑
S⊆N,
Sj,S i
⎞⎟⎠ (pns−1 + pns ) · bns · 1s! ∑
S′∈H(S)
v(S′) = 0.
This proves the generalized symmetry. Next we show that Φ′ satisﬁes the generalized
eﬃciency: for any v ∈ G′,
∑
i∈N
Φ′i(N, v) =
∑
i∈N
⎛
⎜⎝ ∑
S⊆N,
Si
(pns−1 · bns ) · 1s!
∑
S′∈H(S)
v(S′)−
∑
S⊆N,
S i
(pns · bns ) · 1s!
∑
S′∈H(S)
v(S)
⎞
⎟⎠
=
∑
S⊆N
S =∅
⎛
⎝∑
i∈S
(pns−1 · bns ) · 1
s!
∑
S′∈H(S)
v(S′)−
∑
i∈S
(pns · bns ) · 1
s!
∑
S′∈H(S)
v(S)
⎞
⎠
=
∑
S⊆N
S =∅
s · (pns−1 · bns ) · 1
s!
∑
S′∈H(S)
v(S′)−
∑
SN
S =∅
(n− s) · (pns · bns ) · 1
s!
∑
S′∈H(S)
v(S)
=
1
n!
∑
N′∈H(N)
v(N ′).
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This completes the suﬃcient proof. Now we show the uniqueness. Suppose there is
another value φ on G′ satisfying the generalized eﬃciency, linearity and the gener-
alize symmetry. With every ordered coalition T ′ ∈ Ω, T ′ = ∅, there is an associated
zero-one game 〈N, eT ′〉 deﬁned by eT ′(T ′) = 1 and eT ′(S′) = 0 for all S′ = T ′,
S′ ∈ Ω. Since v(S′) = ∑T⊆N ∑T ′∈H(T ) v(T ′) · eT ′(S′) for all S′ ∈ Ω, all v ∈ G′N ,
by linearity we have
φi(N, v) = φi(N,
∑
T⊆N
∑
T ′∈H(T )
v(T ′) · eT ′) =
∑
T⊆N
∑
T ′∈H(T )
v(T ′) · φi(N, eT ′),
for all i ∈ N . Next we determine φi(N, eT ′). Fix the coalition T ′ ∈ Ω, by symmetry
we know that players in T ′ as well as players outside T ′ get the ﬁxed payoﬀ respec-
tively, which only depend on the size of T ′. Then by eﬃciency, (3.14) is derived.
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Abstract We deal with the linkage of inﬁnitely repeated games. Results
are obtained by analysing the relations between the feasible individually
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1. Introduction
There has developed an interest in the theory and applications of linking, also called
‘interconnection’. The basic idea is the following. Consider a group of decision mak-
ers who are simultaneously involved in several diﬀerent real world problems (issues).
The standard approach is to consider the decision making process for each problem
in isolation. In practice, however, the decision making process with respect to one
problem is usually inﬂuenced by the decision making processes with respect to the
other problems (spill-over eﬀects or links). Discarding the links among the issues and
analyzing the decision process on each issue separately rather than in a multi-issue
decision making context is likely to lead to biased outcomes. Particularly, a single
issue approach ignores the possibility that if the issues have compensating asym-
metries of similar magnitudes, an exchange of concessions may allow and enhance
cooperation which extends beyond cooperation in the single issue context.
Some well-known real world examples of linking are the negotiations ‘on land
for peace’ between Israel and Palestina and the deal on WTO membership and
participation in the Kyoto agreement between the EU and Russia. In the economics
literature the notion of linking has been applied in the context of multimarket
behaviour in oligopolistic markets (see e.g. Bernheim andWhinston, 1990; Spagnolo,
1999) and of international environmental problems (see e.g. Folmer et al., 1993;
Botteon and Carraro, 1998; Carraro and Siniscalco, 1999; Finus, 2001).
A game theoretical framework for the linking of repeated games was developed
by Folmer et al. (1993) and by Folmer and von Mouche (1994). In Folmer and von
Mouche (2000) the following themes for linking of discounted inﬁnitely repeated
games were suggested:
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– linking may sustain more cooperation;1
– linking may eliminate social welfare losses;
– linking may bring Pareto improvements;
– linking may facilitate cooperation.
We observe that ‘may’ is used here to indicate that the characteristics of linking of
repeated games mentioned do no hold unconditionally but depend on the particular
nature of the problem at hand. However, to our best knowledge, the conditions under
which these characteristics hold have not yet been thoroughly analysed which is a
major omission in the light of the practical and theoretical relevance of linking.
Admittedly, some results about the conditions under which the characteristics of
more cooperation and Pareto improvements hold can be found in Ragland (1995)
and Just and Netanyahu (2000). However, these results are limited in scope because
the settings in these publications concern the special case of linking of two repeated
2× 2-bimatrix games.
The main purpose of the article2 is to identify classes of isolated stages games for
which the themes ‘linking may sustain more cooperation’ and ‘linking may bring
Pareto improvements’ materialize or not; special attention is paid to the role of
asymmetries. As these themes refer to properties of subgame perfect Nash equi-
libria of the linked and isolated games, Folk theorems, and in particular feasible
individually rational payoﬀ regions, come into the picture. In fact we formalize the
two themes in terms of these regions and analyse how these regions for the isolated
games relate to that of the linked game. Our results apply to the linking of an arbi-
trary ﬁnite number of discounted inﬁnitely repeated games with an arbitrary ﬁnite
number of (the same) players.
From a mathematical point of view analysing the two themes concerns the han-
dling of two geometric problems. As these problems are in their own interesting
and make sense without their game theoretic motivation, we organize the article as
follows. In Section 2 we introduce notations and present some useful general results
about Minkowski sums, normal cones and Pareto boundaries with which we shall
handle the two geometric problems. The material in this section may have some
interest in its own, especially as we cannot give good references for it in the liter-
ature. In Section 3 we state and analyse the two geometric problems in their pure
form. Next, in Section 4 we show how the results in Section 3 induce results for the
two themes for linked repeated games.
2. Convexity and Geometry
For the whole article we ﬁx positive numbers m,n and write
N := {1, . . . , n}, M := {1, . . . ,m}.
For a = (a1, . . . , an),b = (b1, . . . , bn) ∈ IRn we write a ≥ b if ai ≥ bi for all
i ∈ N . We write a > b if a ≥ b and a = b. And we write a ! b if ai > bi for all
i ∈ N .
1 This is the counterpart of the theme ‘repetition enables cooperation’ for repeated games.
’More’ is relative to the single issue case.
2 The article concerns an improved version of Folmer and von Mouche (2007) and deals
with a research question proposed in Folmer and von Mouche(2000).
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The relation≥ on IRn is a partial order. ForA ⊆ IRn its (strong) Pareto boundary
P(A)
is deﬁned as the set of maximal elements of A, i.e. as the set of elements a of A
for which there does not exist c ∈ A with c > a. And for A ⊆ IRn its weak Pareto
boundary
Pw(A)
is deﬁned as the set of elements a of A for which there does not exist c ∈ A with
c! a. Of course, P(A) ⊆ Pw(A).
Proposition 1. Let A be a compact subset of IRn. For every a ∈ A there exists
b ∈ P(A) with b ≥ a. "
Proof. Z := {z ∈ IRn | z ≥ a} is closed. This implies that Z ∩ A is compact. As
a ∈ Z ∩ A w have Z ∩ A = ∅ and therefore also P(Z ∩A) = ∅. Take b ∈ P(Z ∩ A).
Then b ∈ Z ∩ A ⊆ Z, so b ≥ a. Now we prove by contradiction that b ∈ P(A). So
suppose there would exist c ∈ A with c > b. Then we had c > b ≥ a, so c ∈ Z ∩A
and c > b, which is a contradiction with b ∈ P(Z ∩A). Q.E.D.
Proposition 2. Let B,C ⊆ IRn. Suppose for no c ∈ C there exists d ∈ IRn \ C
with d > c. Then P(B ∩ C) = P(B) ∩C. "
Proof. ‘⊆’: by contradiction. So suppose a ∈ P(B ∩ C) and a ∈ P(B) ∩ C. As
a ∈ B ∩ C ⊆ C, it follows that a ∈ P(B). As a ∈ B, there is b ∈ B with b > a.
As a ∈ P(B ∩ C), it follows that b ∈ B ∩ C. Thus b ∈ IRn \ C, a ∈ C and b > a,
which is a contradiction.
‘⊇’: suppose d ∈ P(B)∩C. So d ∈ B ∩C. If we would have a ∈ B∩C such that
a > d, then, noting that a ∈ B and d ∈ B, we would have a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Denote the set of permutations of N by
Sn.
For π ∈ Sn, the mapping Tπ : IRn → IRn deﬁned by
Tπ(x1, . . . , xn) := (xπ(1), . . . , xπ(n))
is a linear isomorphism. We have
Tπ2 ◦ Tπ1 = Tπ1◦π2 , Tid = id, (Tπ)−1 = Tπ−1 .
We call A ⊆ IRn permutation-symmetric if Tπ(A) = A for all permutations
π ∈ Sn. So each subset of IR is permutation symmetric.
Deﬁne the function C : IRn → IR by
C(a) :=
∑
l∈N
al
and for a subset A of IRn, denoting by C  A the restriction of the function C to A,
S(A) := argmax(C  A), s(A) := sup(C  A). (1)
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The following simple properties hold:
s(Conv(A)) = s(A) and S(Conv(A)) = Conv(S(A)); (2)
for all π ∈ Sn : s(Tπ(A)) = s(A) and S(Tπ(A)) = Tπ(S(A)). (3)
Closedness (boundedness) of A implies closedness (boundedness) of S(A). And, with
Weierstrass’ theorem,
A non-empty and compact ⇒ S(A) non-empty and compact. (4)
The sets S(A),P(A),Pw(A) are subsets of the topological boundary ∂A of A:
S(A) ⊆ P(A) ⊆ Pw(A) ⊆ ∂A.
So, by (4), P(A) = ∅ if A is non-empty and compact.
Deﬁnition 1. Let Ak (k ∈ M) be non-empty subsets of IRn and a ∈ A =
∑
k∈M Ak.
3
We call (a(1), . . . , a(m)) ∈ A1 × · · · ×Am a decomposition of a if a =
∑
k∈M a
(k). "
For this situation:
Proposition 3. For every p ∈ IRn and a ∈ A
p · z ≤ p · a (z ∈ A) ⇔ p · z(k) ≤ p · a(k) (k ∈M, z(k) ∈ Ak). "
Proof. ‘⇒’: by contradiction, suppose there exists k and z(k) such that p · z(k) >
p · a(k). Then b := z(k) + ∑l∈M\{k} a(l) ∈ A and p · b > p · a, which is a
contradiction.
‘⇐’: suppose z ∈ A. Let (z(1), . . . , z(m)) be a decomposition of z. By assumption
p · z(k) ≤ p · a(k) (k ∈ M). Summing over k ∈M gives p · z ≤ p · a. Q.E.D.
Proposition 4. Let Ak (k ∈ M) be subsets of IRn and A =
∑
k∈M Ak.
1. If Ak = ∅ (k ∈M), then s(A) =
∑
k∈M s(Ak).
2. S(A) =
∑
k∈M S(Ak). "
Proof. 1. As Ak = ∅ (k ∈M) we obtain
s(
∑
k
Ak) = sup(C(
∑
k
Ak)) = sup(
∑
k
C(Ak)) =
∑
k
sup(Ck(Ak)) =
∑
k
s(Ak).
2. In case there is an k with Ak = ∅, the desired result holds. Now suppose
Ak = ∅ (k ∈M). Taking p = (1, 1, . . . , 1) in Proposition 3 gives for a decomposition
(a(1), . . . , a(m)) of a ∈ A: a ∈ S(A) ⇔ a(k) ∈ S(Ak) (k ∈ M), i.e. the desired
result. Q.E.D.
Proposition 5. Let Ak (k ∈ M) be subsets of IRn and A =
∑
k∈M Ak.
1. Suppose every Ak is non-empty. For every decomposition (a(1), . . . , a(m)) of
a ∈ A it holds that a ∈ P(A) ⇒ a(k) ∈ P(Ak) (k ∈M).
2. P(A) ⊆∑k∈M P(Ak). "
3 The sum here is a Minkowski sum.
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Proof. 1. By contradiction, suppose a ∈ P(A) and there exists l such that b(l) ∈ Al
and b(l) > a(l). With y := b(l)+
∑
k∈M\{l} a
(k) ∈ A one has y = a+(b(l)−a(l)) >
a, a contradiction.
2. This follows from part 1. Q.E.D.
In general, the inclusion in Proposition 5(2) is not an equality. Here is a special
case where equality holds:
Proposition 6. If m = 2 and A1 or A2 has a maximiser, then P(A1 + A2) =
P(A1) + P(A2). "
Proof. We may assume that A2 has a maximiser, say b. So we have
y ≤ b (y ∈ A2) (5)
This implies P (A2) = {b}. By Proposition 5(2) only ‘⊇’ remains to be proved. This
we do by contradiction. So suppose c ∈ P(A1) + P(A2), but c ∈ P(A1 + A2). Let
a ∈ P(A1) such that c = a + b. As c ∈ A1 + A2 and c ∈ P(A1 + A2), there is
d ∈ A1 +A2 with d > c. Let a′ ∈ A1 and b′ ∈ A2 such that d = a′ + b′. Then, by
(5), a′ > a+ (b− b′) ≥ a, so a′ > a. But a ∈ P(A1), a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Let A be a non-empty subset of IRn and z ∈ A, i.e. z is an element of the
topological closure of A. Then
NA(z) := {d ∈ IRn | d · (a− z) ≤ 0 for all a ∈ A}.
NA(z) is a convex cone and is called the normal cone of A in z. Moreover, we deﬁne
for z ∈ A the positive normal cone of A in z as
N+A (z) := {d ∈ NA(z) | d > 0}.
Note that 0 ∈ NA(z), but that N+A (z) may be empty.
Proposition 7. Let Ak (k ∈ M) be non-empty subsets of IRn, A =
∑
k∈M Ak and
(a(1), . . . , a(m)) a decomposition of a ∈ A. Then NA(a) = ∩k∈MNAk(a(k)) and
N+A (a) = ∩k∈MN+Ak(a(k)). "
Proof. We prove the ﬁrst statement; then the second holds too.
⊆: suppose d ∈ NA(a). So d · z ≤ d · a (z ∈ A). Proposition 3 implies d · z(k) ≤
d · a(k) (k ∈M, z(k) ∈ Ak). Thus d ∈ NAk(ak) (k ∈M).
⊇: suppose d ∈ ∩k∈MNAk(a(k)). So d · z(k) ≤ d · a(k) (k ∈ M, z(k) ∈ Ak).
Proposition 3 implies d · z ≤ d · a (z ∈ A). Thus d ∈ NA(a). Q.E.D.
Proposition 8. Let A be a non-empty convex subset of IRn. Then z ∈ Pw(A) ⇒
N+A (z) = ∅. "
Proof. Deﬁne B := {b ∈ IRn | b ≥ z}. For ◦B, i.e. for the topological interior of
B one has
◦
B = {b ∈ IRn | b ! z} and thus ◦B ∩ A = ∅. The sets ◦B and A are
convex, non-empty and disjoint. Using a separation theorem, there exists an aﬃne
hyperplane that separates A and
◦
B. Therefore there exists d ∈ IRn \ {0} such that
d · a ≤ d · b (a ∈ A, b ∈ ◦B). Even now
d · a ≤ d · b (a ∈ A,b ∈ B). (6)
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With b = z it follows that d ·a ≤ d ·z (a ∈ A). Now we prove by contradiction that
d > 0. So (remembering that d = 0) suppose di < 0 for some i. For b ∈ B deﬁned
by bj := zj (j = i) and bi := c where c ≥ ai, we have
d · b =
n∑
j∈N\{i}
djzj + dic.
For c large enough d · b ≤ d · z, which is a contradiction with (6). Q.E.D.
Proposition 9. For non-empty subsets A and B of IRn with A ⊆ B one has:
B compact and P(B) ⊆ A ⇒ N+B (z) = N+A (z) (z ∈ A). "
Proof. Because A ⊆ B one has N+B (z) ⊆ N+A (z). By contradiction we prove that
N+B (z) ⊇ N+A (z). So suppose d ∈ N+A (z)\N+B (z). Now (w−z) ·d ≤ 0 for all w ∈ A,
but not for all z ∈ B. This implies that there is a w ∈ B\A such that d·(w−z) > 0.
As B is compact, there is, by Proposition 1, b ∈ P(B) such that b ≥ w. As d > 0,
also d · (b− z) > 0. So b ∈ A. But b ∈ P(B) ⊆ A, which is a contradiction. Q.E.D.
3. Two Geometric Problems
3.1. Stating the Problems
In this section ﬁx non-empty subsets U1, . . . , Um of IRn and deﬁne, denoting by IRn+
the closed positive octant of IRn,
Fk := Conv(Uk) ∩ IRn+ (k ∈M), F :=
∑
k∈M
Fk,
U :=
∑
k∈M
Uk, F := Conv(U) ∩ IRn+.
Note that Conv(U) =
∑
k∈M Conv(Uk). It is easy to see (also see Proposi-
tion 10(1)) that
F ⊆ F. (7)
Problem 1. Provide interesting conditions under which F ⊂ F.
Our second problem deals with the following object
EXP = {v ∈ P(F ) | there exists w ∈ F with w ! v}.
We refer to the elements of EXP as expansion points of PB(F ). Note that So
F = F ⇒ EXP = ∅. (8)
Of course, also P (F ) = ∅ implies that EXP = ∅. But EXP = ∅ is also possible if
P (F ) = ∅ and F ⊂ F as Figure 4 below shows.
Problem 2. Provide interesting conditions under which EXP = ∅, under which
∅ ⊂ EXP ⊂ P(F ) and under which ∅ ⊂ EXP = P(F ).
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Now we illustrate these two problems (in case m = n = 2) with some ﬁgures.4
Remark. (1) In all these ﬁgures every Conv(Uk) are polygons. This makes that
Fk (k ∈ m), F,U and F are polygons.
Figure 1 relates to
U1 = {(2, 1), (−3, 2), (5,−1), (0, 0)}, U2 = {(1, 2), (−1, 5), (2,−3), (0, 0)}.
Figure 1 (and also Figures 2 – 5) are to be interpreted as follows. Four polygons
are drawn: the sets Conv(U1) and Conv(U2), the Minkowski sum of these two sets
and the set F = F1 + F2 being the boldfaced polygon. These four polygons are
respectively drawn in the following three ﬁgures:
–2
2
4
–2 2 4
–4
–2
0
2
4
6
–4 –2 2 4 6
0
1
2
3
4
1 2 3 4
We note that in the case of Figure 1
U1 + U2 = {(3, 3), (1, 6), (−2, 4), (−4, 7), (4,−2), (2, 1), (−1,−1), (−3, 2),
(6, 1), (4, 4), (1, 2), (−1, 5), (7,−4), (5,−1), (2,−3), (0, 0)}.
Figure 2 relates to
U1 = {(0, 2), (3, 1), (−3, 0), (0, 0)}, U2 = {(0, 1), (1, 1/2), (−2, 0), (0, 0)}.
–4
–2
0
2
4
6
–4 –2 2 4 6
Fig. 1: F ⊂ F and ∅ ⊂ EXP = P (F ). (Neither U1 nor U2 is permutation-symmetric).
Figure 3 relates to
U1 = {(7, 1), (−3, 3), (10,−2), (0, 0)}, U2 = {(1, 7), (−2, 10), (3,−3), (0, 0)}.
Figure 4 relates to
U1 = {(2, 2), (−2, 4), (4,−2), (0, 0)}, U2 = {(2, 2), (−1, 1), (1,−1), (0, 0)}.
4 Figures 1, 3, 4, 5 are taken from Folmer and von Mouche (2000).
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Fig. 2: F = F and EXP = ∅. (Neither U1 nor U2 is permutation-symmetric).
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Fig. 3: F ⊂ F and ∅ ⊂ EXP ⊂ P (F ) (U1 and U2 are not permutation-symmetric).
Figure 5 relates to
U1 = {(2, 2), (−2, 10), (10,−2), (0, 0)}, U2 = {(3, 3), (−3, 4), (4,−3), (0, 0)}.
3.2. On Problem 1
Now let us return to Problem 1.
Proposition 10. 1. F ⊆ F. And F = F if and only if
∑
k∈M (Conv(Uk)∩IRn+) ⊇
IRn+ ∩
∑
k∈M Conv(Uk).
2. If m = 1, then F = F. "
Proof. 1. F =
∑
k∈M (Conv(Uk) ∩ IRn+) ⊆
∑
k∈M IR
n
+ ∩
∑
k∈M Conv(Uk) = IR
n
+ ∩∑
k∈M Conv(Uk) = F.
2. F = F1 = Conv(U1) ∩ IRn+ = Conv(U) ∩ IRn+ = F. Q.E.D.
Of course, because of (7), if F = ∅, then F = F holds. The next proposition
identiﬁes two little bit less trivial cases for this to hold:
Proposition 11. Each of the following conditions is suﬃcient for F = F to hold.
1. There exist rk > 0 (k ∈M) and c ∈ IRn such that Uk = rk(U1 + c) (k ∈M).
2. Uk ⊆ IRn+ (k ∈M). "
Proof. 1. We have Conv(Uk) ∩ IRn+ = Conv(rk(U1 + c)) ∩ IRn+ = rk Conv(U1 + c) ∩
rkIR
n
+ = rk(Conv(U1+c)∩IRn+); here the last equality holds as rk = 0. This implies,
with r :=
∑
k rk and with sums on k ∈M∑
(Conv(Uk) ∩ IRn+) =
∑
rk(Conv(U1 + c) ∩ IRn+) = r(Conv(U1 + c) ∩ IRn+);
154 Henk Folmer, Pierre von Mouche
–2
2
4
6
–2 2 4 6
Fig. 4: F ⊂ F and EXP = ∅ (U1 and U2 are permutation-symmetric).
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Fig. 5: F ⊂ F and ∅ ⊂ EXP ⊂ P (F ) (U1 and U2 are permutation-symmetric).
here the last equality holds as IRn+ ∩ Conv(U1 + c) is convex and the rk are non-
negative. Further
r(Conv(U1 + c) ∩ IRn+) = r Conv(U1 + c) ∩ r IRn+ = r Conv(U1 + c) ∩ IRn+
= IRn+ ∩
∑
(rk Conv(U1 + c)) = IR
n
+ ∩
∑
Conv(Uk).
So the proof is complete by Proposition 10(1).
2. Using Uk ⊆ IRn+ and
∑
k Conv(Uk) ⊆ IRn+ we obtain
∑
k(Conv(Uk) ∩ IRn+) =∑
k Conv(Uk) = Conv(
∑
k Uk) = Conv(
∑
k Uk)∩IRn+ = IRn+∩
∑
k Conv(Uk). Q.E.D.
Figure 2 shows that there are situations with F = F that are not covered by
Proposition 11. In all other ﬁgures F ⊂ F holds. Theorem 1 below gives our main
result for F ⊂ F to hold. This theorem is based on the following principle:
Proposition 12. Suppose there exists l ∈M such that Conv(S(Ul))∩ IRn+ = ∅ and
S(U) ∩ IRn+ = ∅, then F ⊂ F. "
Proof. We shall prove that S(U) ∩ IRn+ ⊆ F \ F (and then the desired result
follows). So ﬁx b ∈ S(u) ∩ IRn+. Of course, b ∈ F. Now we shall prove by contra-
diction that b ∈ F . So suppose b ∈ F = ∑k Fk. Take hk ∈ Conv(Uk) ∩ IRn+ such
that b =
∑
k h
k. Using (2), we have for every k ∈M∑
j
hkj ≤ s(ConvUk) = s(Uk). (9)
Because hl ∈ IRn+ it follows that hl ∈ Conv(S(Ul)) and so hl ∈ Conv(Ul) \
Conv(S(Ul)). By virtue of (2) we have Conv(S(Ul)) = S(Conv(Ul)) and so hl ∈
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Conv(Ul) \ S(Conv(Ul)). Therefore, in (9) we have a strict inequality for k = l.
Because b ∈ S(U), one has ∑j bj = s(U). With Proposition 4 it follows that
s(U) =
∑
k s(Uk) >
∑
k
∑
j F
k
j =
∑
j
∑
k F
k
j =
∑
j bj = s(U), which is a contra-
diction. Q.E.D.
Now we shall identify a more concrete situation (i.e. in terms of the Uk) that
satisﬁes this principle. In order to do so we introduce some notions in the following
two deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 2. Let Ak (k ∈ M) be subsets of IRn. The sets Ak (k ∈ M) have
compensating asymmetries of exactly the same magnitude if m = n and there are
πk ∈ Sn (k ∈M) with π1 = Id such that
{π1(j), . . . , πn(j)} = N (j ∈ N) and Ak = Tπk(A1) (k ∈M). "
Remarks. (2) If m = n = 1, then A1 has compensating asymmetries of exactly
the same magnitude.
(3) If at least one Ak is permutation-symmetric, then Ak (k ∈ M) have com-
pensating asymmetries of exactly the same magnitude if and only if all Ak are
identical.
(4) If Ak (k ∈ M) have compensating asymmetries of exactly the same mag-
nitude, their Minkowski sum A is not necessarily permutation-symmetric as the
following example shows;5 but it is if m = 2 as Proposition 13(4) shows.
Example 1. Let m = n = 3, A1 = {(3, 0, 1), (0, 2, 4)} and (using cycle notations)
π1 = id, π2 = (132), π3 = (123). So A2 = π2(A1) = {(1, 3, 0), (4, 0, 2)}, A3 =
π3(A1) = {(0, 1, 3), (2, 4, 0)}. The sets Ak (k ∈ M) have compensating asymmetries
of exactly the same magnitude and
A = {(4, 4, 4), (6, 7, 1), (7, 1, 6), (9, 4, 3), (1, 6, 7), (3, 9, 4), (4, 3, 9), (6, 6, 6)}. "
Proposition 13. Suppose Ak (k ∈ M) are subsets of IRn that have compensating
asymmetries of exactly the same magnitude. Let A =
∑
k∈M Ak and l ∈M .
1. S(Al) = ∅ ⇔ S(A) = ∅. And #S(Al) = 1 ⇔ #S(A) = 1.
2. If S(Al) = ∅, then (s(Al), . . . , s(Al)) ∈ S(A).
3. s(A) = ns(Al).
4. If m = 2, then A is permutation-symmetric. "
Proof. It is easy to see that we may suppose l = 1.
Let πk (k ∈M) be as in Deﬁnition 2. By Proposition 4(2) and (3)
S(A) =
∑
k∈M
Tπk(S(A1)). (10)
1. By (10).
2. Let a ∈ S(A1). By (10), b :=
∑
k Tπk(a) ∈ S(A). For i ∈ N we have
bi =
∑
k aπk(i) =
∑
k ak. Thus b1 = · · · = bn. As nb1 = s(A) = ns(A1) it follows
that b = (s(A1), . . . , s(A1)) ∈ S(A).
5 Indeed, there T(12)A = A.
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3. This holds if A1 = ∅. Now suppose A1 = ∅. By Proposition 4, s(A) =
s(
∑
k Tπk(A1)) =
∑
k s(Tπk(A1)) =
∑
k s(A1) = ns(A1).
4. Let π ∈ Sn. We shall prove that Tπ(A) = A. Well, Tπ(A) = Tπ(A1 +
Tπ2(A1)) = Tπ(A1) + Tπ(Tπ2(A1)) = Tπ(A1) + (Tπ2◦π)(A1). As S2 = {π1, π2},
we obtain Tπ(A) = A1 + Tπ2(A1) = A. Q.E.D.
The notion in the following deﬁnition is taken from Folmer and von Mouche
(2000).
Deﬁnition 3. Let X be a subset of IRn. For j ∈ N , X has a j-defect if yj < 0 for
all y ∈ S(X). And X has a defect if it has a j-defect for some j. "
Proposition 14. Let X be a subset of IRn with a defect.
1. If X has a j-defect and π ∈ Sn, then Tπ(X) has a π−1(j)-defect.
2. If S(X) = ∅ and X ∩ IRn+ = ∅, then X is not permutation-symmetric.
3. Conv(S(X)) ∩ IRn+ = ∅. "
Proof. We suppose that X has a j-defect.
1. Suppose b ∈ S(Tπ(X)). By (3), b ∈ Tπ(S(X)). Take a ∈ S(X) such that
b = Tπ(a). So bπ−1(j) = aj . Using that X has a j-defect, we see that bπ−1(j) < 0.
2. By contradiction, suppose X is permutation-symmetric. By part 1, for each
π ∈ Sn the set Tπ(X) has a π−1(j)-defect. As Tπ(X) = X , the set X has an i-defect
for every i ∈ N . Take y ∈ S(X). Now yi < 0 (i ∈ N). Let w ∈ X ∩ IRn+. Then one
has
∑n
j=1 wj ≥ 0 >
∑n
i=1 yi, a contradiction with y ∈ S(X).
3. With Ij := {a ∈ IRn | aj < 0}, X having a j-defect is equivalent with
S(X) ⊆ Ij . As Ij is convex, this in turn is equivalent with Conv(S(X)) ⊆ Ij . As
Ij ∩ IRn+ = ∅, it follows that Conv(S(X)) ∩ IRn+ = ∅. Q.E.D.
Proposition 15. Suppose Uk (k ∈ M) have compensating asymmetries of exactly
the same magnitude. Let l ∈M .
1. [S(Ul) = ∅ and s(Ul) ≥ 0] ⇔ S(U) ∩ IRn+ = ∅.
2. [S(Ul) = ∅ and s(Ul) > 0] ⇔ S(U) ∩ IRn++ = ∅. "
Proof. 1. ‘⇐’: so S(U) = ∅. By Proposition 4, S(Ul) = ∅. Take u ∈ S(U) ∩ IRn+.
Then s(U) = C(u) ≥ 0. Proposition 13(3) implies s(Ul) ≥ 0.
‘⇒’: with Proposition 13(2), (s(Ul), . . . , s(Ul)) ∈ S(U) ∩ IRn+.
2. Analogous to part 1. Q.E.D.
Theorem 1. Suppose Uk (k ∈ M) have compensating asymmetries of exactly the
same magnitude, S(U1) = ∅ and s(U1) ≥ 0.6
1. (a) S(U) ∩ IRn+ = ∅, so U does not have a defect.
(b) if U1 has a defect, then F ⊂ F.
2. Suppose U1 ∩ IRn+ = ∅. Fix n ∈ U1 ∩ IRn+ and y ∈ S(U1).
(a) No Uk is permutation-symmetric.
(b) With7 a :=
∑
k Tπk(n) and b :=
∑
k Tπk(y) we have a ∈ U ∩ IRn+,
b ∈ S(U) and b! a.
6 This implies that n = 1 and therefore also that m = 1.
7 Here πk (k ∈ M) are as in Deﬁnition 2.
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(c) S(U) ∩ IRn++ = ∅. "
Proof. 1a. By Proposition 15(1).
1b. By the principle (i.e. Proposition 12). It applies by virtue of Proposition 14(3)
and part 1a.
2. a. By Proposition 14(2), U1 is not permutation symmetric. Now further apply
also the ﬁrst part of this proposition.
b. Note that Tπk(n), Tπk(y) ∈ Uk (k ∈ M). Also Tπk(n) ∈ IRn+ (k ∈ M). So
a =
∑
k
Tπk(n) ∈ U ∩ IRn+, b =
∑
k
Tπk(y) ∈ U.
By (3), Tπk(y) ∈ S(Tπk(U1)) = S(Uk) (k ∈ M). By Proposition 4, b ∈ S(U).
For i ∈ N we have ai =
∑
k nπk(i) =
∑
k nk and bi =
∑
k yπk(i) =
∑
k yk. So
a1 = a2 = · · · = an =: a and b1 = b2 = · · · = bn =: b follows. As U1 has a defect
and n ∈ IRn+, n ∈ S(U1) holds. Proposition 3 now implies that a ∈ S(U). It follows
that na < nb. Therefore a < b which implies that b! a.
c. By part 2b. Q.E.D.
Theorem 1(1b) explains F ⊂ F in Figure 1. In this ﬁgure also the assumptions
of Theorem 1(2) and therefore also its conclusions hold.
Although in Theorem 1(2) no Uk is permutation symmetric, we observe from
Figures 4 and 5 that F ⊂ F is compatible with every Uk permutation-symmetric.
The next result generalises Theorem 1(1): indeed, there in case s(U1) ≥ 0 it is
possible to take Wk = Uk (k ∈ M) and v(k) = Tπk(y) (k ∈M).
Theorem 2. Suppose Uk (k ∈ M) have compensating asymmetries of exactly the
same magnitude and S(U1) = ∅. Fix y ∈ S(U1). Suppose W1, . . . ,Wn are subsets of
IRn such that for every k ∈M there exists v(k) ∈ S(Wk) such that
v
(k)
i ≥ yπk(i) −
s(U1)
n
(i ∈ N). (11)
Let W :=
∑
kWk,
1. (a) S(W ) ∩ IRn+ = ∅, so W does not have a defect;
(b) if some Wk has a defect, then F ⊂ F.
2. if the inequalities in (11) are strict, then S(W ) ∩ IRn++ = ∅. "
Proof. 1a. Let v :=
∑
k v
(k). By Proposition 4(2), v ∈ S(W ). For i ∈ N we have
vi =
∑
k
v
(k)
i ≥
∑
k
(yπk(i) −
s(U1)
n
) =
∑
k
yk − s(U1) = s(U1)− s(U1) = 0.
Thus also v ∈ IRn+.
1b. By the principle. It applies by virtue of Proposition 14(3) and part 1a.
2. Analogous to part 1a. Q.E.D.
Figure 3 shows that there are situations where the Uk (k ∈M) have compensat-
ing asymmetries of exactly the same magnitude where F ⊂ F holds that are not
covered by Theorem 1.
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3.3. On Problem 2
Now let us return to problem 2.
Proposition 16. 1. P(F) = P(Conv(U)) ∩ IRn+ and P(Fk) = P(Conv(Uk)) ∩
IRn+ (k ∈ M).
2. EXP = P(F ) \ Pw(F). "
Proof. 1. By Proposition 2.
2. ‘⊆’: suppose u ∈ EXP. Then u ∈ P(F ) and there exists w ∈ F such that
w ! u. By (7), u ∈ F. Therefore u ∈ Pw(F).
‘⊇’: suppose u ∈ P(F ) \ Pw(F). By (7), u ∈ F. As u ∈ Pw(F), there is an
w ∈ F with w ! u. Thus u ∈ EXP. Q.E.D.
Theorem 1(1b) also explains F ⊂ F in the following example and shows that
EXP = ∅ can hold under the general assumptions of Theorem 1.
Example 2. m = n = 2, U1 = {(−1, 1), (−1,−2)}, U2 = {(1,−1), (−2,−1)}. Now
U = {(0, 0), (−3, 0), (0,−3), (−3,−3)}, F1 = ∅, F2 = {−1} × [0, 1], F = ∅, F =
{(0, 0)}, F ⊂ F and EXP = ∅. "
Proposition 17. If a ∈ P(F ), then a ∈ EXP ⇔ N+Conv(U)(a) = ∅. "
Proof. ‘⇒’: let c ∈ F such that c ! a. For all d > 0 one has d · (c − a) > 0.
Because c ∈ Conv(U), it follows that d ∈ N+Conv(U)(a).
‘⇐’: by Proposition 8, a ∈ Pw(Conv(U)). So there exists c ∈ Conv(U) with
c! a. Since a ∈ IRn+, also c ∈ IRn+. This implies c ∈ F. Thus a ∈ EXP. Q.E.D.
We have already seen that if F = F holds, then EXP = ∅. A natural question
now is whether F ⊂ F implies that EXP = ∅. The answer is ‘no’ as Figure 3
shows. Proposition 11(2) implies that the condition Uk ⊆ IRn+ (k ∈ M) is suﬃcient
for EXP = ∅ to hold. This condition is quite strong. In the next proposition, which
also explains EXP = ∅ in Figure 4, there are more interesting conditions.
Proposition 18. If, in case m = 2, P(Conv(U)) ⊆ IRn+ and Conv(U1) or Conv(U2)
has a maximiser which belongs to IRn+, then
1. P(F) ⊇ P(F );
2. EXP = ∅. "
Proof. 1. We may assume that Conv(U2) has a maximiser, say b. This implies
P (Conv(U2)) = {b}. As b ∈ IRn+, we have b ∈ F2. This implies that b also is
a maximiser of F2 and therefore P (F2) = {b}. Now with Proposition 16(1) and
Proposition 6
P(F) = P(Conv(U)) ∩ IRn+ = P(Conv(U)) = P(Conv(U1) + Conv(U2))
= P(Conv(U1)) + P(Conv(U2)) ⊇ P(Conv(U1)) ∩ IRn+ + P(Conv(U2))
= P(F1) + P(F2) = P(F1 + F2) = P(F ).
2. By part 1 and Proposition 16(2). Q.E.D.
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Remark. (5) Figure 4 shows that the general conditions of Proposition 18 are
compatible with F ⊂ F,EXP = ∅ and P(F) ⊂ P(F ).
The next theorem explains EXP = ∅ in Figure 2.
Theorem 3. Suppose Conv(Uk) (k ∈M) are compact. If P(Conv(Uk)) ⊆ IRn+ (k ∈
M), then EXP = ∅. "
Proof. According to Proposition 17 the proof is complete if we can prove that
N+
Conv(U)
(z) = ∅ for all z ∈ P(F ). So suppose z ∈ P(F ) = P(∑k Fk). By Proposi-
tion 8 one has N+∑
k Fk
(z) = ∅. As z ∈∑k Fk, there exists z(k) ∈ Fk (k ∈ M) such
that z =
∑
k z
(k). With Proposition 7 one obtains
∅ = N+∑
k Fk
(z) = ∩kN+Fk(z).
By assumption P(Conv(Uk)) ⊆ IRn+ for all k. Therefore P(Conv(Uk)) ⊆ Conv(Uk)∩
IRn+ = Fk. So we can apply Proposition 9 with A = Fk, B = Conv(Uk) and z = z(k)
and get
N+Conv(Uk)
(z(k)) = N+Fk(z
(k)) (k ∈M)
and therefore ∩kN+Conv(Uk)(z) = ∅. Applying Proposition 7, N
+
Conv(U)(z) = ∅
follows. Q.E.D.
Note that in Figure 2 even F = F holds. However, under the conditions of
Theorem 3, F ⊂ F may hold as the following example shows.
Example 3. In case m = 3, n = 1, U1 = {−1, 1}, U2 = {2}, U3 = {3} one has
F = [5, 6], F = [4, 6]. Thus F ⊂ F and EXP = ∅. "
The above results partially solve Problem 2.
4. Application to Linked Repeated Games
4.1. Games in strategic form
Consider a game in strategic form Γ among n players. That is, for each player
i ∈ N = {1, . . . , n} we have a non-empty (action) set X i and a real-valued (payoﬀ )
function f i on the set of action proﬁles X := X1 × · · · × Xn. For x ∈ X,
f(x) := (f1(x), . . . , fn(x)) is called the payoﬀ vector at x and f i(x) is called
the payoﬀ of player i at x. We call
B := {f(x) | x ∈ X}
the set of basic payoﬀ vectors. Its convex hull Conv(B) is called the feasible set. The
minimax payoﬀ of player i is deﬁned by
vi := inf
z∈X1×···×Xi−1×Xi+1×···×Xn
sup
xi∈Xi
f i(z1, . . . , zi−1, xi, zi+1, . . . , zn).
An element w of IRn is called individually rational if wi ≥ vi (i ∈ N) and strictly
individually rational if wi > vi (i ∈ N)
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We call the game regular if each payoﬀ function is bounded and each player has
minimax payoﬀ 0.8
A Nash equilibrium e is an action proﬁle with the property that for every i ∈
N the function f i(e1, . . . , ei−1, ·, ei+1, . . . , en) has ei as maximiser. Payoﬀ vectors
at Nash equilibria are individually rational. An action proﬁle that maximises the
total payoﬀ function
∑
i∈N f
i is called fully cooperative. Denoting the set of fully
cooperative strategy proﬁles by Y we have (in terms of (1)
S(B) = f(Y ), (12)
So suﬃcient for Y to be non-empty is that B is compact.
For π ∈ Sn, i.e. a permutation of N , the game in strategic form π(Γ ) (called
a permuted game of Γ ) is deﬁned as the game in strategic form where the action
set Zi of player i is Xπ(i) and his payoﬀ function hi is given by hi(z1, . . . , zn) =
fπ(i)(zπ
−1(1), . . . , zπ
−1(n)). Note that
the set of basic payoﬀ vectors of π(Γ ) equals Tπ(B). (13)
The game Γ is called symmetric if each player has the same action set and if for
every π ∈ Sn one has Γ = π(Γ ). If Γ is symmetric, then Tπ(B) = B for all π ∈ Sn,
i.e. (see section 2) B is permutation-symmetric.
4.2. Repeated games
A repeated game is speciﬁed by a game in strategic form Γ , called the stage game,
a number T (positive or +∞) and a number δ ∈ [0, 1]. Such a game simply will be
denoted by
< Γ > .
T is called the number of repetitions and δ is called a discount factor.9 When T =
∞, we always suppose to avoid convergence problems that δ < 1 and that payoﬀ
functions are bounded. Itself < Γ > is a game in strategic form with player set
N where the action set of player i now is called his strategy set, denoted by [X i],
and deﬁned as the collection of sequences of mappings σi = (σit)0≤t<T with σ
i
t :∏t−1
τ=0X → X i. And the payoﬀ function of player i in < Γ > is the function
[f i] : [X1]× · · · × [Xn] → IR deﬁned by
[f i](σ) :=
T−1∑
t=0
δtf i(at(σ)),
where ajt (σ) ∈ Xj (0 ≤ t < T ), called outcome path for player j, inductively is
deﬁned by aj0(σ) := σ
j
0 and a
j
t (σ) := σ
j
t (a0(σ), a1(σ), . . . , at−1(σ)) (1 ≤ t < T ).
For a regular game in strategic form Γ the intersection of IRn+ and its feasible set
is an important object. One calls it the feasible individually rational payoﬀ region
of the game. The feasible individually rational payoﬀ region plays an important role
in Folk theorems which relate to the geometric structure of the set of (average)
8 Note that for a regular game in strategic form it is possible that its feasible set does not
contain 0. Indeed, this for example holds for the regular bimatrix game
(−2; 2 0; −4
1; −3 −2; 0
)
.
9 Notice that in our setting a discount factor is player independent.
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subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payoﬀ vectors for inﬁnitely repeated games <
Γ >. For the purpose of this paper it is not necessary to go into the details of the
Folk theorems.10 For this, we refer to, for example, Benoît and Krishna (1996).
4.3. Direct sum games
Consider games in strategic form 1Γ, . . . ,mΓ with (the same) n players. We refer
to them as isolated stage games. M = {1, . . . ,m} is the set of issues. Denote, for
k ∈M , by
Uk
the set of basic payoﬀ vectors of kΓ . So Uk ⊆ IRn. Let, for k ∈ M and j ∈ N ,
kX
j be the action set and kf j the payoﬀ function of player j in kΓ . Deﬁne for each
k ∈M
kX := kX
1 × · · · × kXn
and for each player j ∈ N
∗Xj := 1Xj × · · · × mXj.
Moreover, deﬁne the mapping Ψ : 1X× · · · × mX→ ∗X1 × · · · × ∗Xn by
Ψ(1x, · · · ,mx) := (∗x1, . . . , ∗xn).
Ψ is called the canonical mapping. Note that the canonical mapping is a bijection.
The trade-oﬀ direct sum game (⊕Γ )α is deﬁned as the game in strategic form where
player j has action set ∗Xj and his payoﬀ function is given by11
f jα(∗x
1, . . . , ∗xn) :=
∑
k∈M
kf
j(kx
1, . . . , kx
n).
(In the case of two bimatrix games (⊕Γ )α is the tensor sum of the individual
bimatrix games.) The set of basic payoﬀs vectors U of (⊕Γ )α equals the Minkowski
sum of the Uk:
U =
∑
k∈M
Uk.
Let, for k ∈ M , kE be the set of Nash equilibria of kΓ , kY the set of fully
cooperative action proﬁles of kΓ . And let Eα be the set of Nash equilibria of (⊕Γ )α
and Yα the set of fully cooperative action proﬁles of (⊕Γ )α . It can be shown that
(see Folmer and von Mouche (1994))
Ψ(1E × · · · × mE) = Eα, (14)
Ψ(1Y × · · · × mY ) = Yα (15)
and also that regularity of each kΓ implies regularity of (⊕Γ )α. In this case the
feasible individually rational payoﬀ region of kΓ is
Fk := Conv(Uk) ∩ IRn+
10 Especially one has to specify the types of strategies.
11 The α refers to the fact that in this formula the payoﬀs of the isolated games are added
(with weights 1).
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and the feasible individually rational payoﬀ region of (⊕Γ )α is
F = Conv(U) ∩ IRn+.
Finally, deﬁne the aggregated feasible individually rational payoﬀ region as
F :=
∑
k∈M
Fk.
4.4. Tensor games
Let 1Γ, . . . ,mΓ be regular isolated stage games with (the same) n players and
consider the inﬁnitely repeated games < kΓ > (k ∈M).12 Linking of the (isolated)
repeated games < kΓ > (k ∈ M) is done by combining them into a repeated
game (⊗Γ )α, a so-called trade-oﬀ tensor game. Formally (⊗Γ )α just is the inﬁnitely
repeated game with (⊕Γ )α as stage game. In Folmer et al. (1993) it is shown that
Nash equilibria for each repeated game < kΓ > lead in a canonical way to a Nash
equilibrium for the trade-oﬀ tensor game (⊗Γ )α.13 In general, the trade-oﬀ tensor
game also has other (subgame perfect) Nash equilibria. Folk theorems are useful
for investigating these equilibria. In fact, the eﬀects of linking can be studied by
comparing the sets F and F. This has been done in Section 3. All the results
there, in particular F ⊆ F, apply. The ﬁve ﬁgures in Section 3 are compatible with
the following regular games. Below we shall discuss game theoretic pendants of the
results in Section 3.
Figure 1: 1Γ =
(
2; 1 −3; 2
5; −1 0; 0
)
, 2Γ =
(
1; 2 −1; 5
2; −3 0; 0
)
.
Figure 2: 1Γ =
(
0; 2 3; 1
−3; 0 0; 0
)
, 2Γ =
(
0; 1 1; 0.5
−2; 0 0; 0
)
.
Figure 3: 1Γ =
(
7; 1 −3; 3
10; −2 0; 0
)
, 2Γ =
(
1; 7 −2; 10
3; −3 0; 0
)
.
Figure 4: 1Γ =
(
2; 2 −2; 4
4; −2 0; 0
)
, 2Γ =
(
2; 2 −1; 1
1; −1 0; 0
)
.
Figure 5: 1Γ =
(
2; 2 −2; 10
10; −2 0; 0
)
, 2Γ =
(
3; 3 −3; 4
4; −3 0; 0
)
.
A strict inclusion F ⊂ F (see Problem 1 in Section 3) can be interpreted as
‘linking sustains more cooperation’. And EXP = ∅, i.e. the existence of an expansion
point of the Pareto boundary PB(F ) (see Problem 2 in Section 3), can be interpreted
as ‘Linking brings Pareto improvements’. So in this way we now have formalized for
tensor games the themes ‘linking may sustain more cooperation’ and ‘linking may
bring Pareto improvements’ from the introduction.
The results in Section 3 now can be formulate in terms of the above game the-
oretic situation. (8) implies that in the case linking brings Pareto improvements, it
also sustains more cooperation. The reverse does not hold in general. Proposition 11
leads in an obvious way to two classes of isolated stage games for which linking does
12 It is is implicitly assumed that in each of them the periods are the same and the discount
factors are the same.
13 It is straightforward to show that this statement remains valid if one replaces ‘Nash
equilibrium’ by ‘subgame perfect Nash equilibrium’.
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not sustain more cooperation. The next theorem is the game theoretic pendant of
Theorem 1 and is a formalisation of the basic idea that an exchange of concessions
may enhance cooperation if the issues have compensating asymmetries of similar
magnitude.
Theorem 4. Consider isolated regular stage games 1Γ, . . . ,mΓ with m = n players
for which there are πk ∈ Sn (k ∈ M) with π1 = Id such that {π1(j), . . . , πn(j)} =
N (j ∈ N) and kΓ = Tπk(1Γ ) (k ∈ M). Also suppose the basic payoﬀ set U1 is
compact. Suppose 1Γ has a Nash equilibrium and U1 has a defect.
1. Then linking sustains more cooperation.
2. The game (⊕Γ )α has a Nash equilibrium e and a fully cooperative action pro-
ﬁle y, with strictly individually payoﬀ vector, which is an unanimous Pareto
improvement of e.14 "
Proof. Let n be a Nash equilibrium of 1Γ . As 1f(n) is individually rational, we
have 1f(n) ∈ U1 ∩ IRn+. So s(U1) ≥ 0. As U1 is compact, S(U1) = ∅. By (12),
S(U1) = 1f(1Y ). Fix r ∈ 1Y . So 1f(r) ∈ S(U1).
1. (13) implies that Uk (k ∈ M) have compensating asymmetries of exactly the
same magnitude. Now apply Theorem 1(1b).
2. Now kx := (nπk(1), . . . , nπk(n)) ∈ kE (k ∈M). By (14), e := Ψ(1x, . . . ,mx)
∈ Eα, i.e. e is a nash equilibrium of (⊕Γ )α. Also kz := (rπk(1), . . . , rπk(n)) ∈
kY (k ∈M). By (15), y := Ψ(1z, . . . ,mz) ∈ Yα, i.e. y is a fully cooperative action
proﬁle of (⊕Γ )α.
The payoﬀ vector at e equals a :=
∑
k∈M Tπk(1f(n)).
15 And that at y equals
b :=
∑
k∈M Tπk(1f(y)). Now apply Theorem 1(2b,2c). Q.E.D.
With Theorem 2 we have studied how far can one deviate in Theorem 1 from
the situation of (exact) permuted games. In doing so, we have made more precise
the above ‘similar magnitude’. Concerning Pareto improvements, we identiﬁed in
Proposition 18 and Theorem 3 classes where linking does not bring Pareto improve-
ments. We also showed with Figure 5 that in the case all isolated stage game are
symmetric (but not identical), more cooperation and even Pareto improvements are
possible.
We note that the above isolated stage games related to Figures 1, 3 and 5 are
prisoners’ dilemma games.16 Concerning this we mention that suﬃcient for the
condition ‘Suppose 1Γ has a Nash equilibrium and U1 has a defect’ in Theorem 4
to hold is that 1Γ is a 2× 2-bimatrix prisoners’ dilemma game with a unique fully
cooperative action proﬁle.17
14 I.e. f jα(y) > f jα(e) (j ∈ N).
15 Indeed: a = (
∑
k kf
1(kx), . . . ,
∑
k kf
n(kx)) =
∑
k(kf
1(kx), . . . , kf
n(kx)) =∑
k(1f
πk(1)(n), . . . , 1f
πk(n)(n)) =
∑
k Tπk(1f
1(n), . . . , 1f
n(n)) =
∑
k Tπk(1f(n)).
16 We call a game in strategic form a prisoners’ dilemma game if every player i ∈ N has
a strictly dominant action (i.e. a unique action that gives player i for every choice of
actions of the other players a maximal payoﬀ) and the unique Nash equilibrium is in
the weak sense Pareto-ineﬃcient (i.e. there exists an action proﬁle in which every payoﬀ
is higher than in the equilibrium).
17 Indeed, for this situation 1Γ has a Nash equilibrium and a defect. The existence of a
defect follows from the fact that for every 2 × 2-bimatrix prisoners’ dilemma game for
each player his payoﬀ at the unique Nash equilibrium equals his minimax payoﬀ 0.
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Abstract Airline alliance has become a prominent feature in the compet-
itive airline industry. However, most research in this ﬁeld focuses on the
revenue management or pricing mechanism, rather than the initial intent
of an airline alliance: providing a network of connectivity and convenience
for international passengers and convenient marketing branding to facilitate
travelers making inter-airline codeshare connections within countries. The
main concern in this paper is how an airline’s service quality might aﬀect the
selection of its partner airline during the formation of airline alliances. The
main contribution is to show the strategic eﬀects of the service quality on
the proposed complementary airline alliances following a three-stage analysis
framework, where the pre-alliance industry of the potential alliance members
can either be monopoly or duopoly. We ﬁnd that an airline will cooperate
with the one which has the same service quality level if the pre-alliance ser-
vice quality distribution of the airlines in the whole market diﬀers greatly,
while it tends to choose the one with similar (either higher or lower) service
quality level as its partner if the distribution is approximately uniform.
Keywords: airline alliances, service quality, three-stage analysis framework.
1. Introduction
An airline alliance is an agreement between two or more airlines to cooperate on
a substantial level (e.g., codeshare ﬂights, ticketing systems, maintenance facilities,
ground handling personnel, check-in and boarding staﬀ, and etc.) to provide a net-
work of convenient and seamless connectivity for passengers. At present, most ma-
jor airlines belong to one of the three big airline alliances: Star Alliance, Oneworld,
and SkyTeam. One of the fundamental building blocks of an airline alliance is the
codeshare ﬂights. Codeshare is an aviation business agreement where two or more
airlines share the same ﬂight. A seat purchased from one airline’s ticketing system
is actually operated by its partner airline under a diﬀerent ﬂight number or code.
Take three big Asian airlines of Star Alliance as an example, passengers’ demand
from Tokyo (NRT) to Beijing (PEK) can be satisﬁed either by a direct ﬂight under
ANA (NH), or an optional transit ﬂight with the ﬁrst leg Tokyo (NRT) to Seoul
(ICN) by Asiana Airlines (OZ), and the second leg Seoul (ICN) to Beijing (PEK)
 Special thanks for the comments from M. Nakayama, Faculty of Economics, Keio Uni-
versity.
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by Air China (CA). Under codeshare agreement, this interline product is marketed
by both Asiana Airlines and Air China, and generates proﬁt for both carriers.
Airline alliances can be categorized from diﬀerent aspects, i.e., commercial or
strategic, passenger or cargo, and etc. From the competitiveness of the pre-alliance
market, it can be classiﬁed as parallel or complementary (Park, 1997). A parallel
alliance refers to collaboration between two or more airlines competing on the same
route. The pre-alliance market is duopoly or oligopoly. The complementary alliance
refers to the case where two airlines link up their existent networks providing an
interline service to the passengers, where the pre-alliance market might be monopoly.
In reality, two airlines might form both a parallel and a complementary alliance.
The example of Asiana Airlines (OZ) and Air China (CA) mentioned above is
complementary, while in fact the second leg is usually under a codeshare ﬂight by
Asiana Airlines (OZ) and Air China (CA), in this case, the two airlines are parallel
from Seoul (ICN) to Beijing (PEK). In this paper, we focus on the complementary
alliance, and leave parallel alliance as a future extension.
The existing literature on airline alliance is quite sparse and limited. One clas-
sical research is to provide hypothesis and reasons under which hub-and-spoke
networks are equilibrium structures, i.e., Hendricks et al., 1997; Berry et al., 2006;
Aguirregabiria and Ho, 2012. Recent trend is focusing on the revenue management
and sharing aspect, i.e., Vinod, 2005; Chen et al., 2010; Wright et al., 2010. How-
ever, little attention has been paid to the initial intent to form an airline alliance:
better service quality for passengers. The delivery of high service quality is essential
for airlines’ survival and competitiveness. One of the distinguishing features of our
paper is to discuss about the service quality’s eﬀects on the formation of airline
alliances.
Service quality is a consumer’s overall impression of the relative inferiority and
superiority of the organization and its services (Bitner and Hubbert, 1994). Airline
service quality is diﬀerent from services in other industries, comprising tangible and
intangible attributes, i.e., seat pitch and size, in-ﬂight service, service frequency,
on time performance, and etc. It can be evaluated by the ﬁve-star quality rating
system. The idea that the service quality has an important eﬀect on the selection
of alliance partners came from the member airlines’ service quality rating data for
the three big alliances1:
Table 1: Service quality rating data.
Rating Star Alliance Oneworld SkyTeam Other
(28 members) (12 members) (19 members)
5-Star 40% 20% 0% 40%
4-Star 29.03% 12.9% 12.9% 45.17%
3-Star 13.93% 4.91% 9.01% 72.15%
2-Star 0% 0% 0% 100%
1-Star 0% 0% 0% 100%
The rest of the industry belongs to none of the airline alliances above. We
can see that these three main alliances do not accept airlines rating lower than
1 Data source: IATA, as of June 2012
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3 as its member, and the average service quality rate of Star Alliance is obviously
higher than that of the other two alliances, which indicates that the service quality
of an airline aﬀects to some extent on the alliance formation. Airlines with high
service quality tend to cooperate with each other. As to the literature we know,
this is the ﬁrst paper analyzing its eﬀect on the selection of alliance partners by our
proposed three-stage analysis framework, namely pre-alliance equilibria analysis,
alliance equilibria analysis and criteria veriﬁcation.
Colonques and Fillol, 2005 analyzes the proﬁtability of two alliances from the
pricing aspect. Their model is less general because of the speciﬁc assumption of
monopoly pre-alliance market. Another feature of our paper is a general network
topology allowing for both monopoly and duopoly pre-alliance market. The analysis
and conclusion for oligopoly pre-alliance market is similar but a little bit complicated
compared to that of the duopoly one, which is an important extension to pursue in
the future.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we describe our
general network model. Section 3 exposes the three-stage analysis framework for
three types of pre-alliance market: Monopoly–Monopoly, Monopoly–Duopoly, and
Duopoly–Duopoly. The optimal strategy for each airline is discussed in Section 4,
and our concluding remarks and extensions are presented in Section 5.
2. General network model
2.1. Network
We consider a simple network with 3 airports A, B, and C. There is direct ﬂight(s)
between airport A and B, also B and C, but no direct ﬂight between A and C.
Passengers wishing to ﬂy from A to C (or C to A) have to transit once in airport
B. The airline industry of A–B, and B–C can either be monopoly or duopoly, then
three types of basic pre-alliance markets are formed as below:
Fig. 1: Monopoly–Monopoly
There are two airlines in the Monopoly–Monopoly case, where each airline owns
monopoly power in their respective market.
For the Monopoly–Duopoly case, the market of airline 1 is monopoly, while
airlines 2 and 3 are competing on the same route B–C.
Finally for the Duopoly–Duopoly case, airlines 1 and 4, and airlines 2 and 3 are
competing on the same route, respectively.
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Fig. 2: Monopoly–Duopoly
Fig. 3: Duopoly–Duopoly
2.2. Notation
We denote by A the set of airlines, which we index by i = 1, 2, 3, 4 in the analysis.
Some notation that we will use to model the structure of the alliance is shown as
below:
-di: passengers’ demand for airline i.
-dij : the pre-alliance passengers’ demand for market A–C, where i is the airline
of market A–B, and j of market B–C.
-daij : passengers’ demand for alliance i − j if airlines i and j form an alliance.
It does not include the demand for each airline’s self-operated market. We assume
that each airline’s strategy and demand in their respective individual market are
not aﬀected by the decision of the alliance. The superscript a is used to denote
quantities associated with Alliance.
-Ci: the overall operational cost for airline i.
-Πi: the pre-alliance proﬁt of airline i. Π∗i denotes the equilibrium proﬁt.
-Πaij : the joint proﬁt of alliance i− j if airlines i and j form an alliance, includ-
ing the proﬁt generated in each airline’s self-operated market. Πaij ∗ denotes the
equilibrium joint proﬁt.
-Πaiji
∗,Πaijj
∗: the proﬁt allocated to airline i, j respectively, if airlines i and j
form an alliance.
-pi: the fare charged for passengers by airline i.
-paij : the fare decided and charged jointly by alliance i − j if airlines i and j
form an alliance.
-qi = qg or qb: the service quality of airline i, which is assumed to be either qg or
qb in this paper. The subscript g and b are used to denote “good" and “bad" service
quality, respectively.
-m: a positive parameter that measures the market size.
-γd: a positive parameter in the demand function which measures the eﬀect of
service quality on the demand. The superscript d is used to denote the quantity
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associated to Demand. Assuming identical passengers, this eﬀect does not diﬀer
among airlines.
-γci : a positive parameter in the cost function which measures the eﬀect of ser-
vice quality on the cost of airline i. The superscript c is used to denote quantities
associated to Cost. We assume that γci = γcg if qi = qg, and γci = γcb if qi = qb.
θ: a positive parameter measuring the improvement of the alliance service quality
over two individually operated airlines, assuming θ ∈ (1/2, 1).
-βaiji , β
aij
j : the fraction of the joint proﬁt Π
aij ∗ collected by airline i, j respec-
tively, if airlines i and j form an alliance, where βaiji + β
aij
j = 1. We denote by R
the proﬁt allocation rule, and Rp the proportional rule.
The rest of the notation will be introduced in the corresponding sections.
2.3. Demand and cost function
Deﬁnition 1. The demand function for airline i is linear as follows:
Monopoly market:
di = m− pi + γdqi (1)
Duopoly market of airlines i and k:
di = m− pi + pk + γdqi − γdqk (2)
In the monopoly market, the demand of airline i is decreasing with the fare
it charged for passengers, and increasing with its service quality. In the duopoly
market, the demand of airline i is increasing with the fare its rival k charged, and
decreasing with the rival’s service quality. For simplicity, we assume linear demand
functions and the parameter measuring the eﬀect of price is assumed to be 1.
Deﬁnition 2. The pre-alliance demand function of passengers between airport A
and C is:
dij = m− (pi + pj) + γd(qi + qj
2
) (3)
where airline i operates route A–B, and airline j operates route B–C.
Before forming any alliance, the perceived service quality for passengers between
A and C is assumed to be the average service quality of the two airlines.
Deﬁnition 3. The demand function for alliance i− j is:
daij = m− paij + γdθ(qi + qj) (4)
where θ ∈ (1/2, 1).
If airlines i and j form an alliance, the perceived service quality for passengers
of market A–C is higher than that before forming an alliance, for reasons like no
necessity of luggage claim during transit, faster mileage accumulation, and etc. Thus
we assume θ ∈ (1/2, 1).
Deﬁnition 4. The cost function for airline i is:
Ci = γ
c
i qi (5)
The alliance formation cost is neglectable compared to the operational cost, i.e.,
the integration of the ticketing system, share of check-in and boarding staﬀ, and
etc. It is assumed to be 0 in this paper.
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2.4. Assumptions about proﬁt allocation
In general, the proration scheme R used by the alliance will inﬂuence both the
overall proﬁt of the alliance and the allocated proﬁt to each airline. We assume that
the ultimate aim of each airline is to maximize its own proﬁt. It is reasonable to
assume that airlines are seeking a strategy that increases the joint proﬁt by forming
an alliance. The proﬁt allocation mechanism is actually a bargaining problem, which
is left as a future extension work. In this paper, we assume that the proportional
rule Rp has already been chosen by the alliance, and primarily focus on examining
how the service quality aﬀects the selection of a partner airline.
Deﬁnition 5. The proportional rule Rp is deﬁned as:
β
aij
i =
Πi
∗
Πi
∗ +Πj∗
β
aij
j =
Πj
∗
Πi
∗ +Πj∗
(6)
2.5. Decision criteria
The fundamental questions faced by airline i with service quality qi are:
-Whether to cooperate with another airline to form an alliance.
-If yes, which airline should be chosen as the partner.
For the ﬁrst question, airline i will form an alliance with airline j only if the
cooperation is to bring more proﬁt for i than that of the pre-alliance equilibria.
Both collective and individual rationality should be satisﬁed.
Deﬁnition 6. Collective rationality. For two airlines i and j, they are to form
an alliance only if the joint proﬁt of the alliance is more than the sum of their
pre-alliance proﬁt.
Πaij ∗ > Π∗i +Π
∗
j (7)
Deﬁnition 7. Individual rationality. For two airlines i and j, they are to form
an alliance only if the alliance proﬁt allocated to each of them is more than that of
their respective pre-alliance proﬁt.
Π
aij
i
∗
> Π∗i
Π
aij
j
∗
> Π∗j
(8)
However, as the proportional rule Rp is assumed to be adopted as the proration
scheme in this paper, these two criteria coincide with each other. Only the collective
rationality is to be checked in the following analysis.
For the second question, if airline i has two options, namely airlines j and k, it
will select the one which brings more proﬁt to itself as the partner. The stability
of each proposed formation should be checked, and the more stable alliance will be
formed.
Deﬁnition 8. Stability. For airline i with two potential partner airlines j and k,
the stability of alliance i− j is higher than that of alliance i− k if and only if
Π
aij
i
∗
> Πaiki
∗ (9)
Service Quality’s Eﬀects on the Selection of a Partner Airline 171
3. Analysis: a three-stage framework
As mentioned above, we proceed to the analysis for the equilibria of three types
of pre-alliance market: Monopoly–Monopoly, Monopoly–Duopoly, and Duopoly–
Duopoly by our proposed three-stage framework.
3.1. Monopoly–Monopoly
For the pre-alliance Monopoly–Monopoly situation, airlines 1 and 2 both own monopoly
power for the route A–B and B–C, respectively. From the service quality’s perspec-
tive, each airline’s rate could either be qg or qb, thus three cases will be analyzed:
-Case 1: q1 = qg, q2 = qg
-Case 2: q1 = qb, q2 = qb
-Case 3: q1 = qg, q2 = qb
It is easy to estimate that the equilibria of the ﬁrst two cases are the same. Let
us ﬁrst give the analysis for the alliance of two airlines with high service quality.
Case 1: q1 = qg, q2 = qg
Pre-alliance equilibria. We start by deﬁning the total proﬁt for airline i:
Πi = pi(di + d12)− Ci (10)
where d12 is deﬁned by equation (3).
By diﬀerentiation, we get:
Π∗1 = Π
∗
2 =
8
25
(m+ γdqg)
2 − γcgqg (11)
Alliance equilibria. If airlines 1 and 2 form an alliance, the total proﬁt that the
alliance might receive is:
Πa12 = p1d1 + p2d2 + p
a12da12 − C1 − C2 (12)
where da12 is deﬁned by equation (4).
We get the following result:
Πa12∗ =
12
25
(m+ γdqg)
2 + (
m
2
+ θγdqg)
2 − 2γcgqg (13)
The proportional rule Rp is applied to make the proﬁt allocation, where βa121 =
βa122 = 1/2. It yields,
Πa121
∗ = Πa122
∗ =
Πa12∗
2
(14)
Criteria veriﬁcation. The Monopoly–Monopoly case is the simplest one in which
neither of the airlines has an optional potential partner. Hence only the collective
rationality needs to be veriﬁed. Straightforward calclulation shows that
Πa12∗ −Π∗1 −Π∗2 > 0 (15)
is satisﬁed. This cooperation is to bring more proﬁt for both airlines.
For case 2 and case 3, following the same three-stage analysis framework, the
collective rationality can be veriﬁed and we get the same conclusion.
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3.2. Monopoly–Duopoly
We consider the pre-alliance Monopoly–Duopoly network, in which airlines 2 and 3
are competing in the B–C market, while airline 1 still enjoys the monopoly power
as in the previous section. For a passenger of market A–C, there are two options:
- A–B by airline 1, B–C by airline 2.
- A–B by airline 1, B–C by airline 3.
These two options are assumed to be competitive with each other no matter for
the pre-alliance market, or the re-formed market if airline 1 cooperates with another
airline. In the Monopoly–Duopoly setting, where airlines 2 and 3 diﬀer in service
quality, which one is to be selected as airline 1’s partner becomes our main concern.
Note that there are 8 possible combinations here, only two representative cases will
be analyzed:
-Case 1: q1 = qg, q2 = qg, q3 = qb
-Case 2: q1 = qb, q2 = qg, q3 = qb
Let us ﬁrst discuss the case when 1 and 2 are airlines with high service quality,
while 3 with low service quality.
Case 1: q1 = qg, q2 = qg, q3 = qb
Pre-alliance equilibria. Passengers’ demand for market A–C is deﬁned as:
d12 = m− (p1 + p2) + (p1 + p3) + γd(q1 + q2
2
)− γd(q1 + q3
2
)
d13 = m− (p1 + p3) + (p1 + p2) + γd(q1 + q3
2
)− γd(q1 + q2
2
)
(16)
The deﬁnition above suggests that before any alliance is formed, the fare and
service quality of airlines 2 and 3 interactively aﬀect A–C passengers’ choice.
The total proﬁt for each airline is deﬁned as:
Π1 = p1(d1 + d12 + d13)− C1
Π2 = p2(d2 + d12)− C2
Π3 = p3(d3 + d13)− C3
(17)
The equilibria solutions by diﬀerentiation are:
Π∗1 =
1
4
(3m+ γdqg)
2 − γcgqg
Π∗2 = 2(m+
1
4
γd(qg − qb))2 − γcgqg
Π∗3 = 2(m−
1
4
γd(qg − qb))2 − γcbqb
(18)
Alliance equilibria. If airlines 1 and 2 form an alliance, passengers’ demand for
market A–C will be:
da12 = m− pa12 + (p1 + p3) + γdθ(q1 + q2)− γd(q1 + q3
2
) (19)
The journey of two tickets issued by airlines 1 and 3 separately is still a com-
petitive option for alliance 1-2. The total proﬁt of alliance 1-2 is deﬁned the same
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as in equation (12) and we can get Πa12∗, the maximum alliance proﬁt. Applying
the proportional rule Rp, the proﬁt allocated to each airline under the cooperation
scheme of 1-2 is:
Πa121
∗
= βa121 Π
a12∗
Πa122
∗ = Πa12∗ −Πa121 ∗
(20)
The calculation under the cooperation scheme of 1-3 can be done similarly.
Criteria veriﬁcation. Let us verify the collective rationality ﬁrst, assume qb = αqg,
where α ∈ (0, 1) :
Πa12∗ −Π∗1 −Π∗2 > 0 (21)
is satisﬁed if and only if
qg ∈ (ωa12m−d(m, γd, θ, α),+∞) (22)
where ωa12m−d(m, γ
d, θ, α) ∈ R+. It indicates that an airline will consider forming an
alliance with another if and only if its service quality reaches a certain level, i.e.,
low accident rate. Otherwise, it is diﬃcult for any other airline to accept it as a
partner. Also the airline itself is focusing on improving its service quality and rarely
has spare capital to invest in alliance formation. For the stability of formation,
Πa121
∗ −Πa131 ∗ > 0 (23)
is satisﬁed if and only if
α ∈ (0, υm−d(m, γd, qg)) (24)
where υm−d(m, γd, qg) ∈ (0, 1) and is close to 1. The alliance structure of 1-2 is
more stable than that of 1-3, and vice versa if qg ∈ (ωa13m−d(m, γd, θ, α),+∞), and
α ∈ (υm−d(m, γd, qg), 1), 1-3 is more stable.The conclusion of case 2 is opposite to
that of case 1.
3.3. Duopoly–Duopoly
In this section, we consider the network with four airlines shown in Fig. 3, where
the service quality of the two airlines competing on the same route diﬀers as in the
previous section. This topology represents a typical situation of the airlines in or
to-be-in the three big airline alliances. Before examining the speciﬁc strategy to be
adopted by the three-stage analysis framework, we describe a simple example of
two big airlines in Taiwan: EVA Air (BR) and China Airlines (CI). The network
coverage of the two airlines is nearly the same. In other words, they are competing
nearly on each route. China Airlines joined SkyTeam in 2011, and EVA Air is to join
Star Alliance later in 2013. As is known that China Airlines has records of many
incidents and accidents since its formation, and was announced as the one with worst
safety record among 60 international airlines by Jet Airliner Crash Data Evaluation
Centre (JACDEC) in January, 2013. On the contrary, Eva Air has not had any
aircraft losses or passenger fatalities in its operational history. From the perspective
of the most important factor of service quality, safety, China Airlines’ rate deﬁnitely
cannot exceed that of EVA Air. Referring the three big airline alliances’ service
quality rating data, Star Alliance is doing better than SkyTeam as well. The analysis
in this section can also be viewed as providing a theoretical support for the member
selection criteria by the three big airline alliances. Let’s take Star Alliance as an
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airline with high service quality, SkyTeam as one with low service quality, and start
the analysis from the pre-alliance equilibria.
The representative case: q1 = qg, q2 = qg, q3 = qb, q4 = qb
Pre-alliance equilibria. A–C Passengers’ demand for the ﬁrst option is deﬁned as:
d12 = m− (p1 + p2) + (p1 + p3) + (p4 + p2) + (p4 + p3)
+ γd(
q1 + q2
2
)− γd(q1 + q3
2
)− γd(q4 + q2
2
)− γd(q4 + q3
2
)
(25)
d13, d42, and d43 can be deﬁned similarly as d12.
The pre-alliance proﬁt for airline 1 is:
Π1 = p1(d1 + d12 + d13)− C1 (26)
Π2, Π3, and Π4 can be deﬁned respectively as well. We use Π∗1 , Π∗2 , Π∗3 and Π∗4 to
denote the equilibria solutions. The calculation is simple, and we are not to present
the long results here.
Alliance equilibria. If the alliance structure is 1-2 (high-high) and 4-3 (low-low),
passengers’ demand for market A–C will become:
da12 = m− pa12 + pa43 + γdθ(q1 + q2)− γdθ(q4 + q3)
da43 = m− pa43 + pa12 + γdθ(q4 + q3)− γdθ(q1 + q2)
(27)
It is reasonable assuming passengers will not choose the option constituted by
two airlines from diﬀerent alliances. The alliance proﬁt is deﬁned the same as in
equation (12). For alliance structure of 1-3 and 4-2, follow the same pattern above to
make the deﬁnitions. By assuming qb = αqg, γcb = αγ
c
g, where α ∈ (0, 1), we can get
the equilibria solutions ofΠa12∗, Πa43∗, Πa13∗ andΠa42∗. Applying the proportional
rule Rp, the proﬁt allocated to each airline under diﬀerent cooperation schemes can
be denoted as Πa121
∗, Πa122
∗, Πa434
∗, Πa433
∗, Πa131
∗, Πa133
∗, Πa424
∗ and Πa422
∗.
Criteria veriﬁcation. Let us verify the collective rationality ﬁrst:
Πa12∗ −Π∗1 −Π∗2 > 0
Πa43∗ −Π∗4 −Π∗3 > 0
(28)
are satisﬁed if and only if
qg ∈ (ωa12−a43d−d (m, γd, θ, α),+∞) (29)
where ωa12−a43d−d (m, γ
d, θ, α) ∈ R+. For the stability of formation,
Πa121
∗ −Πa131 ∗ > 0
Πa122
∗ −Πa422 ∗ > 0
Πa433
∗ −Πa133 ∗ > 0
Πa434
∗ −Πa424 ∗ > 0
(30)
are satisﬁed if and only if
α ∈ (0, υd−d(m, γd, qg)) (31)
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where υd−d(m, γd, qg) ∈ (0, 1) and is close to 1. The alliance structure of 1-2 and
4-3 is more stable than that of 1-3 and 4-2, and vice versa the structure of 1-3 and
4-2 is more stable if
qg ∈ (ωa13−a42d−d (m, γd, θ, α),+∞)
α ∈ (υd−d(m, γd, qg), 1)
(32)
where ωa13−a42d−d (m, γ
d, θ, α) ∈ R+.
4. The optimal strategy
Proposition 1. For a pre-alliance Monopoly–Monopoly network consisted of air-
lines i and j, for any qi, qj ∈ R+, assuming the proration scheme R is proportional,
then
Π
aij
i
∗
> Π∗i
Π
aij
j
∗
> Π∗j
(33)
The optimal strategy of the two airlines is cooperation with each other.
This proposition indicates that for a Monopoly–Monopoly market, the coop-
eration will always bring more proﬁt for each of its member, mainly due to the
extension of network coverage for each airline, and demand increment because of
the more convenient service during transit.
Proposition 2. For a pre-alliance Monopoly–Duopoly network consisted of airlines
i, j and k, in which airline i’s market is monopoly, for any qk = αqi = αqj , where
α ∈ (0, 1), assuming the proﬁt allocation rule R is proportional, then if qi = qj ∈
(ω
aij
m−d(m, γ
d, θ, α),+∞), and α ∈ (0, υm−d(m, γd, qg))
Π
aij
i
∗
> Π∗i
Π
aij
i
∗
> Πaiki
∗ (34)
Airline i’s optimal strategy is to select airline j as its partner in the alliance forma-
tion. Vice versa, if qi = qj ∈ (ωaikm−d(m, γd, θ, α),+∞), and α ∈ (υm−d(m, γd, qg), 1),
the equilibrium alliance structure should be i− k.
If the pre-alliance service quality distribution diﬀers greatly, the airline in the
monopoly market will choose the one with the same service quality level as its
partner, while if the distribution is approximately uniform, a combination of service
quality and price competitiveness tends to be formed.
Proposition 3. For a pre-alliance Duopoly–Duopoly network consisted of airlines
i, j, k and l, in which airlines i and l, airlines j and k each form a duopoly market,
for any qk = ql = αqi = αqj , where α ∈ (0, 1), assuming the proration scheme R is
proportional, then if qi = qj ∈ (ωaij−alkd−d (m, γd, θ, α),+∞), and α ∈ (0, υ(m, γd, qg))
Π
aij
i
∗
> Πaiki
∗
Π
aij
j
∗
> Π
alj
j
∗
Πalkk
∗
> Πaikk
∗
Πalkl
∗
> Π
alj
l
∗
(35)
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The equilibrium alliance structure should be i − j, and k − l. Vice versa, if qi =
qj ∈ (ωaik−aljd−d (m, γd, θ, α),+∞), and α ∈ (υ(m, γd, qg), 1), the equilibrium alliance
structure should be i− k, and l − j .
This conclusion is intuitive. If the diﬀerence between airlines with high service
quality and low service quality is large, airlines tend to form an alliance with another
with the same service quality level. An airline with high service quality will not
accept one with poor service quality to degrade itself too much. Whereas if the
diﬀerence is relatively small, an airline with high service quality tends to select the
one with price competitiveness as its partner, even if this kind of cooperation might
reduce the overall rate of service quality a little bit.
5. Concluding remarks and extensions
Airline alliances are selling increasing numbers of interline products. The service
quality rating data for the three big airline alliances suggests the need to understand
the impact of service quality during the alliance formation. This paper is the ﬁrst to
propose a framework studying service quality’s eﬀects on the selection of a partner
airline. In particular, we model the optimal strategy decision process by a three-stage
analysis framework. In the ﬁrst stage, analyze the pre-alliance equilibria that each
airline manages its own market in a non-cooperative fashion so as to maximize its
expected proﬁt. In the second stage, analyze the alliance equilibria under diﬀerent
cooperation schemes assuming a particular proﬁt allocation rule. In the third stage,
verify the collective rationality and stability to ﬁnalize the decision process.
The three main insights can be corroborated by airlines of the three big alliances,
i.e., China Airlines and Eva Air. Basically airlines prefer to play with the one with
the same service quality level. When the service quality of the airlines in the whole
market does not diﬀer too much with each other, the trend becomes a combination
of service quality and price competitiveness. Of course this conclusion is more or
less depending on the assumption of the demand functions.
In studying the eﬀects of service quality, we ﬁnd that the optimal strategy of an
airline is, to some extent, sensitive to the particular proﬁt allocation rule. We assume
for simultaneous move in this paper. If we assign airline i, who owns monopoly power
in its pre-alliance market in the Monopoly–Duopoly section, with the privilege to
move ﬁrst, the conclusion deviates from proposition 2 such that equilibrium alliance
structure is always i− j.
An important feature of this study is the more general network topology. It
suggests an extension of the oligopoly pre-alliance market, which is more close to
the real situation. This is more complicated compared to the analysis of the duopoly
market, in this respect, our results can be viewed as the ﬁrst step to understand
how airlines with diﬀerent service quality will act assuming a particular allocation
scheme.
Another aspect of the model deserves some attention is the proﬁt allocation rule.
In the ﬁrst stage, the proportional rule is assumed to be applied in our analysis. For
the future research, the application of strong Nash equilibrium or the equilibrium
of bargaining game is an important extension to pursue.
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Finally, in our model only complementary alliance is considered, the real sit-
uation is the coexistence of complementary and parallel alliances among partner
airlines. Such a scheme, however, requires more factors, i.e., the ﬂeet size, the ca-
pacity, service frequency and etc., to be included in the model for analysis. Describ-
ing service quality’s strategic eﬀects under the coexistence scheme will also be an
interesting area of further study.
References
Aguirregabiria, V. and C.Y. Ho (2012). A Dynamic Oligopoly Game of the US Airline
Industry: Estimation and Policy Experiments. Journal of Econometrics, 168 (1), 156–
173.
Berry, S., M. Carnall and P. Spiller (2006). Airline hubs: costs, markups and the implica-
tions of customer heterogeneity. Advances in Airline Economics, Vol. 1: Competition
Policy and Antitrust (Lee, D., eds), 183-â-214. Elsevier Press, Amsterdam.
Bitner, M. J. and A.R. Hubbert (1994). Service quality: New directions in theory and
practice. In: Encounter satisfaction versus overall satisfaction versus quality (Rust, R.
T. and R. Oliver, eds), pp., 77. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.
Chen, L. and T. Homem-de-Mello (2010). Re-solving stochastic programming models for
airline revenue management. Annals of Operations Research, 177, 91–114.
Colonques, R.M. and R.F. Fillol (2005). Strategic Eﬀects Of International Airline Al-
liances. Working Papers. Serie AD 2005–15, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones
Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
Hendricks, K., M. Piccione and G. Tan (1997). Entry and exit in hub-spoke networks. Rand
Journal of Economics, 28, 291–303.
Park, J. (1997). The eﬀect of airline alliances on markets and economic welfare. Trans-
portation Research, Part E, 33, 181–195.
Vinod, B. (2005). Alliance revenue management. Journal of Revenue and Pricing Manage-
ment, 4, 66–82.
Wright, C. P., H. Groenevelt and R. Shumsky (2010). Dynamic revenue management in
airline alliances. Transportation Science, 44, 15–37.
Coalitional Model of Decision-Making over the Set of
Projects with Diﬀerent Preferences of Players
Xeniya Grigorieva
St.Petersburg State University,
Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control Processes,
University pr. 35, St.Petersburg, 198504, Russia
E-mail: kseniya196247@mail.ru
WWW home page: http://www.apmath.spbu.ru/ru/staff/grigorieva/
Abstract Let be N the set of players and M the set of projects. The coali-
tional model of decision-making over the set of projects is formalized as
family of games with diﬀerent ﬁxed coalitional partitions for each project
that required the adoption of a positive or negative decision by each of
the players. The players’ strategies are decisions about each of the project.
Players can form coalitions in order to obtain higher income. Thus, for each
project a coalitional game is deﬁned. In each coalitional game it is required
to ﬁnd in some sense optimal solution. Solving successively each of the coali-
tional games, we get the set of optimal n-tuples for all coalitional games. It
is required to ﬁnd a compromise solution for the choice of a project, i. e. it is
required to ﬁnd a compromise coalitional partition. As an optimality princi-
ples are accepted generalized PMS-vector (Grigorieva and Mamkina, 2009;
Petrosjan and Mamkina, 2006) and its modiﬁcations, and compromise so-
lution (Malafeyev, 2001). The proposed paper is the generalization of the
paper "Static Model of Decision-making over the Set of Coalitional Parti-
tions" (Grigorieva, 2012) for the case when the preferences of players are
diﬀerent.
Keywords: coalitional game, PMS-vector, compromise solution.
1. Introduction
The set of agents N and the set of projectsM are given. Each agent ﬁxed his partic-
ipation or not participation in the project by one or zero choice. The participation in
the project is connected with incomes or losses which the agents wants to maximize
or minimize. Agents may form coalitions. This gives us an optimization problem
which can be modeled as game. This problem we call static coalitional model of
decision-making.
Denote players by i ∈ N and the projects by j ∈ M . The family M of diﬀerent
noncooperative games are considered. In each game Gj , j ∈ M the player i has
two strategies accept or reject the project. The payoﬀ of player in each game is
determined by strategies chosen by all players in this game Gj . As it was mentioned
before the players can form coalitions to increase the payoﬀs. In each game Gj
coalitional partition is formed and the problem is to ﬁnd the optimal strategies for
coalitions and the allocation of coalitional payoﬀ between the members of coalition.
The games G1, . . . , Gm are solved by using the PMS-vector ﬁrst introduced in
(Petrosjan and Mamkina, 2006) and its modiﬁcations (Grigorieva and Mamkina,
2009).
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Then having the solutions of games Gj , j = 1, m the new optimality principle
− “the compromise solution" is proposed to select the best projects j∗ ∈ M . The
problem is illustrated in three players case.
2. Statement of the problem
Consider the following problem. Suppose
– N = {1 , . . . , n} is the set of players;
– M = {1 , . . . , m} is the set of projects, which require making positive or nega-
tive decision by each of the n players;
– Xji = {0 ; 1} is the set of pure strategies xji of player i , i = 1, n. The strategy
xji can take the following values: x
j
i = 0 as a negative decision for the some
project j and xji = 1 as a positive decision;
– li = 2 is the number of pure strategies of player i for all j;
– xj is the n-tuple of pure strategies chosen by the players;
– Xj =
∏
i=1 , n
Xji is the set of n-tuples;
– μji =
(
ξ0, ji , ξ
1, j
i
)
, ξ0, ji + ξ
1, j
i = 1, ξ
0, j
i , ξ
1, j
i ≥ 0, is the mixed strategy of
player i, where ξ0, ji is the probability of making negative decision by the player
i for some project j, and ξ1, ji is the probability of making positive decision
correspondingly;
– Mji is the set of mixed strategies of i-th player;
– μj is the n-tuple of mixed strategies chosen by players for some project j;
– Mj =
∏
i=1, n
Mji is the set of n-tuples in mixed strategies for some project j;
– Kji
(
xj
)
: Xj → R1 is the payoﬀ function deﬁned over the set Xj for each
player i , i = 1, n , and for some project j.
Thus, for a ﬁxed project j we have noncooperative n-person game Gj
(
xj
)
:
Gj
(
xj
)
=
〈
N,
{
Xji
}
i=1 , n
,
{
Kji
(
xj
)}
i=1 , n , xj∈Xj
〉
. (1)
Now suppose a coalitional partitions Σj of the set N is deﬁned for all j = 1 , m:
Σj =
{
Sj1, . . . , S
j
l
}
, l ≤ n , n = |N | , Sjk ∩ Sjq = ∅ ∀ k = q,
l⋃
k=1
Sjk = N .
Then we have m simultaneous l-person coalitional games Gj
(
xjΣj
)
, j = 1 , m , in
normal form associated with the game Gj
(
xj
)
:
Gj
(
xjΣj
)
=
〈
N,
{
X˜j
Sjk
}
k=1 , l , Sjk∈Σj
,
{
H˜
j
Sjk
(
xjΣj
)}
k=1 , l , Sjk∈Σj
〉
, j = 1 , m .
(2)
Here for all j = 1 , m:
– x˜j
Sjk
=
{
xji
}
i∈Sjk
is the l-tuple of strategies of players from coalition Sjk , k =
1, l;
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– X˜j
Sjk
=
∏
i∈Sjk
Xji is the set of strategies x˜
j
Sjk
of coalition Sjk , k = 1, l, i. e. Carte-
sian product of the sets of players’ strategies, which are included into coalition
Sjk;
– xjΣj =
(
x˜j
Sj1
, . . . , x˜j
Sjl
)
∈ X˜j, x˜j
Sjk
∈ X˜j
Sjk
, k = 1, l is the l-tuple of strategies
of all coalitions;
– X˜j =
∏
k=1, l
X˜j
Sjk
is the set of l-tuples in the game Gj
(
xjΣj
)
;
– lj
Sjk
=
∣∣∣X˜j
Sjk
∣∣∣ = ∏
i∈Sj
k
li is the number of pure strategies of coalition Sjk;
– ljΣj =
∏
k=1,l
lj
Sj
k
is the number of l-tuples in pure strategies in the game Gj
(
xjΣj
)
.
– M˜j
Sjk
is the set of mixed strategies μ˜j
Sjk
of the coalition Sjk , k = 1, l;
– μ˜j
Sjk
=
(
μ˜1, j
Sjk
, ... , μ˜
l
S
j
k
, j
Sjk
)
, μ˜ξ, j
Sjk
≥ 0 , ξ = 1, lSjk ,
l
S
j
k∑
ξ=1
μ˜ξ, j
Sjk
= 1, is the mixed
strategy, that is the set of mixed strategies of players from coalition Sjk , k =
1, l;
– μjΣj =
(
μ˜j
Sj1
, . . . , μ˜j
Sjl
)
∈ M˜j , μ˜j
Sjk
∈ M˜j
Sjk
, k = 1, l, is the l-tuple of mixed
strategies;
– M˜j =
∏
k=1, l
M˜j
Sjk
is the set of l-tuples in mixed strategies.
From the deﬁnition of strategy x˜j
Sjk
of coalition Sjk it follows that
xjΣj =
(
x˜j
Sj1
, . . . , x˜j
Sj
l
)
and xj =
(
xj1 , . . . , x
j
n
)
are the same n-tuples in the
games Gj
(
xj
)
and Gj
(
xjΣj
)
. However it does not mean that μj = μjΣj .
Payoﬀ function H˜j
Sjk
: X˜j → R1 of coalition Sjk for the ﬁxed projects j, j =
1, m, and for the coalitional partition Σj is deﬁned under condition that:
H˜j
Sjk
(
xjΣj
)
≥ Hj
Sjk
(
xjΣj
)
=
∑
i∈Sjk
Kji
(
xj
)
, k = 1 , l , j = 1 , m , Sjk ∈ Σj , (3)
where Kji (x) , i ∈ Sjk , is the payoﬀ function of player i in the n-tuple xjΣj .
Deﬁnition 1. A set of m coalitional l-person games deﬁned by (2) is called
static coalitional model of decision-making.
Deﬁnition 2. Solution of the static coalitional model of decision-making in pure
strategies is x∗, j
∗
Σj∗ , that is Nash equilibrium (NE) in pure strategies in l-person game
Gj∗
(
xj
∗
Σj∗
)
, with the coalitional partition Σj
∗
, where coalitional partition Σj
∗
is
the compromise coalitional partition (see 3.2).
Deﬁnition 3. Solution of the static coalitional model of decision-making in
mixed strategies is μ∗, j
∗
Σj∗ , that is Nash equilibrium (NE) in a mixed strategies in
l-person game Gj∗
(
μj
∗
Σj∗
)
, with the coalitional partition Σj
∗
, where coalitional
partition Σj
∗
is the compromise coalitional partition (see 3.2).
Generalized PMS-vector is used as the coalitional imputation (Grigorieva and
Mamkina, 2009; Petrosjan and Mamkina, 2006).
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3. Algorithm for solving the problem
3.1. Algorithm of constructing the generalized PMS-vector in a
coalitional game.
Remind the algorithm of constructing the generalized PMS-vector in a coalitional
game (Grigorieva and Mamkina, 2009; Petrosjan and Mamkina, 2006).
1. Calculate the values of payoﬀ H˜j
Sjk
(
xjΣj
)
for all coalitions Sjk ∈ Σj , k = 1, l ,
for coalitional game Gj
(
xjΣj
)
by using formula (3).
2. Find NE (Nash, 1951) x∗, jΣj or μ
∗, j
Σj (one or more) in the game Gj
(
xjΣj
)
.
The payoﬀ vector of coalitions in NE in mixed strategies is equal to E
(
μ∗, jΣj
)
={
v
(
Sjk
)}
k=1, l
.
Payoﬀ of coalition Sjk in NE in mixed strategies is computed by formula
v
(
Sjk
)
=
lj
Σj∑
τ=1
pτ, jH˜
j
τ, Sj
k
(
xjΣj
)
, k = 1, l,
where
– H˜j
τ, Sjk
(
xjΣj
)
is the payoﬀ function of coalition Sjk;
– pτ, j =
∏
k=1,l
μ˜ξk, j
Sjk
, ξk = 1, l
j
Sjk
, τ = 1, ljΣj , is probability of realization
H˜j
τ, Sjk
(
xjΣj
)
.
The value H˜j
τ, Sjk
(
xjΣj
)
is random variable. There could be many l-tuples of NE
in the game, therefore, v
(
Sj1
)
, ...., v
(
Sjl
)
, are not uniquely deﬁned.
The payoﬀ of each coalition in NE E
(
μ∗, jΣj
)
is allocated according to the Shapley
value (Shapley, 1953) Sh (Sk) =
(
Sh
(
Sjk : 1
)
, ... , Sh
(
Sjk : s
))
:
Sh
(
Sjk : i
)
=
∑
S′⊂Sj
k
S′i
(s′−1) ! (s−s′) !
s !
[v (S′)− v (S′\ {i})] ∀ i = 1, s , (4)
where s =
∣∣∣Sjk∣∣∣ (s′ = |S′|) is the number of elements in sets Sjk (S′), and v (S′) are
the maximal guaranteed payoﬀs for S′ ⊂ Sk.
Moreover
v
(
Sjk
)
=
s∑
i=1
Sh
(
Sjk : i
)
.
Then PMS-vector in the NE in mixed strategies μ∗, jΣj in the game Gj
(
xjΣj
)
is
deﬁned as
PMSj
(
μ∗, jΣj
)
=
(
PMSj1
(
μ∗, jΣj
)
, ..., PMSjn
(
μ∗, jΣj
))
,
where
PMSji
(
μ∗, jΣj
)
= Sh
(
Sjk : i
)
, i ∈ Sjk, k = 1, l.
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3.2. Algorithm for ﬁnding the set of compromise solutions.
We also remind the algorithm for ﬁnding a set of compromise solutions (Malafeyev,
2001; p.18).
CPMS (M) = arg min
j
max
i
{
max
j
PMSji − PMSji
}
.
Step 1. Construct the ideal vector R = (R1, . . . , Rn) , where Ri = PMSj
∗
i =
max
j
PMSji is the maximal value of payoﬀ function of player i in NE on the set M ,
and j is the number of project j ∈M :⎛⎝ PMS11 ... PMS1n... ... ...
PMSm1 ... PMS
m
n
⎞⎠
↓ ... ↓
PMS
j∗1
1 ... PMS
j∗n
n
Step 2. For each j ﬁnd deviation of payoﬀ function values for other players from
the maximal value, that is Δji = Ri − PMSji , i = 1 , n:
Δ =
⎛⎝ R1 − PMS11 ... Rn − PMS1n... ... ...
R1 − PMSm1 ... Rn − PMSmn
⎞⎠ .
Step 3. From the found deviations Δji for each j select the maximal deviation
Δji∗j
= max
i
Δji for all players i:
⎛⎝ R1 − PMS11 ... Rn − PMS1n... ... ...
R1 − PMSm1 ... Rn − PMSmn
⎞⎠ =
⎛⎝ Δ11 ... Δ1n... ... ...
Δm1 ... Δ
m
n
⎞⎠ → Δ1i∗1... .
→ Δmi∗m
Step 4. Choose the minimal deviation for all j from all maximal deviations
among all players i Δj
∗
i∗
j∗
= min
j
Δji∗j
= min
j
max
i
Δji .
The project j∗ ∈ CPMS (M) , on which the minimum is reached is a compromise
solution of the game Gj
(
xjΣj
)
for all players.
3.3. Algorithm for solving the static coalitional model of decision-
making.
We have an algorithm for solving the problem.
1. Fix a j , j = 1 , m.
2. Find the NE μ∗, jΣj in the coalitional game Gj
(
xjΣj
)
and ﬁnd allocation in NE,
that is PMSj
(
μ∗, jΣj
)
.
3. Repeat iterations 1-2 for all other j , j = 1 , m.
4. Find compromise solution j∗, that is j∗ ∈ CPMS (M).
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4. Example
Consider the set M = {j}j=1, 3 and the set N = {I1 , I2 , I3} of three players, each
having 2 strategies in noncooperative game Gj (x): xi = 1 is “yes" and xi = 0 is “no"
for all i = 1 , 3. The payoﬀ’s functions of players in the game Gj (x) are determined
by tables 1, 3, 5.
Table 1: The payoﬀs of players in the coalitional game G1 (xΣ1) with coalitional partition
Σ1 = {{I1, I2} , I3}.
The strategies The payoﬀs The payoﬀs of coalition
I1 I2 I3 I1 I2 I3 {I1, I2}
1 1 1 4 2 1 6
1 1 0 1 2 1 3
1 0 1 3 1 5 4
1 0 0 5 1 3 6
0 1 1 5 3 1 8
0 1 0 1 2 2 3
0 0 1 0 4 2 4
0 0 0 0 4 3 4
1. Compose and solve the coalitional game G1 (xΣ1) , Σ1 = {{I1, I2} , I3}, i. e.
ﬁnd NE in mixed strategies in the game:
η = 3/7 1− η = 4/7
0
0
ξ = 1/3
1− ξ = 2/3
1 0
(1, 1) [6, 1] [3, 1]
(0, 0) [4, 2] [4, 3]
(1, 0) [4, 5] [6, 3]
(0, 1) [8, 1] [3, 2] .
It’s clear, that ﬁrst matrix row is dominated by the last one and the second is
dominated by third. One can easily calculate NE and we have
y =
(
3/7 4/7
)
, x =
(
0 0 1/3 2/3
)
.
Then the probabilities of payoﬀ realizations (coalitions S = {I1, I2} and N\S =
{I3} in mixed strategies (in NE)) are as follows:
η1 η2
ξ1 0 0
ξ2 0 0
ξ3 1/7
4/21
ξ4 2/7
8/21
.
The Nash value of the game in mixed strategies is calculated by formula:
E (x, y) =
1
7
[4, 5] +
2
7
[8, 1] +
4
21
[6, 3] +
8
21
[3, 2] =
[
36
7
,
7
3
]
=
[
5
1
7
, 2
1
3
]
.
In the table 2 pure strategies of coalition N\S and its mixed strategy y are given
horizontally at the right side. Pure strategies of coalition S and its mixed strategy
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Table 2: The maximal guaranteed payoﬀs of players I1 and I2.
The strategies of N\S ,
the payoﬀs of S and N\S
Mathematical y 0.43 0.57
Expectation x +1 +0
2.286 2.000 0 − (1 , 1) (4 , 2) (1 , 2)
4.143 1.000 0.33 +(1 , 0) (3 , 1) (5 , 1)
2.714 2.429 0.67 +(0, 1) (5 , 3) (1 , 2)
0.000 4.000 0 − (0 , 0) (0 , 4) (0 , 4)
v (I1) v (I2)
min 1 2.286 2.000
min 2 0.000 1.000
max 2.286 2.000
x are given vertically. Inside the table players’ payoﬀs from the coalition S and
players’ payoﬀs from the coalition N\S are given at the right side.
Allocate the game’s Nash value in mixed strategies according to Shapley’s value
(4):
Sh1 = v (I1) +
1
2 [v (I1, I2)− v (I2)− v (I1)] ,
Sh2 = v (I2) +
1
2 [v (I1, I2)− v (I2)− v (I1)] .
Find the maximal guaranteed payoﬀs v (I1) and v (I2) of players I1 and I2. For
this purpose ﬁx a NE strategy of a third player as
y¯ =
(
3/7 4/7
)
.
Denote mathematical expectations of players’ payoﬀs from coalition S when
mixed NE strategies are used by coalitionN\S by ES(i, j) (y¯) , i, j = 1, 2. In the table
2 the mathematical expectations are located at the left, and values are obtained by
using the following formulas:
ES(1, 1) (y¯) =
(
3
7 · 4 + 47 · 1 ; 37 · 2 + 47 · 2 ; 37 · 1 + 47 · 2
)
=
(
2 27 ; 2 ; 1
4
7
)
;
ES(1, 2) (y¯) =
(
3
7 · 3 + 47 · 5 ; 37 · 1 + 47 · 1 ; 37 · 5 + 47 · 3
)
=
(
4 17 ; 1 ; 3
6
7
)
;
ES(2, 1) (y¯) =
(
3
7 · 5 + 47 · 1; 37 · 3 + 47 · 2; 37 · 1 + 47 · 2
)
=
(
2 57 ; 2
3
7 ; 1
4
7
)
;
ES(2,2) (y¯) =
(
3
7 · 0 + 47 · 0 ; 37 · 4 + 47 · 4 ; 37 · 3 + 47 · 2
)
=
(
0; 4 ; 2 37
)
.
Third element here is mathematical expectation of payoﬀs of the player I3 (see table
1 too).
Then, look at the table 1 or table 2,
minH1 (x1 = 1, x2, y¯) = min
{
2 27 ; 4
1
7
}
= 2 27 ;
minH1 (x1 = 0, x2, y¯) = min
{
2 57 ; 0
}
= 0;
∣∣∣∣ v (I1) = max{2 27 ; 0} = 2 27 ;
minH2 (x1, x2 = 1, y¯) = min
{
2; 2 37
}
= 2 ;
minH2 (x1, x2 = 0, y¯) = min {1; 4} = 1;
∣∣∣∣ v (I2) = max {2; 1} = 2.
Thus, maxmin payoﬀ for player I1 is v (I1) = 2 27 and for player I2 is v (I2) = 2.
Hence,
Sh1 (y¯) = v (I1) +
1
2
(
5 17 − v (I1)− v (I2)
)
= 2 27 +
1
2
(
5 17 − 2 27 − 2
)
= 2 57 ;
Sh2 (y¯) = 2 +
3
7 = 2
3
7 .
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Thus, PMS-vector is equal to
PMS1 = 2
5
7
; PMS2 = 2
3
7
; PMS3 = 2
1
3
.
Table 3: The payoﬀs of players in the coalitional game G2 (xΣ2) with coalitional partition
Σ2 = {{I1, I3} , I2}.
The strategies The payoﬀs The payoﬀs of coalition
I1 I2 I3 I1 I2 I3 {I1, I3}
1 1 1 4 2 1 5
1 1 0 1 1 2 3
1 0 1 3 1 5 8
1 0 0 5 1 3 8
0 1 1 5 3 1 6
0 1 0 1 3 2 3
0 0 1 0 4 3 3
0 0 0 0 3 2 2
2. Compose and solve the coalitional game G2 (xΣ2) , Σ2 = {{I1, I3} , I2}, i. e.
ﬁnd NE in mixed strategies:
η = 5/6 1− η = 1/6
ξ = 1/2
0
0
1− ξ = 1/2
1 0
(1, 1) [5, 2] [8, 1]
(0, 0) [3, 3] [2, 3]
(1, 0) [3, 1] [8, 1]
(0, 1) [6, 3] [3, 4] .
It’s clear, that second and third matrix rows are dominated by the ﬁrst. One
can easily calculate NE and we have
y =
(
5/6 1/6
)
, x =
(
1/2 0 0 1/2
)
.
The Nash value of the game in mixed strategies is calculated by formula:
E (x, y) =
5
12
[5, 2] +
1
12
[8, 1] +
5
12
[6, 3] +
1
12
[3, 4] =
[
66
12
,
30
12
]
=
[
5
1
2
, 2
1
2
]
.
Find the maximal guaranteed payoﬀs v (I1) and v (I3) of players I1 and I3. For
this purpose ﬁx a NE strategy of a third player as
y¯ =
(
5/6 1/6
)
.
Then maxmin payoﬀ for player I1 is v (I1) = 1.68 and for player I3 is v (I3) = 2
(see table 4). Allocate the game’s Nash value in mixed strategies E1 (x, y) = 5.5
according to Shapley’s value (4):
Sh1 = v (I1) +
1
2 [v (I1, I3)− v (I1)− v (I3)] = 2.59 ,
Sh3 = v (I3) +
1
2 [v (I1, I3)− v (I1)− v (I3)] = 2.91 .
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Table 4: The maximal guaranteed payoﬀs of players I1 and I3.
The strategies of N\S ,
the payoﬀs of S and N\S
Mathematical y 0.5 0.5
Expectation x +1 +0
3.83 1.68 0.5 − (1 , 1) (4 , 1) (3 , 5)
1.68 2.17 0 +(1 , 0) (1 , 2) (5 , 3)
4.15 1.34 0.5 +(0, 1) (5 , 1) (0 , 3)
0.83 2.00 0 − (0 , 0) (1 , 2) (0 , 2)
v (I1) v (I3)
min 1 1.68 1.34
min 2 0.83 2.00
max 1.68 2.00
Table 5: The payoﬀs of players in the coalitional game G3 (xΣ3) with coalitional partition
Σ3 = {{I2, I3} , I1}.
The strategies The payoﬀs The payoﬀs of coalition
I1 I2 I3 I1 I2 I3 {I2, I3}
1 1 1 4 2 1 3
1 1 0 0 2 2 4
1 0 1 3 1 5 6
1 0 0 3 1 3 4
0 1 1 4 3 1 4
0 1 0 1 2 2 4
0 0 1 0 4 3 7
0 0 0 0 4 2 6
Thus, PMS-vector in mixed strategies is equal to
PMS1 = 2.59; PMS2 = 2.5; PMS3 = 2.91.
3. Compose and solve the coalitional game G3 (xΣ3) , Σ3 = {{I2, I3} , I1}, i. e.
ﬁnd NE in mixed strategies in the game:
η = 1 1− η = 0
0
0
0
ξ = 1
1 0
(1, 1) [3, 4] [4, 4]
(0, 0) [4, 3] [6, 0]
(1, 0) [4, 0] [4, 1]
(0, 1) [6, 3] [7, 0] .
The ﬁrst three matrix rows are dominated by the last. Then second column is
dominated by the ﬁrst. Hence we have
y =
(
1 0
)
, x =
(
0 0 0 1
)
.
The Nash value of the game equals:
E (x, y) = [6, 3] .
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Find the maximal guaranteed payoﬀs of players I2 and I3. Fix a NE strategy of
a ﬁrst player as
y¯ =
(
1 0
)
.
Then
minH2 (y¯, x2 = 1, x3) = min {2; 2} = 2 ;
minH2 (y¯, x2 = 0, x3) = min {1; 1} = 1;
∣∣∣∣ v (I2) = max {2; 1} = 2;
minH3 (y¯, x2, x3 = 1) = min {1; 5} = 1 ;
minH3 (y¯, x2, x3 = 0) = min {2; 3} = 2;
∣∣∣∣ v (I3) = max {1; 2} = 2.
Allocate the game’s Nash value in mixed strategies E1 (x, y) = 6 according to
Shapley’s value (4):
Sh2 = v (I2) +
1
2 [v (I2, I3)− v (I2)− v (I3)] = 3 ,
Sh3 = v (I3) +
1
2 [v (I2, I3)− v (I2)− v (I3)] = 3 .
Thus, PMS-vector in pure strategies is equal:
PMS1 = PMS2 = PMS3 = 3 .
Present the obtained solution in the table 6.
Table 6: Payoﬀs of players in NE for various cases of the coalitional partition of players.
Project Coalitional The n-tuple of NE Probability Payoﬀs
partitions (I1, I2, I3) of realization NE of players in NE
((1, 0) , 1) 1/7
1 Σ1 = {{I1, I2} {I3}} ((1, 0) , 0) 4/21 ((2.71, 2.43) , 2.33)
((0, 1) , 1) 2/7
((0, 1) , 0) 8/21
(1, (1) , 1) 5/12
2 Σ2 = {{I1, I3} {I2}} (1, (0) , 1) 1/12 (2.59, (2.5) , 2.91)
(0, (1) , 1) 5/12
(0, (0) , 1) 1/12
3 Σ3 = {{I2, I3} {I1}} (1, (0, 1)) 1 (3, (3, 3))
Applying the algorithm for ﬁnding a compromise solution, we get the set of
compromise coalitional partitions (table 7). Therefore, compromise imputation is
Table 7: The set of compromise coalitional partitions.
I1 I2 I3 I1 I2 I3
Σ1 = {{I1, I2} {I3}} 2.71 2.43 2.33 Δ {{I1, I2} {I3}} 0.29 0.57 0.67 0.67
Σ2 = {{I1, I3} {I2}} 2.59 2.5 2.91 Δ {{I1, I3} {I2}} 0.41 0.5 0.09 0.5
Σ3 = {{I2, I3} {I1}} 3 3 3 Δ {{I2, I3} {I1}} 0 0 0 0
R 3 3 3
PMS-vector in coalitional game with the coalition partition Σ3 in NE (1 , (0 , 1))
in pure strategies with payoﬀs (3 , (3 , 3)).
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Moreover, in situation, for example, (1 , (0 , 1)) the ﬁrst and third players give
a positive decision for corresponding project. In other words, if the ﬁrst and third
players give a positive decision for corresponding project, and the second does not,
then payoﬀ of players will be optimal in terms of corresponding coalitional interac-
tion.
5. Conclusion
A static coalitional model of decision-making over the set of projects with diﬀerent
preferences of players and algorithm for ﬁnding optimal solution are constructed in
this paper, and numerical example are presented.
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Abstract In this work we join on classical SIR model to describe inﬂuenza
epidemic in urban population with procedure of making decision. We sup-
pose that agent in urban population makes a choice: whether or not to
participate in vaccination company. Each decision involve diﬀerent costs
and indirectly inﬂuence on the population state. We formulated an opti-
mal control problem to study the optimal behavior during epidemic period
and vaccination company. All theoretical results are also supported by the
numerical simulations.
Keywords: SIR model, vaccination problem, evolutionary games, optimal
control, epidemic process.
1. Introduction
Originally Susceptible-Infected-Recovered model and its modiﬁcation describe a fast
spreading process, such as inﬂuenza epidemic or other forms of respiratory viral
diseases, circulated in urban population. Total population is divided into three sub-
groups: Susceptible, Infected and Recovered. Susceptible is group where people are
not infected, Infected is a group of people having the disease, and Recovered is
group, where all members have immunity to the disease. Human population meets
inﬂuenza epidemic almost every year then SIR model is very actual and can be used
in social and economic applications.
During the years many medical methods such as preventive measures, intensive
treatment, etc. were developed to protect entire population during annual epidemics.
Hence preventive measures or medical treatment can be considered as an external
inﬂuence to the development of epidemics and can be used as control parameters
in the model. Since vaccination is one of the most eﬀective method to protect
population from the annual epidemics then we chose is as an control parameter.
However vaccination can not be absolutely eﬀective and moreover such as it was
proofed in the previous research total vaccination is very expensive and usually do
not apply to protect population against a ﬂu epidemics. Hence we can establish a
new problem such as vaccination problem.
We assume that vaccination company occurs before the seasonal epidemic begins,
because it is necessary take into account regulation immune system of individual
after vaccination, because failing health after vaccination not allow to resist against
another viruses. Unfortunately ﬂu vaccines are eﬀective only for one season owing to
mutation of pathogens and waning immunity. We suppose that inﬂuenza epidemic
continues until there are no more newly infected individuals.
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In this model we assume that before epidemic period each agent of population
may choose a behavior: participate or not in vaccination company. All decision
provoke corresponding costs and inﬂuence on the future agent’s incomes. If agent
of population chooses the application of vaccination then he should pay it costs
and estimate the consequences if vaccine is not eﬀective. Hence in current work we
extend classical Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) model with the procedure of
making decisions. We reformulate original model in terms of optimal control and
couple it with the process of making decisions.
1.1. Related Works
Recent literature has seen a large amount of interest in using optimal control and
game-theoretic methods to study disease control of inﬂuenza for public health.
First, this research problem was refereed in (Kermack and Kendrick, 1927), where
an Susceptible-Infected-Recovered model has been proposed to study the epidemic
spread in a homogeneous population. It provides a deterministic dynamical sys-
tem model as the mean ﬁeld approximation of the underlying stochastic evolution
of the host subpopulations. In (Behncke, 2000) and (Kolesin and Zhitkova, 2004),
many variants of optimal control models of SIR-epidemics are investigated for the
application of medical vaccination and health promotion campaigns. In the paper
(Fu et al., 2010) the vaccination problem is considered from the individual agents’
point of view.
Also epidemic models can be applied to the diﬀerent ﬁelds of human activity, for
instance in (Khouzani et al., 2010; Khouzani et al., 2011), optimal control methods
have been used to study the class of epidemic models in mobile wireless networks,
and Pontryagin’s maximum principle is used to quantify the damage that the mal-
ware can inﬂict on the network by deploying optimum decision rules.
Diﬀerent from the work done in the past, in current work population agents
based on the available information make a decision whether or not they participate
in vaccination company. Their choices are included in the SIR model and as a result
we receive the optimal control strategy (intensity of vaccination) that depends on
the decision procedure.
2. Model
We use Susceptible-Infected-Recovered model to describe epidemiological process in
urban population with following assumption that each agent in population allows
to participate in vaccination company or refuses it. In current model vaccination
company establish the inﬂuence to the population and hence we can consider it as
control parameter in the model. Then, at time t, ns, nI , nR correspond to fractions of
the population who are susceptible, infected and for all t, conditionN = ns+nI+nR
is justiﬁed. Deﬁne
S(t) =
nS
N
, I(t) =
nI1
N
, R(t) =
nR
N
, (R(t) = 1− S(t)− I(t))
as portions of the susceptible, the infected and the recovered in the population.
And in addition to the above the model is formulated as follows (Khatri, 2003;
Kermack and Kendrick, 1927):
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dS
dt
= −δSI − u;
dI
dt
= δSI − σI;
(1)
here transmission rate from state S to I is
δ = δ0m(
nI
N
) = δ0mI, (2)
where value δ0 is a transmissibility of disease, m is a number of contacts per
time unit, and parameter σ = 1T which is intensive rate of transition from infected
to recovered and it is in inverse proportion to the average duration of the disease.
Here R = 1− S − I, variable u(t) ∈ (0, 1) is control parameter which is interpreted
as the intensity of vaccination in agents per day.
2.1. Objective Function
In this work we will minimize aggregated cost in time interval [0, T ], hence at any
given t following costs exist in the system: fi(I(t)) these are individual’s treatment
costs, which are non-decreasing and twice-diﬀerentiable, convex functions, such as
fi(0) = 0, fi(I(t)) > 0, i = 1, N for I(t) > 0; functions li(R(t)) are agent’s beneﬁt
rate, which arise when infected agent becomes recovered, li(R(t)) is non-decreasing
and diﬀerentiable function and l(0) = 0; functions hi(u(t)) describe vaccination
costs that help to reduce epidemic spreading, hi(u(t)) is twice-diﬀerentiable and
increasing function in ui(t) such as hi(0) = 0, hi(x) > 0, i = 1, N when u > 0.
Hence costs function for i-th agent in population is:
Ji = fi(I(t))− li(R(t)) + hi(u(t)). (3)
Therefore aggregated system costs is:
J =
T∫
0
N∑
i=1
(fi(I(t))− li(R(t)) + hi(u(t)))dt. (4)
2.2. Making decision procedure
In current section we present a procedure of making decisions that inﬂuence to the
epidemic process in urban population. Previous researches have proofed that vacci-
nation company as a preventive measure is very eﬀective and allows to reduce the
quantity of infected in entire population. However each agent in population have
a possibilities to estimate his own proﬁt of participation in vaccination company.
Agent can take into account the vaccination cost, feasible complications after vac-
cination and also he can estimate the herd immunity. We suppose that the last
circumstance does not presume than an agent necessarily knows the exact infor-
mation, he can evaluate the average number of his contacts, the current epidemic
situation, that can be presented in mass communication media, etc. Meanwhile the
collective result of vaccination decisions determines the level of population immu-
nity and the strain of the epidemic in current period. When level of vaccination
coverage in total population is increased then even agents who are unvaccinated
have less risk to become infected. Then we assume that every agent, having this
information might decide to decline the vaccination this year and thereby he re-
duces own vaccination costs. However agents might have incomplete information
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with the some rumors from the neighbors or friends, or they also may estimate the
epidemic situation incorrectly, thus this scenario leads following problem, increas-
ing of unvaccinated individuals provoke the diminution of the herd immunity in the
future and thereby collective costs during epidemic period will arise. The reduction
of the vaccinated individuals induces the increasing of infected in population the
then it leads that the frequency of meeting with infected agents is also increased.
Then each unvaccinated agent may transform to the infected and then he should
pay treatment costs, that include healthcare expenses, lost productivity and the
possibility of pain. Usually treatment costs exceed the vaccination expanses.
Thus in current work we suppose that each agent chooses between two possible
alternatives:
– to be vaccinated;
– not to be vaccinated and probably to be infected;
If agent participate in vaccination company then he gets a vaccination costs, in
our model these costs are described by functions hi(u), where u is intensity of vac-
cination. Vaccination costs contain the immediate monetary cost, the opportunity
cost of time spent to get the vaccine and any health eﬀects. We also suppose that
vaccination is not absolutely eﬀective and vaccination company should be ﬁnished
before the epidemic starts.
Infected agents incur treatment costs, which are denoted as functions fi(I), and
when agent convalesce then his treatment costs are reduced to the value l(R), which
is beneﬁt function.
Then describe the decision procedure, each season an agent adopts one of the
alternative, which determines whether or not he vaccinated. At the end of the season
each agent decides whether to change the vaccination decision or not, depending
on the current aggregated costs. Then agent i selects at random agent j, and in
imitates his role model if opponents payoﬀ is higher. Deﬁne probability that agent
i adopts behavior of agent j as follows (Fu et al., 2010):
ρij =
1
1 + exp(−β(pj − pi)) , (5)
where pj is agent’s payoﬀ on j-th decision, parameter β ∈ (0,∞).
We incorporate this probability to the basic Susceptible-Infected-Recovered model,
which is presented in section 2., thus transmission rate from S to I can be rewritten:
δ = δ0mIρij . (6)
3. Structure of optimal control
We use Pontryagin’s maximum principle (Pontryagin et al., 1962), to ﬁnd the op-
timal control u = (u1, u2) to the problem described above in Section 2.. Deﬁne the
associated Hamiltonian H and adjoint functions λS , λI1 , λIr , λR as follows:
H = −λ0
N∑
i=1
(fi(I(t)) − li(R(t)) + hi(u(t)))+
λS(−δS(t)I(t)− u) + λI(δS(t)I(t)− σI(t)) =
−λ0
N∑
i=1
(fi(I(t)) − li(R(t)) + hi(u(t)))−
δS(t)I(t)(λS − λI)− λSu− λIσ.
(7)
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We construct adjoint system as follows:
λ˙I(t) = −∂H∂I = λ0
N∑
i=1
f ′i(I(t)) + δS(λS(t)− λI(t)) + λI(t)σ;
λ˙S(t) = −∂H∂S = λS(t)δI(t) − λ2(t)δI(t) = δI(t)(λS(t)− λI(t));
(8)
with the transversality conditions given by
λI(T ) = 0, λS(T ) = 0, λR(T ) = 0. (9)
According to Pontryagin’s maximum principle, there exist continuous and piece-
wise continuously diﬀerentiable co-state functions λi that at every point t ∈ [0, T ]
where u1 and u2 is continuous, satisfy (8) and (9). In addition, we have λ(t) =
(λ0(t), λS(t), λI(t), λR(t)) òàêàß œòî
u ∈ arg max
u∈[0,1]
H(λ, (S, I, R), u). (10)
To determine an optimal control parameter that maximize Hamiltonian (7) we
consider derivative
∂H
∂u
:
∂H
∂u
= −λ0
N∑
i=1
h′i(u)− λS = −(λ0
N∑
i=1
h′i(u) + λS). (11)
Now let equal to zero right parts of equations (11), (8):
−(λ0
N∑
i=1
h′i(u) + λS) = 0;
λ0
N∑
i=1
f ′i(I(t)) + δS(λS(t)− λI(t)) + λI(t)σ = 0;
δI(t)(λS(t)− λI(t)) = 0.
(12)
From the ﬁrst equation of system (12), Hamiltonian reaches maximum if and
only if next condition is satisﬁed:
(λ0
N∑
i=1
h′i(u) + λS) < 0. (13)
Let be λ0 = 1, then expression (13) can be reformulated:
N∑
i=1
h′i(u) < −λS , (14)
and we will proof that λS < 0.
From (12) we received that
λS = − 1
σ
n∑
i=1
f ′i(I(t)), (15)
where σ ≥ 0,
n∑
i=1
f ′i(I(t)) ≥ 0 by deﬁnition then λS < 0, hence maximum
of Hamiltonian is reached on the negative half-space then we should proof that
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function λS is increasing. Consider adjoint system (8) and show that derivative
λ˙S = δI(t)(λS(t)− λI(t)) ≥ 0.
We will proof this statement base on the next two properties (Khouzani et al.,
2011):
Property 1. Let w(t) be a continuous and piecewise diﬀerential function of t. Let
w(t1) = L and w(t) > L for all t ∈ (t1, . . . , t0]. Then ˙w(t+1 ) ≥ 0, where w(t+1 ) =
lim
x→x0
v(x).
Property 2. For any convex and diﬀerentiable function y(x), which is 0 at x = 0,
y′(x)x − y(x) ≥ 0 for all x ≥ 0.
Step I. Consider instant time moment t = T , from transversality conditions
(9) we have λS(T )− λI(T ) = 0, and λ˙S(T )− λ˙I(T ) = −
n∑
i
f ′i(I(T )) < 0, λ˙I(T ) =
n∑
i
f ′i(I(T )) > 0, therefore function λI is increasing on the interval [0, T ].
Step 2.(Proof by contradiction).
Let 0 ≤ t∗ < T be the last instant moment at which one of the inequality
constraints are performed:
Condition 1. λI(t) > 0, λS(t)− λI(t) = 0 for t∗ < t < T .
Condition 2. λI(t) = 0, λS(t)− λI(t) < 0 for t∗ < t < T .
Now consider a diﬀerence:
λ˙S(t
∗+)− λ˙I(t+∗) = δI(T )(λS − λI)− (λ0
N∑
i=1
f ′i(I(t)) + δS(λS − λI) + λIσ) =
δI(T )(λS − λI)− λ0
N∑
i=1
f ′i(I) +
H
I
+
λS
I
u+
λI
I
σI − λIσ
+
λ0
I
(
N∑
i=1
(fi(I(t)) − li(R(t)) + hi(u(t)))) =
= δI(T )(λS − λI)− λ0
I
(
N∑
i=1
f ′i(I(t))I −
N∑
i=1
fi(I(t))) +
H
I
−λ0
I
N∑
i=1
li(R(t)) +
λ0
I
N∑
i=1
hi(u(t)) +
λS
I
u+
λI
I
σI − λIσ
(16)
The system ODE is autonomous, i.e., the Hamiltonian and the constraints on
the control u do not have an explicit dependency on the independent variable t.
Then at time t = T Hamiltonian is:
H(T ) = −λ0
N∑
i=1
(fi(I(T )) + li(R(T )) + hi(u(T )))−
−δS(T )I(T )(λS(T )− λI(T ))− λS(T )u(T )− λI(T )σI(T ).
(17)
costs functions follow the next conditions fi(I(T )) ≥ 0, li(R(T )) ≥ 0, hi(u(T )) ≥
0 and transversality conditions (9) at time moment T are justiﬁed then
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H(T ) ≤ 0.
Hence as far as functions f , l, h are non-decreasing we have:
H(t)− λ0
N∑
i=1
(fi(I(t)) + li(R(t)) + hi(u(t))) =
−δS(T )I(T )(λS(T )− λI(T ))− λS(T )u(T )− λI(T )σI(T ) ≤ 0.
(18)
By property 2. the term is nonnegative
λ0
I
(
N∑
i=1
f ′i(I(t))I −
N∑
i=1
fi(I(t))) ≥ 0,
from condition 1 (λS − λI) = 0 and λI > 0 and from (18) we received that
λ˙S(t
∗+)− λ˙I(t+∗) < 0, then ddt (λS(t∗+)− λI(t∗+)) < 0, which contradicts property
1, thus time moment t∗+ does not exist.
Step II. Consider formula (16) and suppose that condition 2. is satisﬁed, by
property 2. we have
λ0
I
(
N∑
i=1
f ′i(I(t))I −
N∑
i=1
fi(I(t))) ≥ 0, for all t it is justiﬁed that
H(t) < 0, therefore ddt (λS(t
∗+)−λI(t∗+)) < 0. This also contradicts property 1. and
then time moment t∗+ does not exist in case II. Hence for all t ∈ [0, T ] condition
d
dt (λS(t)− λI(t)) > 0 is satisﬁed.
These proofed results can be formulated as lemmas.
Lemma 1. For all t, 0 < t < T following conditions hold (λS(t)− λI(t)) > 0 and
λI(t) ≤ 0.
Lemma 2. For all t on time interval 0 < t < T we have
(λ0
N∑
i=1
h′i(u) + λS) < 0. (19)
Based on previous research (Khouzani et al., 2010; Khouzani et al., 2011;
Pontryagin et al., 1962), we show that an optimal control u(t) = (u1(t), u2(t)) has
following form.
Theorem 1. Optimal control program u(t) has following structure:
For all t such as 0 < t < t∗, u(t) satisﬁes:
λ0
σ
N∑
i=1
f ′i(I(t) =
N∑
i=1
h′i(u(t)), (20)
For all t such as t∗ < t < T :
u(t) = 0.
4. Numerical simulations
In this section we present numerical simulation which are used to illustrated the
structure of the optimal control and inﬂuence of the human decision to the epidemic
process. In the example we suppose that population size is N = 1000, initial fraction
of subpopulations are: S(0) = 950, I(0) = 50, R(0) = 0. Following values of the
system parameters are used in the simulation: h = 0, 1 is model step, δ0 = 0, 06 is
196 Gubar Elena, Zhitkova Ekaterina
transmissibility of decease, l = 35 is number of contacts per time unit, σ = 1/15 =
0, 06(6) is intensity of recovering.
Based on previous research and on the result of the experiments in this work we
assume that typical duration of disease is 10-15 days. After simulation we receive
that with mentioned initial states and auxiliary parameters the maximum quantity
of infected is I(t) = 511 and epidemic peak is reached at t = 15 day.
In ﬁgure 1 Susceptible-Infected-Recovered model is presented:
Fig. 1: SIR model without application of the control
Below we present the case, where we apply optimal intensity of vaccination (op-
timal control strategy), which allow to reduce the number of infected in population.
In current model vaccination was used as a control parameters in the system hence
agents from subpopulation Susceptible directly transfer to subpopulation Recov-
ered, obtaining immunity. After numerical simulations for the same initial data we
get that the maximum quantity of infected is I∗(t) = 426 at time t = 13. Therefore
we can see that maximum number of Infected is less than in previous case and in
comparing with Fig.1 epidemic peak is achieved early.
Fig. 2: Application optimal control to the SIR model.
In ﬁgure 3 we illustrate the optimal control that minimize aggregated costs on
the preventive measures. For the considered initial states optimal control will be
switched oﬀ at t∗ = 7 day.
One of the main aim of the work is to show that participation of agents in
vaccination company reduces aggregated costs of the entire population, hence in
following ﬁgures we present aggregated costs for diﬀerent cases. First individual
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Fig. 3: Optimal control, uopt = 15 agents per day.
agents costs are deﬁne as follows: treatment costs are fi(I(t)) = aI(t) + b, where
a = 1, b = 1.4, vaccination costs hi(u(t)) = k1u2+k2, and k1 = k2 = 0.5, li(R(t)) =
cR(t) + d, c = 1, d = 0.05.
In ﬁgures 4.-5 aggregated costs received for the time interval [0, T ] and they are
equal to J(u) = 801.5 monetary units (m.u.), which can be in US dollars, Rubles
or Euros depending on the context.
Fig. 4: Aggregated system cost for SIR model without application of the optimal control.
If optimal control is applied to the system then aggregated system costs decrease
and value of functional is equal to J(u) = 707, 14 m.u.
Fig. 5: Aggregated cost for SIR model with application of the optimal control.
To complete the our illustrative example let’s consider a modiﬁcation of the
model, where we take into account only agents choices. Let’s say that for instance
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that intensity of vaccination is u = 5 agents per day, it means that only ﬁve agent
accept a decision about the participation in vaccination company. We should add
also that u < uopt. In such case dynamics in SIR model is changed, the maximum
number of infected is achieved at t∗ = 14 day and equal to Imax = 482 agents. The
result of simulation is presented in ﬁgure 6.
Fig. 6: SIR model with control parameter and decision making procedure.
We can see that the quantity of infected exceeds the number of infected in situa-
tion, where we apply optimal control strategy to the population, and the number of
agents, choosing vaccination decision is not enough to protect population during the
epidemic season. Hence in this case we also can show that aggregates costs increase
and value of functional is J(u) = 761.36 m.u.
Fig. 7: Aggregated costs with u = 0.005 is equal to J(u) = 761.36 m.u.
To summarize the results we have to add that since agents in population do not
have reliable information about epidemic situation then they may choose incorrect
decision, which provoke the degradation of epidemic state in total population.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied an epidemic model that takes into account the agent
motivation to participation in the vaccination company. We incorporate procedure
of making decision to the simple Susceptible-Infected-Recovered model and have
formulated this model in special case. Using Pontryagin’s maximum principle, we
have shown the structure of optimal control, which is depending on the agents costs
induced by choosing decisions. We supported our results with numerical simulations,
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observing diﬀerent cases of epidemic process in entire urban population. In future
work we would extend this model including diﬀerent structure of population, it
means that human decision may depend on his social group, not only his costs and
to modify the model, using number of contacts as a function of the time.
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Abstract The main goal is twofold. Thanks to the so-called indirect func-
tion known as the dual representation of the characteristic function of a
coalitional TU game, we derive a new characterization of the pre-kernel of
the coalitional game using the evaluation of its indirect function on the tails
of pairwise bargaining ranges arising from a given payoﬀ vector. Secondly,
we study three subclasses of coalitional games of which its indirect function
has an explicit formula and show the applicability of the determination of
the pre-kernel (nucleolus) for such types of games using the indirect func-
tion. Three such subclasses of games concern the 1−convex and 2-convex n
person games and clan games. A clan game with the clan to be s singleton
is known as a big boss game.
Keywords: dual representation, indirect function, pre-kernel, 1- and 2-
convex n person games, clan games, big boss games.
1. Introduction and notions
As shown in (Driessen et al., 2010; Driessen et al., 2011), certain practical prob-
lems such as co-insurance situations and library situations can be modeled as a
cooperative game in characteristic function form. Formally, a cooperative game on
player set N is a characteristic function v : P(N) → R deﬁned on P(N) satisfying
v(∅) = 0. Here P(N) denotes the power set of the ﬁnite player set N , given by
P(N) = {S|S ⊆ N}, and shortly called a game v on N. In (Martinez-Legaz, 1996),
the dual representation of cooperative games based on Fenchel Moreau Conjuga-
tion has been introduced, with every game v on N, there is associated the indirect
function πv : RN → R, given by
πv(y) = max
S⊆N
ev(S, y) for all y = (yk)k∈N ∈ RN , (1)
The excess ev(S, y) of a non-empty coalition S at the salary vector y in the game v
represents the net proﬁt the (unique) employer would receive from the selection of
 The ﬁrst author acknowledges ﬁnancial support by National Science Foundation of China
(NSFC) through grantts No. 71171163 and 71271171.
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coalition S, assuming the members of S will produce, using the resources that are
available to the employer, a total amount of output the monetary utility of which
is measured by v(S), and the (possibly negative) salary required by the player i
amounts yi, i ∈ N . Write ev(∅, y) = 0. In the game theory setting, the eﬃcient
salary vectors of which all the excess are non-positive, compose the multi-valued
solution concept called Core, that is
Core(v) = {y ∈ RN |ev(N, y) = 0, ev(S, y) ≤ 0 for all S ⊆ N , S = ∅}, (2)
According to (Martinez-Legaz, 1996), the indirect function πv : RN → R of a game
v on N is a non-increasing convex function which attains its minimum at level zero,
i.e., miny∈RN πv(y) = 0.
In this paper, we use indirect function to determine the nucleolus for three
subclasses of games concerning 1−convex and 2−convex games (Driessen, 1988)
(Driessen and Hou, 2010) and clan games. The theory on 1−convex n person games
has been well developed by Theo Driessen. The key feature of this kind of games
is the geometrically regular structure of its core. For 2−convex games, its core
coincides with a so-called core catcher associated with appropriately chosen lower
and upper Core bounds. For clan games, there is a nonempty coalition called clan,
of which each member has veto power; i.e., no coalition can attain any positive
reward unless it contains all clan members. With the clan to be a singleton, the
clan game reduces to a big boss game.
2. The indirect function of 1-convex and 2-convex n person games and
clan games
Given a game (N, v), its corresponding beneﬁts vector bv = (bvi )i∈N is deﬁned
by bvi = v(N) − v(N\{i}), i ∈ N . Note that the vector bv is an upper bound
for core allocations in that yi ≤ bvi for all i ∈ N , all y ∈ Core(v). In terms of
the characteristic function v, the 1-convexity property requires that, concerning
the division problem, the worth v(N) is suﬃciently large to meet the coalitional
demand amounting its worth v(S), as well as the desirable marginal beneﬁt by any
individual not belonging to coalition S. For notation sake, write z(T ) instead of∑
k∈T
zk for any coalition T ⊆ N and any vector z = (zk)k∈N ∈ RN , where z(∅) = 0,
and use y ≤ bv instead of yi ≤ bvi for all i ∈ N .
Deﬁnition 1. A game v on N is said to be 1-convex if it holds∑
k∈N
bvk ≥ v(N) and v(N) ≥ v(S) +
∑
k∈N\S
bvk for all S ⊆ N , S = ∅. (3)
Example 1. Let the three-person game v on N = {1, 2, 3} be given by v({1}) =
v({2}) = 0, v({3}) = 1, v({1, 2}) = 4, v({1, 3}) = 6, v({2, 3}) = 7, v(N) = 10. It is
left to the reader to check the 1-convexity of this game using the marginal beneﬁt
vector bv = (3, 4, 6). It turns out that core coincides with the triangle with the
three vertices (0, 4, 6), (3, 1, 6), (3, 4, 3). In fact, (y1, y2, y3) ∈ Core(v) is equivalent
to y1 + y2 + y3 = 10 and y1 ≤ 3, y2 ≤ 4, y3 ≤ 6. Under the latter upper core bound
assumption y ≤ bv, the ﬁrst part of the following theorem reports that the level
equation πv(y) = c for its indirect function πv is solved by the hyperplane equation
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y1+ y2 + . . .+ yn = v(N)− cm provided c > 0. Here the larger the strictly positive
level c, the smaller v(N) − c. In case c = 0, then its level equation πv(y) = 0 is
solved by any hyperplane equation y1 + y2 + . . .+ yn = d where the real number d
ranges from bv(N) to v(N). The lowest hyperplane with d = v(N) represents the
core of the 1−convex game.
Theorem 1. Let v be a 1-convex game on N and we study the indirect function of
this game with respect to the following two types of vectors, given y ∈ Rn.
Type 1: y ≤ bv.
Type 2: There exists a unique  ∈ N with y > bv and yi ≤ bvi for all i ∈ N , i =  .
Then its indirect function πv : RN → R satisﬁes the following properties:
(i)πv(y) = max
[
0, v(N)−
∑
k∈N
yk
]
for vectors of type 1.
(ii)πv(y) = max
[
0, v(N\{ })−
∑
k∈N\{}
yk
]
= max
[
0, v(N)−
∑
k∈N
yk + y − bv
]
for vectors of type 2.
Proof. (i) Let S ⊆ N , S = ∅, and y ∈ RN with yi ≤ bvi for all i ∈ N . From (3), we
derive
v(S)− y(S) = v(S)− y(N) + y(N\S)
≤ v(S)− y(N) +bv(N\S) ≤ v(N)− y(N) (4)
Thus, the restriction of the indirect function πv to the comprehensive hull of the
marginal beneﬁt vector bv attains its maximum either for S = N or S = ∅.
(ii) For every y ∈ RN such that there exists a unique  ∈ N with y > bv and yi ≤ bvi
for all i ∈ N , i =  , it holds that, on the one hand, v(S)− y(S) ≤ v(N)− y(N) for
all S ⊆ N with  ∈ S because the above chain (4) of inequalities still holds due to
 ∈ N\S. For all S ⊆ N with  ∈ S, it holds
v(S)− y(S) = v(S)− y(N) + y + y(N\(S ∪ { }))
≤ v(S)− y(N) + y +bv(N\(S ∪ { }))
= v(S)− y(N) + y − bv +bv(N\S)
≤ v(N)− y(N) + y − bv = v(N\{ })− y(N\{ }). (5)
In this setting, the indirect function πv attains its maximum either for S = N ,
S = N\{ } or S = ∅, but S = N cancels.
Corollary 1. For every 1-convex game v on N and the payoﬀ vector y = (yk)k∈N ∈
RN , it holds:
y ∈ Core(v) ⇔ y(N) = v(N), πv(y) = 0 ⇔ y(N) = v(N), y ≤ bv.
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The former if and only if implication is trivial, while the latter if and only if
implication is shown by the (partial) determination of the indirect function for
1-convex games according to Theorem 1.
In the remainder of this section, we switch from 1-convex to 2-convex games. In
this framework, it is useful to introduce the so-called gap function gv : P(N) → R of
a game v on N, given by gv(S) = b
v
(S)− v(S) for all S ⊆ N , S = ∅, and gv(∅) = 0.
In view of (3), a game v on N is 1-convex if and only if the nonnegative gap function
attains its minimum at the grand coalition, i.e., 0 ≤ gv(N) ≤ gv(S) for all S ⊆ N ,
S = ∅.
Deﬁnition 2. (Driessen, 1988) A game v on N is said to be 2-convex if the following
two conditions hold:
gv({i}) + gv({j}) ≥ gv(N) ≥ gv({i}) for any players i, j ∈ N , i = j (6)
v(N) ≥ v(S) +
∑
k∈N\S
bvk for all S ⊆ N , |S| ≥ 2 (7)
For 2-convexity, the main condition (3) is kept except for singletons, of which the
gap is leveled below the gap of the grand coalition, whereas the sum of two such
gaps majorizes the gap of the grand coalition.
Theorem 2. Let v be a 2-convex game on N and we study the indirect function of
this game with respect to the following four types of vectors, given y ∈ Rn.
Type 1: y ≤ bv.
Type 2: There exists a unique  ∈ N with y > bv ≥ v({ }) and v({i}) ≤ yi ≤ bvi for
all i ∈ N , i =  .
Type 3: There exists a unique j ∈ N with yj < v({j}) ≤ bvj and v({i}) ≤ yi ≤ bvi
for all i ∈ N , i = j.
Type 4: There exist unique j,  ∈ N with y > bv ≥ v({ }), yi ≤ bvi for all i ∈ N ,
i =  , and yj < v({j}) ≤ bvj , yi ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ N , i = j. Then its indirect
function πv : RN → R satisﬁes the following properties:
(i)πv(y) = max
[
0, v(N)−
∑
k∈N
yk, (v({i})− yi)i∈N
]
for vectors of type 1.
(ii)πv(y) = max
[
0, v(N\{ })−
∑
k∈N\{}
yk
]
= max
[
0, v(N)−
∑
k∈N
yk + y − bv
]
for vectors of type 2.
(iii)πv(y) = max
[
v(N)−
∑
k∈N
yk, v({j})− yj
]
for vectors of type 3.
(iv)πv(y) = max
[
v(N\{ })−
∑
k∈N\{}
yk, v({j})− yj
]
= max
[
v(N)−
∑
k∈N
yk + y − bv , v({j})− yj
]
for vectors of type 4.
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The proof is similar to the previous proof of Theorem(1) and is left to the reader.
Corollary 2. Let v be a 2-convex game on N and let y = (yk)k∈N ∈ Rn. Then
y ∈ Core(v) iﬀ y(N) = v(N) and πv(y) = 0 iﬀ y(N) = v(N) and v({i}) ≤ yi ≤ bvi
for all i ∈ N .
The former if and only if statement is general and the latter is shown by the
structure of the indirect function.
Deﬁnition 3. (Potters et al., 1989; Muto et al., 1988; Branzei et al., 2008, page
59) A game v on N is said to be a clan game if bvi ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ N and
there exists a coalition T ⊆ N , called the clan, such that v(S) = 0 whenever T ⊆ S
and
v(N) ≥ v(S) +
∑
k∈N\S
bvk for all S ⊆ N , S = ∅, with T ⊆ S (8)
A clan game v with an empty clan reduces to an 1-convex game, provided gv(N) ≥ 0.
A clan game with the clan to be a singleton is known as a big boss game. Although
both subclasses are interrelated, the description of its indirect function requires to
distinguish two cases (either a singleton or a multi-person clan).
Theorem 3. Let v be a big boss game on N, say player 1 is the big boss and we
study the indirect function of this game with respect to the following four types of
vector, given y ∈ Rn.
Type 1: 0 ≤ yi ≤ bvi for all i ∈ N\{1}.
Type 2: There exists a unique  ∈ N\{1} with y > bv ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ yi ≤ bvi for all
i ∈ N\{1,  }.
Type 3: There exists a unique  ∈ N\{1} with y < 0 ≤ bv and 0 ≤ yi ≤ bvi for all
i ∈ N\{1,  }.
Type 4: There exist unique j,  ∈ N\{1} with y > bv ≥ 0, yj < 0 ≤ bvj , and
0 ≤ yi ≤ bvi for all i ∈ N\{1, j,  }.
Then its indirect function πv : RN → R satisﬁes the following properties:
(i)πv(y) = max
[
0, v(N)−
∑
k∈N
yk
]
for vectors of type 1.
(ii)πv(y) = max
[
0, v(N\{ })−
∑
k∈N\{}
yk
]
= max
[
0, v(N)−
∑
k∈N
yk + y − bv
]
for vectors of type 2.
(iii)πv(y) = max
[
−y, v(N)−
∑
k∈N
yk
]
for vectors of type 3.
(iv)πv(y) = max
[
−yj, v(N\{ })−
∑
k∈N\{}
yk
]
= max
[
−yj, v(N)−
∑
k∈N
yk + y − bv
]
for vectors of type 4.
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Proof. Let y = (yk)k∈N ∈ RN .
(i) Suppose that 0 ≤ yi ≤ bvi for all i ∈ N\{1}. We distinguish two types of coalitions
S ⊆ N , S = ∅. In case 1 ∈ S, then v(S) − y(S) = −y(S) ≤ 0. In case 1 ∈ S, then
v(S) − y(S) ≤ v(N) − y(N) as shown in (4), due to (8) together with yi ≤ bvi for
all i ∈ N\{1}. This proves part (i).
(ii) Suppose that there exists a unique  ∈ N\{1} with y > bv ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ yi ≤ bvi
for all i ∈ N\{1,  }. We distinguish three types of coalitions S ⊆ N , S = ∅. In case
1 ∈ S, then v(S) − y(S) = −y(S) ≤ 0. In case {1,  } ⊆ S, then v(S) − y(S) ≤
v(N)− y(N) as shown in (4), due to (8) together with yi ≤ bvi for all i ∈ N\{1,  }.
In case 1 ∈ S,  ∈ S, then (5) applies once again. This proves part (ii).
(iii) Suppose that there exists a unique  ∈ N\{1}with y < 0 ≤ bv and 0 ≤ yi ≤ bvi
for all i ∈ N\{1,  }. We distinguish two types of coalitions S ⊆ N , S = ∅. In case
1 ∈ S, then v(S) − y(S) = −y(S) ≤ −y. In case 1 ∈ S, then v(S) − y(S) ≤
v(N) − y(N) as shown in (4), due to (8) together with yi ≤ bvi for all i ∈ N\{1}.
This proves part (iii).
(iv) Suppose that there exist unique j,  ∈ N\{1} with y > bv ≥ 0, yj < 0 ≤ bvj ,
and 0 ≤ yi ≤ bvi for all i ∈ N\{1, j,  }. We distinguish three types of coalitions
S ⊆ N , S = ∅. In case 1 ∈ S, then v(S)− y(S) = −y(S) ≤ −yj. In case 1 ∈ S, the
proof proceeds similar to the proof of part (ii).
Corollary 3. Let v be a big boss game on N and let y = (yk)k∈N ∈ Rn. Then
y ∈ Core(v) iﬀ y(N) = v(N) and πv(y) = 0 iﬀ y(N) = v(N) and 0 ≤ yi ≤ bvi for
all i ∈ N\{1}.
Theorem 4. Let v be a clan game on N, say coalition T ⊆ N with at least two
players is the clan. and we study the indirect function of this game with respect to
the following four types of vector, given y ∈ Rn.
Type 1: yi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N and yi ≤ bvi for all i ∈ N\T .
Type 2: There exists a unique  ∈ N\T with y > bv ≥ 0, yi ≤ bvi for all i ∈ N\T ,
i =  , and yi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N .
Type 3: There exists a unique  ∈ N with y < 0, yi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N\{ }, and
yi ≤ bvi for all i ∈ N\T .
Type 4: There exist unique j ∈ N ,  ∈ N\T with yj < 0, yi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N\{j},
and y > bv ≥ 0, yi ≤ bvi for all i ∈ N\T , i =  .
Then its indirect function πv : RN → R satisﬁes the following properties:
(i)πv(y) = max
[
0, v(N)−
∑
k∈N
yk
]
for vectors of type 1.
(ii)πv(y) = max
[
0, v(N\{ })−
∑
k∈N\{}
yk
]
= max
[
0, v(N)−
∑
k∈N
yk + y − bv
]
for vectors of type 2.
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(iii)πv(y) = max
[
−y, v(N)−
∑
k∈N
yk
]
for vectors of type 3.
(iv)πv(y) = max
[
−yj, v(N\{ })−
∑
k∈N\{}
yk
]
= max
[
−yj, v(N)−
∑
k∈N
yk + y − bv
]
for vectors of type 4.
The proof of Theorem 4 is similar as the proof of Theorem 3 and is left to the
reader.
Corollary 4. Let v be a clan game with coalition T ⊆ N as the clan and let y =
(yk)k∈N ∈ Rn. Then y ∈ Core(v) iﬀ y(N) = v(N) and πv(y) = 0 iﬀ y(N) = v(N)
and yi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N and yi ≤ bvi for all i ∈ N\T .
Finally, we remark that a geometrical characterization of a clan game, say with
coalition T ⊆ N as the clan, is shown in (Branzei et al., 2008, page 60) requiring
that v(N)·ej ∈ Core(v) for all j ∈ T and there exists x ∈ Core(v) such that xi = bvi
for all i ∈ N\T .
3. Solving the pre-kernel by means of the indirect function
In this section, we characterize the pre-kernel of a game on N by the evaluation of the
indirect function of the game at pairwise bargaining ranges arising from the payoﬀ
vector involved. Formally, for every pair of players i, j ∈ N, i = j, the surplus svij(y)
of player i against player j at the (salary) vector y in the game v on N is given by
the maximal excess among coalitions containing player i, but not containing player
j. That is,
Deﬁnition 4. Let v be a game on N and y = (yk)k∈N ∈ RN .
(i) For every pair of players i, j ∈ N , i = j, the surplus svij(y) of player i against
player j at the (salary) vector y in the game v is given by
svij(y) = max
[
ev(S, y)| S ⊆ N, i ∈ S, j ∈ S
]
(9)
(ii) The pre-kernel K∗(v) of the game v consist of eﬃcient salary vectors of which
all the pairwise surpluses are in equilibrium, that is (Maschler et al., 1979)
K∗(v) = {y ∈ RN |ev(N, y) = 0, svij(y) = svji(y) for all i, j ∈ N , i = j.} (10)
For the alternative description of the pre-kernel, with every payoﬀ vector x =
(xk)k∈N ∈ RN , every pair of players i, j ∈ N , i = j, and every transfer amount
δ ≥ 0 from player i to player j, there is associated the modiﬁed payoﬀ vector
xijδ = (xijδk )k∈N ∈ RN deﬁned by xijδi = xi − δ, xijδj = xj + δ, and xijδk = xk for all
k ∈ N\{i, j}.
Theorem 5. Let v be a game on N and x = (xk)k∈N ∈ RN satisfying the eﬃciency
principle x(N) = v(N).
(i) For every pair of players i, j ∈ N , i = j, the indirect function πv : RN → R
satisﬁes πv(xijδ) = svij(x) + δ, provided δ ≥ 0 is suﬃciently large.
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(ii) x ∈ K∗(v) if and only if the evaluation of the pariwise bargaining ranges arising
from x through the indirect function are in equilibrium, that is, for every pair
of players i, j ∈ N , i = j, the indirect function satisﬁes πv(xijδ) = πv(xjiδ) for
δ suﬃciently large.
Proof. Fix the pair of players i, j ∈ N , i = j. Firstly, we claim that coalitions not
containing player i or containing player j are redundant for maximizing the excesses
at the modiﬁed payoﬀ vector xijδ , provided the transfer amount δ ≥ 0 is suﬃciently
large. For that purpose, for all coalitions S ⊆ N\{i}, T ⊆ N\{j}, note the following
two equivalences:
v(S ∪ {i})−
∑
k∈S∪{i}
xijδk ≥ v(S)−
∑
k∈S
xijδk iﬀ δ ≥ v(S)− v(S ∪ {i}) + xi (11)
v(T ∪ {j})−
∑
k∈T∪{j}
xijδk ≤ v(T )−
∑
k∈T
xijδk iﬀ δ ≥ v(T ∪ {j})− v(T )− xj (12)
From (1) and (11)–(12) respectively, we derive that
πv(xijδ) = max
S⊆N
[
v(S)−
∑
k∈S
xijδk
]
= max
S⊆N,
i∈S, j ∈S
[
v(S)−
∑
k∈S
xijδk
]
(13)
where the choice of δ can be improved by
δ ≥ max
[
max
S⊆N\{i}
|v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)− xi|, max
T⊆N\{j}
|v(T ∪ {j})− v(T )− xj |
]
because of |α| ≥ α as well as |α| ≥ −α for all α ∈ R. Finally, from (13), xijδi = xi−δ,
and (9) respectively, we conclude that, for δ ≥ 0 suﬃciently large, the following chain
of equalities holds:
πv(xijδ) = max
S⊆N,
i∈S, j ∈S
[
v(S)−
∑
k∈S
xijδk
]
= max
S⊆N,
i∈S, j ∈S
[
v(S)−
∑
k∈S
xk
]
+ δ = svij(x) + δ
This proves part (i). Together with (10), part (ii) follows immediately.
4. Remarks about determination of the nucleolus
The aim of this section is to illustrate the signiﬁcant role of the indirect function
for three classes of games (1-convex, 2-convex and clan games) to determine its
nucleolus through a uniform approach replacing its original computation approach.
Under these circumstances, the nucleolus belongs always to the pre-kernel, and so
it is suﬃcient to solve the system for its unique solution. Thus we avoid the formal
deﬁnition of the nucleolus.
Remark 1. Suppose the game v on N is 1-convex. For every payoﬀ vector x =
(xk)k∈N ∈ RN satisfying the eﬃciency principle x(N) = v(N) as well as x ≤ b
v
,
and for every pair of players i, j ∈ N , i = j, the evaluation of the indirect function
πv : RN → R at the tail of the bargaining range described by the corresponding
modiﬁed payoﬀ vector xijδ is in accordance with Theorem 1(i)–(ii) dependent on
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the size of its j-th component xijδj = xj + δ in comparison to player j-th marginal
beneﬁt bvj . From the explicit formula for the indirect function of 1-convex games,
we conclude the following:
πv(xijδ) = 0 if xijδj ≤ bvj , that is δ ≤ bvj − xj
πv(xijδ) = max
[
0, xijδj − bvj
]
= xj + δ − bvj > 0 otherwise
For suﬃciently large δ, the equilibrium condition πv(xijδ) = πv(xjiδ) is met if
and only if xj + δ− bvj = xi+ δ− bvi , that is xj − bvj = xi− bvi for all i = j. Together
with the eﬃciency principle x(N) = v(N), the unique solution of this system of
linear equations is given by
xi = b
v
i −
α
n
for all i ∈ N , where α = bv(N)− v(N) ≥ 0
The latter solution is known as the nucleolus and turns out to coincide with the
gravity of the core being the convex hull of n extreme points of the form bv −α ·ei,
i ∈ N . Here {e1, e2, . . . , en} denotes the standard basis of Rn.
We consider once again the 3-person game of the Example 1 in order to illustrate
Remark 1 and Theorem 5. Let payoﬀ vector x satisfy x(N) = v(N) = 10 as well
as x ≤ bv = (3, 4, 6). From Remark 1, we obtain that πv(xijδ) = xj + δ − bvj ,
πv(xjiδ) = xi + δ − bvi for suﬃciently large δ. By Theorem 5(ii), it holds that
x ∈ K∗(v) iﬀ πv(xijδ) = πv(xjiδ) for δ suﬃciently large. Thus, x ∈ K∗(v) iﬀ
xj + δ− bvj = xi+ δ− bvi and due to eﬃciency, the nucleolus is given by x = (2, 3, 5).
Remark 2. Suppose the game v on N is a big boss game, with player 1 as the big
boss. For every payoﬀ vector x = (xk)k∈N ∈ RN satisfying the eﬃciency principle
x(N) = v(N) as well as 0 ≤ xk ≤ bvk for all k ∈ N\{1}, and for every pair of
players i, j ∈ N , i = j, the evaluation of the indirect function πv : RN → R at
the tail of the bargaining range described by the corresponding modiﬁed payoﬀ
vector xjδ is in accordance with Theorem 3(i)–(iv) dependent on the size of its
j-th component xjδj = xj − δ in comparison to the zero level as well as its  -th
component xjδ = x + δ in comparison to player  -th marginal beneﬁt b
v
 . From
the explicit formula for the indirect function of big boss games, we conclude the
following: for {j,  } ⊆ N\{1}, and for δ ≥ 0 suﬃciently large
πv(xjδ) = max
[
−(xj − δ), (x + δ)− bv
]
= δ −min
[
xj , b
v
 − x
]
πv(x1δ) = max
[
0, (x + δ)− bv
]
= δ + x − bv
πv(x1δ) = max
[
0, −(x − δ)
]
= δ − x
For all  ∈ N\{1} and suﬃciently large δ, the equilibrium condition
πv(x1δ) = πv(x1δ) is met if and only if x− bv = −x, that is x = b
v

2 for all  = 1.
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Further, the equilibrium condition πv(xjδ) = πv(xjδ) for any pair {j,  } ⊆ N\{1}
is given by
min
[
xj , b
v
 − x
]
= min
[
x, b
v
j − xj
]
equalities which are satisﬁed trivially.
Remark 3. Suppose the game v on N is a clan game, say coalition T ⊆ N with at
least two players is the clan. From the explicit formula for the indirect function of
clan games, as presented in Theorem 4 (ii)–(iv), we conclude that, for δ ≥ 0 suﬃ-
ciently large, the equilibrium condition πv(xijδ) = πv(xjiδ) reduces to the following
system of equations: xi = xj for all i, j ∈ T , and
xi = min
[
bvi − xi, xj
]
whenever i ∈ T , j ∈ T
min
[
bvj − xj , xi
]
= min
[
bvi − xi, xj
]
whenever i, j ∈ T
In summary, the unique solution is a so-called constrained equal reward rule of
the form xi = λ for all i ∈ T and xi = min
[
λ,
bvi
2
]
for all i ∈ N\T , where the
parameter λ ∈ R is determined by the eﬃciency condition x(N) = v(N).
Remark 4. Suppose the game v on N is 2-convex. From the explicit formula for
the indirect function of 2-convex n-person games, as presented in Theorem 2(iv),
we conclude that, for δ ≥ 0 suﬃciently large, the equilibrium condition πv(xjδ) =
πv(xjδ) reduces to the following system of equations: for every pair of players
j,  ∈ N , j =  ,
min
[
bv − x, xj − v({j})
]
= min
[
bvj − xj , x − v({ })
]
As shown in (Driessen and Hou, 2010), the unique solution is of the parametric
form xi = v({i})+min
[
μ,
bvi−v({i})
2
]
for all i ∈ N , where the parameter μ ∈ R is
determined by the eﬃciency condition x(N) = v(N).
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Abstract In present article are considered the models explaining the mech-
anisms of emergence and development of situations, in which it is appropriate
for economic agents to collaborate and act together despite of having inde-
pendent goals. The main attention is concentrated to diﬀerent approaches to
deﬁnition of concept of equilibrium for model of collaboration of two agents.
The work is devoted to problems in the study of economic instruments,
inducing the agents, which initially have independent and uncoordinated
systems of goals to commission any beneﬁcial actions. Particularly, we con-
sider an interaction of economic agents when each of them may take the
actions, that bring beneﬁt to other. Stimulus to "positive" behavior each
agent is a waiting counter actions, that will be useful for him. To identify
this class of situations it is proposed to use the term "collaboration". In a
model of collaboration between two economic agents is proposed version to
express of mixed strategies of players in the form of continuous distribution,
which enabled us to formulate two alternative approaches of equilibrium:
based on the criterion of minimizing variance of utility of participants and
based on the criterion of minimizing of VaR.
Keywords: Game theory, collaboration, Nash equilibrium, value at risk
(VaR), quantile.
Models that explain the mechanisms of emergence and situation development, in
which it is appropriate for economic agents to collaborate and act together despite
of having independent goals have become rather interesting in both theoretical
and application way. An interaction of economic agents, where each of them takes
actions that bring direct beneﬁt not only to him but to other agents, can serve as
the simplest example. An expectation of a beneﬁcial counter action is an incentive
for each agent to behave in this way. The most important diﬀerence between this
behavior model from the "classical" models of rational economic agent’s utility
optimization is that here the utility of each agent depends directly on decisions
made by others, whom he can indirectly inﬂuence.
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We deﬁne such examples of agents’ interaction with the term "collaboration".
We could as well use the "indication" collaboration for that. On the other hand,
such deﬁnition could create false associations with models based on cooperative
games, also a further framework of the proposed model is solely based on a strategy
game with complete information.
The main problem which is considered in this article is to present one possible
approach based on the methods of modern game theory, which makes us able to
describe and explain the mechanisms of collaborative relations between economic
agents.
Obviously collaboration (in the context in which we agreed to consider it) and
related issues may arise, for example, between the parties of public and private
partnership, alongside with major investment projects or diﬀerent schemes of ﬁ-
nancing from various levels of budget sources. Moreover, such models can also be
useful in situations that go beyond "pure" economics. For instance, they can be
applied to studies of intergovernmental negotiation processes aimed at achievement
of agreements, which will complexly take both economic and political interests of
the parties into account.
We will consider a simpliﬁed situation in order to explain the fundamental ideas
of the proposed model. It describes interaction between two parties (agents, par-
ticipants, players) i ∈ I = {1, 2}, who make a decision upon the value of their
own contribution to some common project. This contribution (degree) is quantita-
tively characterized by some arbitrary value from 0 to 1: where "0" stands for lack
of aﬃrmative action in the project (non-collaboration, extremely selﬁsh behavior,
etc.), and "1" reﬂects the highest possible level of aﬃrmative action (the maximum
propensity to collaborate, ultimately constructive behavior).
If we take into consideration previously set objectives when we deﬁne the utility
functions of players, we assume that the input (costs) performed by the agents
reduce utility they can get, utility can increase due to inputs of his opponents. Linear
relations are acceptable in model, because they reﬂect adequately its fundamental
properties. So we deﬁne the utility function of the ﬁrst player, as
u1(x1, x2) = b1x2 − a1x1 (1)
and the utility function of the second player as
u2(x1, x2) = b2x1 − a2x2 (2)
Accordingly, a is a value (score, a measure of regret) of a resource unit spent
(invested in the project) by the player i and b is utility (eﬀect, measure of satis-
faction) for the i–th player, which he gets from a unit invested in the project by
another party. Let’s imaging such a situation as "classical" ﬁnite non-cooperative
two-person game. We face the fact that it has an obvious Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies
x∗1 = 0, x
∗
2 = 0. (3)
Obviously our productivity functions are arranged in such a way (see Fig.2) that
the best response of the ﬁrst player to any second player’s strategy will be to reduce
his share of participation to zero.
max
x1∈[0,1]
{u1(x1, x2)} = u1(0, x2), ∀x2 ∈ [0, 1] (4)
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Fig. 1: Productivity functions
max
x2∈[0,1]
{u2(x1, x2)} = u2(x1, 0), ∀x1 ∈ [0, 1] (5)
Thus, if we follow the concept of Nash equilibrium, we arrive to a pessimistic
conclusion that the model described in the framework of collaboration between the
players would not happen (the most stable situation is "mutual self–interest"). In
this context, this is a particular interest to study modiﬁcations of this model in
order to explain the mechanisms, which lead to the emergence of a collaborative
relationship (collaboration) between economic agents.
First of all we concentrate on the approaches associated with transition from
the original game to its mixed extension. Due to the fact that this scenario is based
on a continuous set of pure strategies of the players, it seems obvious to set their
mixed strategies as probability distributions with densities p1(x1) and p2(x2) on
the interval [0, 1], see Fig.7. According to this suggestion, a particular choice of
strategies by players in a particular round of the game can be interpreted as an
implementation of independent random variables x˜1 and x˜2.
Fig. 2: Mixed strategies densities
This idea of mixed strategies of the players is a generalization of the "traditional"
deﬁnition of mixed strategies in matrix and bimatrix games, which can be deﬁned
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as a likelihood (p1, . . . , pk, . . .) in accordance with every player implement one or
another pure strategy. To follow this logic, we would have had to sample the intervals
[0, 1] in order to bring in traditional "discontinuous" mixed strategies. This method,
however, seems to be not enough justiﬁed and reasonable in terms of reﬂecting the
economic realities.
When mixed strategies are deﬁned in the form of continuous distributions, a
player’s strategic choice is generally reduced to the choice of parameters of these
distributions. Due to the fact that the number of parameters in diﬀerent probability
distributions classes is diﬀerent, we come to a conclusion that deﬁnition of the play-
ers’ strategies within the stated model will vary according to the type of distribution
p1(x) or p2(x) we’ve chosen. Actually the value of strategies chosen by the partici-
pants in each act of the game can be viewed as a realization of independent random
variables x˜1, x˜2, whose densities are known; and utilities u1(x˜1, x˜2), u2(x˜1, x˜2) are
determined as functions of random variables, which characteristics, generally spo-
ken, can be determined with the help of p1(x), p2(x).
We should note that speciﬁcation of participants’ strategic choices in the form
of continuous probability distributions can be justiﬁed by the theory of evolution-
ary games. Namely, we can assume that we have a community consisting of groups
(populations). Diﬀerent populations of players have diﬀerent tendencies to collabo-
rate (collaborative behavior). These tendencies are realizations of random variables
x˜i with densities pi(x). When members of diﬀerent populations confront in some
acts of the game, their success (or lack of success) can be expressed in terms of util-
ity u˜i. After that evolution of stochastic characteristics of propensity to cooperate
takes place and these indicators reach some "benchmark" stable states, based on
the experience accumulated by populations.
Of course if the strategies of participants are determined with continuous proba-
bility distributions, we can only compare them correctly if function pi(x) is restricted
by some single parametric class Pi. In this case, parameters of density functions
pi(x) become "obvious" characteristics of strategies. Accordingly, the set of possible
situations in a game is deﬁned by the set of all possible combinations pi(x) of all
players.
In terms of the classical Nash approach (Vorobiev, 1984), (Vorobiev, 1985),
(Moulin, 1985), (Pecherskiy and Belyaeva, 2001) the equilibrium (solution) in of
the described model will be characterized by such joint choice of probability dis-
tributions (p∗1(x), p∗2(x)) from which every participant in the game would not be
advantageous to deviate separately from, i.e.:
E{u1(x˜1, x˜2) ‖ p∗1(x), p∗2(x)}  E{u1(x˜1, x˜2) ‖ p1(x), p∗2(x)} (6)
E{u1(x˜1, x˜2) ‖ p∗1(x), p∗2(x)}  E{u1(x˜1, x˜2) ‖ p∗1(x), p2(x)} (7)
for every p1(x) ∈ P1, p2(x) ∈ P2, where E{ui(x˜1, x˜2) ‖ p1(x), p2(x)} is expected
value of ui(x˜1, x˜2), calculated in the assumption that distribution x˜1 is determined
by the density function p1(x) and distribution x˜2 by the density function p2(x).
Since a randomized model is being described, we cannot deny admissibility and
validity of alternative approaches, which determine the equilibrium conditions with
respect to other criteria. Particularly, they may be:
– minimization of variances of players’ utilities (perhaps with additional restric-
tions on the lower levels, below which the utility expectation value cannot go);
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– minimization of α–quintile values of players’ utility function distributions, that
is, below which the value of the utility will not fall with a probability 1− α.
1. Equilibrium based on minimization of utility variance
Let us consider the ﬁrst mentioned approach in details. To some extent, the ideas of
this approach are similar to the ideas in the Markowitz model of portfolio selection
that minimizes risk (Binmore, 1987), (Binmore, 1988), (Cheon, 2003). In this case,
we may assume that equilibrium in this model will be characterized by such joint
selection of probability distributions p∗1(x) ∈ P1 and p∗2(x) ∈ P2, which will provide
us with conditions fulﬁlled:
D{u1(x˜1, x˜2) ‖ p∗1(x), p∗2(x)}  D{u1(x˜1, x˜2) ‖ p1(x), p∗2(x)} (8)
D{u1(x˜1, x˜2) ‖ p∗1(x), p∗2(x)}  D{u1(x˜1, x˜2) ‖ p∗1(x), p2(x)} (9)
D{u1(x˜1, x˜2) ‖ p1(x), p2(x)} — variance of u1(x˜1, x˜2), calculated in assumption
that distribution of x˜1 is determined by a density function p1(x), and distribution
of x˜2 is determined by a density function p2(x).
In other words, conditions (8)–(9) deﬁne the situation, in which participants
make an attempts to deviate from, taken by one or another party on an individual
basis, lead to an increase in the risk. Variance is used as a measure of risk. A "weak"
point of this approach in determination of equilibrium is connected with the fact,
that minimal risks can be achieved at an unacceptably low expected utility values.
This, in turn, can be "corrected" by introducing a concept of conditional equilib-
rium, under which one can understand a joint choice of probability distributions
p∗1(x) ∈ P1 and p∗2(x) ∈ P2, which provides fulﬁllment of conditions (8)–(9), as well
as conditions
E{u1(x˜1, x˜2) ‖ p1(x), p2(x)}  u¯i, i = {1, 2} (10)
where u¯i are lower bounds on acceptable levels of expected utility of participants.
Subsequent development of the approach (8)–(9) is clearly possible under condition
that we specify classes of possible distributions pi(xi). We should note that this step
is substantial, moreover, it can be critical to the prospects of using this model.
Based on the general properties of solutions, which are made by real economic
agents and concern issues of mutual collaboration, we can use an asymmetric tri-
angular distribution for modeling the behavior of variables x˜i, see Fig. 71. On the
interval [0, 1] densities of asymmetric triangular distributions are uniquely deter-
mined by the choice of parameter m — the point of mode. It is known that an
arbitrary random variable distributed in an asymmetric triangular law on the in-
terval [0, 1] has expected value
Ex˜ =
1
3
(m+ 1) (11)
and variance
Dx˜ =
1
18
(m2 −m+ 1). (12)
1 The distribution which is used here is a generalization of an asymmetric triangular
distribution (Simpson’s Distribution)
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On the basis of (11) and (12) we can obtain an expression for expectation of utility
functions of players (1) — (2), considering them after the transition to the mixed
extension of the game as functions of random variables x˜1, x˜2:
E{u1(x˜1, x˜2)} = E{b1x˜2 − a1x˜1} = 1
3
[b1(m2 + 1)− a1(m1 + 1)], (13)
E{u2(x˜1, x˜2)} = E{b2x˜1 − a2x˜2} = 1
3
[b2(m1 + 1)− a2(m2 + 1)], (14)
and their variances as well
D{u1(x˜1, x˜2)} = D{b1x˜2 − a1x˜1} = b21Dx˜2 + a21Dx˜1 = (15)
=
b21
18
[m22 −m2 + 1] +
a21
18
[m21 −m1 + 1],
D{u2(x˜1, x˜2)} = D{b2x˜1 − a2x˜2} = b22Dx˜1 + a22Dx˜2 = (16)
=
b22
18
[m21 −m1 + 1] +
a22
18
[m22 −m2 + 1],
Having (15) and (16) we derive that D{u1(x˜1, x˜2)} and D{u2(x˜1, x˜2)} are convex
quadratic functions of parametersm1 andm2, and, consequently, they reach a global
extremum at the point
(m∗1,m
∗
2) = (
1
2
,
1
2
), (17)
which determines the state of equilibrium in the sense of (8) — (9) for a model
of collaboration. Thus, a situation of mutual stability (in terms of minimization
of risk criterion) in models constructed on basis of triangular distributions occurs
when players choose their strategies relying on symmetric triangular distributions.
This reﬂects the advantage of behavior based on the "golden mean" between ex-
treme selﬁshness and willingness to maximize collaboration. If guided by the con-
cept of conditional equilibrium (8) — (10), the global minimum point of variances
D{ui(x˜1, x˜2)} (17) may be outside of set of valid values m1,m2, deﬁned by condi-
tions {
−a1m1 + b1m2  3u¯1 − (b1 − a1)
b2m1 − a2m2  3u¯2 − (b2 − a2)
In this case, the procedure of ﬁnding conditional equilibrium in the sense of (8)
— (10) reduces to solving a series of quadratic programming problems. Of course,
the hypothesis, that values x˜i are distributed under the triangular law, cannot be
regarded as an assumption which has non-alternative beneﬁts. Other interesting and
meaningful results for this model can also be obtained for the distributions of other
classes. In particular, let us consider the model of collaboration, which is based on
the assumption that the distribution of values x˜i is exponential2 with parameters
λi, i.e.
pi(x) = λie
−λixi
If we compare modiﬁcations of densities of triangular and exponential distribu-
tions, it is easy to see that the latter reﬂects the situation of initially low "propensity
2 Obviously, in this case we assume the possibility of expanding the domain of xi on the
whole positive axle shaft, provided that the probability of x˜i > 1 is close to zero.
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to collaborate" of the economic agents more appropriately, see Fig. 3.One can also
note that gamma distribution can be used for more ﬂexible modeling of "propensity
of players to collaborate" ratios.
Fig. 3: Exponential, gamma and triangular distributions
If x˜i are exponentially distributed then the expected utilities of players will be
E{u1(x˜1, x˜2)} = E{−a1x˜1 + b1x˜2} = −a1
λ1
+
b1
λ2
, (18)
E{u2(x˜1, x˜2)} = E{b2x˜1 − a2x˜2} = b2
λ1
− a2
λ2
(19)
In accordance with the formula for adding the variances of independent random
variables, the dispersion of the utility can be expressed as
D{u1(x˜1, x˜2)} =
(
a1
λ1
)2
+
(
b1
λ2
)2
(20)
D{u2(x˜1, x˜2)} =
(
b2
λ1
)2
+
(
a2
λ2
)2
(21)
As appears from (21) — (22) functions D{ui(x˜1, x˜2)} have obvious inﬁmums equal
to 0, when λ1 → ∞, λ2 → ∞. This means nothing more than a repetition of
"pessimistic outcome", which has been obtained earlier: the variance for exponential
distributions will be as smaller, as closer they are concentrated near xi = 0, which
corresponds to a situation of lack of collaboration.
The above considerations are valid if x˜i are gamma distributed with some pa-
rameters κi, λi .This follows directly from the form of expectation and variance for
the corresponding random variables.
Ex˜i =
κi
λi
, Dx˜i =
κi
λ2i
2. Equilibrium based on the criterion of minimizing VaR utility
Let us now consider a speciﬁc approach, where players make choice about appropri-
ate degrees of collaboration taking distribution of their utility function utility into
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consideration, i.e.
Fu1(x˜1,x˜2)(u) = P{u1(x˜1, x˜2)  u}
and
Fu2(x˜1,x˜2)(u) = P{u2(x˜1, x˜2)  u}
A similar approach can be considered as an analogue of the concept of value at
risk (VaR), which is widely used in modern risk management. The behavior of
the utility distribution function of a player i is a function of independent random
variables x˜1, x˜2 in this model. It is presented on Fig. 8. Taking into consideration
(1) and (2) we can note that for xi ∈ [0, 1]ui ∈ [−ai, bi], and consequently
Fig. 4.
At the same time the choice of speciﬁc parameter values for p1(x) and p2(x)
determines how function Fui(x˜1,x˜2)(u) will increase on the interval [−ai, bi]. Thus,
for the same level of probability quantiles of the distribution function
u(α) = F−1ui(x˜1,x˜2)(α, p1(x), p2(x))
depends on the choice of parameters of probability distributions (densities p1(x)
and p2(x)) of random variables x˜1, x˜2. As we can see from Fig. 8,
u(1)(α) < u(2)(α),
i.e. α–quantile of the distribution function of the ﬁrst player’s utility , which we
get from densities p(1)1 (x) and p
(1)
2 (x), is lower than the one corresponding densities
p
(2)
1 (x) and p
(2)
2 (x). Thus, for the ﬁrst player a strategic option deﬁned by p
(2)
1 (x) and
p
(2)
2 (x) is preferred, since its threshold below which his utility ui(x˜1, x˜2) wouldn’t
drop will be higher with probability 1− α.
In this particular approach, the equilibrium in the model of collaboration
can be deﬁned as a set of probability distributions (p∗1(x), p∗2(x)) of some
parametric classes P1 and P2, which deﬁne strategies of participants which
satisfy the following conditions (with a given level of probability α and
any other probability distributions (p1(x) ∈ P1 and (p2(x) ∈ P2)
F−1u1(x˜1,x˜2)(α, p
∗
1(x), p
∗
2(x))  F−1u1(x˜1,x˜2)(α, p1(x), p
∗
2(x)) (22)
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F−1u2(x˜1,x˜2)(α, p
∗
1(x), p
∗
2(x))  F−1u2(x˜1,x˜2)(α, p
∗
1(x), p2(x)) (23)
We will now pay a little bit more attention to usage of the following approach in
a case when pi(x) determine random variables x˜i, which are distributed under the
asymmetric triangular law. As it has been already noted, the choice of the actual
density pi(x) is uniquely connected to the choice of parameter mi, which is a mode,
and therefore we can consider players’ utility distribution functions ui(x˜1, x˜2) as
function of m1 and m2 using the notation Fui(x˜1,x˜2)(u,m1,m2). We should pay our
attention to the fact that even with such a simple functional form of density in
the case of an asymmetric triangular distribution, functions Fui(x˜1,x˜2)(u,m1,m2)
do not have a "compact" analytic expression. "Method" of ﬁnding the value of
Fu1(x˜1,x˜2)(u,m1,m2) having a particular value for u¯1 is shown on Fig. 2.. There is
evident from Fig.5, in order to ﬁnd the value
Fu1(x˜1,x˜2)(u¯1,m1,m2) = P{u1(x˜1, x˜2)  u¯1 = −a1x1 + b1x2}
we should calculate the sum FI + FII + FIII + FIV , where
FI =
m1∫
0
2x1
m1
⎡⎢⎢⎣
min
{
u¯1+a1x1
b1
;m2
}∫
0
2x2
m2
dx2
⎤⎥⎥⎦ dx1,
FII =
1∫
m1
2x1 − 2
m1 − 1
⎡⎣ m2∫
0
2x2
m2
dx2
⎤⎦ dx1,
FIII =
m1∫
b1m2−u¯1
a1
2x1
m1
⎡⎢⎢⎣
u¯1+a1x1
b1∫
m2
2x2
m2 − 1dx2
⎤⎥⎥⎦ dx1,
FIV =
1∫
m1
2x1 − 1
m1 − 1
⎡⎢⎢⎣
u¯1+a1x1
b1∫
m2
2x2 − 2
m2 − 1 dx2
⎤⎥⎥⎦ dx1,
Thus, in order to ﬁnd the values of distribution functions Fui(x˜1,x˜2)(u,m1,m2) for
arbitrary u ∈ [−ai, bi] we will only have to consider all possible situations of geom-
etry of line ui(x1, x2) and point (m1,m2).
In spite of "bad" analytical properties of functions Fui(x˜1,x˜2)(u,m1,m2) we
are able to describe their behavior with appropriate accuracy by using numeri-
cal methods for speciﬁc ai and bi. In particular the results of numerical model-
ing of function Fu1(x˜1,x˜2)(u,m1,m2) with the help of MathCAD software tools for
a1 = 1, b1 = 2, m2 = 0.8 are shown on Fig. 2.. In other words, in a situation
where the ﬁrst player gives value to the actions of a second player twice as much as
his own costs and the strategy of a second player is determined by the asymmet-
ric triangular distribution with mode equal to 0.8. Fig. 2. depicts graphics of the
ﬁrst player’s utility distribution function for cases when his strategy is determined
by the asymmetric triangular distribution with mode m(1)1 = 0.2 (line FI_1) and
m
(2)
1 = 0.8 (line FI_2).
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Fig. 5.
As follows from geometry of quantile lines for a level of probability α the quan-
tiles found with respect to the distribution function FI_2 will be less than quantiles
found in respect to the distribution function FI_1. Thus in these conditions when
the second player chooses the level of collaboration equal to m(2)1 = 0.8, it is prefer-
able for the ﬁrst player to choose the higher level of collaboration m(2)1 = 0.8, not
m
(1)
1 = 0.2, which would mean more egoistic type of behavior.
In particular - actual values.
Fig. 6.
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It should be admitted that from a mathematical point of view, we should modify
the criterion function in respect to which the equilibrium conditions are determined
in order to abandon the situation of a non-constructive equilibrium in the proposed
model. Roughly speaking, if the players evaluate their results depending on the
utility (or expected utility), then situation of non–collaboration becomes stable. At
the same time, if they apply diﬀerent criteria (variance, measure of risk, or VaR
utility), the situation of collaboration is preferable.
This is what gives the approaches considered above an added signiﬁcance in
terms of economic meaning. In particular, applying them, we can form the principles
of construction and maintenance of mechanisms for collaboration in situations that
are initially characterized with selﬁsh behavior of the parties.
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Abstract We investigate a noncooperative diﬀerential game with two play-
ers. Each player has his own random terminal time. After the ﬁrst player
leaves the game, the remaining one continues and gets the ﬁnal reward for
winning. An example is introduced where two ﬁrms compete in extracting
a unique nonrenewable resource over time. The optimal feedback strategy,
i.e. the optimal extraction rate, is calculated in a closed form.
Keywords:Diﬀerential game, random terminal time, Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
equation
1. Introduction
In the last decades many economic models have been investigated with the precious
help of the tools provided by diﬀerential game theory (see Dockner et al., 2000,
Jørgensen and Zaccour, 2007). Both deterministic and stochastic approaches have
been widely developed in a wide range of diﬀerent frameworks.
This paper aims to analyze a class of models of diﬀerential games with 2 players.
In particular, we consider a framework where the terminal instants of the game are
random variables having diﬀerent cumulative distribution functions. The ﬁrst player
which stops the game is the loser, whereas the remaining player gets a terminal
reward and keeps playing. In this case the game collapses into a optimal control
problem.
We are going to fully characterize the structure of the game and to determine
its dynamic equilibrium structure. Finally, we will feature an example which is a
modiﬁcation of the standard model of extraction (see Rubio, 2006), with linear
state dynamics and a logarithmic payoﬀ structure. It will be completely discussed
and its optimal feedback solution will be exhibited.
2. Game Formulation
There are two players which participate in diﬀerential game Γ (t0, x0). The game
Γ (x0) with dynamics
x˙ = g(t, x, u1, u2), x ∈ Rn, ui ∈ U ⊆ compRl, (1)
x(t0) = x0
starts from initial state x0 at the time instant t0. But here we suppose that each
player has a distinct terminal time. The payoﬀ of the game is composed of two com-
ponents: the integral payoﬀ achieved while playing, and the ﬁnal reward, assigned
to the player which stays alive after the retirement of its rival;
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Let T1 and T2 be the independent random variables denoting the respective
terminal instants of the players, and assume that their c.d.f. F1(·), F2(·) and their
p.d.f. f1(·) and f2(·) are known. Random variables aren’t bounded from above, i.e.
Tk ∈ [t0; +∞),
k = 1, 2.
Suppose, that for all feasible controls of players, participating the game, there
exists a continuous at least piecewise diﬀerentiable and extensible on [t0,∞) solution
of a Cauchy problem (1).
Denote the instantaneous payoﬀ of player i at the time τ , τ ∈ [t0,∞) by
hi(τ, x(τ), u1, u2), or brieﬂy hi(τ). Suppose, that for all feasible controls of play-
ers which participate the game, the instantaneous payoﬀ function of each player is
bounded, piecewise continuous function of time τ (piecewise continuity is treated
as following: function hi(τ) could have only ﬁnitely many point of discontinuity on
each interval [t0, t] and bounded on this interval).
Thereby, the function hi(τ) is Riemann integrable on every interval [t0, t], in
other words for every t ∈ [t0,∞) there exists an integral
t∫
t0
hi(τ)dτ .
So, we have that the expected integral payoﬀ of the player i can be represented
as the following mathematical expectation:
Ii(t0, x0, u1, u2) = E
[∫ min{T1,T2}
t0
hi(t)dt
]
, (2)
where E[·] is the mathematical expectation of a function of a random vector (T1, T2).
Moreover, we suppose that at the ﬁnal (random) moment of the game, if player
i is the only one remaining in the game, he receives the terminal payoﬀ Φi(x(T )),
where Φi(x(T )) are continuous functions on Rm. Then the expected terminal payoﬀ
of the player i can be evaluated as:
Si(t0, x0, u1, u2) = E
[
Φi(x(Tj))I[Ti>Tj ]
]
, (3)
where I[·] is the indicator function and E[·] is the mathematical expectation of a
function of a random vector (T1, T2).
Then the total expected payoﬀ of the player i is:
Ki(t0, x0, u1, u2) = E
[∫ min{T1,T2}
t0
hi(t)dt + Φi(x(T ))I[Ti>Tj ]
]
. (4)
3. Transformation of expected payoﬀ
The total expected payoﬀ (4) is diﬃcult to use in order to ﬁnd solutions of the
game. The standard methods of solution, such as Pontryagin’s maximum principle
or ﬁnding the solution of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equatoin, can not be applied.
We need to transform the payoﬀ (4) into the standard integral functional for inﬁnite-
horizon diﬀerential games.
3.1. Expected integral payoﬀ
At ﬁrst consider the expected integral payoﬀ (2). We could rewrite it in the following
form by the deﬁnition of mathematical expectation
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Ii(t0, x0, u1, u2) =
∫ ∫ min{τ1,τ2}
t0
hi(t)dt dFT1,T2(τ1, τ2), (5)
where FT1,T2(τ1, τ2) is the cumulative distribution function of the random vector
(T1, T2).
Consider the following function of the random vector:
T = min{T1, T2}.
Since the function min{} is a measurable function, then T is a random variable
(Borovkov, 1999). Denote by F (t) the cumulative distribution function of the ran-
dom variable T . Using the cumulative distribution functions of the random variables
T1, T2, we can write the expression for F (t) in an explicit
form (Kostyunin et al., 2011)
F (t) = 1− (1 − F1(t))(1 − F2(t))
Mathematical expectation (5) could be represented in the
equivalent form (Borovkov, 1999)
Ii(t0, x0, u1, u2) =
∫ ∫ τ
t0
hi(t)dt dF (τ).
Thus, we could consider the expected integral payoﬀ (5) as the mathematical
expectation of a function of a random variable T :
Ii(t0, x0, u1, u2) = E
[∫ T
t0
hi(t)dt
]
, (6)
where E[·] is the mathematical expectation of a function of a random variable
T .
If the instantaneous payoﬀ function is nonnegativehi(τ, x, u1, u2), ∀τ, x, u1, u2
then the following equality holds (Kostyunin and Shevkoplyas, 2011)
Ii(t0, x0, u1, u2) =
∞∫
t0
hi(τ)(1 − F (τ))dτ. (7)
If the instantaneous payoﬀ function does not satisfy the condition of nonnegativ-
ity, (7) holds if the following condition is satisﬁed (Kostyunin and Shevkoplyas, 2011)
lim
T→∞
(F (T )− 1)
T∫
t0
hi(t)dt = 0. (8)
Note, that for a nonnegative instantaneous payoﬀ function hi(t) the existence of
the integral in the right-hand side of (7) implies that (8) holds.
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3.2. Expected terminal payoﬀ
Consider the expected terminal payoﬀ (3)
Si(t0, x0, u1, u2) = E
[
Φi(x(Tj))I[Ti>Tj ]
]
,
The expectation in (3) could be expressed as the following Lebesgue-Stieltjes
integral:
E
[
Φi(x(Tj))I[Ti>Tj ]
]
=
∫
Φi(x(tj))I[ti>tj ]dFT1,T2(t1, t2). (9)
Suppose that the function Φi(x) satisﬁes the condition of nonnegativity. In this
case we can use the following theorem on iterated integrals (Borovkov, 1999)
Theorem 1 (Theorem on iterated integrals). For a Borel function g(x, y) ≥ 0,
and independent random variables ξ1 è ξ2:∫
g(x1, x2)dFξ1ξ2(x1, x2) =
∫ [∫
g(x1, x2)dFξ2 (x2)
]
dFξ1(x1).
Using this theorem, we obtain the following expression for (9)∫ +∞
t0
[∫ +∞
t0
Φi(x(tj))I[ti>tj ]dFi(ti)
]
dFj(tj).
Then we obtain∫ +∞
t0
[∫ tj
t0
Φi(x(tj))I[ti>tj ]dFi(ti) +
∫ +∞
tj
Φi(x(tj))I[ti>tj ]dFi(ti)
]
dFj(tj).
The ﬁrst term under the integral equals to zero. Further, we ﬁnd∫ +∞
t0
[∫ +∞
tj
Φi(x(tj))dFi(ti)
]
dFj(tj) =
∫ +∞
t0
[
Φi(x(tj))
∫ +∞
tj
fi(ti)dti
]
fj(tj)dtj .
Finally, we obtain an expression for the expectation in (3)
E
[
Φi(x(Tj))I[Ti>Tj ]
]
=
∫ +∞
t0
Φi(x(tj))(1 − Fi(tj))fj(tj)dtj . (10)
Then, the suﬃcient condition for total payoﬀ transformation is given by the
following propositions.
Proposition 1. If the instantaneous payoﬀ function and the terminal payment
function are nonnegative
hi(τ, x(τ), u1, u2) ≥ 0, Φi(x(t)) ≥ 0,
then the total expected payoﬀ of player i (4) could be written as
Ki(t0, x0, u1, u2) =
∫ ∞
t0
[hi(τ) (1− F (τ)) + Φi(x(τ))fj(τ)(1 − Fi(τ))] dτ. (11)
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Proposition 2. If the terminal payment function is nonnegative
Φi(x(t)) ≥ 0,
and the following condition is satisﬁed
lim
T→∞
(F (T )− 1)
T∫
t0
hi(t)dt = 0,
then the total expected payoﬀ of player i (4) could be written as (11).
4. Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
Let the game Γ (t0, x0) develops along the trajectory x(t). Then at the each time
instant t, t∈(t0;∞) players enter a new game (subgame) Γ (t, x(t)) with initial state
x(t) = x.
The expected payoﬀ for player i in this subgame is given by the following equa-
tion (Kostyunin et al., 2011)
Ki(t, x.u1, u2) =
1
(1− F1(t))(1 − F2(t))
+∞∫
t
[h∗i (τ) (1− F (τ)) + Φi(x∗(τ))fj(τ)(1 − Fi(τ))] dτ.
We denote by Wi(t, x) the i-th optimal value function of the problem starting at
t ∈ (0,+∞), with initial data x(t) = x. The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation has
the same form as in the case where the terminal instants of the players are bounded
from above (Kostyunin et al., 2011)
−∂Wi(t, x)
∂t
+Wi(t, x)
[
f1(t)
1− F1(t) +
f2(t)
1− F2(t)
]
=
max
ui
[hi(t, x, u1, u2) + Φi(x(t))
fj(t)
1 − Fj(t) +
∂Wi(t, x)
∂x
φ(t, x, u1, u2)]. (12)
4.1. Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation and hazard function
Let us remark that the term f(ϑ)1−F (ϑ) in the left-hand side of equation (12) is a well-
known function in mathematical reliability theory. It has a name of Hazard function
(or failure rate) with typical notation λ(ϑ)
λ(t) =
f(t)
1− F (t) . (13)
Using the deﬁnition of the Hazard function (13), we get the following form for
new Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (12):
−∂Wi(t, x)
∂t
+Wi(t, x) [λ1(t) + λ2(t)] =
max
ui
[hi(t, x, u1, u2) + Φi(x(t))λj(t) +
∂Wi(t, x)
∂x
φ(t, x, u1, u2)]. (14)
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4.2. Exponential distribution case
For exponential distribution of terminal instants F (t) = 1− e−λt, the Hazard func-
tion is constant: λ(t) = λ. So, inserting λi instead of λi(t) into (12), we easily get
the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for player i
−∂Wi(t, x)
∂t
+Wi(t, x) [λ1 + λ2] =
max
ui
[hi(t, x, u1, u2) + Φi(x(t))λj +
∂Wi(t, x)
∂x
φ(t, x, u1, u2)]. (15)
5. An example
Consider the following framework, borrowed from (Rubio, 2006) (Example 2.1) and
(Dockner et al., 2000) (Example 5.7) and modiﬁed with the above discount factor.
This example originally describes the joint exploitation of a pesticide, but its struc-
ture makes it suitable for our aim. Note that, in contrast to (Rubio, 2006), we
conﬁne our attention to the Nash equilibrium under simultaneous play, and we con-
sider the non-stationary feedback case, that is our optimal value function explicitly
depends on the initial instant t.
We ﬁx m = 1, i.e., a unique state variable x(t), denoting the amount of the
resource, whereas the i-th payoﬀ function explicitly depends on the rate of extraction
of the i-th player but not on the state variable:
hi(x(t), ui(t)) = lnui(t),
whereas the terminal payoﬀ is given by
Φi(x
∗(T )) = ci ln(x(Ti)).
Note that hi(·) is well-deﬁned and concave for ui > 0.
The transition function is linear and decreasing in the controls, so the dynamic
constraint is: {
x˙ = −u1 − u2
x(0) = x0 > 0
.
The kinematic equation ensures that the terminal payoﬀ is well-deﬁned in that the
resource cannot equal 0 in ﬁnite time.
Using the data of the above model, we obtain:
Wi(0, x0) = E
⎡⎣ Ti∫
0
lnu∗i dtI[Ti<Tj ] +
Tj∫
0
lnu∗i dtI[Ti>Tj ] + ci lnx(Tj)I[Ti>Tj ]
⎤⎦ .
The i-th optimal value function of the problem starting at t ∈ (0, ω), and with
initial condition x(t) = x, is given by:
Wi(t, x) =
1
(1− Fi(t))(1 − Fj(t))
ω∫
t
[lnu∗i (τ, x(τ)) (1− F (τ)) + ci lnx(τ)fj(τ)(1 − Fi(τ))] dτ.
(16)
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In compliance with the previous Section, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations
are given by:
−∂Wi(t, x)
∂t
+Wi(t, x) [λi(t) + λj(t)] =
max
ui
[
ln(ui) + ci lnx(t)λj(t)− ∂Wi(t, x)
∂x
(ui + u
∗
j)
]
. (17)
In order to explicitly determine the optimal strategy in the feedback Nash struc-
ture, we guess the following ansatz for the solution to (17):
Wi(t, x) = Ai(t) ln x+Bi(t),
where Ai(t) and Bi(t) are unknown functions of t, such that the following limits are
satisﬁed:
lim
t→ωAi(t) = 0, limt→ωBi(t) = 0. (18)
The relevant ﬁrst order partial derivatives to be employed in (17) are:
∂Wi(t, x)
∂t
= A˙i(t) lnx+ B˙i(t),
∂Wi(t, x)
∂x
=
Ai(t)
x
.
Maximizing the r.h.s. of (17) yields:
1
u∗i
− ∂Wi(t, x)
∂x
= 0 ⇐⇒ u∗i =
x
Ai(t)
.
Hence, plugging u∗i ,
∂Wi(t, x)
∂t
and
∂Wi(t, x)
∂x
into (17), we obtain the following
equation:
−A˙i(t) lnx− B˙i(t) + (Ai(t) lnx+Bi(t)) [λi(t) + λj(t)] =
ln
x
Ai(t)
+ ci lnxλj(t)− Ai(t)
x
(
x
Ai(t)
+
x
Aj(t)
)
. (19)
After collecting terms with and without lnx, we determine the following ODEs
for the time-dependent coeﬃcients of Wi(t, x):
−A˙i(t) +Ai(t) [λi(t) + λj(t)]− 1− ciλj(t) = 0, (20)
−B˙i(t) +Bi(t) [λi(t) + λj(t)] + lnAi(t) + 1 + Ai(t)
Aj(t)
= 0, (21)
composing a Cauchy problem endowed with the transversality conditions:
lim
t−→ωAi(t) = 0, limt−→ωBi(t) = 0. (22)
Proposition 3. The optimal feedback strategy for the i-th ﬁrm is given by:
u∗i (t, x) =
x∫ ω
t
(1 + ciλj(τ))e
− ∫ τ
t
(λi(θ)+λj(θ))dθdτ
. (23)
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Proof. We just consider the Cauchy problem in Ai(t), because the explicit calcu-
lation of Bi(t) can be avoided in that Bi(t) does not appear in the expression of
u∗i : {
A˙i(t) = Ai(t) [λi(t) + λj(t)]− 1− ciλj(t)
lim
t→ωAi(t) = 0
,
whose general solution is given by:
Ai(t) = e
∫ t
0
(λi(τ)+λj(τ))dτ
(
C −
∫ t
0
(1 + ciλj(τ))e
− ∫ τ
0
(λi(s)+λj(s))dsdτ
)
, (24)
where the constant C is determined by employing the transversality condition on
Ai(t):
C =
∫ ω
0
(1 + ciλj(τ))e
− ∫ τ
0
(λi(s)+λj(s))dsdτ,
leading to the solution:
A∗i (t) = e
∫
t
0
(λi(τ)+λj(τ))dτ
[∫ ω
t
(1 + ciλj(τ))e
− ∫ τ
0
(λi(s)+λj(s))dsdτ
]
. (25)
We can simplify:
A∗i (t) =
∫ ω
t
(1 + ciλj(τ))e
− ∫ τ
t
(λi(s)+λj(s))dsdτ. (26)
Finally, the expression of the optimal feedback strategy for the i-th ﬁrm can be
achieved from the FOCs of the model:
u∗i (t, x) =
x
A∗i (t)
=
x∫ ω
t
(1 + ciλj(τ))e
− ∫ τ
t
(λi(θ)+λj(θ))dθdτ
. (27)
As a further application, we can consider the circumstance where the two dis-
tributions of the ﬁrms are the standard exponential distributions, i.e.
fi(t; λi) =
{
λie
−λit, if t ≥ 0
0, if t < 0
,
whose means are respectively λ−11 , λ
−1
2 , both positive, with λ1 = λ2, ensuring
asymmetry.
In this case the hazard functions are constant, i.e. λ1(t) ≡ λ1 and λ2 ≡ λ2, then
substituting in (23) we obtain the two optimal feedback strategies:
u∗1(t, x) =
(λ1 + λ2)x
(1 + c1λ2)[1− e−(λ1+λ2)(ω−t)] , (28)
u∗2(t, x) =
(λ1 + λ2)x
(1 + c2λ1)[1− e−(λ1+λ2)(ω−t)] . (29)
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6. Concluding remarks
This paper intends to be a contribution to the literature of diﬀerential games in an
area which can be deﬁned as deterministic, but enriched with some stochastic ele-
ments. In particular, it is focused on the feature of extraction games that is deﬁnitely
realistic: the uncertainty about the terminal times of an extracting activity.
The dynamic feedback equilibrium structure has been determined and the spe-
ciﬁc technicalities of this setting have been pointed out. As an example, a model of
nonrenewable resource extraction with a logarithmic utility structure was examined
and solved in a closed form.
There exist some possible further extensions, also concerning the example we
developed. It would be interesting to check the speciﬁc optimal strategies in pres-
ence of more complex hazard functions (for example, the Weibull distribution) or
endowed with alternative payoﬀ structures. Another interesting development might
consist in considering a competition among more than 2 ﬁrms, having diﬀerent
terminal times.
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Abstract A game-theoretic model of territorial environmental production
under Cournot competition is studied. The process is modeled as cooperative
diﬀerential game with coalitional structure. The Nash equilibrium in the
game played by coalitions is computed and then the value of each coalition
is allocated according to some given mechanism between its members. The
numerical example is given.
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1. Introduction
A game-theoretic model of territorial environmental production is considered. The
model is based on the research of Petrosyan and Zaccour (2003). In the paper of
Petrosyan and Zaccour (2003) the international environmental agreement is mod-
eled, which provides a time-consistent allocation of total costs for all players under
which the pollution is reduced.
The model of territorial environmental production is an extension of above
mentioned model (Petrosyan and Zaccour, 2003). The region market is considered,
where all ﬁrms produce homogeneous product under Cournot competition. The pro-
duction process damages to the environment. Emission of each player is proportional
to its output. Any ﬁrm has three types of costs: production costs, abatement costs
and damage costs.
We consider the voluntary approach to environmental regulation, which became
popular in a series of countries. The cooperation of ﬁrms leads to increase their
proﬁts and decrease of pollution, but the price of product is increased.
The approach of this paper is diﬀerent. The more general coalitional setting
is considered, when not only the grand coalition, but also a coalitional partition
of players can be formed. This kind of approach was considered before in . Coali-
tional values for static games have been studied in a series of papers (Bloch, 1966;
Owen, 1997). In a recent contribution, Owen (1997) proposed a characterization of
the Owen value for static games under transferable utility. Owen (1997) deﬁned the
coalitional value for static simultaneous games with transferable payoﬀs by gener-
alizing the Shapley value to a coalitional framework. In particular, the coalitional
value was deﬁned by applying the Shapley value ﬁrst to the coalition partition and
then to cooperative games played inside the resulting coalitions. This approach as-
sumed that coalitions in the ﬁrst level can cooperate (as players) and form the
grand coalition. The game played with coalition partitioning becomes cooperative
one with specially deﬁned characteristic function: The Shapley value computed for
this characteristic function is then the Shapley-Owen value for the game.
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The present paper emerges from idea that it is more natural not to assume
that coalitions on the ﬁrst level can form a grand coalition. At ﬁrst step the Nash
equilibrium in the game played by coalitions is computed. Secondly, the value of
each coalition is allocated according to the Shapley value in the form of PMS-vector,
that was derived in the paper of Petrosyan and Mamkina (2006) . The approach
was considered earlier in (Kozlovskaya et al., 2010). The main result of this paper
is the calculation of this solution (PMS-vector). The main result of the paper is
construction the dynamic PMS-value in the model of territorial environmental
production.
2. Problem Statement
Consider a region market with n ﬁrms which produce for simplicity the same prod-
uct. Let I be the set of ﬁrms involved in the game: I = {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Denote by qi = qi(t) the output of ﬁrm i at the instant of time t. The price of
the product p = p(t) is deﬁned as follows
p(t) = a− bQ(t) , (1)
where a > 0, b > 0, Q(t) =
n∑
i=1
qi(t) – the total output. The price function p(t) is
inverse demand function:
Q = Q(t) =
a− p(t)
b
.
The production cost of any ﬁrm equals
Ci(qi(t)) = cqi(t), c > 0, i ∈ I.
The game Γ (s0, t0) starts at the instant of time t0 from the initial state s0, where
s0 = s(t0) is the stock of pollution at time t0. Let us denote by ei(t) the emission
of ﬁrm i at time t. The emission of ﬁrms are linear subject to output:
ei(qi(t)) = αqi(t), α > 0. (2)
Denote by e¯i maximum permissible emission for ﬁrm i:
0 ≤ ei(qi(t)) ≤ e¯i. (3)
We get from (3) that maximal permissible output of ﬁrm i is equal to
qmaxi =
e¯i
α
,
then maximal permissible total output equals
Qmax =
e¯
α
,
where e¯ =
n∑
i=1
e¯i. Suppose the parameters of model are such that the following
inequality is true
a− c− b
α
e¯ ≥ 0,
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which guarantees the nonnegativity of price (1).
Denote by s = s(t) the total stock of accumulated pollution by time t. The
dynamics of pollution accumulation is deﬁned by the following diﬀerential equation:
s˙(t) = α
n∑
k=1
qi(t)− δs(t),
s(t0) = s0, (4)
where δ is the rate of pollution absorption, α > 0 is a known parameter. Any ﬁrm
has two types of costs, which are not directly connected with the production process:
abatement costs and damage costs. The abatement costs at moment of time t equals
Ei(qi(t)) =
γ
2
ei(t)(2e¯i − ei(t)) = γ
2
αqi(2e¯i − αqi),
γ > 0, 0 ≤ ei(t) ≤ e¯i.
The cost function Ei(qi) increases and reaches the maximum at qi = qmaxi . The
function Ei(qi) is concave. Damage costs depends on the stock of pollution:
Di(s(t)) = πis(t), πi > 0, i ∈ I.
The ﬁrm i tries to maximize the proﬁt
Πi(s0, t0; q) =
∞∫
t0
e−ρ(t−t0){pqi − Ci(qi)−Di(s)− Ei(qi)}dt, (5)
where q = q(t) = (q1(t), q2(t), . . . , qn(t)), t ≥ t0 is trajectory of production output,
0 < ρ < 1 is a discount rate, p is deﬁned by (1).
3. Coalitional Solution
LetΔ = (S1, S2, . . . , Sm) be the partition of the set I, such that Si∩Sj = ∅,
m⋃
i=1
Si =
I, |Si| = ni,
m∑
i=1
ni = n.
Denote by M the set M = {1, 2, . . . , ,m}.
Suppose that each ﬁrm i from I is playing in interests of coalition Sk, to which
it belongs, trying to maximize the sum of payoﬀs of its members, i.e.
max
qj∈Sk
∑
j∈Sk
Πj(s0; q) =
= max
qj∈Sk
∞∫
t0
e−ρ(t−t0)
∑
j∈Sk
{pqj − Cj(qj)−Dj(s)− Ej(qj)}dt,
(6)
where q = q(t) = (q1(t), q2(t), . . . , qn(t)), t ≥ t0 – trajectory of production output,
0 < ρ < 1 – discount rate.
Without loss of generality it can be assumed that coalitions Sk are acting as
players. Then at ﬁrst stage the Nash equilibrium is computed. The total cost of
coalition Sk is allocated among the players according to Shapley value of corre-
sponding subgame Γ (Sk). The game Γ (Sk) is deﬁned as follows: let Sk be the set
of players involved in the game Γ (Sk) , Γ (Sk) is a cooperative game.
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Deﬁnition 1. The vector
PMS(x, t) = [PMS1(x, t), PMS2(x, t), . . . , PMSn(x, t)],
is a PMS-vector, where PMSi(x, t) = Shi(Sk, x, t), if i ∈ Sk, where
Shi(Sk, x, t) =
∑
M⊃i,M⊂Sk
(nk −m)!(m− 1)!
nk!
[V (M,x, t)− V (M\{i}, x, t)]
and (S1, S2, . . . , Sm) is the partition of the set I.
3.1. The Construction of Coalitional Solution
Step 1. Computation of the Nash equilibrium in the game of coalitions Sk, k ∈ M .
Each ﬁrm i from I is playing in interests of coalition Sk, to which it belongs,
trying to maximize the sum of payoﬀs of its members (6).
The Nash equilibrium in the game of coalitions is computed by the solution of
the following system:
max
qj∈Sk
∑
j∈Sk
Πj(s0; q) = max
qj∈Sk
∞∫
t0
e−ρ(t−t0)
∑
j∈Sk
{pqj−
−Cj(qj)−Dj(s)− Ej(qj)}dt k ∈M,
(7)
subject to equation dynamics (4).
Step 2. Computation of the characteristic function and the Shapley value in the game
ΓSkV (s0), k = 1, 2, . . . ,m. Computation of the characteristic function isn’t stan-
dard ( Petrosyan and Zaccour, 2003): when the characteristic function is calcu-
lated for K, the left-out players stick to their Nash strategies
Step 3. Construction of the PMS-vector.
Payoﬀs of all players i ∈ I forms a PMS-vector (Petrosyan and Mamkina, 2006).
PMS(s0) = (PMS1(s0), PMS2(s0), . . . , PMSn(s0)), PMSi(s0) = ShSki (s0),
where ShSk(s0) is the Shapley value in the game ΓSkV (s0)
The Nash equilibrium is calculated with the help of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
equation (Dockner et al., 2000). The total cost of coalition Sk is allocated among
the players according to Shapley value of corresponding subgame Γ (Sk). The game
Γ (Sk) is deﬁned as follows: let Sk be the set of players involved in the game Γ (Sk)
, Γ (Sk) is a cooperative game.
Computation of the characteristic function of this game isn’t standard. When the
characteristic function is computed for the coalition K ∈ Sk, the left-out players
stick to their Nash strategies. Payoﬀs of all players i ∈ I forms a PMS-vector
(Petrosyan and Mamkina, 2006).
3.2. The Nash Equilibrium in the Game of Coalitions
The solution of the system (7) is equivalent to the solution if the system of Hamilton-
Jacobi-Belman equations
ρWSk = max
qj ,j∈Sk
{
∑
j∈Sk
(qj(a− bQ)− cqj − πjs+ γα
2
qj(αqj − 2e¯j))+
+
∂WSk
∂s
(αQ − δs)}, k ∈ M,
(8)
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where Q =
∑
j∈I
qj , Wsk is the Bellman function subject to equation od dynamics
(4). By the ﬁrst Step to ﬁnd the Nash equilibrium, consider the system (8).
Diﬀerentiating with respect to qi, i ∈ Sk the right hand side of the equation (8)
leads to
a− bQ− b
∑
j∈Sk
qj − c+ γα2qi − γαe¯i + α∂WSk
∂s
= 0, i ∈ I, k ∈M. (9)
Let us denote QSk =
∑
j∈Sk
qj .Then Q =
m∑
j=1
QSj , the system (9) is obtained in the
following form
a− b
m∑
j=1
QSj − bQSk − c+ γα2qi − γαe¯i + α
∂WSk
∂s
= 0, i ∈ I, k ∈M. (10)
Summing equations (10) with respect to Sk gives
nk(a− c− b
m∑
j=1
QSj )−nkbQSk +γα2QSk −γαe¯Sk +αnk
∂WSk
∂s
= 0, k ∈ M, (11)
where e¯Sk =
∑
j∈Sk
e¯j . Solving (11) subject to QSk , ﬁnd
QSk =
nk(a− c− bQ)− γαe¯Sk + αnk ∂WSk∂s
bnk − α2γ , k ∈ M. (12)
Summing (12) with respect to the set M leads to
Q =
m∑
j=1
nj(a− c− bQ)− γαe¯Sj + αnj ∂WSj∂s
bnj − α2γ =
=
m∑
j=1
nj(a− c+ α∂WSj∂s )− γαe¯Sj
bnj − α2γ −Q
m∑
j=1
bnj
bnj − α2γ ,
then one can ﬁnd:
Q =
m∑
j=1
nj(a− c+ α∂WSj∂s )− γαe¯Sj
bnj − α2γ
1 +
m∑
j=1
bnj
bnj − α2γ
. (13)
Substituting (13) in (12) gives the formula for QSk . Then solving (9) leads to:
qi =
e¯i
α
− 1
α2γ
(a− c− bQ− bQSk + α
∂WSk
∂s
), i ∈ Sk (14)
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It can be shown by the usual way that the Bellman function
WSk = ASkx+BSk , k = 1, 2, . . . ,m, (15)
satisﬁes the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (8) [13]. One can notice that
∂WSk
∂x
= ASk . (16)
Substituting (15) and (16) in formula (14) gives:
qˆi =
e¯i
α
− 1
α2γ
(a− c− bQˆ− bQˆSk + αASk), i ∈ Sk,
where
QˆSk =
nk(a− c− bQ)− γαe¯Sk + αnkASk
bnk − α2γ , k ∈M,
and
Qˆ =
m∑
j=1
nj(a− c+ αASj )− γαe¯Sj
bnj − α2γ
1 +
m∑
j=1
bnj
bnj − α2γ
,
it means that
qni =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
qˆi, qˆi ∈ [0, e¯iα ]
e¯i
α , qˆi >
e¯i
α
0, qˆi < 0
i ∈ I. (17)
Substituting (15) and (16) into the formula (8) leads to:
ρASks+ ρBSk = Q
n
Sk(a− c−Qn)−
∑
j∈Sk
πjs+
+
γα
2
∑
j∈Sk
qnj (αq
n
j − 2e¯j) +ASk(αQn − δs), k ∈ M.
(18)
From (18), we get the coeﬃcients ASk and BSk :
ASk = −
∑
j∈Sk
πj
ρ+ δ
BSk =
1
ρ
(
QnSk(a− c− bQn) +ASkQn +
γα
2
∑
j∈Sk
qnj (αq
n
j − 2e¯j)
)
,
(19)
where qni is deﬁned by the formula (17), and
QnSk =
∑
j∈Sk
qnj , k ∈ M, (20)
Qn =
∑
j∈M
QnSj , (21)
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3.3. Computation of the Characteristic function
Computation of the characteristic function of this game is not standard. When the
characteristic function is computed for the coalition K ⊂ I, we suppose that the
left-out players have used their Nash equilibrium strategies. The advantage of this
approach is the following: such characteristic function is easier to compute. This
approach requires to solve only one equilibrium problem, all others being standard
dynamic optimization problems, while standard approach requires to solve 2n − 2
equilibrium problems, which are harder then a dynamic optimization one. But this
approach has a limitation, because in general the characteristic function is not
superadditive. The superadditivity of the characteristic function was considered in
(Kozlovskaya et al., 2010; Zenkevich and Kozlovskaya, 2010).
Suppose that for parameters of the model the following conditions hold:
1
b(n+ 1)− α2γ
(
a− c− bα(A− γe¯)
b− α2γ
)
≤ 1
b− α2γ
( b
α
e¯i − αAi
)
,
e¯i
α
+
1
2bn− α2γ (a− c+ αA−
2b
α
e¯) ≥ 0, i ∈ I,
(22)
where
e¯ =
∑
j∈I
e¯j ,
A = −
∑
j∈I
πj
ρ+ δ
.
Conditions (22) are the suﬃcient conditions of superadditivity of the characteristic
function.
Computation of th Nash equilibrium in the game ΓSkV (s0) To ﬁnd the Nash
equilibrium the system of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations must be solved:
max
ei
Πi(s; q) = max
ei
∞∫
t
e−ρ(τ−t){pqi − Ci(qi)−Di(s)− Ei(qi)}dτ , i ∈ Sk. (23)
The solution of the system (23) is equivalent to the solution of the system of
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations.
ρWi = max
qi
{qi(a− bQ)− cqi−πis+ γα
2
2
q2i − γαe¯iqi+
+
∂Wi
∂s
(αQ − δs)}, i ∈ Sk.
(24)
Diﬀerentiaiting the right hand side (24) with respect to qi and equating to 0 leads
to
a− bQ− bqi − c+ γα2qi − γαe¯i + α∂Wi
∂s
= 0, i ∈ Sk
Recall that players from I\Sk stick to the strategies (17), where QnSj is deﬁned
by the formula (20)
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a− b
∑
j∈M\{k}
QnSj − bQsk − bqi − c+ γα2qi − γαe¯i + α
∂Wi
∂s
= 0, i ∈ Sk (25)
Summing (25) by Sk gets
nk(a− c− b
∑
j∈M\{k}
QnSj)− nkbQsk − bQSk + γα2QSk − γαe¯Sk + α
∑
j∈Sk
∂Wj
∂s
= 0,
We obtain
QNSk =
nk(a− c− b
∑
j∈M\{k}
QnSj )− γαe¯Sk + α
∑
j∈Sk
∂Wj
∂s
b(nk + 1)− α2γ . (26)
One can ﬁnd from (25), that
qNi =
e¯i
α
+
1
b− α2γ (a− c− b
∑
j∈M\{k}
QnSj − bQSk + α
∂Wi
∂s
− b
α
e¯i). (27)
On account of (22), 0 ≤ qNi ≤ e¯iα . The Bellman functions have the linear form:
Wi = Ais+Bi, i ∈ Sk. (28)
Substituting (28) into (24), we obtain
ρAis+ ρBi = q
N
i (a− c− b
∑
j∈M\{k}
QnSj − bQNSk)− πis+
+
γα
2
qNi (α
N
i − 2e¯i) +Ai(α(
∑
j∈M\{k}
QnSj +Q
N
Sk
)− δs)
(29)
from (29) one can ﬁnd
Ai = − πi
ρ+ δ
Bi =
1
ρ
(qNi (a− c− b
∑
j∈M\{k}
QnSj − bQNSk) +
γα
2
qNi (α
N
i − 2e¯i)+
+αAi(
∑
j∈M\{k}
QnSj +Q
N
Sk
)),
(30)
where QnSj is deﬁned by (3.2.), q
N
i is deﬁned by (3.3.) and
QNSk =
nk(a− c− b
∑
j∈M\{k}
QnSj )− γαe¯Sk + αASk
b(nk + 1)− α2γ ,
qNi =
e¯i
α
+
1
b− α2γ (a− c− b
∑
j∈M\{k}
QnSj − bQNSk + αAi −
b
α
e¯i).
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Computation of the characteristic function for the intermidiate coalition
L in the game ΓSkV (s0) Let L ∈ Sk, |L| = l, |Sk| = nk. Players from L maximize
max
qi,qi∈L
Πi(s; q) = max
qi,qi∈L
∞∫
t
e−ρ(t−τ){pqi − Ci(qi)−Di(s)− Ei(qi)}dτ, (31)
on the assumption of the left-out players stick to their Nash equilibrium strategies
qNi . The solution of (31) is equivalent to the solution of the following Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equation.
ρWL = max
qj∈L
{
∑
j∈L
qj(a− bQ)− c
∑
j∈L
qj −
∑
j∈L
πjs+
+
γα2
2
∑
j∈L
q2j − γα
∑
j∈L
e¯jqj +
∂WL
∂s
(αQ − δs)}.
(32)
Diﬀerentitating the right hand side of (32) with respect to qi and equating to 0
gives:
a− c− bQ− b
∑
j∈L
qj + γα
2qi − γαe¯i + α∂WL
∂s
= 0. (33)
Suppose the players from I\Sk stick to qni (17) and t he players from Sk\L stick to
qNi (3.3.), so from (33) it can be obtained
a− c− b
∑
j∈M\{k}
QnSj − b
∑
j∈Sk\{L}
qNj − 2b
∑
j∈L
qj + γα
2qi− γαe¯i+α∂WL
∂s
= 0. (34)
By the same way it can be found:
qL =
∑
j∈L
qLj =
l(a− c− b( ∑
j∈M\{k}
QnSj +
∑
j∈Sk\{L}
qNj ))− γαe¯L + αAL
2bl− α2γ , (35)
and then
qLi =
e¯i
α
+
1
b− α2γ (a− c− b(
∑
j∈M\{k}
QnSj +
∑
j∈Sk\{L}
qNj + q
L) +αAL− b
α
e¯L). (36)
Because of the condition (22), 0 ≤ qLi ≤ e¯iα . The characteristic function is deﬁned
by the following formula:
WL = ALs+BL, (37)
where
AL =−
∑
j∈L
πj
ρ+ δ
BL =
1
ρ
(qL(a− c− b(
∑
j∈M\{k}
QnSj +
∑
j∈Sk\{L}
qNj + q
L)))+
+
γα
2
∑
j∈L
qLj (αq
L
j − 2e¯j)+αAL(
∑
j∈M\{k}
QnSj +
∑
j∈Sk\{L}
qNj + q
L).
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3.4. Characteristic function
We have proved that characteristic function of the game ΓSkV (s0) is given by the
following formula:
V (K, s) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
0, K = ∅,
Wi(s), K = {i},
WSk(s), K = Sk,
WL(s), K = L,
where Wi(s), WL(s), WSk(s) is deﬁned by (15), (37), (28).
3.5. The PMS-vector in the game ΓSkV (s0)
Let sn(t), t ≥ t0 be the coaltiotnal trajectory, and players from coalition Sk players
are agreed to divide the total payoﬀ V (Sk, s0) according to Shapley value:
Sh(s) = (Sh1(s), Sh2(s), . . . , Shn(s)),
where SHi(s) is deﬁned by (38). The structure of the Shapley value is the following
Shi(s
n(t)) = Ais
n(t) +Bshi, (38)
4. The Numerical Example of the Coalitional Solution
All computations were executed in MAPLE 10.
4.1. Parameters of the Model
Consider the game of territorial environmental production of 7 players:
I = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}. Let the parameters of the model be the following:
t0 = 0 – the initial instant of time ,
s0 = 0 – the initial stock of pollution,
p(t) = 8000− 10
7∑
i=1
qi(t) - the price function,
c = 3 – speciﬁc production costs,
ρ = 0.07 – discount rate,
α = 4 – coeﬃcient that characterizes the speciﬁc emission volume,
δ = 0.2 – natural rate of pollution absorption,
γ = 0.055 – abatement costs coeﬃcient
e¯ = (600, 450, 510, 480, 550, 410, 430) - maximum permissible emissions,
π = (4.7, 5.3, 5, 5.1, 4.8, 5.2, 5.05) - damage costs coeﬃcients.
It follows from (2) and (3) that maximum permissible outputs of players are equal
to
qmax = (150, 112.5, 127.5, 120, 137.5, 102.5, 107.5)
4.2. Results
Consider the following cases:
1. the Nash equilibrium
2. full cooperation
3. coalitional partition Δ1 = ({1, 2, 3}, {4, 5}, {6, 7})
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4. coalitional partition Δ2 = ({1, 2}, {3, 4}, {5, 6, 7})
5. coalitional partition Δ3 = ({1, 2, 3, 4}, {5, 6, 7})
6. coalitional partition Δ4 = ({1, 2}, {3, 4}, {5}, {6}, {7})
7. coalitional partition Δ5 = ({1, 2, 3, 4}, {5}, {6}, {7})
Table 1: Results
max NE COO Δ1 Δ2 Δ3 Δ4 Δ5
p -575 1085.99 4292.47 2155.02 2156.65 2869.6 2098.54 3173.57
q1 150 96.64 80.46 82.34 117.6 85.3 79.7 56.29
q2 112.5 99.28 42.96 44.84 80.1 47.8 42.2 18.79
q3 127.5 98.32 57.96 59.84 102.9 62.8 65 33.79
q4 120 98.89 50.46 90.21 95.4 55.3 57.5 26.29
q5 137.5 97.68 67.96 107.7 84.5 109 135.7 137.5*
q6 102.5 100.41 32.96 97.28 49.5 74 102.5* 102.5*
q7 107.5 100.17 37.96 102.3 54.5 79 107.5* 107.5*
The ﬁrst string of the table contains the prices of product in all 7 cases. The price
of product is the highest in the case oﬀ full cooperation, the price is the lowest, when
the players compete. The dynamics of pollution in any of 7 cases are the following:
sN (t) = 13828.02− 13828.02e−02t,
sI(t) = 7415.07− 7415.07e−02t,
sΔ1(t) = 11689.95− 11689.95e−02t,
sΔ2(t) = 11686.7− 11686.7e−02t,
sΔ3(t) = 10260.8− 10260.8e−02t,
sΔ4(t) = 11802.9− 11802.9e−02t,
sΔ5(t) = 9652.9− 9652.9e−02t.
Functions sΔ1(t), sΔ2(t) sΔ4(t) are almost coincides, so let us denote it by sΔ1(t)
(Pic. 1). The emissions are maximin in the case of competition at any t and minimum
in the case of cooperation. On Fig. 2-8 proﬁts of any player are represented. The
proﬁt is lowest in the Nash equilibrium (competitive case) for any player. On Fig.
9 and 10 the proﬁt functions of players in the case of cooperation and competition
are represented. On Fig. 11-15 the the proﬁt functions of players in the case of
coalitional partitions are represented.
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V ({1}, sN(t)) = 443161.9+ 240710e−0.2t
V ({2}, sN(t)) = 410614.1+ 271439e−0.2t
V ({3}, sN(t)) = 436648.3+ 256074.5e−0.2t
V ({4}, sN(t)) = 434696.7+ 261196e−0.2t
V ({5}, sN(t)) = 454212 + 245831.5e−0.2t
V ({6}, sN(t)) = 460253.9+ 266317.5e−0.2t
V ({7}, sN(t)) = 479901 + 258635.2e−0.2t
Sh1(s
I(t)) = 2596830.2+ 129041.3e−0.2t
Sh2(s
I(t)) = 2534222.5+ 145514.7e−0.2t
Sh3(s
I(t)) = 2633017.4+ 137278e−0.2t
Sh4(s
I(t)) = 2643934.6+ 140023.6e−0.2t
Sh5(s
I(t)) = 2630935.5+ 131786.9e−0.2t
Sh6(s
I(t)) = 2693927.9+ 142769.1e−0.2t
Sh7(s
I(t)) = 2704317.1+ 138650.8e−0.2t
PMS11(s
1(t)) = 1004458.7+ 203491.8e−0.2t
PMS12(s
1(t)) = 9836653.3+ 229469.5e−0.2t
PMS13(s
1(t)) = 1019834.5+ 216480.6e−0.2t
PMS14(s
1(t)) = 2116292.1+ 220810.2e−0.2t
PMS15(s
1(t)) = 2116722+ 207821.4e−0.2t
PMS16(s
1(t)) = 2135539.1+ 225139.9e−0.2t
PMS17(s
1(t)) = 2149420.1+ 218645.4e−0.2t
PMS21(s
2(t)) = 2098449.6+ 203435.1e−0.2t
PMS22(s
2(t)) = 2106725.7+ 229405.6e−0.2t
PMS23(s
2(t)) = 2110817.6+ 216420.4e−0.2t
PMS24(s
2(t)) = 2116851.4+ 220748.8e−0.2t
PMS25(s
2(t)) = 1004927.8+ 207763.6e−0.2t
PMS26(s
2(t)) = 1021950.9+ 225077.2e−0.2t
PMS27(s
2(t)) = 1052447.7+ 218584.6e−0.2t
PMS31(s
3(t)) = 1618274.1+ 1786139e−0.2t
PMS32(s
3(t)) = 1620465.4+ 2014156.7e−0.2t
PMS33(s
3(t)) = 1634972.8+ 1900147.8e−0.2t
PMS34(s
3(t)) = 1638652.2+ 1938150.8e−0.2t
PMS25(s
3(t)) = 2698271.6+ 1824141.9e−0.2t
PMS36(s
3(t)) = 2740960.6+ 1976153.7e−0.2t
PMS37(s
3(t)) = 2289477+ 1919149.3e−0.2t
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PMS41(s
4(t)) = 912508.3+ 205458.4e−0.2t
PMS42(s
4(t)) = 893504 + 231687e−0.2t
PMS43(s
4(t)) = 941322.5+ 218572.7e−0.2t
PMS44(s
4(t)) = 879177.1+ 222944.2e−0.2t
PMS45(s
4(t)) = 3133855.8+ 209829.8e−0.2t
PMS46(s
4(t)) = 2125635.4+ 2273156.4e−0.2t
PMS47(s
4(t)) = 2294008.6+ 2207584.7e−0.2t
PMS51(s
5(t)) = 718845.5+ 168031.3e−0.2t
PMS52(s
5(t)) = 702952+ 189482.1e−0.2t
PMS53(s
5(t)) = 724518+ 178756.7e−0.2t
PMS54(s
5(t)) = 724522.1+ 182331.8e−0.2t
PMS55(s
5(t)) = 5447153.4+ 171606.4e−0.2t
PMS56(s
5(t)) = 3859509.6+ 185907e−0.2t
PMS57(s
5(t)) = 4100063.7+ 180544.2e−0.2t
Fig. 1: Dynamics of pollution
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Fig. 2: Proﬁt functions of 1st player Fig. 3: Proﬁt functions of 2nd player
Fig. 4: Proﬁt functions of 3st player Fig. 5: Proﬁt functions of 4nd player
Fig. 6: Proﬁt functions of 5st player Fig. 7: Proﬁt functions of 6nd player
Coalitional Solution in a Game Theoretic Model 245
Fig. 8: Proﬁt functions of 7st player
Fig. 9: Proﬁt functions of player in the
Nash equilibrium
Fig. 10: Proﬁt functions of player in the
cooperation
Fig. 11: Proﬁt functions of player in the
case Δ1
Fig. 12: Proﬁt functions of player in the
case Δ2
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Fig. 13: Proﬁt functions of player in the
case Δ3
Fig. 14: Proﬁt functions of player in the
case Δ4
Fig. 15: Proﬁt functions of player in the case Δ5
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On a Mutual Tracking Block for the Real Object and its
Virtual Model-Leader
Andrew N. Krasovskii
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Abstract The research is devoted to a feedback control problem of stochas-
tic stable mutual tracking for motions of a real dynamical object, and some
virtual computer simulated model-leader, under dynamical and informa-
tional disturbances. The control and disturbance actions in the model are
determined by proposed random tests. To obtain solution to the consid-
ered problem we apply the so-called extremal minimax and maximin shift
conditions. Theoretical results are illustrated by numerical simulations.
Keywords: feedback control, nonlinear system, extremal shift.
1. Introduction
The investigations in this work are based on the approaches, methods and con-
structions from the theory of stochastic processes, theory of stability, theory of
optimal control and diﬀerential games, tracing and observation of the processes
and so on, which proposed and are developed in the works of Bellman (1957),
Isaacs (1965), Krasovskii and Subbotin (1974), Kurzhanski (1977), Mishchenko
(1972), Osipov and Kryazhimskii (1995), Pontryagin, Boltyanskii, Gamkrelidze and
Mishchenko (1962) and many other authors. This work uses the ideas of the books
(Krasovskii and Subbotin, 1974; Krasovskii and Krasovskii, 1994). The stochastic
process for the solution of considered problem is based on the appropriate construc-
tions of the so-called extremal shift (Krasovskii, 1980) of given controlled x-object
to its virtual w-model-leader.
2. Mutual tracking block. Extremal shift.
The dynamics of x-object is described by the vector ODE – nonlinear in controls u
and disturbances v:
x˙ = A(t)x+ f(t, u, v) + hdin(t), t0 ≤ t ≤ θ, (1)
subject to restrictions:
u ∈ P = {u[1], . . . , u[M ]}, v ∈ Q = {v[1], . . . , v[N ]}. (2)
Here symbols M and N are given numbers. Symbol hdin(t) denotes a random
vector-function restricted by the following constrains:
|hdin(t)| ≤ H, E{hdin(t)} ≤ δdin, t ∈ [t0, θ], (3)
where H stands for a suﬃciently large constant, δdin is a small constant, where
E{· · · } is the mathematical expectation (Liptser and Shiryaev, 1974).
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Let us consider the case, when the saddle point condition for the small game
(McKinsey, 1952), i.e.:
minu∈P maxv∈Q 〈l · f(t, u, v)〉 = maxv∈Q minu∈P 〈l · f(t, u, v)〉, (4)
where l is any n-dimensional vector and the symbol 〈l · f(t, u, v)〉 denotes the inner
product in Rn,is not satisﬁed for the function f(t, u, v).
Let us choose a partition tk ∈ Δ{tk} = {t0, t1, . . . , tk < tk+1, . . . , tK = θ}, where
K is a large number, and consider the ﬁnite-diﬀerence equation for x-object:
x[tk+1] = x[tk] + (A(tk)x[tk] + f(tk, u, v) + hdin(tk))(tk+1 − tk). (5)
Together with a real x-object we consider the motion of an abstract w-model:
w[tk+1] = w[tk]+(A(tk)w[tk]+
M∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
f(tk, u
[i], v[j])piqj+hdin(tk))(tk+1−tk). (6)
Here numbers pi, i = 1, . . . ,M and qj , j = 1, . . . , N satisfy conditions:
pi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . ,M,
M∑
i=1
pi = 1, qj ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , N,
N∑
j=1
qj = 1. (7)
We assume that the motion of w-model is simulated by a computer, implemented
in a regulator, and considered as the "leader" (or "pilot") for the motion of x-object.
Further, we consider the case, when position {tk, x[tk]}, k = 0, . . . ,K, of x-object
is estimated with some informational error Δinf [tk], such that at each time moment
tk ∈ Δtk only the distorted position {tk, x∗[tk]} is known, where:
x∗[tk] = x[tk] +Δinf [tk]. (8)
Here Δinf [tk] is a random vector.
Control actions for x-object and w-model, which provide mutual tracking in the
combined process x-object, x-model-leader, are constructed as follows.
At the moment tk, k = 0, . . . ,K − 1, a vector of actions u0[t] = u0[tk] ∈ P, t ∈
[tk, tk+1), for the real x-object is chosen by probability test:
P (u0[tk] = u
[i] ∈ P ) = poi , i = 1, . . . ,M. (9)
Here symbol P denotes probability (Liptser and Shiryaev, 1974) and probabili-
ties poi : poi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . ,M,
∑M
i=1 p
0
i = 1, are chosen from the so-called Extremal
Minimax Shift Condition:
minp maxq 〈l∗[tk],
M∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
f(tk, u
[i], v[j])piqj〉 = 〈l∗[tk],
M∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
f(tk, u
[i], v[j])p0i q
∗
j 〉,
(10)
under restrictions (7). Here l∗[tk] = x∗[tk]− w[tk].
Let the "control action" q0[tk] for the virtual w-model be chosen from the Ex-
tremal Maxmin Shift Condition:
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maxp minq 〈l∗[tk],
M∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
f(tk, u
[i], v[j])piqj〉 = 〈l∗[tk],
M∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
f(tk, u
[i], v[j])p∗i q
0
j 〉,
(11)
Probabilities {qj} that deﬁne the stochastic disturbances v[tk] ∈ Q on x-object,
and "actions" {pi} for w-model may take arbitrary values subject to conditions (7).
Theorem 1. Under described above choices (10) and (11) of the random actions
u0[tk] for x-object and "actions" q0[tk] for w-model, for any chosen beforehand
numbers V ∗ and 0 < β < 1, there exist suﬃciently small numbers δ0 > 0, δinf >
0, δdin > 0, δ > 0, such that the following inequality holds:
P (V (t, l[t]) ≤ v∗, ∀t ∈ [9, θ]) ≥ 1− β, (12)
if l[t0] ≤ δ0, E{|l(t) − l∗(t)| l(t)} ≤ δinf , for any admissible l[t] = x[t] − w[t], t ∈
[0, θ], E{hdin{t}}, and Δt = tk+1 − tk ≤ δ. Here:
V (t, l[t]) = V (t, x[t], w[t]) = |x[t]− w[t]|2eλt. (13)
Presented results are illustrated by a model example and its numerical simula-
tion.
Example 1. In this section we apply the elaborated algorithms to computer for
tracing of a motions x-object and w-model for the concrete 2-dimensional system.
Let us consider the model problem such that the control x-object (1) is described
by the ﬁnite-diﬀerential equation (5), where in our concrete case we assume:
x =
[
x1
x2
]
, A(t) =
(
0 1
1 0
)
, (14)
u ∈ P = u[1] = −1, u[2] = 1, v ∈ Q = v[1] = −1, v[2] = 1, (15)
and the function f(t, u, v) has the form:
f(t, u, v) =
{
0, 5u+ (u+ v)2 + v for t ∈ [0, ϑ4 ) ∪ [ θ2 , 3ϑ4 ),
u+ (u+ v)2 + 0, 5v for t ∈ [ϑ4 , θ2 ) ∪ [ 3ϑ4 , ϑ].
}
(16)
As it was described above, hdin(tk) in (1) is a dynamical error (1) that has a
random character. And we used the positional stochastic feedback control scheme in
which the informational image x∗[tk] at the current moment tk ∈ Δtk satisﬁes the
condition (8). Here the w-model (6), (7) that corresponds to x-object (5),(14),(16)
has the form:
w[tk+1] = w[tk] + (A(tk)w[tk] + f˜pq(tk) + hdin(tk))(tk+1 − tk), (17)
where:
f˜pq(tk) =
2∑
i=1
2∑
j=1
f(tk, u
[i], v[j])piqj . (18)
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Here f(tk, u[i], vj) is a function (16), and: pi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, p1 + p2 = 1, qj ≥
0, j = 1, 2, q1 + q2 = 1.
Under the values of parameters of the {x,w} system (5),(14)–(18): x1[0] =
−1.0, x2[0] = 1.0, w1[0] = −0.95, w2[0] = 1.05, ϑ = 4.0, Δt = tk+1 − tk = ϑ =
0.01, E|hinf | ≤ δinf = 0.01, E|hdin(t)| ≤ δdin = 0.01, we obtain the results of
the computer simulation for the motions of the x-object (solid line) and w-model
(dashed line) presented at the ﬁgure 1.
−1 −0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5
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−0.5
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x2, w2
Fig. 1
At this Fig. 1 we have the phase portrait of the motion of x-object and w-model.
In this case we chose the control actions u0[t] = u0[tk] ∈ P, tk ≤ t < tk+1 for x-
object and "actions" q0[tk] for w-model under the algorithms (Extremal Minimax
and Maximin Shifts Conditions) from section 2 . The control actions v[t] = v[tk] ∈
Q, tk ≤ t < tk+1 for x-object and "actions" p[tk] for w-model we constructed by
some random mechanism.
3. Conclusion
By the Theorem 1 the solution of the considered problem of the mutual tracing of
the motions of the real controlled object and its virtual model-leader is established.
The illustrative example and its computer simulation is given.
References
Bellman, R. (1957). Dynamic Programming. Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ.
Isaacs, R. (1965). Diﬀerential Games: A Mathematical Theory with Applications to Warfare
and Pursuit, Control and Optimization. J. Wiley and Sons, New York.
Krasovskii, A.N. (1980). On Minimax Position Control. Prikl. Mat. Mekh., 44(4), 602–
610. (1980) J. Appl. Math.Mech., 44, 425–430.
252 Andrew N. Krasovskii
Krasovskii, A.N˙. and Krasovskii, N.N. (1994). Control under Lack of Information.
Birkhauser, Boston.
Krasovskii, A.N. and Choi, Y. S. (2001). Stochastic Control with the Leaders-Stabilizers.
Preprint : Inst. Math. Mech.,Ural Branch Russ. Akad. Sci., Yekaterinburg.
Krasovskii, N.N. and Subbotin, A. I. (1974). Positional Diﬀerential Games. Nauka.
Moscow. Engl. transl.: (1988). Game-Theoretical Control Problems. Springer, New
York.
Kurzhanski, A.B. (1977). Control and Observation under Uncertainty Conditions. Nauka,
Moscow.
Liptser, R. S. and Shiryaev, A.N. (1974). Statistics of Random Processes: Nonlinear Filtra-
tion and Related Problems. Nauka, Moscow. Engl. transl.: (2001) Statistics of Random
Processes, Vol. 1: General Theory, Vol. 2: /em Applications. Springer, Berlin.
McKinsey, J. C. (1952). Introduction to the Theory of Games. McGraw-Hill, New York.
Mishchenko, E. F. (1972). On Certain Game Problems in Pursuit and Evasion. Avtom.
Telemekh., 9, 24–30. Autom. Remote Control 33, 1424–1429.
Osipov, Yu. S. and Kryazhimskii, A.V. (1995). Inverse Problems for Ordinary Diﬀerential
Equations: Dynamical Solutions. Gordon and Breach, Amsterdam.
Pontryagin, L. S., Boltyanskii, V.G., Gamkrelidze, R.V. and Mishchenko, E.F˙. (1962). The
Mathematical Theory of Optimal Processes Fizmatgiz, Moscow, 1961; Interscience, New
York.
Game-Theoretic Model on a Cognitive Map
and its Tolerance to Errors in Input Data
to Analyze a Conﬂict of Interests Between
Russia and Norway in Barents Sea
Sergei G. Kulivets
Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences RAS,
Profsoyouznaya st. 65, Moscow, 117997, Russia
E-mail: skulivec@yandex.ru
WWW home page: https://sites.google.com/site/sergeikulivets/
Abstract Some problems of complex control in the ﬁelds connected with
public life (i.e., social-economic, political and other ﬁelds) include
ill-structured control object. Situation appears ill-structured if the basic pa-
rameters have qualitative (not quantitative) nature, and their values are sub-
jective expert evaluations. Cognitive maps serve to solve control problems
for ill-structured situations. Cognitive map is a model representing knowl-
edge of the expert (or a group of experts) regarding situation; this model
is described in the form of weighted directed graph. The nodes of cognitive
map correspond to those concepts being employed to describe the situation.
The concept may be treated as a variable (for instance, "national defence
capacity") which may have diﬀerent values, such as "high", "low" and so on.
Weighted arc is interpreted as direct cause-eﬀect relationship between two
concepts. Suppose several decision-makers (agents) take part in the process
of decision making in an ill-structured situation given that the utility of each
of them depends both on his self actions and the actions of the others, than
interactions of the agents can be seen as a game on the cognitive map. In the
game cognitive map represents a model of ill-structured control object and
clearly describe the dynamics of the situation. The use of cognitive maps in
the game gives more detailed and visual simulation of the environment of
the conﬂict in the form of simple causal links, so as to describe the goals and
strategies of the agents in terms of the environment which makes it more
convenient to simulate the real conﬂicts adequately. Since the input data for
the model are expert evaluation prone to subjectiveness, it is necessary to
estimate the tolerance of model results to errors in input data. Experts eval-
uate the "importance percentage" of a target concept compared the others
target concepts and the weight of edges in cognitive map as the type of the
causal links and its strength. In this paper we consider the problem of model
tolerance to errors in input data and illustrate it on the material of conﬂict
of interests between Russia and Norway in the Barents Sea.
Keywords: game, cognitive map, conﬂict of interests, dominant strategy,
tolerance to errors.
1. Introduction
Cognitive maps were previously introduced by Axelrod (1976) to clarify and improve
decision making process. A cognitive map is a weighted digraph-based mathemat-
 This work was supported by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research under grant
No.12-01-31428-mol-a and No.11-01-00771-a
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ical model of a decision maker belief system about some limited domain, such as
a policy problem. Cognitive map nodes correspond to situation concepts. Concepts
are interpreted as variables whose values may vary. Weighted edges are interpreted
as direct causal links from one concept to another. Analysis of possible situation
developments depending on the control (in terms of an inﬂuence on some concepts)
is one of the possible applications of cognitive maps. Both direct (situation devel-
opment prediction with the ﬁxed control) and inverse (search of the appropriate
control) cognitive analysis problems are considered for this purpose.
The game-theoretic model of interactions between several agents at a dynamic sys-
tem in the form of a situation cognitive map was generally considered by Novikov
(2008). Since the input data for the model are expert evaluation prone to subjec-
tiveness, it is necessary to estimate the tolerance of model results to errors in input
data. Experts evaluate the "importance percentage" of a target concept compared
the others target concepts and the weight of edges in cognitive map as the type of
the causal links and its strength. In this paper we consider the problem of model tol-
erance to errors in input data and illustrate it on the material of conﬂict of interests
between Russia and Norway in the Barents Sea.
2. Description of model
2.1. General model
A linear cognitive map C is called a weighted digraph, if its nodes (concepts) and
edges (causal links) meet the conditions stated below, and the undermentioned rule
regarding node value dynamics is given. By M = {1, . . . , m} denote the set of all
concepts. A causal concept is a concept where an edge starts; an eﬀect concept is a
concept where an edge ends. Thereafter let an adjacency matrix of the digraph W
be a matrix with elements wji ∈ R, if elements of the matrix correspond to weights
of graph edges, which deﬁne types and strengths of causal links. Strength of the
causal link from the j-th causal concept to the i-th eﬀect concept is equal to the
absolute value of the edge weight |wji|. The sign of the edge weight corresponds to
the link type: if wji > 0, then the causal link from the j-th concept to the i-th one
is positive, if wji < 0, then the causal link is negative (Roberts, 1976).
All results were obtained for discrete time and the zero-time initial state. An pulse
process of a cognitive map is deﬁned by the rule (1) with the initial concept vector
x(0) = (x1(0), x2(0), . . . , xm(0)), x(0) ∈ Rm, and the vector p = (p1, p2, . . . , pm),
p ∈ Rm of an external pulse to each node at the zero time point (Roberts, 1976).
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) + pi(t), pi(t) =
{
pi, if t = 0;∑
j∈M wji · pj(t− 1), if t = 1, 2, 3, . . . . (1)
Let us ﬁx the discrete time point T (T > 0). Then the concept vector x(T ) is
deﬁned by the expression:
x(T ) = x(0) + p(0) + p(1) + · · · + p(T − 1) = x(0) + p + p ·W + · · · + p ·WT−1 =
x(0) + p · (E +W + · · ·+WT−1) = x(0) + p · TQ.
Where E is an identity matrix. Let a matrix TQ = E+W + · · ·+WT−1 be a matrix
of an inﬂuence reachability by the time T for the adjacency matrix W . Then the
sum of the consequent increments for the concept xj is as follows:
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T∑
t=0
pj(t) =
∑
k∈M
T qkj · pk. (2)
Where T qkj are elements of the matrix TQ. Let us consider the problem of
semistructured situation control at a linear cognitive map-based model. Let control
actions be external pulses to each node at the zero-time point p; where pj = 0, if
there is no control to the node j. A control eﬀect is a set of all concept values at
the time point :
xj(T ) = xj(0) +
T∑
t=0
pj(t), j ∈M. (3)
A control target is deﬁned by desirable values for all or some concepts x(T ) =
( x1(T ), x2(T ), . . . , xm(T )), x(T ) ∈ Rm (Roberts, 1976).
The agent with the number i ∈ N has a nonempty subset of concepts Mi ∈ M he
can control. Let Mi be a set of controlled concepts of the i-th agent. For any two
agents i, j ∈ N : Mi ∩Mj = ∅ and ∪k∈NMk ∈ M . By mi denote the number of
concepts at the set Mi.
A control action of each agent is contained in a vector of mutual control ac-
tions p = (p1, p2, . . . , pm). Let the strategy si of the i-th agent be a vector of or-
dered components of the vector p with indices from the set {k1, k2, . . . , kmi} = Mi:
si = (pk1 , pk2 , . . . , pkmi ). Each agent deﬁnes only "his" components of the vector p
during the inﬂuence on the situation. If there are no agent who inﬂuences on the
concept, then the corresponding component is null: (∀j ∈ M − ∪k∈NMk), pj = 0.
Control actions require some expense of limited resources. Let us impose the basic
restrictions to control actions for each concept in the form of the interval of accept-
able values: (∀j ∈ ∪k∈NMk) pj ∈ [−1, 1]. Then the set of i-th agent strategies Si can
be represented as the Cartesian productmi of intervals [−1, 1]mi. Let the hypercube
(s1, s2, . . . , sn) ∈ S1 × · · · × Sn be the set of all agent strategies S1 × · · · × Sn.
Let us deﬁne the utility function fi(x1(T ), x2(T ), . . . , xm(T )) on the result set for
each agent. The control target of i-th agent is the maximization the function fi. If
the i-th agent want to increase (alternatively, decrease) in the value of the concept
xj , then it is desirable for him to maximize the expression (xj(T )−xj(0)) (similarly
−(xj(T )−xj(0))). If the agent i can deﬁne desirable values for several concepts, then
the weighted sum should be maximized according to the above stated expressions
for such concepts. Each coeﬃcient is interpreted as an "importance percentage" of
restrictions on the corresponding concept. The utility function of the i-th agent is
as follows:
fi(x1(T ), x2(T ), . . . , xm(T )) =
∑
j∈M
γij · (xj(T )− xj(0)). (4)
Where |γij | is the "importance percentage" of the j-th concept value for the i-th
agent, γij ∈ [−1, 1], the sum of all |γij | at the right hand side of the expression (4)
is equal to 1. The sign of the coeﬃcient γij indicates the direction of variation of
the concept value (being beneﬁcial to the agent). In particular, provided γij > 0 the
i-th agent strives for inﬁnite increasing the j-th concept value. If γij < 0, then the
i-th agent seeks to inﬁnitely decrease the value of the j-th concept. Finally, γij = 0
means the i-th agent does not care about the value of the j-th concept.
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Let the target concept of the i-th agent be a concept with γij = 0 at the utility
function (4). After the deﬁnition of all game parameters, let us represent the game
at the normal form:
ΓC = {N, {Si}i∈N , {fi}i∈N , C, T }. (5)
Let substitute xj(T ) with the right-hand side of the expression (2) and (3) in
formula (4). Proceeding in this manner, one derives
fi =
∑
j∈M
γij · (xj(T )− xj(0)) =
∑
k∈M
⎛⎝∑
j∈M
γij · T qkj
⎞⎠ · pk = ∑
k∈M
Tαik · pk. (6)
Dominant strategies of the agent i are deﬁned by:
pk = sign(Tαik), k ∈ Mi. (7)
The model (5) is based on the model considered in Novikov (2008) but has some
diﬀerence. It has a point of control eﬀect T (target time) that let to make analysis
more detail.
2.2. A model of conﬂict of interests between Russia and Norway in
Barents Sea
Norway and Russia have sovereign rights over shelf space in the Barents Sea, which
includes: 1) the Russian continental shelf (the right of Russia), 2) the Norwegian
continental shelf (the right of Norway), 3) the oﬀshore area of Svalbard (the right
is governed by the Svalbard Treaty in Paris, 1920) and 4) continental shelves space
disputed zone. Disputed territory is about 175 thousand sq. km. Disputed area after
40 years of negotiations was divided into two approximately equal parts in Russian-
Norwegian treaty on maritime delimitation in the Barents Sea on September 15,
2010 (hereinafter the Treaty).
There was constructed cognitive map representations of the situation surrounding
the signing of the Treaty (see Fig. 1) based on the materials from open source
with expert evaluations of the situation in the Barents Sea and the Treaty. During
constructing the model we should took into account the proportionality of the prop-
agation time from concept to concept along the arc. The estimated time of impact
along the arcs model in about 4-5 years. Time eﬀect of impact from concept "12 to
"7 is about 10 years, so between them added a dummy concept which is not marked
in Fig. 1.
Control concept for Russia – concept "1, for Norway – concept "2. The initial impact
+1 for each of these concepts is interpreted as a desire to conclude the Treaty. The
impact -1 as the absence of such aspirations, and on the contrary, his rejection. The
impact value equal to zero, can be interpreted as indiﬀerence of the gamer on this
issue. The target concepts for Russia will consider two: "3 and "8 (with "importance
percentage" γ1,3 = 0.5 and γ1,8 = 0.5) for Norway "4 and "11 (with γ2,4 = 0.5 and
γ2,11 = 0.5). The solution of the game is the equilibrium with dominant strategies.
A set of solutions were found for diﬀerent target times T (see Fig. 2).
We shall explain two broken lines represented on Fig. 2 in greater detail. In the
model (5) the desirable variations of values of target concepts are established for
the ﬁxed point in time T in the future (target time T ). Thus if the target time T
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Fig. 1: Cognitive map that reﬂects the causal links between concepts in the problem of the
disputed territory in the Barents Sea. (The target concepts Russia is 
3 and 
8, Norway is

4 and 
11)
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is small, it means, that agents are inclined to statement of short-term targets and
wait for fast results from the action. Than more value so more "far-sightedness" of
agent targets. There is a solution of game (5) in the form of equilibrium of dominant
strategies according (7) at ﬁxed . Diﬀerent values are corresponds with diﬀerent
games, accordingly and diﬀerent dominant strategies of agents. On axis "X" on
Fig. 2 diﬀerent values of target time , that is the diﬀerent games in which targets of
agents are changing from short term (for values 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 on axis) to long run (9,
10, 11, 12, etc.). The lines in Fig. 2 shows how the "far-sightedness" agents in terms
of targets, aﬀects the optimal strategy to choose, in accordance with the targets.
As can be seen from Fig. 2 division of the disputed territory in the Barents Sea in
two is proﬁtable for Norway. It is proﬁtable without depends on target time T . In
the case of Russia the situation is quite diﬀerent. According to Fig. 2 the signing of
the Treaty will beproﬁtable for Russia in the short term, but not favourable in the
long run.
Fig. 2: The set of equilibriums in dominant strategies for games depending on the target
time T . The axis "X" is the diﬀerent values of the target time T , the vertical axis "Y"
corresponding to the equilibrium strategies of agents: Russia and Norway.
The results of the work model (Fig. 2) were obtained with using expert evaluation
of the importance of target concepts (γ1,3= 0.5, γ1,8 = 0.5, γ2,4 = 0.5 and γ2,11 =
0.5) and expert evaluation of the weights of the arcs in the digraph of cognitive
maps (Fig. 1). Let estimate the tolerance of the model results to errors in the
expert evaluations.
3. Estimate of tolerance to errors in input data
3.1. Estimate of tolerance to errors in a target coeﬃcient γij
Let consider the situation where the expert make an error in one of the weights
coeﬃcients γis in (6). If expert did not make an error, the value of Tαik would be
(8). Because of the error the value of Tαik changes to (9). It is enough to satisfy
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condition (10) to keep strategy (7) unchanged after making the error. From this
condition we obtain an estimate of error in one coeﬃcient in (6).
Tαik = γi1T qk1 + γi2T qk2 + · · ·+ γisT qks + · · ·+ γi,mT qk,m. (8)
Tα
ε
ik = γi1T qk1 + γi2T qk2 + · · ·+ (γis ± εiks)T qks + · · ·+ γi,mT qk,m. (9)
Tαik · Tαεik = Tαik(Tαik ± εiks · T qks) > 0 ⇒ εiks <
∣∣∣∣Tαik
T qks
∣∣∣∣ . (10)
We claim that:
Proposition 1. Suppose there is an error of expert estimate in only one target
coeﬃcient γis (s ∈ Mi) of the agent utility function fi and it doesn’t exceed the
value (11) then the dominant strategy of the agent i is invariable.
εis = min
k∈Mi
∣∣∣∣Tαik
T qks
∣∣∣∣ (11)
Indeed, this follows from the necessary of working the condition (10) for all
control concepts of agent i. The value (11) is called the estimate of tolerance to
errors in value of γis or allowable error.
Fig. 3 shows the results of calculations of (11) for the target concepts of both agents
(Russia " 3, " 8 and Norway " 4, " 11). Fig. 3 shows that the least sensitive to changes
(due to errors) is concept " 4. The value of γ2,4 is not critical to the invariance of
the result when T > 2. The reason is probably in the causal link ("4 → "11). We
shall return to this fact further in analysis of allowable errors for the weights of the
arcs of the digraph.
The estimates of tolerance to errors in value of γij (11) are within the range of
allowed values [-1, 1] for the other concepts. However, allowable error in γij is quite
large for the concepts "3 and "11. The allowable error in γij is much smaller for the
concept "8. It is clear that the correct evaluation of γij for the concept "8 is the
most important for choosing the optimal strategy. It requires a high conﬁdence in
the correct evaluation γ1,8.
Note that the values of the allowable errors for the concepts " 3 and " 8 at T = 5
are equal to zero. It is happened because the optimal strategy for Russia at T = 5
is an omission (see Fig. 2). This strategy is not stable to errors in the coeﬃcient
values γij , because (7).
A similar analysis of allowable errors for the target concepts can be used for
their selecting. For example the allowable error in concept "4 is bigger than the
high limit of the value range γ2,4 ∈ [−1, 1]. The concept " 4 should not be selected
as the target concept in a game with cognitive map (Fig. 1) because it is not critical
for the invariance result.
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Fig. 3.
3.2. Estimate (lower bound) of tolerance to error in all target
coeﬃcients
Let consider the situation where the expert make an error in all weight coeﬃcients
in (6). If expert did not make an error, the value of Tαik would be (8). Because of
the error the value of Tαik changes to (12). It is enough to satisfy condition (13) to
keep strategy (7) unchanged after making the error. From this condition we obtain
an estimate of error (lower bound) in all coeﬃcients in (6).
Tα
ε
ik = (γi1±εik)T qk1+(γi2±εik)T qk2+ · · ·+(γis±εik)T qks+ · · ·+(γi,m±εik)T qk,m.
(12)
We claim that:
Tαik · Tαεik = Tαik(Tαik ± εik ·
m∑
s=1
T qks) > 0 ⇒ εik <
∣∣∣∣ Tαik∑m
s=1 T qks
∣∣∣∣ . (13)
Proposition 2. Suppose there are some errors of expert estimates in target
coeﬃcient γis (s ∈ Mi) of the agent utility function fi and each of them doesn’t
exceed the value (14) then the dominant strategy of the agent i is invariable.
εi = min
k∈Mi
∣∣∣∣ Tαik∑m
s=1 T qks
∣∣∣∣ . (14)
Indeed, this follows from the necessary of working the condition (13) for all
control concepts of agent i. The value (14) is called the estimate of tolerance to
errors in all values of γis or allowable error in all values γis (s ∈Mi).
Fig. 4 shows the results of calculations of (14) for both agents (Russia and Norway).
Fig. 4 shows that the allowable error in all values γis is very small. It is an illustration
of the unstable situation of Russia in this game (5). The optimal solution for Russia
in the model is not stable for a ﬁxed system of priorities γ1,3 = 0.5 and γ1,8 = 0.5.
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The values of the target coeﬃcients γ2,4 = 0.5 and γ2,11 = 0.5 for Norway are stable
enough. The optimal solution for Norway stays the same for all γij in range ±0.5.
Note that the values of the allowable errors for the target concepts for Russia at
T = 5 are equal to zero. It is happened because the optimal strategy for Russia
at T = 5 is an omission (see Fig. 2). This strategy is not stable to errors in the
coeﬃcient values γij , because (7).
Fig. 4.
3.3. Estimate (lower bound) of tolerance to error in a weight of arc in
digraph of cognitive map
Let consider the situation where the expert make an error in δ in a weight of arc
wrs of cognitive map. In this case, the adjacency matrix of a digraph to be the next:
Wδ =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
w11 · · · w1s · · · w1m
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
wr1 · · · wrs ± δ · · · wrm
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
wm1 · · · wms · · · wmm
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
In this situation the error δ is the reason for errors in elements of matrix of an
inﬂuence reachability by the time T TQ:
TQε = (E +Wδ +W
2
δ + · · ·+WT−1δ ).
The elements of the matrix (TQε− TQ) correspond to the changes in every element
of matrix of an inﬂuence reachability by the time T caused by an error δ in adjacency
matrix W . The change in one element can be represented as (15), where Pk(wks)
the algebraic sum of products of elements of matrix W . It is necessary to estimate
the error ε in the value of elements of matrix TQ for getting the estimation the
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tolerable error δ in the matrix element wrs.
∣∣
T q
ε
ij − T qij
∣∣ = ∣∣δ · P1({wks}) + δ2 · P2({wks}) + · · ·+ δT−1 · PT−1({wks})∣∣ < ε.
(15)
Similar to the arguments (12), (13) we obtain an estimate of error εik for the
elements of TQ (16)-(17).
Tα
ε
ik = γi1(T qk1±εik)+γi2(T qk2±εik)+ · · ·+γis(T qks±εik)+ · · ·+γi,m(T qk,m±εik).
(16)
Tαik · Tαεik = Tαik(Tαik ± εik ·
m∑
s=1
Tγis) > 0 ⇒ εik <
∣∣∣∣ Tαik∑m
s=1 Tγis
∣∣∣∣ . (17)
The value εik is so error in every element of matrix TQ that the value of the control
concept k in the dominant strategy of the agent i is invariable. It is clear that if
error in every element of matrix TQ less than (18) then the dominant strategies of
every agent is invariable.
ε = min
i∈N
min
k∈Mi
∣∣∣∣ Tαik∑m
s=1 γis
∣∣∣∣ (18)
We claim that:
Proposition 3. Suppose there is an error of expert estimate in a weight of arc wrs
of cognitive map and it doesn’t exceed the value δ from (15), where ε is calculated
as (18) then the dominant strategies of every agent is invariable.
The value δ is called the estimate of tolerance to error in a weight of arc in digraph
of cognitive map or allowable error in wrs(r, s ∈M).
We can calculate the allowable error δ in the weight of wrs using the expression (15)
with ε from (18). Note that the expression standing on the left of the inequality
sign in (15) is a continuous function from δ, which always intersects the Ox-axis at
0. Consequently, if ε > 0 then there are values in a neighborhood of 0 witch satisfy
(15).
On the basis of Symbolic Math Toolbox MATLAB were calculated the allowable
error δ in all weights of arcs in digraph of cognitive map on Fig. 1 (Fig. 5).
Fig. 5 shows the dependence of the allowable error δ from target time T in the
game (5). The weights of the links ("1 → "6) and ("2 → "6) have the most low
values of allowable errors δ. This is illustration of the importance of the concept "
6 for agents target. The weight of the arc ("4 → "11) is less critical, but important.
The reason is probably in the fact that both concepts " 4 and " 11 are the target
concepts for Norway. This connection provides an additional agreement between
two sub-targets. The values of links ("1 → "12) and ("2 → "12) are also important.
The arcs ("1 → "6), ("2 → "6), ("1 → "12) and ("2 → "12) are the main causal links
witch providing connectivity the control concepts with all other in cognitive map.
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Fig. 5.
4. Conclusion
This paper deals with the issue of input data error tolerance of the game on cog-
nitive map according to expert evaluations. The model is constructed on the basis
of conﬂict of interests between Russia and Norway on maritime delimitation in the
Barents Sea. As a result was evaluated the error in the coeﬃcients of the utility
functions of agents as well as in the weights of the arcs of the digraph of cognitive
maps in this model. The estimation of errors tolerance made it possible to under-
stand the structural properties of the model and to assess the degree of selecting
target concepts feasibility.
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Abstract A generalization of the game-theoretical model of tax control
adjusted for possible corruption and inspectors mistakes is considered. The
hierarchical model has a three-level structure: at the highest level of a hi-
erarchy is an administration of tax authority, in the middle is an inspector,
subordinated to tax administration, and at the lowest level are n taxpayers.
It is supposed, that an interaction between risk-neutral players of diﬀerent
levels of a hierarchy corresponds to scheme “principal-to-agent”.
The model is studied for the case when the penalty is proportional to the
level of evasion. It is supposed that a tax inspector may turn out a bribetaker
or make ineﬀective tax audit, i.e. make a mistake and don’t reveal an existing
tax evasion.
In the case of corruption a tax control supposed to be eﬀective, i.e. reveals
existing tax evasions always. As in previous models, it is supposed that fact
of corruption is very diﬃcult to reveal and an inspector is punished only for
negligent audit.
In the case of ineﬀective auditing it is assumed that the tax inspector can
mistake and miss an existing evasion with the probability, which can be
considered as a part of negligent inspectors of their total number.
For every possible situation the players proﬁt functions and optimal strate-
gies are found.
Keywords: tax auditing, tax evasion, corruption, ineﬀective auditing.
1. Introduction
One of the most important aspects of modeling of taxation is the tax control.
Mathematical models of tax inspection considering a corruption earlier were studied
in (Chander and Wilde, 1992), (Hindriks and Keen and Muthoo, 1999) and (Vasin
and Panova, 1999). Due to the mathematical tradition, founded in these works the
game-theoretical model of tax audit adjusted for possible corruption and inspectors’
mistakes is considered.
In the basis of this model there is a hierarchical game, described in (Kumacheva
and Petrosyan, 2009). In the mentioned game the tax authority (high level of the
hierarchy) and the ﬁnite number of taxpayers (low level of the hierarchy) are players,
is considered.
To investigate the case of corruption let’s consider an improved hierarchical
model, which has a three-level structure: at the highest level of a hierarchy is an
administration of tax authority, in the middle is an inspector, subordinated to tax
administration, and at the lowest level are n taxpayers. As in the previous models,
such as (Chander and Wilde, 1998) and (Vasin and Morozov, 2005), it is supposed
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that the interaction between the tax authority and each taxpayer corresponds to the
scheme “principal-to-agent”. The players’ behaviour is supposed to be risk neutral.
For studying the case of inspectors’ mistake let’s suppose that the auditing is not
100%-eﬀective and consider a probability of an inspector’s mistake as a parameter
of the model.
2. The Base Model
In the studied model a set of n taxpayers is considered; each of them has income
level equal to ik, where k = 1, n. The income of the taxpayer rk is declared at the
end of a tax period, where rk ≤ ik for each k = 1, n. Let t be the tax rate, π be the
penalty rate. These rates are assumed to be constant.
As in (Kumacheva and Petrosyan, 2009) and (Boure and Kumacheva, 2010), it
is considered here that the audit of the k-th taxpayer is made by the tax authority
with the probability pk (0 ≤ pk ≤ 1). Model is constructed following the assumption,
that the taxpayers are aware of these probabilities.
If the evasion is revealed as the result of the tax audit, then the evaded taxpayer
should pay the penalty, which depends on the evasion’s level. In (Boure and Ku-
macheva, 2010) the model was studied in four cases of penalties, which are known
from (Vasin and Morozov, 2005):
1. the net penalty is proportional to evasion;
2. the penalty is proportional to diﬀerence between true and payed tax;
3. the penalty is restricted by the given level of the agent’s minimal income in the
case of his nonoptimal behaviour;
4. the post-audit payment is proportional to the revealed evaded income.
Let’s consider the ﬁrst case, when the penalty is proportional to evasion. In other
words, if the evasion is revealed, the taxpayer should pay the underpaid tax and the
penalty, both of which depend on the evasion’s level.
Without consideration of possible corruption the expected tax payment of the
k-th taxpayer in this case of penalty is deﬁned from the equation
uk = trk + pk(t+ π)(ik − rk), (1)
where the ﬁrst summand is always paid by the taxpayer (pre-audit payment), and
the second – as the result of the tax auditing, made with probability pk (post-audit
payment).
Let’s make the model more sophisticated by upgrading to a three-level game.
The tax authority is divided on the administration and a subordinated inspector,
who may be a corruptionist. As earlier, it is supposed, that the interaction between
risk-neutral players of the diﬀerent levels of the hierarchy corresponds to the scheme
“principal-to-agent”.
The tax authority sends an inspector for the tax audit with the probability
pk, which costs ck, k = 1, n. For the bribe bk audit inspector can agree not to
inform his administration about the evasion revealed. With the probability p˜k the
tax administration makes corruption-free re-auditing of this taxpayer, which costs
c˜k. Both of the audits are supposed to be eﬀective, i. e. they reveal the existing
evasion.
If a result of re-auditing is the revelation of the fact that the evasion was con-
cealed by the inspector, the taxpayer must pay (t+ π)(ik − rk) (as earlier) and the
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inspector must pay a ﬁne f · (ik − rk), where f is an inspector’s penalty coeﬃcient.
Following (Hindriks and Keen and Muthoo, 1999), it is supposed, that the fact of
corruption is very diﬃcult to reveal and an inspector is punished only for negligent
audit.
2.1. The Condition of an Evasion
The k-th taxpayer evades, if his expected payments in the case of evasion are less
than the tax, which he pays, declaring his true income, i. e. the inequality
trk + pk(t+ π)(ik − rk) < tik,
which holds or, that is equivalent to:
pk(t+ π)(ik − rk) < t(ik − rk). (2)
The condition (2) is violated, if the probability of audit pk = p∗ for each k = 1, n,
where
p∗ =
t
t+ π
. (3)
2.2. The Condition of a Bribe Existence
Let’s suppose, that there was an audit and an inspector identiﬁed an evasion of
the k-th taxpayer. Let’s deﬁne the condition, in which it is more proﬁtable for a
taxpayer to pay a bribe to an inspector, then to pay a post-audit payment. Expected
payments of a taxpayer in a case, when a bribe was given, but the tax evasion was
revealed whatever as a result of re-audit, is p˜k(t + π)(ik − rk) + bk. The bribe is
proﬁtable for a taxpayer, when
p˜k(t+ π)(ik − rk) + bk < (t+ π)(ik − rk). (4)
It follows from this inequality, that the value of proﬁtable bribe for the k-th taxpayer
should be less than his tax payments when there was no re-audit:
bk < (1− p˜k)(t+ π)(ik − rk). (5)
It is proﬁtable for an inspector to take a bribe, if it is more than an expected
penalty, which an inspector should pay in the case of re-auditing. That is
bk > p˜kf(ik − rk). (6)
Thus, we can obtain a mutually an inspector and a taxpayer beneﬁcial bribe
condition:
p˜kf(ik − rk) < bk < (1− p˜k)(t+ π)(ik − rk). (7)
It means, that a bribe is possible only, when an interval
(p˜kf(ik − rk); (1− p˜k)(t+ π)(ik − rk))
exists. It doesn’t exist, if the probability of re-auditing takes value
p˜∗ =
t+ π
t+ π + f
, (8)
which is deﬁned as the solution of the equation, which is got as a marginal case of
the inequality (7).
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3. The Stages of the Game
The studied hierarchical game can be divided on the next stages.
On the ﬁrst stage a tax inspector is not considered as a separate level of hierarchy
and an interaction between the tax authority and a taxpayer is studied. Being
the high-level player, the tax authority makes the ﬁrst move, choosing a pair of
vectors: p = (p1, . . . , pn) and p˜ = (p˜1, . . . , p˜n). Components of vector p are values
of probabilities of audits of each taxpayer, and components of vector p˜ are values
of probabilities of the re-auditings of activities of tax inspectors. The second move
is made by taxpayers: they make decisions to evade or to pay their taxes honestly,
that is to declare rk < ik or rk = ik, k = 1, n. If there was no tax audit, the game
can be considered as ﬁnished on this stage.
If the tax authority sends an inspector for auditing of the k-th taxpayer, the
second stage of the game begins. There is an interaction between an inspector and
a taxpayer on this stage. Let the ﬁrst taxpayer’s move is a choice of the strategy of
evasion. Then the strategy of his second step is a decision whether to give a bribe
to an inspector or not. The strategy of the inspector, who revealed evasion, is the
choice whether to take a bribe or not.
The third stage is an interaction between the administration of the tax authority
and both of the subordinated levels of hierarchy. The realization of this stage does
not depend on the results of the previous stage and happens, if the tax authority
makes a re-audit of an inspector’s activity.
Thus, players’ strategies are the following. For each k = 1, n the administration
of the tax authority chooses probabilities pk and p˜k of auditing of a taxpayer and re-
auditing of an inspector’s activity correspondingly. On the ﬁrst move the taxpayer
makes a decision to evade or not, on the second move – to give a bribe to an inspector
or not. The strategy of the inspector, who revealed evasion, is the choice whether
to take a bribe or not.
4. Possible Situations
In the model considered there are three possible situations:
1. there were an evasion and a given bribe;
2. a taxpayer evaded, but there was no corruption;
3. an honest payment due to a declaration.
Furtheron, let’s consider each of them separately.
4.1. An Evasion with a Corruption
The situation of an evasion with a bribe is possible in the following cases:
1. Let conditions (2) and (7) be fulﬁlled, i. e. an evasion is proﬁtable for a taxpayer
and a bribe is proﬁtable for both sides (the taxpayer and the inspector).
2. Let the condition (2) isn’t fulﬁlled, i. e. there is a big risk of revelation of an
evasion of a taxpayer. But the interval, deﬁned in (7), exists, therefore, it is
possible to reach an agreement about a bribe.
As in the previous models (Kumacheva and Petrosyan, 2009) and (Boure and
Kumacheva, 2010), let’s consider expected tax payments of the k-th taxpayer, k =
268 Suriya Sh. Kumacheva
= 1, n. Let’s change (1), assuming a possibility of a bribe. Then we obtain that in
both cases expected tax payments are
uk = trk + pk[p˜k(t+ π)(ik − rk) + bk]. (9)
The expected payoﬀ wk of the k-th taxpayer is:
wk = ik − trk − pk[p˜k(t+ π)(ik − rk) + bk].
The inspector takes a bribe, but can be audited and ﬁned, therefore, his expected
payoﬀ, got from auditing of the k-th taxpayer, (over his wages), is
Jk = pk(bk − p˜kf(ik − rk)).
The tax authority’s proﬁt function in this case has the form
Rk = trk + pk [p˜k ((t+ π + f)(ik − rk)− c˜k)− ck] . (10)
It should be noted that the tax authority’s net income, a taxpayer’s declared
income and, therefore, his expected payoﬀ in general depend on the strategy of
the tax authority. Thus, the functions Rk(pk, p˜k), rk(pk, p˜k) and wk(pk, p˜k) will be
considered further.
Choosing a strategy rk(pk, p˜k) at the ﬁrst stage of the game, the taxpayer ana-
lyzes the possibility of both an evasion and a fact of corruption. Some combination
of the mentioned distortions can be realized when the expected post-audit payments
of the taxpayer (the second summand of (9)) is less then his underpaid taxes:
pk[p˜k(t+ π)(ik − rk) + bk] < t(ik − rk).
Taking into account, that a bribe, which the taxpayer means to give, should satisfy
the inspector ((6) is fulﬁlled), the last inequality takes a form:
pkp˜k(t+ π + f) < t.
If this condition isn’t fulﬁlled, the probabilities pk and p˜k relate as follows:
pkp˜k =
t
t+ π + f
. (11)
A fact of choosing strategies, that satisﬁed (11), by the tax authority, does not
let the simultaneous implementation of the evasion and bribe. Let’s consider the
next situations.
4.2. An Evasion without Corruption
Let pk satisﬁes the condition (2). The k-th taxpayer evaded, made his declared in-
come lower than his true level. However, he risked vainly, and the tax authority send
an inspector, who revealed the tax evasion. Negotiations about a bribe are doomed
to failure, because the probability of re-audit is chosen by the tax administration
correspondingly to (11).
In this situation the k-th taxpayer’s proﬁt function is
wk = ik − trk − pk(t+ π)(ik − rk);
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the tax authority’s payoﬀ is deﬁned as
Rk = trk + pk [((t+ π)(ik − rk)− ck)− p˜k c˜k] =
= trk + pk ((t+ π)(ik − rk)− ck)− t
t+ π + f
c˜k.
The inspector gets nothing over his usual wages.
4.3. The Honest Payment Corresponding to the Declaration
Let’s suppose, that the condition (2) is violated. If pk and p˜k relate as in (11), a
taxpayer will not risk to evade, understanding that if an evasion is revealed it will
be impossible to reach an agreement with an inspector about mutually beneﬁcial
bribe.
In the considered situation the expected tax authority’s net income Rk (proﬁt
function), got from the taxation of the k-th taxpayer is
Rk = t ik − pk(ck + p˜kc˜k),
the taxpayer’s declared income r∗k = ik, the bribe bk = 0. I. e., the taxpayer’s payoﬀ
is wk = ik− tik (his true income level less honestly paid tax), an inspector’s beneﬁt
over his usual wages is Jk = 0 (he does not get a bribe).
Proposition 1. The maximum tax authority’s income, got from the taxation of
the k-th taxpayer, is reached when audit probability pk = p∗ and re-audit probability
p˜k = p˜
∗:
max
pk,p˜k
Rk(pk, p˜k) = Rk(p
∗, p˜∗) = tik − t
t+ π
ck − t
t+ π + f
c˜k. (12)
Herewith the taxpayer’s maximum payoﬀ wk(p∗, p˜∗) = ik − tik is reached when his
declared income r∗k = rk(p
∗, p˜∗) = ik; when the taxpayer and the tax authority have
such strategies, the inspector’s beneﬁt over his usual wages is Jk = 0.
Proof. At the ﬁrst stage the tax authority’s optimal strategy is a choice of the
minimum value of the probability of audit, that guarantees violation of the condition
(2), that is, pk = p∗, where p∗ is deﬁned from the equality (3). From the results, given
in (Boure and Kumacheva, 2010) it follows that this strategy is the tax authority’s
optimal strategy in order to maximize its income.
The k-th taxpayer will declare r∗k = ik, if on the second stage of his interaction
with the tax authority the possibility of corruption is excluded, i. e., p˜k relates with
pk = p
∗ by the condition (11). If p∗ from (3) is put in (11), the minimum value of
the probability of re-audit, which guarantees violation of the condition (7), will be
obtained. It means that p˜k = p˜∗, where p˜∗ is deﬁned from (8), for each k = 1, n.
unionsq
4.4. Cases, Allowing Unproﬁtable Activities of the Tax Authority
The case of unproﬁtable activities of the tax authority, when the parameters t, π
and ck relate so as inequality
(t+ π)ik < ck (13)
holds was considered in (Boure and Kumacheva, 2010).
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Fig. 1: Dependence the k-th taxpayer’s expected proﬁt wk on the probability of audit pk
Fig. 2: Dependence the tax authority’s expected proﬁt Rk on the probability of audit pk
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The proposition was formulated for this case. This proposition implies that for
the tax authority it is optimal (in order to maximize its proﬁt function) not to audit
the k-th taxpayer, because each value of the probability of the audit pk > 0 gives
only dead losses, i. e. Rk ≤ 0.
If in the case of unproﬁtable activities of the tax authority the players act op-
timally (corresponding to the mentioned proposition), the game is ﬁnished on the
ﬁrst stage, as an inspector is not sent for auditing. Thus, there is no sense in the
further interaction between players of diﬀerent levels of the hierarchy.
If the inequality
(t+ π)ik ≥ ck (14)
is fulﬁlled for the parameters t, π and ck, the second stage of the game is imple-
mented. Re-auditing with any value of the probability will be unproﬁtable for the
tax authority, if the relations of the parameters t, π, f , ck and c˜k such, as following
inequality
c˜k > (t+ π + f)
(
ik − ck
t+ π
)
(15)
holds.
In this case the optimal (in order to maximize its net tax income) strategy
is p˜k = 0. But then for any value of pk the taxpayer and the inspector have an
opportunity to reach an agreement about bribe bk, and, thus, the taxpayer can
evade with impunity. In this case the optimal audit strategy is pk = 0.
It is obvious that if (6) holds, the right side of inequality (15) becomes a negative
and, therefore, it is fulﬁlled for any relation of c˜k, π and f . Thus, inequality, opposite
to (15), implies (4).
5. The Optimal Player’s Strategies
Following (Chander and Wilde, 1998) and (Vasin and Morozov, 2005), let’s notice,
that the tax authority’s strategy in general is some optimal contract (Vasin and
Morozov, 2005) or optimal scheme (Chander and Wilde, 1998) (t, π, p, p˜, f), where
t, π and f are the parameters of long-term tax control, and p = (p1, . . . , pn) and
p˜ = (p˜1, . . . , p˜n) are the strategies, chosen by the tax authority in each tax period
for the k-th taxpayer, k = 1, n.
As it was in (Boure and Kumacheva, 2010), the tax authority’s net income is
deﬁned as a sum of the payoﬀs Rk, k = 1, n. It’s obvious, that
max
p,p˜
R =
n∑
k=1
Rk(p
∗, p˜∗).
Correspondingly to the previous proposition, the maximum value of the net
tax income from taxation of the k-th taxpayer is reached on a restricted class of
strategies of the tax authority, which fulﬁlls (11). The taxpayer’s best reply on the
tax authority’s activity (due to the mentioned optimal strategies) is deﬁned in the
same proposition.
The generalization of the considered reasonings is formulated in the next theo-
rem.
Theorem 1. 1. If a relation of parameters t, π, f , ck and c˜k allows to make a
proﬁtable audit of the k-th taxpayer (the inequality, opposite to (15), holds), the
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maximum of the tax authority’s income, got from taxation of the k-th taxpayer,
is reached when the strategy of auditing (3)
pk = p
∗ =
t
t+ π
and the strategy of re-auditing (8)
p˜k = p˜
∗ =
t+ π
t+ π + f
and has a form (12). In conditions of such strategy of the tax authority the k-th
taxpayer’s optimal strategy (in order to maximize his payoﬀ) is r∗k(p
∗, p˜∗) = ik;
his payoﬀ is wk(p∗, p˜∗) = ik − tik.
2. In the case, when for parameters t, π, f , ck and c˜k holds (15), the maximum
of the tax authority’s income is reached when the strategy of auditing p∗ = 0
and the strategy of re-auditing p˜∗ = 0; its value is Rk = 0. In this case the k-th
taxpayer optimal strategy is r∗k(0, 0) = 0; his payoﬀ is wk(0, 0) = ik.
The inspector’s payoﬀ is Jk = 0 in both cases.
Thus, taxpayers’ and the tax authority’s optimal strategies are found in condi-
tions of possible corruption.
6. Possible Mistakes of Inspectors
Let’s suppose that the auditing is not 100%-eﬀective. It means that tax inspectors
can make unintentional mistakes and miss an existing evasion.
Let’s consider a parameter μ, which has two diﬀerent meanings.
On the one hand μ is the probability of an inspector’s mistake. Then, from the
probabilistic point of view we obtain that the value (1 − μ) is the eﬀectiveness of
auditing. Therefore it can be included as an additional specifying multiply of the
probability of auditing pk in every equality.
On the other hand μ can be considered as a part of negligent inspectors of
their total number. Then, the probability of re-auditing p˜k depends on μ. As in
(Hindriks and Keen and Muthoo, 1999), it is considered that there is no way to
identify if the auditing was negligent or the inspector was corrupted. So, as in the
case of corruption, the negligent inspector pays a ﬁne f · (ik − rk) and the tax
evader pays penalty (t + π) (ik − rk). To construct the optimal strategy the tax
administration needs to obtain an estimation μ̂ of the probability μ.
7. Conclusion
In this paper the game-theoretical model of tax control, based on the hierarchical
game with a three-level structure and adjusted for possible corruption and inspec-
torsŠ mistake, is considered. The playersŠ proﬁt functions and optimal strategies
are found considering two mentioned features.
In the previous papers with the familiar problems (Chander and Wilde, 1992)
and (Hindriks and Keen and Muthoo, 1999) and (Vasin and Panova, 1999) a bi-
nary distribution of taxpayers’ income was considered. The game-theoretical model,
presented in this paper, diﬀers from the mentioned models by the assumption about
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a nonuniformity of taxpayers not only on the income level, but on the costs of audit-
ing for the tax authority. Another speciﬁc feature, on which this hierarchical model
was constructed, is the assumption that a strategy of the tax authority doesn’t
depend on the taxpayer’s income, declared in given tax period.
However, it should be noted, that results, obtained for this model, highly corre-
late with previous conclusions, published in the papers (Chander and Wilde, 1992)
and (Vasin and Panova, 1999), which are devoted to problems of taxation.
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Abstract The paper explores the classic consumer search model introduced
by Stahl in (Stahl, 1989). Literature uses the unique symmetric Nash Equi-
librium, but does little to discuss asymmetric Equilibria. This paper de-
scribes all possible asymmetric Nash Equilibria of the original model, under
the common literature assumption of consumer reserve price. Those include
strategies of three types: pure, continuous mixing and a mixture of the pre-
vious two types. The ﬁndings suggest that on some level, lower than the
symmetric Equilibrium, price dispersion will still exist, together with some
level of price stickiness, both observed in reality.
Keywords: Sequential Consumer Search, Oligopoly, Asymmetric NE
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: D43, D83, L13.
1. Introduction
Empirical studies, such as (Bazucs and Imre, 2009) or (Martin-Oliver et al., 2005),
have established that signiﬁcant price dispersion exists even for homogeneous goods.
As the literature suggests, this eﬀect is observed in many market structures and is
persistent. One of the explanations for this phenomenon is that consumers search
for the cheapest price. Since searching is costly, consumers may settle down for
a slightly higher price. In the literature many papers deal with search models,
for example (Burdett and Judd, 1983), (Burdett and Smith, 2009), (Carlson and
McAﬀee, 1983), (Stahl, 1989), (Varian, 1980) and (Watanabe, 2010). Search models
were developed originally in order to provide a solution to the Diamond Paradox
(Diamond, 1971), which predicted a complete market failure. The search models
vary in the scope, the length, the stopping condition or the information revealed
during the consumer search.
Additional Empiric studies, for example (Janssen et al., 2004), reveal that the
model introduced by Stahl in (Stahl, 1989) perform very well and predicts correctly
the pricing model of 86 out of 87 tested products. Moreover, (Baye et al., 2009)
empirically shows the existence of the two consumer types predicted by this model.
Therefore, this paper will concentrate on the Stahl search model.
The Stahl model is dealt extensively in the literature, and is a a very popular
model. Numerous extension to the Stahl Model were introduced, and the various
extensions are dealing with nearly every aspect of the model. Among those are
introducing heterogeneous searchers. Example for such extensions are (Chen and
Yhang, 2011) and (Stahl, 1996), where the searchers have diﬀerent cost for each
additional store they visit. They can diﬀer by the search scope, as discussed in
(Astone-Figari and Yankelevich, 2010), where some stores are near, and thus will
be searched ﬁrst. Another extension introduced advertisement costs, as discussed,
 Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through GRK 801 is grate-
fully acknowledged.
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for example by (Chioveanu and Zhou, 2011). There are also models where already
the ﬁrst price is costly, such as (Janssen et al., 2005), or no possibility to freely
return to previously visited store, such as (Janssen and Parakhonyak, 2008). The
literature has discussion regarding the sequential search in the model and looks also
at non-sequential search, for example in (Janssen and Moraga Gonzales, 2004), or
the unknown production cost as shown in (Janssen et al., 2009). Most assumptions
of the model introduced by Stahl in (Stahl, 1989) are discussed extensively, ex-
cept one main assumption, used extensively in the literature. This is the focus on
symmetric equilibria, where all sellers select an identical strategy. One of reasons
is the mathematical complexity: (Carlson and McAﬀee, 1983) and (Rotschild, 1973)
showed that in symmetric equilibria consumer reserve price must exist, and in asym-
metric ones it may not. Reserve price assumption is common in the literature, and
therefore, the paper considers only NE with reserve price, yet justiﬁes the ratio-
nality behind it. Nevertheless, one should note that additional Equilibria without
reserve price may exist, and fall beyond the scope of this paper.
For comparison, in the Varian search model introduced in (Varian, 1980), it is
shown in (Baye et al., 1992) that there are asymmetric equilibria, but those can
be ignored. In the Stahl model there might be additional equilibria when diﬀerent
settings are considered. Additionally, it is shown in (Baye and Morgan, 1999) that
one can receive additional equilibria in commonly known games, when the scope is
broadened. This paper ﬁnds a family of asymmetric equilibria to the original model,
where strategies are of (at most) three types - some sellers (at least two) mix over
the entire available price interval with a seller invariant distribution, whereas the
second group (might be empty) selects the reserve price as a pure strategy. The
third group (might be empty) has a pricing distribution which consists of a mass
point at the reserve price, and use the same distribution as the ﬁrst group up to a
seller speciﬁc cutoﬀ price.
An additional outcome of this model can explain price stickiness, as described
for example in (Davis and Hamilton, 2003). Many equilibria found here have mass
points on certain prices. This implies that with some probability the price in the
previous round can be the same also in the next round, even though the seller is
mixing. In reality it is known that that prices do not change too often and are sticky.
The results of this model can provide an insight on why it is so, as prices selected
with mass points can remain unchanged during several periods.
The structure of the paper is as follows: ﬁrst the Stahl model is formally in-
troduced. Then knowledge and structure of the game are discussed. Afterward the
structure of the asymmetric NE of the model is discussed, followed by an exam-
ple of such Equilibrium. Lastly the implications of the results are discussed, and
suggestions on how those results can be empirically tested.
2. Model
The Stahl model, as introduced in (Stahl, 1989) is formally described below. Nota-
tion was adjusted to the recent literature on the Stahl model.
There are N sellers, selling an identical good. Each seller owns a single store.
The production cost is normalized to 0, and assume that the seller can meet the
demand. Additionally, there are buyers, each of whom wishes to buy a unit of the
good. The mass of buyers is normalized to 1. This implies that there are many small
buyers, each of which is strategically insigniﬁcant.
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The sellers are identical, and set their price once at the ﬁrst stage of the game.
If the seller mixes then the distribution is selected simultaneously, and only at a
later stage the realizations take place.
The buyers are of two types. A fraction μ of buyers are shoppers, who know where
the cheapest price is, and they buy at the cheapest store. In case of a draw they
randomize uniformly over all cheapest stores, spreading equally among the cheap-
est stores. The rest are searchers, who sample prices. Sampling price in the ﬁrst,
randomly and uniformly selected, store is free. It is shown in (Janssen et al., 2005)
that if it is not the case then some searchers would avoid purchase, and in all other
aspects the results would be the same. If the price at the store is satisfactory - the
searcher will buy there. However, if the price is not satisfactory - the searcher will
go on to search, sequentially, in additional stores, where each additional search has
a cost c. The second (or any later) store is randomly and uniformly selected from
the previously unvisited stores, and the searcher may be satisﬁed, or search further
on. When a searcher is satisﬁed, she has a perfect and free recall. This implies she
will buy the item at the cheapest store she had encountered, randomizing uniformly
in case of a draw.
The buyers need to be at both types (namely, 0 < μ < 1). If there are only
shoppers - it is the Bertrand competition setting (Baye and Morgan, 1999), and
if there are only searchers the Diamond Paradox (Diamond, 1971) is encountered,
both well studied.
Before going on, make a technical assumption on the model. In order to avoid
measure theory problems it is assumed that mixing is possible by setting mass
points or by selecting distribution over full measure dense subsets of intervals. This
limitation allows all of the commonly used distributions and mixtures between such.
Additionally, note two very basic observations:
– Sellers cannot oﬀer a price above some ﬁnite bound M . This has the interpre-
tation of being the maximal valuation of a buyer for the good.
– Searchers accept any price below c. The logic behind it is any price below my
further search cost will be accepted, as it is not possible to reduce the cost by
searching further.
2.1. Reserve Price and Knowledge
In the symmetric Stahl model the consumers have a reserve price in NE. The reserve
price determines the behavior of consumers - the searcher is satisﬁed and searches
no further if and only if the price is (weakly) below her reserve price, unless all
stores are visited. If the price is below the reserve price - the search stops and the
consumer purchases the good, if not - the search will continue. If all prices are
above the reserve price - the cheapest store will be selected, after searching in all
stores. In order to maintain in one line with the vast literature of the model, and
being able to compare the results reserve price existence is assumed. However, one
needs to specify when and how the reserve price is determined. The reserve price
is determined simultaneously to the price strategy choice of the sellers. The reserve
price is identical to all searchers, as was also in the original model. It will be denoted
throughout the paper as PM . How the reserved price is determined is dealt with
below.
Below is the setting that allows searching, as diﬀerence in prices can provide
incentives to it. Moreover, it extends the symmetric Stahl model knowledge available
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to the searchers, as the reserve price is c above the expected price of a seller. There,
they knew the mixed strategy chosen by the sellers, and their behavior (whether
to search further or not) was adjusted accordingly. Here, as the strategies of the
sellers do not have to be identical, a price observed implies something on prices
not observed yet. After observing price p in a store, the searcher can estimate the
probability that the strategy of the seller is a speciﬁc one, and from that induce the
expected price in other stores. Therefore, it is important to introduce beliefs and
explain how exactly these are adjusted while searching.
The searchers have beliefs regarding the prices set. For each possible (pure and
mixed) strategy s of the model is attached a belief, stating how many sellers are
actually using this strategy denoted as n(s) (clearly the sum of n(s) is n, the number
of stores). Each strategy has an expected price, denoted e(s). Now, it is easy to
explain how the searcher will determine whether she searches on or not.
Suppose the searcher observed the price p. Let the probability that this price
p came from strategy s be denoted as prob(p, s). For this the searcher calculates
chance that s is selected by some seller and the probability that p is the realization of
strategy s (relevant for mixed strategies). One needs to note that if some strategies
(with positive n(s)) have a mass point on p only those will be considered, and if
there are no mass points on p the densities will play a role. Formally:
prob(p, s) =
n(s)f(s)∑
p∈s′ n(s′)p(s′)
(1)
Now, if the searcher thinks that strategy s was selected, searching further will
yield the expected price in all the other stores. Therefore, it is the expected price,
only that n(s) is now one lower (as s was observed in one of the stores). If n(s) ≤ 1
s will be simply omitted from further calculations:∑
s′:n(s′)>0,s′ 	=s n(s
′)e(s′) + [n(s)− 1]+e(s)∑′
s n(s
′)
(2)
Searchers search further only when the expected price in a search is at least c
lower than the lowest observed price. Below is an example of how to calculate an
expected search price, and additionally illustrates that no reserve price may exist:
Example 1 (Expected Search Price Calculation). Suppose the search cost c is 0.9 and
pricing strategies, equally probable from the beliefs of a searcher, are as follows:
1. Uniform in [1, 9], Exp. value of 5
2. Uniform in [5, 9], Exp. value of 7
3. Pure strategy of 7.
After observing the price of 7 one is certain with prob. 1 that she had encountered
the third strategy seller. An additional search will yield the average between the
expected values of the two strategies - namely - 6, making a search worthy.
After observing the price of 7+ε One knows that she had encountered one of the
mixed strategies, and due to a likelihood ratio - twice more probable that it is the
second strategy. Therefore, with probability 1/3 it is the ﬁrst str. and probability
2/3 the second str.
If the ﬁrst strategy was encountered, then an additional search will end up in
ether second or third strategy - both with expected price of 7.
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If it is the second strategy, then an additional search will end up with expected
price of 5 or of 7, as both can occur with equal probability (due to the beliefs)
expected price in an additional search in this case is 6.
Combining the two possibilities, when taking into account that the second case is
twice more probable, the expected price in an additional search is (2·6+7)/3 = 6.333,
making another search not proﬁtable.
Here one sees the problematic assumption of the reserve price - it might be
the case that it does not exist. However, in order to maintain in one line with the
literature I concentrate on NE with a reserve price. Therefore, when one has a
suspected a proﬁle to be a NE one still needs to check whether the searchers there
behave rationally, when adopting a reserve price. Therefore, the set of all possible
NE may be wider, as some NE without a reserve price may exist, and fall beyond
the scope of this paper.
2.2. Game Structure
The game is played between the sellers, searchers and the shoppers. The time line
of the game is as follows:
1. Sellers select pricing strategies and consumers set reserve price.
2. Realizations of prices occur for sellers with mixed strategies.
3. Shoppers go and purchase the item at the cheapest store
4. Searchers select a store and observe the price in the store
5. If the price observed is weakly below PM the searcher is satisﬁed and purchases
the item, if not the search continues
6. All unsatisﬁed searches select one additional store, pay c and sample the price
there.
7. If the price observed is below PM the searcher is satisﬁed and purchases the
item, if not the search continues
8. ...
9. When the searcher observed all stores and observed only prices above PM she
would buy at the cheapest store encountered.
When the reserve price and pricing strategies are being determined the knowl-
edge of the various agents of the game is as follows:
– Sellers are aware of the reserve price set by the searchers
– Ssearchers have beliefs about which strategies were actually played by the sellers
(see subsection 2.1.).
– Shoppers will know the real price in each store in the moment it is realized.
The probability that seller i sells to the shoppers when oﬀering price p is denoted
αi(p). Let q be deﬁned as the expected quantity that seller i sells when oﬀering
price p. The expected quantity sold by the seller consists of the expected share of
searchers that will purchase at her store, plus the probability she is the cheapest
store multiplied by the fraction of shoppers. This is also the market share of the
seller.
Note that the reserve price ensures that the searcher will purchase at the last
visited store, unless all stores were searched.
The utilities of the game are as follows:
– The seller utility is the price charged multiplied by the expected quantity sold.
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– The consumer utility is a large constant M , from which item price and search
costs are subtracted.
The NE of the game has a Bayesian structure, and is as follows:
– Searchers have a reserve price.
– The searchers beliefs coincide with the actual strategies played.
– The reserve price is rational for the searchers
– No seller can unilaterally adjust the pricing strategy and gain proﬁt in expected
terms.
Remark 1. As the sum of the searcher and seller utilities may diﬀer only in the
search cost, any strategy proﬁle where the searchers always purchase the item at
the ﬁrst store visited is socially optimal.
3. Equilibrium Structure
Before stating out the main results of the original model, a number of deﬁnitions is
required. The reserve price is denoted as PM . Additionally, a speciﬁc price denoted
as PL, and it is the price solving the following equation:
PL(μ+
1− μ
n
) = PM
1− μ
n
PL = PM
1− μ
(n− 1)μ+ 1
If the support of seller i strategy is a positive measure interval from PL to some
price pi < PM , and in addition mass point at PM , it will be said that seller i has a
cutoﬀ price of pi.
Now it is possible to describe the NE of the Stahl model:
Theorem 1. In any NE of the Stahl model with a reserve price there are at most
three groups of strategies, as follows:
1. At least two sellers who have the full support of [PL, PM ] with some NE depen-
dent continuous full support distr. function F .
2. A group of sellers (possibly empty) that select PM as a pure strategy
3. A group of sellers (possibly empty) with an individual cutoﬀ price, such that
below the cutoﬀ price the distribution used is the same F as from the ﬁrst group.
Above the cutoﬀ price there is only a mass point at PM .
Additionally, all sellers have the same proﬁt of PM (1− μ)/n.
Proof Shifted to the appendix.
Remark 2. For any combination where the third group is empty and the ﬁrst
group has at least two sellers exists a corresponding NE. Moreover, the sellers have
the same expected proﬁt of PM 1−μn and the searchers buy at the ﬁrst store they
visit. To see this simply adjust the shoppers share to reﬂect the game when only
searchers visiting the mixing sellers exist.
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Fig. 1: The three types of strategies available in a NE of the extended model
Illustration of the three types of strategies can be seen on ﬁgure 1.
Theorem proof will be provided in the appendix. However, the ﬁrst step is re-
quired to understand certain results on the extended model. Therefore, it is provided
below with a short proof. Several examples will be provided in a later section.
Before continuing I wish to provide some very basic, yet important insights,
valid also for the extended model:
Remark 3. As noted already in (Stahl, 1989), due to undercutting no pure NE
exist. This is true for the extended model too for the same reasoning.
Lemma 1. In both models, no seller oﬀers a price above PM in NE.
Let p be the highest (or supremum) price oﬀered in NE, and p > Pm. Such supremum
exists as it is assumed that there is a ﬁnite bound on the prices. Let me distinguish
between several cases:
– A unique mass point at p implies proﬁt 0 to the seller oﬀering it. Searchers would
go on searching and ﬁnd something cheaper, whereas shoppers would buy at a
cheaper price w.p. 1. A deviation to oﬀer the price c would be a proﬁtable one.
– No mass points at price p implies proﬁt 0 to all oﬀering it. In case of a supremum
price - proﬁt is arbitrarily close to 0. In such case deviation to c is proﬁtable.
– Some (but not all) oﬀer price p with a mass point. The same case as with a
single mass point: the searcher would go on searching until she ﬁnds a price
cheaper than p.
– All sellers oﬀer p with a mass point - undercutting is proﬁtable. With some
positive probability (that all oﬀer price p) you would get all the market instead
of just 1/n of it.
To sum it up - for a seller oﬀering a price p > PM there is a proﬁtable deviation in
all cases. 
unionsq
Corollary 1. Any NE is socially optimal. This is since the total utilities of the
sellers and consumers sums up to a constant, as long as the searchers buy at the
ﬁrst store they visit.
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I now show a lemma which will assist in determining the reserve price condition
for the searchers:
Lemma 2. Suppose that in a NE every seller has the expected price of at least
PM − c. Then setting PM as a reserve price is rational for the searchers.
It is not possible to observe a price above PM , therefore, the searcher always
stops searching after the ﬁrst store visited. It is still required to show that after the
ﬁrst price observed it is not rational for the searcher to continue searching.
Suppose a price q was observed. As q ≤ PM it is required to show that an
expected price in a search is at least q − c. As the expected price in a search is
a convex combination of some of the expected prices of sellers it is larger than a
lower bound on such expected values. The lower bound on these expected values
is PM − c. Therefore, the expected price obtained in an additional store is at least
PM − c > q − c, making an additional search unproﬁtable. 
unionsq
Note that the condition here is only a suﬃcient one, and it might be the case that
additional reserve prices may be rational for searchers. Therefore, the asymmetric
NE found here may do not cover all the possible NE of the model.
3.1. Equilibrium Distribution
Here I elaborate on the structure of the F function which is used in equilibrium by
sellers, and what reserve price can be used. Suppose that in equilibrium we have
B = {1, 2, . . . b} sellers with ’bottom’ strategy (mixing over entire support), T sellers
with ’top’ strategy (pure reserve price) and M = {1, 2, . . . g} sellers with ’middle’
strategy (cutoﬀ price strategy), with the cutoﬀ prices of cp1, cp2, . . . cpg and mass
points at the reserve price are with mass of a1, a2, . . . ag.
Let the set of sellers with cutoﬀ point below some price p be denoted as L(p).
From the structure of the equilibrium all sellers have equal proﬁt. Additionally,
all sellers have PM in support and the reserve price attracts no shoppers. Therefore,
the proﬁt for all sellers is:
π = PM (1− μ)/n (3)
For any price p the expected proﬁt needs to be equal to the expression above.
At price p seller i has a certain probability αi(p) to attract shoppers, if she is the
cheapest. This can be calculated as follows:
– For each seller j = i, calculate the probability that j oﬀers a price above p
– Multiply these probabilities
Let p be a price in (PL, PM ). For group O this probability is clear and equal to
1− F (p). For group T - it is zero. For group G we need to distinguish between two
cases: ether p ∈ L(p) and the probability is 1 − F (p), or p ∈ L(p) and then it is
equal a(p). Combining the cases we get that the expression for the expected proﬁt
is as follows:
π = PM (1− μ)/N = p[(1− μ)/n+ μ(
∏
j∈B∪M(p)
(1− F (p))
∏
j∈M\M(p)
(aj))] (4)
As the F function is the same we can simplify and get:
p[(1− μ)/n+ μ((1− F (p))b+|M(p)|
∏
j∈M\M(p)
(1− aj))] = PM (1 − μ)/n (5)
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Extracting F (p) form this equation will yield:
F (p) = b+|M(p)|
√
1− (PM
p
− 1) 1− μ
n
∏
j∈M\M(p)(aj)
(6)
Note that at the point of the cutoﬀ price aj(p) = 1−F (p), and therefore F will
be continuous, and as a certain expression instead of decreasing remains constant
will also be diﬀerentiable. Therefore, it is still possible to calculate the density
and expected value regularly. The last step, based on lemma 2, require ﬁnding
the expected value E(F ), and setting the reserve price at E(F ) + c. As this step
is technical and the expressions involved are in many cases cannot be explicitly
calculated. This step is not done here for the general case, and at the section with
examples speciﬁc cases are provided.
4. NE Example
Consider the Stahl model with 3 sellers and a shoppers fraction of μ = 1/4.
The following asymmetric NE exists:
– The searchers have a reserve price of PM = c/(1− ln2) > c and PL = PM/2.
– One of the sellers oﬀers the reserve price as a pure strategy.
– The other two sellers use a continuous distribution function F (p) = 2 − PM/p
on [PM/2, PM ]
Note that 1/4 is the mass of searchers visiting each of the stores initially.
The pure str. agent receives the proﬁt of PM/4.
Suppose the mixed str. agent selects a price p ∈ [PL, PM ). Then, her expected
proﬁt would be:
p(
1− F (p)
4
+
1
4
) =
p
4
(2− F (p)) = p
4
PM
p
=
PM
4
(7)
Clearly, if the pure str. agent selects a price in (PL, PM ) her prob. to sell to shoppers
is (1−F (p))2 < (1−F (p), and therefore, such deviation is not proﬁtable. Similarly,
selecting PL would lead to the same proﬁt as selecting PM .
Any agent selecting prices above PM would not sell to anyone, and selecting a
price below PL yields less proﬁt.
One last thing to check is the searcher condition. Suﬃcient for this would be to
check that the expected price of the mixed str. seller is at least PM − c.
The density function, which is the derivative of the distribution function, is
PM/p
2. Therefore, the expected value is:
E(F ) =
∫ PM
PM/2
pf(p) =
∫ PM
PM/2
PM/p = PM (ln(PM/PL)) = PM (ln2) (8)
Thus, the expected price of a mixing seller, E(F ) = PM ln2. Since PM (1− ln2) =
c, it is easy to see that PM − E(F ) = c, or PM − c = E(F ) as required.
If a searcher did not observe the price of PM but a lower one, she know that she
had encountered a mixed price agent. Additional search will yield with prob. 0.5
another mixed agent with expected price of PM −c, or prob. 0.5 of a pure agent and
price PM . Combined - expected price in an additional search is PM − c/2, making
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the additional search not proﬁtable after observing a price below PM , due to the
search price c.
If a searcher observed a price of PM she know that she encountered a pure str.
seller, and if she searches further she will get the expected price of PM − c. Here the
searcher is indiﬀerent whether to search on or not. Therefore, it is an equilibrium.
5. Discussion and Summary
The three types of strategies in the NE have some economic motivation. The mixing
seller wishes to compete over the shoppers when the pure reserve price seller does not
to bother with the shoppers. Those kind of behavior are common in the economic
world, and not in all cases all will compete as predicted by the symmetric NE. If
only a single seller decides to compete, she will have monopolistic proﬁts, which
would attract additional competitors, and therefore, in NE at least two sellers will
compete for the shoppers.
The cutoﬀ price is for sellers that do not wish to be bothered with small probabil-
ities. There are several eﬀects that may cause a seller to refrain from suﬃciently low
probability events, for example see (Barron and Yechiam, 2009). Then, such seller
will compete for shoppers, but only at prices that yield the beneﬁt of getting the
shoppers from high enough probability. When the probability to attract shoppers is
lower than this individual threshold, the seller prefers to refrain from the shoppers
market and select the reserve price with mass point instead.
The structure of NE allow to run several empiric tests on a database containing
pricing and chain size data. Sellers may play an asymmetric NE, and the results
here suggest some diﬀerences from the classical Stahl Model. There will be a higher
probability for reserve price. In any asymmetric NE some sellers select the reserve
price with a mass point. This implies that the reserve price will be more commonly
selected. Similarly, larger discounts will be more rare, as the reserve price will be
more common.
The results here open several important questions, which leave place for a fruitful
future research. Firstly, the assumption here is that a reserve price exists. There may
be additional NE without a reserve price, and an interesting question is whether
such exist and how do these look like. This will allow to fully characterize all NE of
the model and fully explain behavior of sellers. An additional question is combined
with the determination of the reserve price. What is the full set of reserve prices
under a certain setting, as here only a lemma provides a suﬃcient condition for the
rationality of it. Moreover, which reserve price will the consumers set in order to
minimize their price. On the other hand - with which NE should the sellers respond.
What is the best NE for sellers and what is the best NE for consumer, will sellers
prefer to mix, or to have a speciﬁc cutoﬀ price? This question of consumer welfare
and seller welfare will provide an important insight on behavior of these groups,
and can provide a policy decision for a regulator in order to set the price lower or
higher.
The Stahl model is a very important tool and the model is being used and applied
in numerous papers. I hope that this paper provides an additional important insight
which will make the Stahl model more applicable and more realistic. Additionally,
any of the further research topics suggested here will provide yet another important
block to the model, and to explaining behavior of consumers and sellers.
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A Omitted Proofs
Here I show the proof to theorem 1. This is shown in a sequence of lemmas, ﬁrst
dealing with the regular Stahl model and then dealing with the extended model.
A1. Mass Points and Highest oﬀered Price
Lemma 3. There are no mass points at any price that can attract shoppers with
positive prob.
If at price q there is a mass point by a single seller i, price just above it is strictly less
proﬁtable for all others, and therefore would not be selected, as there the chance
to attract shoppers drops discontinuously. Thus, seller i can set the mass point
higher and gain more proﬁt. In the case of mass points by several sellers at price
p undercutting is possible, which probability to attract shoppers discontinuously.
Therefore, there are no mass points at prices that can attract shoppers. 
unionsq
Lemma 4. All sellers select PM as the supremum point of their strategy support.
From lemma 1 it cannot be higher than PM .
Suppose that the supremum price of seller i is p < PM . For any price above
p and below PM the probability to sell to shoppers is 0. Therefore, in equilibrium
no seller would select a price in (p, PM ). Additionally, suppose that seller i has the
lowest support supremum.
All sellers cannot have a mass point at p, as in such case undercutting would
be proﬁtable. From previous lemma seller i has no mass point at price p. Thus,
probability to sell to shoppers at price p is 0, for all other shoppers, and no other
seller would have a mass point at this price. Therefore, a deviation exists to seller
i, where i selects prices arbitrarily close to PM instead of prices arbitrarily close to
p is proﬁtable. 
unionsq
Remark 4. Note that this implies equal proﬁt to all sellers in any equilibrium, or
all but one have equal and one higher.
If at least two sellers do not have a mass point at PM the probability that
shoppers buy at PM is 0. Moreover, if only one seller has no mass point at PM she
has weakly higher proﬁt than all other sellers.
The two lemmas combined imply that there can be no mass points at any price
except for PM .
A2. Single Interval and Proﬁt Equivalence
Deﬁnition 1. Let αi(p) be denoted as the probability that p is the cheapest price,
if seller i selects it. Explicitly: what is the probability of seller i to sell to shoppers
given she selects price p. As the distribution is with no mass points except (maybe)
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PM , one can deﬁne αi(p) as the product of ’Probability that seller j sets price above
p’, which is denoted as βj(p). Formally:
βj(p) = 1− Fj(p) (9)
αj(p) =
∏
j 	=i
βj(p) (10)
Lemma 5. Exists an interval I such that the union of the seller strategies is con-
tained in I and dense in it.
Suppose exists an interval [a, b] (a < b < PM ) such that sellers select prices
only below a and above b, and exist prices both below a and above b. Let p− be
the highest price below a that is in the support union of the sellers. A seller can
deviate from p− and prices just below it to b, and sellers arbitrarily close to all of
her previous quantity:
The searchers behavior does not change, as the prices are below PM . Since the
probability for someone to select a price just below p is arbitrarily small, the decrease
in probability to sell to shoppers is arbitrarily small.
The proﬁt form raising the price is much higher than such arbitrarily small loss,
as it is at least (b−p)(1−μ)/n, as the searchers pay strictly more after the deviation.
Therefore, if the support is not continuous there is a proﬁtable deviation. 
unionsq
Corollary 2. Exists an interval I = [PL, PM ], such that any NE strategy proﬁle
the sellers randomize continuously over I, and possibly some sellers set mass points
at PM .
Lemma 6. The previous lemma holds also for two sellers. Meaning - any interval
has a non empty intersection with the support of at least two sellers.
Suppose that all points in an interval [p, p′] (p <′ p < PM ) are selected at most by
one seller. Additionally, from previous lemma this seller needs to have in support
the entire interval. Than exists a proﬁtable deviation for her would be to set a mass
point at p′ instead of selecting the original distribution over the interval. 
unionsq
Corollary 3. Any interval between PL and PM has points in the support of at least
two sellers.
Lemma 7. All sellers have the same proﬁt.
The only case that needed to be shown is as follows: If n− 1 sellers have the same
proﬁt, the other seller cannot have a proﬁt above them. It was shown before that
if at least two sellers do not have mass points at PM all sellers have equal proﬁt. If
only one seller has no mass point at PM then she must have a higher proﬁt. This is
since she can always deviate to a pure strategy oﬀering PM .
Suppose seller i is the only seller who does not oﬀer a mass point at PM . Let pi
be the lowest (inﬁmum if needed) price in the support of i. As it has a higher proﬁt
than all other players this price cannot be the lowest price in the support union.
Note that due to previous lemmas seller i sets no mass point at pi, Fi(pi) = 0. If
no seller selects a price below pi then it is not possible for seller i to have a higher
proﬁt than other sellers, as other sellers could get the same proﬁt as i gets with pi.
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Denote a seller j = i, and examine the proﬁts of seller i and j. As noted before,
πi > π(j).
The proﬁt of seller i oﬀering pi is (remember all searchers visit exactly one store):
πi(pi) = pi((1 − Fj(p)
∏
k 	=i,j
(1− Fk(pi))μ+ (1− μ)/n) (11)
The proﬁt of seller j:
πj(pi) = pi((1 − Fi(p)
∏
k 	=i,j
(1− Fk(pi))μ+ (1− μ)/n) (12)
Since 0 = Fi(pi) ≤ Fj(pi) the proﬁt of j when oﬀering pi is weakly higher than the
proﬁt of i when oﬀering pi. This contradicts the fact that seller i must have a higher
proﬁt than seller j. 
unionsq
I have shown that the support union is equal to some interval I. Let PL be the
lowest price in this interval. As the mixing sellers need to be indiﬀerent between all
the strategies they mix one can say that:
PL =
(1− μ)/n
μ+ (1 − μ)/nPM (13)
Clearly, the searchers do not search at this price, as PL is the cheapest price that
can exist in EQ. Additionally, when a seller selects this price she is certain to sell
to shoppers.
A3. Symmetry
In this subsection I will discuss the symmetries in the NE distribution functions,
and see where they can diﬀer.
Lemma 8. The following inequality needs to be satisﬁed for any p ∈ (PL, PM ):
p(αi(p)μ+
1− μ
n
) ≤ PM (1− μ
n
) (14)
If it is strictly larger than price p will be more proﬁtable than PM , which due
to previous lemmas cannot occur in NE. Moreover, if seller i selects price p there
must be an equality, as the proﬁt i gets from any price she selects has to be equal
to PM (1−μn ). 
unionsq
The following observation will be crucial in understanding the asymmetric NE:
Corollary 4. Only the seller(s) with the maximal α among the sellers may select
the corresponding price.
Note that since there are no mass points α and β change continuously, except
possibly at PM . Note that at PM the α of each seller approaches 0 continuously as
PM is approached, as the probability to sell to shoppers with price PM is 0. Adding
the fact that there are no mass points below PM , it is clear that α a continuous
function.
Lemma 9. Let I be an open interval in [PL, PM ]. Suppose that seller i selects a
price in I with some positive probability. Let j be a diﬀerent seller. Then, also seller
j must select a price from I with same positive probability, or not to select any
prices in or above the interval I, except PM .
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From previous lemma it is known that each interval is selected by at least two
sellers, and done so without mass points. Note that the only way to select elements
continuously is to select a dense subset of an interval.
Assume that seller i sets a positive probability to a dense subset of I = (p′, p∗),
whereas seller j does not select any prices in this interval. Let p ∈ I.
Note that βi is strictly decreasing in the neighborhood of p, and βj remains
constant there. This is since i select prices in the neighborhood of p and j not.
Note that from the deﬁnition it is known that αi/βj = αj/βi. Since βi is de-
creasing and βj , and conclude that αj is decreasing more rapidly then αi.
Therefore, for any price p ∈ I, the ratio of the parameters is αi(p) > αj(p),
except maybe the inﬁmum of the interval.
Similarly, if both i and j do not select prices in an interval then αi and αj
decrease in such interval at the same rate.
Let pˆ be the inﬁmum of an interval that is to the right of I, and is selected by
j. For pˆ, the α parameters need to satisfy αj(p) ≥ αi(p). If both select this price -
equality, if only j does so - weak inequality.
Note that at p the opposite inequality holds, and in all points between p and
pˆ, the parameter βj is decreasing less than βi. Since all the α’s and β’s change
continuously everywhere except PM , it is the case that j cannot oﬀer such prices.
Concluding, if a seller does not select an interval within [PL, PM ) she would not
select any price above it, except possibly PM , where the equation holds due to zero
probability to sell to shoppers. 
unionsq
As shown in Lemma 2, for the reserve price to make sense, the following condition
is suﬃcient: The expected price of a seller is at least PL − c.
Combining the lemmas the theorem 1 is obtained.
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Abstract In the present paper the game theory is applied to an impor-
tant open question in economics: providing microfoundations for often-used
types of production function. Simple diﬀerential games of bargaining are
proposed to model a behavior of workers and capital-owners in processes of
formation of possible factor prices and participants’ weights (moral-ethical
assessments). These games result, correspondingly, in a factor price curve
and a weight curve – structures dual to a production function. Ultimately,
under constant bargaining powers of the participants, the Cobb-Douglas
form of the production function is received.
Keywords: bargaining, diﬀerential games, production factors, choice of
technology, duality, production function.
1. Introduction
It is well known that the acceptance of concrete types of production functions in
economics, such as the Cobb-Douglas and the CES forms, was rather occasional and
till now not enough attempts have been made to explain and justify the wide used
types of production function – e.g. (Matveenko, 1997; Acemoglu, 2003; Jones, 2005;
Lagos, 2006; Nakamura, 2009; Matveenko, 2010; Dupuy, 2012). In the paper mod-
els resulting in the Cobb-Douglas production function are constructed on base of
diﬀerential games of bargaining and by use of dual relations in production and distri-
bution. A simple diﬀerential game of price bargaining is introduced as a benchmark
and then is modiﬁed to a diﬀerential game of bargaining for prices of capital and
labor and to a diﬀerential game of weights (moral-ethical assessments of the factor
owners. Each of these three diﬀerential games exploits one or another of duality
relations existing in the economy (cf. (Cornes, 1992)).
One of the duality relations used in the paper is usually represented as the duality
between the production function Y = F (K,L) and the cost function C(pK , pL, Y ).
The ﬁrst of these functions shows the maximal output in dependence on production
factors: capital and labor, while the second one shows the minimal cost in depen-
dence on prices of the production factors and the output. We study a similar duality
by use of the well-known representation of the production function by use of the
Euler theorem:
F (K.L) =
∂F
∂K
K +
∂F
∂L
L = p(x)x,
where x = (K,L)′ is the vector of production factors (capital and labor) and
p(x) = (∂F/∂K, ∂F/∂L) is the corresponding price vector (the vector of marginal
 The research was supported by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research (grant 11-
01-00878a).
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products). There exists a set Π of the price vectors corresponding the production
function, such that the Euler theorem can be written in the "extremal" version:
F (K,L) = min
p∈Π
px, (1)
which means that the production function represents a result of a choice of the
price vector from the set Π . Let M = {x : F (x) = 1} be the unit level line of the
production function F . A conjugate problem for (1) is the problem of a choice of the
bundle of production factors x = (K,L) from the set M to provide a unit output
with minimal cost:
F ∗(p) = min
x∈M
px.
Rubinov (Rubinov and Glover, 1998; Rubinov, 2000) introduced some other types
of duality using instead of the usual inner product its analogues, such as Leontief
function mini=1,...,n lixi. Notably, the latter is similar to the inner product but uses
the idempotent operation of summation:
⊕
= min. Matveenko (1997; 2010) and
Jones (2005) found a representation for neoclassical production functions which re-
minds (1) but uses the Leontief function as an inner product; in the two factor
case:
F (K,L) = max
l∈Ψ
min{lKK, lLL}.
In Section 2 we introduce the benchmark diﬀerential game of price bargaining.
In Section 3 a diﬀerential game of factor price curve formation is considered. In
Section 4 a diﬀerential game of weight curve formation is studied which, together
with the model in Section 3, provides a foundation for the Cobb-Douglas production
function. Section 5 concludes.
2. Benchmark diﬀerential game of price bargaining
The term bargain relates both to a process of bargaining and to a result of this
process. Both sides of bargaining are being studied in the bargaining theory – a
special chapter of the game theory, However, traditionally, the bargaining theory
deals more with results of bargains rather than with processes of bargaining. Nash
(1950) proposed a system of axioms leading to a so called symmetric Nash bargain-
ing solution; later an asymmetric solution was found and axiomatized . For the re-
views of the axiomatic approach in the bargaining see (Roth, 1979; Thomson, 1994;
Serrano, 2008). The models of processes of bargaining are usually based on as-
sumptions concerning economic beneﬁts gained by participants under one or other
running of the process of bargaining (see (Muthoo, 1999)). For example, a partic-
ipant can bear some costs connected with the duration of the bargaining process.
In practice, however, in many cases the course of a bargaining process depends in
much not on expectations of economic beneﬁts by participants but on their skills to
bargain (see (Schelling, 1956; Blainey, 1988)). These skills can be associated with
bargaining powers of the participants. The notion of bargaining power is often used
in game theory, though, diﬀerent authors put diﬀerent sense into this notion . In this
Section we propose a simple diﬀerential game as a model of a bargaining process. In
diﬀerent versions of the game the bargaining powers of the players are either given
exogenously or are deﬁned endogenously in the game itself.
In the benchmark example of bargaining (Muthoo, 1999) an object is on sale
(e.g. a house). A seller (player S) wishes to sell the house for a price exceeding
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p¯0S(the latter is the minimal price acceptable for player S). A buyer (player B) is
ready to purchase the house for a price not exceeding p¯0B (the maximal acceptable
price for player B). Here p¯0B > p¯
0
S , what ensures the possibility of the bargain. The
seller starts from a start price, pS(0) > p¯0S , and then decreases her price, while
the buyer simultaneously starts from a price pB(0) < p¯0B and then increases her
price. It is assumed, naturally, that pB(0) < pS(0) . A price trajectory pB(t), pS(t)
formed in continuous time stops at a moment T when pB(T ) = pS(T ). It follows
that pB(t) < pS(t) for t ∈ [0, T ) . The selling price will be referred as p∗ . A surplus
of the selling price over (under) the minimal (maximal) admissible price of a player
can be considered as the player’s utility:
uS = p
∗ − p¯0S , uB = p¯0B − p∗. (2)
A set Ω of all possible pairs of utilities on plane (uB, uS) is
Ω = {(uB, uS) : uB + uS = p¯0B − p¯0S , uB, uS ≥ 0}.
A simplest model of price bargaining appears under an assumption that each player
i = B,S changes her price with a constant velocity equal to the bargaining power
of her opponent. A strong opponent forces the player to change her price faster:
pS(t) = pS(0)− bBt, pB(t) = pB(0) + bSt.
The game stops at the moment T which is found from equation:
pS(0)− bBT = pB(0) + bST,
i.e. at the moment
T =
pS(0)− pB(0)
bS + bB
when the selling price is:
p∗ = pS(T ) = pB(T ) =
bS
bS + bB
pS(0) +
bB
bS + bB
pB(0). (3)
So, the selling price is the convex combination of the start prices proposed by the
players summed with weights equal to their relative bargaining powers. If each player
i knows the minimal (maximal) price accessible for the opponent and establishes it
as her start price, then the play stops at the moment:
T =
p¯0B − p¯0S
bS + bB
with the selling price:
p∗ =
bS
bS + bB
p¯0B +
bB
bS + bB
p¯0S
and with the utilities of the players equal to
ui =
bi
bS + bB
(p¯0B − p¯0S), i = B,S. (4)
Theorem 1. Price p∗ corresponds the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution of the
bargaining problem under utilities (2) and bargaining powers bS , bB .
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Proof. The asymmetric Nash bargaining solution is here a solution of the problem
of maximization of the function ubBB u
bS
S on the set Ω . The ﬁrst order optimality con-
dition, bBuS + bSuB, and the constraint, uB+uS = p¯0B− p¯0S , deﬁne the asymmetric
Nash bargaining solution is found, which coincides with (4)).
The case when the players change prices under constant growth rates (rather than
constant velocities) is similar. Since the growth rate of price is the velocity of chang-
ing the logarithm of the price, an equation similar to (3) is fulﬁlled: the bargaining
stops under a price the logarithm of which is equal to the convex combination of the
logarithms of the start prices with weights equal to the relative bargaining powers
of the players.
In a more complex case the velocity of changing price by a player depends on the
actions of her opponent. If the seller decreases her price slowly then the buyer also
increases her price slowly because she does not want the game to stop on a too high
price. Similarly, if the buyer increases her price slowly then the seller decreases her
price slowly. Let the growth rates of price change, gi = p˙ipi , i = B,S , be constant.
The bargaining power of player i can be deﬁned as the value inverse to |gi| :
bB =
1
gB
, bS = − 1
gS
.
Then
gB
gS
= − bS
bB
,
i.e.
dpB
dpS
pS
pB
= −bB
bS
= const,
The game interpretation of this diﬀerential equation is the following. Each player i
chooses a control gi , and the controls are connected by the relation:
gB ≥ |gS| bS
bB
,
which means that in the bargaining process the faster the seller decreases her price
the faster the buyer increases hers. Moreover, a higher bargaining power of the buyer
relaxes this constraint (this means a lower degree of reaction to the opponent’s
actions), and a higher bargaining power of the seller reinforces the constraint. At
the same time the seller is limited by the opposite constraint:
gS ≥ |gB|bB
bS
,
which means that the faster the buyer increases her price the faster the seller de-
creases hers. An increased bargaining power of the buyer forces the seller to diminish
her price faster, and an increased own bargaining power allows the seller to dimin-
ish her price slower. Simultaneous fulﬁllment of inequalities (7) and (8) implies the
Equation (6).
3. Bargaining for production factor prices and corresponding choice of
technologies
In the just described benchmark diﬀerential game the players change their proposals
concerning the same price. Now we turn to diﬀerential games in which the interests
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of the players relate to diﬀerent prices. At each moment of time one of the players
attacks, another one defends. Only the attacker is satisﬁed by the direction of her
price change while the defender hinders changes in her price.
In the present Section the following pair of dual objects will be under consider-
ation:
(i) a neoclassical production function F (K,L) which is characterized by its factor
curve: M = {(K,L) : F (K,L) = 1}, i.e. the set of bundles of resources allowing the
unit output, and
(ii) the factor price curve Π = {(pK , pL)} i.e. the set of such bundles of prices
under which the unit output under unit costs is possible.
3.1. Usual causality
Given production function F (K,L), the price curve Π can be found from the fol-
lowing system of equations:
F (K,L) = 1, (5)
pKK + pLL = 1, (6)
∂F/∂K
∂F/∂L
=
pK
pL
. (7)
Equations (5) and (6) are conditions of the unit output under unit costs. Equation
(7) is a condition of eﬃciency of production; it can be interpreted as a condition of
output maximization under given costs.
The system (5)-(6) establishes a one-to-one correspondence between points of
the factor curve, M , and points of the factor price curve, Π . Indeed, by the Euler
theorem, the Equation (9) can be written as
∂F
∂K
K +
∂F
∂L
L = 1, (8)
then Equations (6)-(7) imply:
∂F
∂K
= pK ,
∂F
∂L
= pL. (9)
In particular, for the Cobb-Douglas production function, F (K,L) = AKαL1−α
, the system (9) takes the form:
αKα−1L1−α = pK ,
(1 − α)AKαL1−α = pL.
Excluding the ratio K/L from these two equations we ﬁnd the factor price curve:
BpαKp
1−α
L = 1
where B = A−1α−α(1− α)−(1−α).
For the CES function F (K,L) = (α(AKK)p + (1 − α)(ALL)p) 1p where p ∈
(−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1) the system (13) takes the form:
αApK(αA
p
K + (1− α)K−p(ALL)p)
1
p−1 = pK ,
(1− α)ApL(α(AKK)pL−p + (1− α)ApL)
1
p−1 = pL.
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Excluding K−pLp from these equations we receive, after some transformations, the
following equation of the factor price curve in form of CES function:
B
[
β
(
pK
AK
)q
+ (1− β)
(
pL
AL
)q]1/q
= 1,
where
B = (α
1
1−p + (1 − α) 11−p ) p−1p , β = α
1
1−p
α
1
1−p + (1− α) 11−p
, q =
p
1− p .
3.2. Reversed causality
Usual causality, considered in the previous Subsection, presupposes that the prices
are primarily determined by the physical side of production - physical technologies
and available bundles of production resources. However, another direction of causal-
ity is possible: institutions, reﬂected by the prices, can deﬁne which products have
to be produced and by use of which technologies. We propose now a model in which
the factor price curve, Π , is deﬁned in a pure institutional way. This model belongs
to a class of island models - such where partially independent segments of a market
are considered.
There are two types of agents: workers and entrepreneurs. A single product is
produced in a continuum of segments – islands, some of them are "inhabited" by
the agents of both types. On each of the inhabited islands in each moment of time
there are deﬁnite prices of labor and capital in terms of the product. In random
moments of time from randomly chosen islands either a part of workers or a part of
entrepreneurs moves to an uninhabited island. Since this moment the prices in the
inhabited island are ﬁxed. After that a part of the other social group also moves
to the "new" island and there the groups start bargaining about the factor prices.
Those who have come ﬁrst possess an advantage and try to increase their factor
price - they attack. Those who have come later try not to allow their factor price
to fall too much - they defend. As start prices in the bargaining process the groups
use the prices in the "old" island at the moment when the ﬁrst group left. It is
assumed that the social groups always have constant bargaining powers, bK , bL .
Weakening this assumption is left for a future research. Opposed to the case of the
selling/purchasing bargaining game considered in Section 2, now the prices relate
to diﬀerent goods (labor and capital). The attacker, a, is interested in maximizing
the growth rate of her factor price while the defender, d, is interested in minimizing
(the module of) the growth rate of her factor price. In the simplest case, similarly
to the case considered in Section 2, it can be assumed that players have constant
growth rates of their factor prices, gi = p˙i/pi, where ga > 0 for the attacker; gd < 0
for the defender; and the price growth rates are linked with the bargaining powers
by the equation:
|gd| = ba
bd
ga.
According to this equation, a higher relative bargaining power bd/ba of the defender
allows her to reach a slower decline in her factor price, i.e. a smaller |gd| . Vice versa,
an increase in the bargaining power of the attacker forces the defender to agree to a
larger decline in her factor price. Equation (14) describing the price change process
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turns into:
dpa
dpd
= − bd
ba
= const,
which can be written as
dpK
pK
bK = −dpL
pL
bL.
Solving this diﬀerential equation we receive the price curve Π :
pbKK p
bL
L = C. (10)
If initially the price vector belongs the curve Π given a constant C then the vector
stays in the same curve further.
To describe the strategic behavior of the players in more details, let the attacker’s
problem be to maximize her price growth rate, ga , under the following constraint:
|gd| ≥ ga ba
bd
,
and, correspondingly, let the defender’s problem be to minimize the module of her
price growth rate, gd, under (17). The inequality (17) means that the attacker forces
the defender to increase her price reduction rate. An increased bargaining power of
the attacker reinforces this constraint, while an increase in the bargaining power of
the defender relaxes it. There exists a continuum of Nash equilibria, (ga, gd) , and
all of them satisfy the equation
ga
|gd| =
bd
ba
This equation, independently on which player (K or L) is the attacker, leads to the
price curve (10). Now let us show in what way the price curve (16) leads to the Cobb-
Douglas type of production function. We will use the representation of neoclassical
production function by use of a menu of Leontief technologies (Matveenko, 1997;
Matveenko, 2010; Jones, 2005). Matveenko (2010) has shown that to each neoclassi-
cal production function F (K,L) a unique technological menu Ψ corresponds which
consists of eﬀectiveness coeﬃcients of the Leontief function and is such that
F (K,L) = max
l∈Ψ
min{lKK, lLL}.
Moreover, there exists a simple one-to-one correspondence between the points (K,L) ∈
M of the factor curve and the points l ∈ Ψ of the technological menu:
(lK , lL) ∈ Ψ ⇔
(
1
lK
,
1
lL
)
= (K˜, L˜) ∈ M.
The function
F ◦(lK , lL) =
1
F
(
1
lK
, 1lL
)
is referred to as a conjugate (polar) function. Representation (18) follows from the
following Lemma.
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Lemma 1. Let F (x1, x2, ..., xn) be an increasing positively homogeneous of 1st power
function of n positive variables, M - its unit level set, and Ψ - the unit level set of
the conjugate function:
M = {x : F (x1, x2, ..., xn) = 1},
Ψ = {l : F
(
1
l1
,
1
l2
, ...,
1
ln
)
= 1}.
Then
F (x1, x2, ..., xn) = max
l∈Ψ
min{l1x1, l2x2, ..., lnxn}.
See proof in (Matveenko, 2010).
When a pair of prices is deﬁned on an island, the island chooses a suitable
technology on base of one or another pure economic criterion (eﬃciency) or an
institutional criterion (fairness). We assume that the whole set ("cloud") of available
Leontief technologies is extensive enough to include all those technologies which any
islands would choose to use. The technological menu Ψ is narrower and consists of
those technologies which would be chosen. Below three mechanisms of choice are
identiﬁed resulting in the same technological menu Ψ and the factor curve .
Mechanism A. Given factor prices p0K , p
0
L , an island chooses such Leontief tech-
nology (lK , lL) which guarantees receiving factor shares equal to the relative bar-
gaining powers of the social groups : α = bKbK+bL for the capital and 1− α = bLbK+bL
for the labor. For this technology, such volumes of factors K˜, L˜ exist for which:
lKK˜ = lLL˜ = 1− α = 1, p0KK˜ = α, p0LL˜ = 1− α.
Such kind of choice of the Leontief technologies by all islands results in the following
factor curve:
M = {(K,L) : pKK = α, pLL = 1− α, (pK , pL) ∈ Π} = {(K,L) : AKαL1−α},
where A = Cαα(1−α
1−α
. Thus, the Leontief technologies chosen by all the islands
deﬁne the Cobb-Douglas production function: F (K,L) = AKαL1−α.
Mechanism B. Given factor prices p0K , p
0
L , an island chooses such Leontief tech-
nology (lK , lL) = ( 1K0 ,
1
L0 ) which is competitive in the sense that, under this tech-
nology, the cost of the unit production on the island is equal to 1, while the cost
on any other island is greater than 1. So, the usage of this technology is proﬁtable
only on the present island. In other words,
p0KK
0 + p0LL
0 = 1 < pKK
0 + pLL
0
for any bundle of prices pK , pL ∈ Π, (pK , pL) = (p0K , p0L). It follows that p0K , p0L is a
solution for the problem:
min
(pK ,pL)∈Π
(pKK
0 + pLL
0).
The ﬁrst order optimality condition for this problem is:
p0LL
0
p0KK
0
=
1− α
α
,
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and we come to the Mechanism A.
Mechanism C. Given factor prices p0K , p
0
L , an island chooses a Leontief technol-
ogy (lK , lL) (or, what is equivalent, (K,L) ∈ M ) ensuring fulﬁllment of a fairness
principle:
max
(K,L)∈M
min{p
0
KK
bK
,
p0L
bL
},
which is analogous to the Rawlsian maximin principle: a gain of the most hurt agent
has to be maximized. Here the gain of an agent is her revenue but with account of
her bargaining power: a participant’s gain increases if her relative bargaining power
increases. The solution is characterized by the equation:
p0KK˜
bK
=
p0LL˜
bL
,
hence,
p0LL˜
p0KK˜
=
1− α
α
,
and again we come to the Mechanism A.
4. Diﬀerential game of weights formation
In this Section we provide a microfoundation for the Mechanism A decribed in
Section 3. We propose a diﬀerential game in which the players (workers and capital-
owners) form a weight curve - a set of possible assessments (weights); the curve is
used by an arbiter to choose a vector of weights in a concrete bargain.
Three common features present in many real bargains and negotiations. Firstly,
it is a presence of an arbiter in which role often a community acts, in a framework
of which the bargainers interact. Examples are so called ’international community’,
including governments and elites of countries, and diﬀerent international organiza-
tions; a ’collective’ or a union in a ﬁrm; a local community; a ’scientiﬁc community’,
etc. The community acts as an arbiter realizing a control for bargains in such way
that unfair, from the point of view of the arbiter, bargains are less possible, at
least as routine ones. An outcome of an unfair bargain can be, with a help of the
arbiter, revised, if not formally than through a conﬂict. Such conﬂicts rather often
arise, both on a local and on a national levels, as well as in international relations.
Secondly, bargains inside a ﬁxed set of participants are often not ’one-shot’ but
represent a routine repeated process in which a ’public opinion’ of the community
is important; and the latter is being formed along with the bargains. Usually it is
unknown in advance what concrete bargains will take place and in what time, and
the process of formation of the public opinion processes uninterruptedly to prepare
it for future bargains. The public opinion can be modeled as a set of the vectors
of weights - the moral-ethical assessments which can be used by the arbiter as co-
eﬃcients for the participants’ utilities . Possibilities of formation of public opinion
are limited both by possibilities of access to media and by image-making abilities of
the participants. Thirdly, the moral-ethical assessments formed by participants are
usually not univalent, but allow a variance: the public opinion practically always
can stress both positive and negative features of a participant; concrete weights
diﬀer in diﬀerent concrete bargains depending on circumstances. Thus, it can be
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useful to speak not about a single vector of weights but rather about a curve (in
case of two participants) or a surface of admissible assessments.
Thus, the public opinion can be modeled as a weight curve (or a weight surface).
In its approval or disapproval of a possible result of a concrete bargain the arbiter
acts in accordance with a Rawlsian-type maximin principle, paying attention to the
most infringed participant, but taking into account admissible vectors of weights
for utilities, the set of which is formed in advance by the participants.
We consider a two stage game. On the ﬁrst stage, two players (workers and
capital-owners) form a curve Λ = (λK , λL consisting of vectors of admissible rep-
utational assessments (weights). On the second stage, for a concrete bargain, an
arbiter (community) chooses an admissible pair of weights from the weight curve
and divides the product Y among the players (Y = YK+YL) to achieve the maximin
max
y∈Ω
max
λ∈Λ
min{λKYK , λLYL}, (11)
where
Ω = {y = (YK , YL) : Y = YK + YL}
is the set of outputs.
Let us describe the ﬁrst stage of the game in detail. A player’s gain depends
negatively on her weight and depends positively on the opponent’s weight . Hence,
each player is interested in decreasing her weight and in increasing the opponent’s
weight. However, in the process of the weight curve formation, the player i would
agree to a decrease in the opponent’s weight in some part of Λ at the expense of an
increase in her own weight, as far as the opponent similarly temporizes in another
part of Λ. Since the system of weights is essential only to within a multiplicative
constant, the players can start the formation of the weight curve Λ from an arbitrary
pair of weights and then construct parts of the curve to the left and to the right
of the initial point. The player who attacks maximizes, at each moment of time,
the module of her weight’s growth rate while the defender minimizes her weight’s
growth rate. This takes place under the following constraint:
|ga| ≤ gd ba
bd
, (12)
which means that a higher bargaining power of the attacker helps her to enlarge
the constraint, while an increase in the bargaining power of the defender makes the
constraint stricter.
In equilibrium (12) is fulﬁlled as an equality. Thus, the constancy of the bar-
gaining powers of the participants implies :
dλL
dλK
λK
λL
= −bK
bL
= const. (13)
The more the bargaining power of a player is the better reputational assessment she
gains for herself. Solving the diﬀerential equation (13) we receive the weight curve
λ :
λbKK λ
bL
L = C = const.
Now we turn to the second stage of the game.
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Lemma 2. For each outcome, the following equality is valid:
maxλ∈Λmin{λKYK , λLYL} = AY
bK
bK+bL
K Y
bL
bK+bL
L ,
where A = const.
Proof. It follows from Lemma 1 when it is applied to the set Λ.
According to (14), the solution of the arbiter’s problem (11) is none other than
the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution.
It is easily seen that the players receive shares proportional to their bargaining
powers. This provides a support to the Mechanism A described in Section 3. This
mechanism, as we have seen there, generates the Cobb-Douglas production function.
Notice, that a constancy of bargaining powers can explain a constancy of factor
shares in some countries on a deﬁnite stage of their development.
5. Conclusion
In this paper a new approach is proposed for understanding a relation between
a physical side of economy (resources and technologies) and its institutional side
(distributional relations between social groups). The idea of the models presented
here is that the distributional behavior can be described by a diﬀerential game of
bargaining.
Three diﬀerential games are proposed to describe a behavior of economic agents
in processes of prices and weights formation. In the benchmark model of price bar-
gaining players are interested in changing the same price in opposite directions. It
is shown that under some conditions this game leads to the Nash bargaining solu-
tion. This benchmark game is modiﬁed to games in which players change (diﬀerent)
prices of their owned resources or change weights (moral-ethical assessments). One
of these games describes bargaining of workers and capital-owners for their factor
prices. In another game the same players bargain for weights (moral-ethical assess-
ments); these weights enter a Rawlsian-type criterion which is used by an arbiter
(community) in concrete bargains. These games result in construction of structures
– a price curve in one case and a weight curve in another – which are dual to the pro-
duction function. Ultimately, under constant bargaining powers of the participants,
these games lead to the Cobb-Douglas form of production function.
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Abstract A non-cooperative four-person game which is related to the queue-
ing system M/M/2 is considered. There are two competing stores and two
competing transport companies which serve the stream of customers with
exponential distribution with parameters μ1 and μ2 respectively. The stream
forms the Poisson process with intensity λ. The problem of pricing and de-
termining the optimal intensity for each player in the competition is solved.
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1. Introduction
A non-cooperative four-person game which is related to the queueing systemM/M/2
is considered. There are two competing stores P1 and P2 and two competing trans-
port companies C1 and C2 which serve the stream of customers with exponential
distribution with parameters μ1 and μ2 respectively. The stream forms the Pois-
son process with intensity λ.. Suppose that λ < μ1 + μ2. Let shops declare the
price for the produced product. After that transport companies declare the price
of the service and carry passengers to the store, and the company C1 carries pas-
sengers to P1, when the company C2 carries passengers to P2. Customers choose
the service with minimal costs. This approach was used in the Hotelling’s duopoly
(Hotelling, 1929; D’Aspremont et al., 1979; Mazalova, 2012) to determine the equi-
librium price in the market. But the costs of each customer are calculated as the
price of the product and transport charges. In this model, costs are calculated as
the sum of prices for services and product plus losses of staying in the queue. Thus,
the incoming stream is divided into two Poisson ﬂows with intensities λ1 and λ2,
where λ1+λ2 = λ. So the problem is following, what price for the service, the price
for the product and the intensity of services is better to announce for the companies
and shops. Such articles as (Altman and Shimkin, 1998; Levhari and Luski, 1978;
Hassin and Haviv, 2003; Mazalova, 2013; Koryagin, 2008; Luski, 1976) are devoted
to the similar game-theoretic problems of queuing processes.
Game-theoretic model of pricing. Consider the following game. Players P1 and P2
declare the price for the produced product p1 and p2 respectively. The customers
have to use a transport to get to the shop. There are two competing transport com-
panies C1 and C2 which serve the stream of customers with exponential distribution
with parameters μ1 and μ2 respectively. The transport companies declare the price
of the service c1 and c2 respectively and carry passengers to the store, and the com-
pany C1 carries passengers to P1, when the company C2 carries passengers to P2.
So the customers choose the service with minimal costs, and the incoming stream
is divided into two Poisson ﬂows with intensities λ1 and λ2, where λ1 + λ2 = λ. In
this case the costs of each customer will be
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ci + pi +
1
μi − λi , i = 1, 2,
where 1/(μi−λi) is the expected time of staying in a queueing system (Saati, 1961).
Then the intensities of the ﬂows λ1 and λ2 = λ− λ1 for the corresponding services
can be found from
c1 + p1 +
1
μ1 − λ1 = c2 + p2 +
1
μ2 − λ2 . (1)
So, the payoﬀ functions for each player are
H1(c1, c2, p1, p2) = λ1c1, H2(c1, c2, p1, p2) = λ2c2,
K1(c1, c2, p1, p2) = λ1p1, K2(c1, c2, p1, p2) = λ2p2.
We are interested in the equilibrium in this game.
Symmetric model. Let start from the symmetric case, when the services are the
same, i. e. μ1 = μ2 = μ. Assuming that the stores ﬁxed their prices p1 and p2, let
us ﬁnd the the equilibrium behavior for the transport companies. The equation (1)
for the intensity λ1 is
c1 + p1 +
1
μ− λ1 = c2 + p2 +
1
μ− λ+ λ1 . (2)
Diﬀerentiating (2) by c1 we can ﬁnd
1 +
1
(μ− λ1)2
dλ1
dc1
= − 1
(μ− λ+ λ1)2
dλ1
dc1
,
from which
dλ1
dc1
= −
(
1
(μ− λ1)2 +
1
(μ− λ+ λ1)2
)−1
. (3)
Now we can ﬁnd Nash equilibrium strategies c∗1 and c∗2 for ﬁxed p1, p2 and c2,
i. e. we can ﬁnd the maximum of H1(c1, c2, p1, p2) by c1. The ﬁrst order condition
for the maximum of payoﬀ function is
dH1(c1, c2, p1, p2)
dc1
= λ1 + c1
dλ1
dc1
= 0,
wherefrom
c∗1 =
λ1
dλ1
dc1
. (4)
substituting (3) to (4), we will get
c∗1 = λ1
(
1
(μ− λ1)2 +
1
(μ− λ+ λ1)2
)
. (5)
For another transport company it is
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c∗2 = λ2
(
1
(μ− λ1)2 +
1
(μ− λ+ λ1)2
)
. (6)
Now we can ﬁnd the Nash equilibrium for players P1 and P2. Let us ﬁnd the
maximum of K1(c1, c2, p1, p2) by p1 when p2 is ﬁxed, assuming that transport com-
panies use the equilibrium strategies. The ﬁrst order condition for the maximum of
payoﬀ function is
dK1(c1, c2, p1, p2)
dp1
= λ1 + p1
dλ1
dp1
= 0,
from where
p∗1 =
λ1
dλ1
dp1
.
substituting the equilibrium prices of the transport companies (5)-(6) to (2) and
diﬀerentiating it by p1, we will get
dλ1
dp1
= −
(
3
(μ− λ1)2 +
3
(μ− λ+ λ1)2 + (2λ1 − λ)
( 2
(μ− λ1)3 −
2
(μ− λ+ λ1)3
))−1
.
(7)
So,
p∗1 = λ1
(
3
(μ− λ1)2 +
3
(μ− λ2)2 + (2λ1 − λ)
( 2
(μ− λ1)3 −
2
(μ− λ2)3
))
.
For another store it is
p∗2 = λ2
(
3
(μ− λ1)2 +
3
(μ− λ2)2 + (2λ2 − λ)
( 2
(μ− λ2)3 −
2
(μ− λ1)3
))
.
Thus we get the system of equations that deﬁnes the equilibrium prices as transport
companies and stores.
c1 + p1 +
1
μ− λ1 = c2 + p2 +
1
μ− λ2
c∗1 = λ1
(
1
(μ− λ1)2 +
1
(μ− λ2)2
)
c∗2 = λ2
(
1
(μ− λ1)2 +
1
(μ− λ2)2
)
p∗1 = λ1
(
3
(μ− λ1)2 +
3
(μ− λ2)2 + (2λ1 − λ)
( 2
(μ− λ1)3 −
2
(μ− λ2)3
))
p∗2 = λ2
(
3
(μ− λ1)2 +
3
(μ− λ2)2 + (2λ2 − λ)
( 2
(μ− λ2)3 −
2
(μ− λ1)3
))
λ1 + λ2 = λ.
Using the symmetry of the problem, the solution of this system is
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λ1 = λ2 =
λ
2
c∗1 = c
∗
2 =
λ
(μ− λ2 )2
(8)
p∗1 = p
∗
2 =
3λ
(μ− λ2 )2
It is easy to check, that the second order condition for the maximum of payoﬀ
function is also satisﬁed.
d2H1
dc21
= 2
dλ1
dc1
+ c1
d2λ1
dc21
.
d2K1
dp21
= 2
dλ1
dp1
+ p1
d2λ1
dp21
.
Diﬀerentiating (3) by c1 and (7) by p1 we ﬁnd
d2λ1
dc21
=
(
dλ1
dc1
)[
2
(μ− λ1)3 −
2
(μ− λ+ λ1)3
]
.
d2λ1
dp21
=
(
dλ1
dp1
)[
10
(μ− λ1)3 −
10
(μ− λ+ λ1)3 + (2λ1 − λ)
( 6
(μ− λ1)4 +
6
(μ− λ+ λ1)4
]
.
In the equilibrium λ1 = λ/2, from which d
2λ1
dc21
= 0 è d
2λ1
dp21
= 0. So,
d2H1(c
∗
1, c
∗
2, p
∗
1, p
∗
2)
dc21
= 2
dλ1
dc1
= −
(
μ− λ
2
)2
< 0.
d2K1(c
∗
1, c
∗
2, p
∗
1, p
∗
2)
dp21
= 2
dλ1
dp1
= −
(
μ− λ2
)2
3
< 0.
So, if one of the players uses the strategy (8), the maximum of payoﬀ of another
player is reached at the same strategy. That means that this set of strategies is
equilibrium.
Asymmetric model. Let us assume now, that transport services are not equal, i. e.
μ1 = μ2, suppose that μ1 > μ2. Let us ﬁnd the equilibrium in the pricing problem
in this case. Let us ﬁx p1, p2 and c2 and ﬁnd the best reply of the player C1. As
well as in the symmetric case we get
dH1(c1, c2, p1, p2)
dc1
= λ1 + c1
dλ1
dc1
= 0,
wherefrom
c∗1 =
λ1
dλ1/dc1
.
Diﬀerentiating (1),we ﬁnd
c∗1 = λ1
(
1
(μ1 − λ1)2 +
1
(μ2 − λ2)2
)
.
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For another transport company it is
c∗2 = λ2
(
1
(μ1 − λ1)2 +
1
(μ2 − λ2)2
)
.
Table 1: The value of (c∗1, c∗2), (p∗1, p∗2) and (λ1, λ2) at λ = 10
μ2
μ1 6 7 8 9 10
(c∗1;c∗2) (10;10)
6 (p∗1;p∗2) (30;30)
(λ1; λ2) (5;5)
(c∗1;c∗2) (5,918;5,804) (2,5;2,5)
7 (p∗1;p∗2) (17,035;16,707) (7,5;7,5)
(λ1; λ2) (5,049;4,951) (5;5)
(c∗1;c∗2) (4,953;4,797) (1,781;1,743) (1,11;1,11)
8 (p∗1;p∗2) (13,636;13,208) (5,26;5,15) (3,33;3,33)
(λ1; λ2) (5,08;4,92) (5,053;4,947) (5;5)
(c∗1;c∗2) (4,553;4,375) (1,494;1,437) (0,866;0,848) (0,625;0,625)
9 (p∗1;p∗2) (12,165;11,689) (4,3;4,136) (2,597;2,533) (1,875;1,875)
(λ1; λ2) (5,1;4,9) (5,097;4,903) (5,054;4,946) (5,5)
(c∗1;c∗2) (4,342;4,15) (1,346;1,276) (0,743;0,713) (0,514;0,503) (0,4;0,4)
10 (p∗1;p∗2) (11,371;10,869) (3,781;3,586) (2,176;2,088) (1,535;1,502) (1,2;1,2)
(λ1; λ2) (5,113;4,887) (5,132;4,868) (5,103;4,897) (5,055;4,945) (5;5)
Now we can ﬁnd the best replies for the P1 and P2.
dKi(c1, c2, p1, p2)
dpi
= λi + pi
dλi
dpi
= 0, i = 1, 2,
from which
p∗i =
λi
dλi/dpi
i = 1, 2.
Using the same arguments as in the symmetric model, we obtain the system of
equations that determine the equilibrium prices as transport companies and stores.
c1 + p1 +
1
μ1 − λ1 = c2 + p2 +
1
μ2 − λ2
c∗1 = λ1
(
1
(μ1 − λ1)2 +
1
(μ2 − λ2)2
)
c∗2 = λ2
(
1
(μ1 − λ1)2 +
1
(μ2 − λ2)2
)
p∗1 = λ1
(
3
(μ1 − λ1)2 +
3
(μ2 − λ2)2 + (2λ1 − λ)
( 2
(μ1 − λ1)3 −
2
(μ2 − λ2)3
))
p∗2 = λ2
(
3
(μ1 − λ1)2 +
3
(μ2 − λ2)2 + (2λ2 − λ)
( 2
(μ2 − λ2)3 −
2
(μ1 − λ1)3
))
λ1 + λ2 = λ.
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In Table 1 the values of the equilibrium prices with diﬀerent μ1, μ2 at λ = 10 and
are given.
2. Conclusion
It is seen from the table, that the higher the intensity of service of one transport
company is, the higher payoﬀ this transport company and the store, which is con-
nected to this company, get. So, they can increase the price of the service and the
price for the product.
References
Hotelling, H. (1929). Stability in Competition. In: Economic Journal, 39, 41–57.
D’Aspremont, C., Gabszewicz, J., Thisse, J.-F. (1979). On Hotelling’s ŞStability in Com-
petitionŤ. Econometrica, 47, 1145–1150.
Mazalova, A.V. (2012). Hotelling’s duopoly on the plane with Manhattan distance. Vestnik
St. Petersburg University, Ser. 10, pp. 33–43. (in Russian).
Altman, E., Shimkin, N. (1998). ndividual equilibrium and learning in processor sharing
systems. Operations Research, 46, 776–784.
Levhari, D., Luski, I. (1978). Duopoly pricing and waiting lines. European Economic Re-
view, 11, 17–35.
Hassin, R., Haviv, M. (2003). To Queue or Not to Queue / Equilibrium Behavior in Queue-
ing Systems. Springer.
Luski, I. (1976). On partial equilibrium in a queueing system with two services.The Review
of Economic Studies, 43, 519–525.
Koryagin, M.E. (1986). Competition of public transport ﬂows. Autom. Remote Control,
69(8), 1380–1389.
Saati, T. L. (1961). Elements of Queueing Theory with Applications. Dover.
Mazalova, A.V. (2013). Duopoly in queueing system. Vestnik St. Petersburg University,
Ser. 10, (submitted).
Optimal Strategies in the Game with Arbitrator
Alexander E. Mentcher
Transbaikal State University,
Faculty of Natural Science, Mathematics and Technology,
Alexandro-Zavodskaya str. 30, Chita, 672039, Russia
E-mail:aementcher@mail.ru
Abstract The organization of negotiations by using arbitration procedures
is an actual problem in game theory. We consider a non-cooperative zero-sum
game, related with an arbitration scheme, generalized well known ﬁnal-oﬀer
procedure. The nash equilibrium in this game in mixed strategies is found.
Keywords: game, arbitration procedure, equilibrium, mixed strategies.
1. Introduction
The problem of some resource allocation among several participants take one of
the central places in the modern theory of economical regulation. This situations
occur in business (a Labour and a Manager consider the question on an improve-
ment in the wage rate), in the market models (a Buyer, who wants to purchase
some merchandise at a lower price, and the Seller, whose purpose is to sell this mer-
chandise at a more beneﬁcial price), insurance models, etc. This is a multicriterial
problem, for which there are several solving approaches. We use game-theoretical
methods of negotiation theory. In order to run the negotiations the participants call
in the third independent party of one or several arbitrators participates. By the
solution, we mean the Nash equilibrium in this game. The procedures with arbitra-
tor’s participation are called arbitration procedures. The problems of negotiation
organization by using arbitration procedures are topical presently and in connection
with of virtual enterprises appearing in the global Internet network.
There are various models of arbitration procedures. One of them is the ﬁnal-oﬀer
arbitration procedure. This procedure was described in the papers (Farber,1980;
Chatterjee, 1981; Kilgour, 1994).
We will ﬁnd an equilibrium in the arbitration games in the terms of salary
problem; however this approach may be also applied for other problems of resources
allocation with arbitrator’s participation.
So, we consider a non-cooperative zero-sum game in which two players L andM ,
called respectively the Labour and the Manager, have a dispute on an improvement
in the wage rate. The player L makes an oﬀer x, and the player M - an oﬀer y; x
and y are arbitrary real numbers. If x ≤ y there is no conﬂict, and the players agree
on a payoﬀ equal to (x+ y)/2. If, otherwise, x > y, the parties call in the arbitrator
A. Assume that the arbitrator’s solution is a discrete random variable and denote
it by z. In the ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration scheme the arbitrator chooses the oﬀer, which
 The research was supported by the Russian Ministry of Education (project 8.3641.2011).
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is closer to its solution z, i.e., the payoﬀ function in this scheme has a form
Hz(x, y) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
x+y
2 , if x ≤ y,
x, if x > y, |x− z| < |y − z|,
y, if x > y, |x− z| > |y − z|,
z, if x > y, |x− z| = |y − z|.
(1.1)
Since in the function (1.1) the arbitrator’s solution z is a random variable, we
take for the payoﬀ function the mathematical expectation of this function:H(x, y) =
EHz(x, y).
Further, let x ∈ [0,+∞), y ∈ (−∞, 0]. If z = 0 almost everywhere, it is evidently
that the point of equilibrium in this game is the pair of pure strategies: (0, 0). In the
papers (Mazalov et al., 2005; Mazalov et al., 2006; Mentcher, 2009) for the cases in
which z is distributed in the ﬁnal set of integer points the Nash equilibria in this
game in mixed strategies were found.
Now we consider a generalization of the ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration procedure. Namely,
let x ∈ [0,+∞), y ∈ (−∞, 0], α > 0 and
Hz(x, y) =
⎧⎨⎩x
α, if |x− z| < |y − z|,
−(−y)α, if |x− z| > |y − z|,
z, if |x− z| = |y − z|.
(1.2)
Let the arbitrator chooses one of the 2n+ 1 numbers: −n, −(n− 1),Ě,−1, 0, 1,
Ě, n− 1, n - with equal probabilities p = 12n+1 . This game does not have a solution
in pure strategies, and we will be looking for the equilibrium in mixed strategies.
Denote by f(x) and g(y) the mixed strategies of the players L and M , respectively.
We have
f(x) ≥ 0,
+∞∫
0
f(x)dx = 1; g(y) ≥ 0,
0∫
−∞
g(y)dy = 1.
Due to the symmetry, the game value is equal to zero, and the optimal strategies
are symmetric in respect to the y-axis, i.e. g(y) = f(−y). Hence, it suﬃces to
construct the optimal strategy only for one player, for example L.
We ﬁnd the optimal strategy for the player L in the following form:
f(x) =
⎧⎨⎩0, if 0 ≤ x < c,ϕ(x), if c < x < c+ 2,
0, if c+ 2 < x < +∞,
(1.3)
where the function ϕ(x) is positive and continuously diﬀerentiable in the interval
(−(c+ 2),−c).
Denote by H(f(x), y) the payoﬀ function of the player M for the strategy f(x)
choosen by the player L. The function H(f(x), y) is continuous on the entire semi-
axis (−∞, 0] and twice continuously diﬀerentiable in the interval (c, c+2). The strat-
egy (1.3) will be optimal, if H(f(x), y) = 0 for y ∈ [−(c+2),−c] and H(f(x), y) ≥ 0
for y ∈ (−∞,−(c+ 2)) ∪ (−c, 0].
Assume that y ∈ [−(c+ 2),−c], then −y ∈ [c, c+ 2], and
H(f(x), y) =
1
2n+ 1
[
n
∫ c+2
c
(−(−y)α)f(x)dx +
∫ −y
c
xαf(x)dx+
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+
∫ c+2
−y
(−(−y)α)f(x)dx + n
∫ c+2
c
xαf(x)dx
]
. (1.4)
If f(x) is an optimal strategy, then
0 = H(f(x),−c− 0) = 1
2n+ 1
[
−(n+ 1)cα + n
∫ c+2
c
xαf(x)dx
]
,
0 = H(f(x),−(c+2)+0) = 1
2n+ 1
[
−n(c+ 2)α + (n+ 1)
∫ c+2
c
xαf(x)dx
]
. (1.5)
From (1.5) we obtain the equation(
n+ 1
n
)
cα =
(
n
n+ 1
)
(c+ 2)α.
Whence we conclude that
c =
2
(1 + 1n )
2
α − 1 (1.6)
and ∫ c+2
c
xαf(x)dx =
√
cα(c+ 2)α. (1.7)
For the strategy (1.3) in order to be optimal, it is necessary that 0 < c ≤ 2n,
whence we obtain 0 < α ≤ 2.
Furthere, it is necessary that H ′(f(x), y) = H ′′(f(x), y) = 0 in the interval
(−(c+ 2),−c). We have
H ′(f(x, y)) =
1
2n+ 1
[
nα(−y)α−1 − 2(−y)αf(−y) + α(−y)α−1
∫ c+2
−y
f(x)dx
]
,
(1.8)
H ′′(f(x, y)) =
1
2n+ 1
[−nα(α− 1)(−y)α−2 + 3α(−y)α−1f(−y)+
+2(−y)αf ′(−y)− α(α − 1)(−y)α−2
∫ c+2
−y
f(x)dx
]
. (1.9)
If now H ′(f(x), y) = H ′′(f(x), y) = 0 in the interval (−(c + 2),−c), then from
(1.8)-(1.9) we obtain
(α− 1)(−y)−1H ′(f(x), y) +H ′′(f(x), y) = 0,
whence
(α + 2)f(−y)− 2yf ′(−y) = 0. (1.10)
Assume that x = −y, then x ∈ (c, c+ 2), f(x) = ϕ(x) and
2xϕ′(x) + (α+ 2)ϕ(x) = 0. (1.11)
The solution of this equation is the function
ϕ(x) = βx−(
α
2+1). (1.12)
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Determine the constant β. From (1.8) we obtain
0 = H ′(f(x),−c− 0) = 1
2n+ 1
[
α(n+ 1)cα−1 − 2cα β
c
α
2+1
]
,
whence
β =
α(n+ 1)
2
c
α
2 .
Therefore, the function f(x) from (1.3) has a form
f(x) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
0, if 0 ≤ x < c,
α(n+1)
2 · c
α
2
x
α
2
+1 , if c < x < c+ 2,
0, if c+ 2 < x < +∞,
(1.13)
where
c =
2(
1 + 1n
) 2
α − 1
.
2. Optimal strategies
Theorem 1. If α ∈ (0, 2] and n = 1, then for the player L the strategy
f(x) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
0, if 0 ≤ x < c,
α·cα2
x
α
2
+1 , if c < x < c+ 2,
0, if c+ 2 < x < +∞,
(2.1)
where c = 2
4
1
α −1
is optimal.
Proof. Assuming in (1.13) n = 1, we come to the formula (2.1) with corresponding
constant c. Check the fulﬁlment of optimal conditions.
Assume that y ∈ [−(c+ 2),−c], then
H(f(x), y) =
1
3
[
−(−y)α +
∫ −y
c
αc
α
2 x
α
2−1dx− (−y)α
∫ c+2
−y
αc
α
2 x−
α
2−1dx+ 2cα
]
=
=
1
3
[−(−y)α + 2cα2 (−y)α2 − 2cα + (−y)α − 2cα2 (−y)α2 + 2cα] = 0. (2.2)
Assume that y ∈ (−∞,−(c+ 4)], then
H(f(x), y) =
∫ c+2
c
xαf(x)dx = 2cα. (2.3)
Assume that y ∈ [−(c+4),−(c+2)], then −y ∈ [c+ 2, c+ 4], −2− y ∈ [c, c+ 2]
and
H(f(x), y) =
1
3
[∫ −2−y
c
xαf(x)dx− (−y)α
∫ c+2
−2−y
f(x)dx + 2
∫ c+2
c
xαf(x)dx
]
=
=
2
3
c
α
2
[
(−2− y)α2 + cα2 + (−y)
α
(c+ 2)
α
2
− (−y)
α
(−2− y)α2
]
. (2.4)
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We have
H(f(x),−(c+ 2)− 0) = 2
3
c
α
2
[
c
α
2 + c
α
2 + (c+ 2)α − 2(c+ 2)α] = 0. (2.5)
Further, assume in (2.4) −2− y = t, t ∈ [c, c+ 2] and consider the function
H˜(t) =
2
3
c
α
2
[
t
α
2 + c
α
2 +
(t+ 2)α
(c+ 2)
α
2
− (t+ 2)
α
t
α
2
]
.
The functions g(t) = (t+2)
α
(c+2)
α
2
and
h(t) = t
α
2 − (t+ 2)
α
t
α
2
= t
α
2
[
1−
(
1 +
2
t
)α]
are monotonouse increasing in the interval [c, c+ 2]. Finally, we conclude that the
function H(f(x), y) is monotonouse decreasing in the interval [−(c + 4),−(c + 2)]
from 2cα to 0 and therefore is positive in the interval [−(c+ 4),−(c+ 2)).
Assume that y ∈ [−c, 0], then −y ∈ [0, c], 2− y ∈ [2, c+ 2] and
H(f(x), y) =
1
3
[
−2(−y)α +
∫ 2−y
c
xαf(x)dx −
∫ c+2
2−y
(−y)αf(x)dx
]
=
=
1
3
[
−(−y)α + 2cα2 (2− y)α2 − 2cα − 2cα2 − 2cα2 (−y)
α
(2− y)α2
]
. (2.6)
We have
H(f(x),−c+ 0) = 0, H(f(x),−0) = 2
3
c
α
2 (2
α
2 − cα2 ) ≥ 0. (2.7)
Furthere,
H ′(f(x), y) =
α
3
[
(−y)α−1 + cα2 −(2− y)
α + 4(−y)α−1 + (−y)α
(2− y)α2+1
]
. (2.8)
Assume that α ∈ (0, 1], then c ∈ (0, 23 ] ⊂ (0, 1].
We have
−(2−y)α+4(−y)α−1+(−y)α = −(2−y)α+(−y)α−1(4−y) ≥ (4−y)− (2−y) = 2.
Therefore, H ′(f(x), y) > 0 in the interval (−c, 0) and take into consideration
(2.7), we conclude that H(f(x), y) > 0 in this interval.
Assume that α ∈ (1, 2], then c ∈ (23 , 2]. We have
H ′(f(x),−c+ 0) = α
6
cα−1(8− c)
c+ 2
> 0,
H ′(f(x),−0) = − αc
α
2
3 · 21−α2 < 0. (2.9)
Therefore, in the interval (−c, 0) exists if only one point y0, for whichH ′(f(x), y0) =
0. If y0 is the unique point, then y0 is the point of maximum for the function
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H(f(x), y) and take into consideration (2.7) we conclude that H(f(x), y) > 0 in the
interval (−c, 0).
Assume in (2.8) −y = t, t ∈ [0, c], y0 = −t0.
Then
H˜ ′(t) =
α
3
[
tα−1 + c
α
2
tα−1(t+ 4)− (t+ 2)α
(t+ 2)
α
2+1
]
.
If now H˜ ′(t) = 0, then we obtain the equation
tα−1(t+ 2)
α
2+1 + c
α
2 tα
(
1−
(
1 +
2
t
)α)
= −4cα2 tα−1. (2.10)
The function from the left part of (2.10) is monotonouse increasing in the interval
(−c, 0), but the function from the right part is monotonouse decreasing in the same
interval. Consequently, it exists an unique point t0, for which H˜ ′(t0) = 0.

unionsq
In particular, if α = 1, we have
f(x) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
0, if 0 ≤ x < 23 ,√
2
3 · 1√x3 , if
2
3 < x <
8
3 ,
0, if 83 < x < +∞.
(2.11)
This result was published in the paper (Mazalov et al., 2005). The grafH(f(x), y)
has the form, presented in Fig. 1.
0 x
2
3
4
3
y
− 143 −4 − 103 − 83 −2 − 43 − 23


Fig. 1.
For α = 2 we have
f(x) =
⎧⎨⎩
0, if 0 ≤ x < 2,
4
x2 , if 2 < x < 4,
0, if 4 < x < +∞.
(2.12)
The graf H(f(x), y) has the form, presented in Fig. 2.
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Fig. 2.
Theorem 2. If α = 1, then for the player L the strategy
f(x) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
0, if 0 ≤ x < c,
(n+1)
√
c
2
√
x3
, if c < x < c+ 2,
0, if c+ 2 < x < +∞,
(2.13)
where c = 2n
2
2n+1 is optimal.
Proof. Assuming in (1.13) α = 1, we come to the formula (2.13) with corresponding
constant c. Check the fulﬁlment of optimal conditions.
Assume that y ∈ (−∞,−(c+ 2)− 2n], then
H(f(x), y) =
∫ c+2
c
xf(x)dx =
√
c(c+ 2) =
2n(n+ 1)
2n+ 1
. (2.14)
Furthere, let k = 3
[
n
2
]
+ 2, if n is odd and k = 3n2 , if n is even. For y ∈ [−(c+
2)−2n+2r,−c−2n+2r], where r = 0, 1, ..., n, ..., k−1 and y ∈ [−(c+2)−2n+2r, 0],
if r = k, we ﬁnd
H(f(x), y) =
1
2n+ 1
[
ry +
(∫ −2n+2r−y
c
xf(x)dx +
∫ c+2
−2n+2r−y
yf(x)dx
)
+
+(2n− r)
∫ c+2
c
xf(x)dx
]
=
=
∫ c+2
c
xf(x)dx − 1
2n+ 1
[
r
∫ c+2
c
(x− y)f(x)dx +
∫ c+2
−2n+2r−y
(x− y)f(x)dx
]
.
(2.15)
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Diﬀerentiating (2.15), we obtain
H ′(f(x), y) =
1
2n+ 1
[
r +
∫ c+2
−2n+2r−y
f(x)dx + (2n− 2r + 2y)f(−2n+ 2r − y)
]
=
=
r − n
2n+ 1
(
1 +
2n(n+ 1)√
2(2n+ 1)(−2n+ 2r − y)
)
(2.16)
It follows from (2.16) that in the interval [−(c+2),−c], where r = n, the expected
payoﬀ H(f(x), y) is constant and because we used the equality H(f(x),−c− 0) = 0
it yields H(f(x), y) = 0 in the interval [−(c+ 2),−c].
For r < n (2.16) gives H ′(f(x), y) < 0 and for r > n — H ′(f(x), y) > 0 in the
interval [−2n+ 2r − (c+ 2),−2n+ 2r − c].
Consequently, the function H(f(x), y) is positive outside the interval [−(c +
2),−c]. That proves the optimality of the strategy (2.13). 
unionsq
Theorem 3. If α = 2, then for the player L the strategy
f(x) =
⎧⎨⎩
0, if 0 ≤ x < 2n,
2n(n+1)
x2 , if 2n < x < 2n+ 2,
0, if 2n+ 2 < x < +∞
(2.17)
is optimal.
Proof. Assuming in (1.13) α = 2, we come to the formula (2.17). Check the fulﬁl-
ment of optimal conditions.
Assume then y ∈ (−∞,−(4n+ 2)], then
H(f(x), y) =
∫ 2n+2
2n
x2f(x)dx = 4n(n+ 1). (2.18)
Furthere, let y ∈ [−(2n+2k+2),−(2n+2k)], where k = −n,−(n−1), . . . ,−1, 0, 1,
. . . , n− 1, n. Then
H(f(x), y) =
1
2n+ 1
[
(n− k)
∫ 2n+2
2n
(−y2)f(x)dx +
∫ −2k−y
2n
x2f(x)dx+
+
∫ 2n+2
−2k−y
(−y2)f(x)dx + (n+ k)
∫ 2n+2
2n
x2f(x)dx
]
=
=
1
2n+ 1
[−(n− k)y2 + 2n(n+ 1)(−2k − y − 2n)+
+2n(n+ 1)y2
(
1
2n+ 2
+
1
y + 2k
)
+ 4n(n+ 1)(n+ k)
]
. (2.19)
For k = 0 we have y ∈ [−(2n+ 2),−2n] and H(f(x), y) = 0 in this interval.
Furthere, assume that y = −2n− 2k. We have
H(f(x),−2n− 2k) = 4n(n+ k)(k − 1)
2n+ 1
. (2.20)
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From (2.20) we obtain that H(f(x),−2n−2k) = 0 for k = −n, k = 0 and k = 1;
and H(f(x),−2n− 2k) > 0 for all other considered values of k.
Besides
H ′(f(x), y) =
2k
2n+ 1
[
y − 4n(n+ 1)k
(y + 2k)2
]
, (2.21)
H ′′(f(x), y) =
2k
2n+ 1
[
1 +
8kn(n+ 1)
(y + 2k)3
]
. (2.22)
If now k ≥ 1, then H ′(f(x), y) < 0 and the function H(f(x), y) is monotonous
decreasing in the interval [−(4n + 2),−(2n + 2)] from 4n(n + 1) to 0. If k ≤ −1,
then H ′′(f(x), y) < 0 and the function H(f(x), y) is concave in the interval [−(2n+
2k + 2),−(2n+ 2k)].
Take into cosideration preceding arguments, we conclude that H(f(x), y) > 0 in
the interval (−2n, 0) and H(f(x), 0) = 0.

unionsq
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Abstract In TU–cooperative game with restricted cooperation the values
of characteristic function v(S) > 0 are deﬁned only for S ∈ A, where A is a
collection of some nonempty coalitions of players.
We examine generalizations of both the proportional solutions of claim prob-
lem (Proportional and Weakly Proportional solutions, the Proportional Nu-
cleolus, and the Weighted Entropy solution) and the uniform losses solution
of claim problem (Uniform Losses and Weakly Uniform Losses solutions,
the Nucleolus, and the Least Square solution). These generalizations are U–
equal sacriﬁce solution, the U–nucleolus and qU–solutions, where U and q
are strictly increasing continuous functions.
We introduce Solidary (Weakly Solidary) solutions, where if a total share of
some coalition inA is less than its claim, then the total shares of all coalitions
in A (that don’t intersect this coalition) are less than their claims. The
existence conditions on A for two versions of solidary solution are described.
In spite of the fact that the versions of the solidary solution are larger than
the corresponding versions of the proportional solution, the necessary and
suﬃcient conditions on A for inclusion of the U–nucleolus in two versions
of the solidary solution coincide with conditions on A for inclusion of the
proportional nucleolus in the corresponding versions of the proportional solu-
tion. The necessary and suﬃcient conditions on A for inclusion qU–solutions
in two versions of the solidary solution coincide with conditions on A for in-
clusion of the Weighted Entropy solution in the corresponding versions of
the proportional solution.
Moreover, necessary and suﬃcient conditions on A for coincidence the U–
nucleolus with the U–equal sacriﬁce solution and conditions on A for coin-
cidence qU–solutions with the U–equal sacriﬁce solution are obtained.
Keywords: claim problem; cooperative games; proportional solution; weighted
entropy; nucleolus.
1. Introduction
A TU–cooperative game with restricted cooperation is a quadruple (N,A, c, v), where
N is a ﬁnite set of agents, A is a collection of nonempty coalitions of agents, c is
a positive real number (the amount of resourses to be divided by agents), v =
{v(T )}T∈A, where v(T ) > 0 is a claim of coalition T . We assume that A covers N
and N ∈ A.
A set of imputations of (N,A, c, v) is the set
{{yi}i∈N : yi ≥ 0,
∑
i∈N
yi = c}.
A solution F is a map that associates to any game (N,A, c, v) a subset of its set
of imputations. Then F (N,A, c, v) is a solution of (N,A, c, v). We denote y(S) =∑
i∈S yi.
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If A = {{i} : i ∈ N} then a claim problem arises, therefore, a cooperative game
with restricted cooperation can be considered as a claim problem with coalition
demands.
Solutions of claim problem and their axiomatic justiﬁcations are described in
surveys (Moulin, 2002) and (Thomson, 2003). For claim problems, the Proportional
solution, the Uniform Losses solution and their generalization Equal Sacriﬁce so-
lution are well known. The papers (Naumova, 2011, 2012) and this paper consider
generalizations of these solutions to games with restricted cooperation.
For claim problems, the Proportional solution, the Proportional Nucleolus, and
the Weighted Entropy solution give the same results. In the case of generalized claim
problems, the Proportional solution is the most natural generalization, but this set
can be empty for some games. The larger set is the Weakly Proportional solution,
where the ratios of total shares of coalitions to their claims are equal for disjoint
coalitions in A. This set can also be empty. The Proportional Nucleolus and the
Weighted Entropy solution are always nonempty and deﬁne uniquely total shares
of coalitions in A. These solutions can give diﬀerent results.
For claim problems, the Uniform Losses solution, the nucleolus, and the Least
Square solution give the same results. For generalized claim problems, the Uniform
Losses solution and the Weak Uniform Losses solution are the most natural gen-
eralizations but they can be empty. The Nucleolus and the Least Square solution
can give diﬀerent results, but each of them is always nonempty and deﬁne uniquely
total shares of coalitions in A.
Necessary and suﬃcient conditions on A that provide the existence of the Pro-
portional solution (Weakly Proportional solution) are obtained in (Naumova, 2011)
and these conditions coincide with conditions that provide the existence of the Uni-
form Losses solution (Weakly Uniform Losses solution).
Necessary and suﬃcient conditions on A that provide inclusion of the Weighted
Entropy solution in the Proportional solution are the same as conditions on A for
inclusion of the Least Square solution in the Uniform Losses solution. The same are
conditions for inclusion of the Proportional Nucleolus in the Proportional solution
and conditions for inclusion of the Nucleolus in the Uniform Losses solution. These
conditions were obtained in (Naumova, 2011). That paper also contains necessary
and suﬃcient conditions on A for coincidence the Weighted Entropy solution and
the Weakly Proportional solution.
The paper (Naumova, 2012) considers only generalizations of the Proportional
solution of claim problems. Generalizations of the Weighted Entropy solution that
are called g–solutions are introduced. Necessary and suﬃcient conditions on A for
inclusion of the g–solution in the Weakly Proportional solution are the same for all g.
These conditions permit to obtain for each g the necessary and suﬃcient conditions
on A for coincidence the g–solution and the Weakly Proportional solution. The
obtained conditions are the same as conditions for coincidence the Weighted Entropy
solution and the Weakly Proportional solution. The paper (Naumova, 2012) also
contains necessary and suﬃcient conditions on A for inclusion of the Proportional
Nucleolus in the Weakly Proportional solution. The proofs of that paper are not
suitable for obtaining conditions on A for inclusion of the Nucleolus and the Least
Square solution in the Weakly Uniform Losses solution.
In this paper we consider two topics. First, for strictly increasing continuous
functions U , we introduce U -equal sacriﬁce solutions that generalize both the Pro-
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portional solution and the Uniform Losses solution, U–nucleolus that generalize
both the Proportional Nucleolus and the Nucleolus, and qU–solutions that gen-
eralize both q–solutions and the Least Square solution. All results of the paper
(Naumova, 2012) concerning the proportional case are generalized. In particular,
we obtain conditions on A that provide inclusion of the Nucleolus in the Weakly
Uniform Losses solution and conditions on A that provide inclusion of the Least
Square solution in the Weakly Uniform Losses solution.
Moreover, we obtain the necessary and suﬃcient conditions on A that provide
coincidence of the U–nucleolus and the Weakly U–equal sacriﬁce solution.
Second, we introduce new solution concepts of Solidary solution ( Weakly Sol-
idary solution) that contain U–equal sacriﬁce solutions (Weakly U–equal sacriﬁce
solutions).
For almost all solutions of claim problems, if one agent gets less than its claim
then each agent gets less than its claim, i.e., the solidarity property takes place.
Two versions of Solidary solutions are obtained by generalizations of the solidarity
property to games with restricted cooperation.
In spite of the fact that the versions of the Solidary solution are larger than
the corresponding versions of the Proportional solution, the conditions on A that
ensure existence results for the versions of the Solidary solutions are the same as
for the corresponding versions in the proportional case. Moreover, the conditions
on A that provide inclusions of the U–nucleolus in the Solidary solution (Weakly
Solidary solution) are the same as conditions on A that provide inclusions of the
Proportional Nucleolus in the Proportional (Weakly Proportional) solution. The
conditions on A that provide inclusion of the qU–solution in the Solidary (Weakly
Solidary) solution are the same as conditions on A for inclusion of the Weighted
Entropy solution in the Proportional (Weakly Proportional) solution.
The paper is organized as follows. The deﬁnitions of U–equal sacriﬁce solu-
tions, U–nucleolus, qU–solutions, the Solidary solutions and the relations between
U–equal sacriﬁce solutions and the Solidary solutions are given in Section 2. Some
properties of qU–solutions that will be used in next sections are obtained in Sec-
tion 3. Conditions on A for existence the U–equal sacriﬁce and the Weakly U–equal
sacriﬁce solutions are described in Section 4. Necessary and suﬃcient conditions on
A for inclusion of the qU–solution in the U–equal sacriﬁce solution and in the Sol-
idary solution and for inclusion of the U–nucleolus in the U–equal sacriﬁce solution
and in the Solidary solution are obtained in Section 5. In Section 6 we describe
necessary and suﬃcient condition on A for inclusion the U–nucleolus in the Weakly
U—equal sacriﬁce solution and in the Weakly Solidary solution and necessary and
suﬃcient condition on A for inclusion of qU–solution in the Weakly U–equal sacri-
ﬁce solution and in the Weakly Solidary solution. In Section 7 we describe necessary
and suﬃcient conditions on A for coincidence the qU–solution with the Weakly U–
equal sacriﬁce solution and conditions on A for coincidence the U–nucleolus with
the Weakly U–equal sacriﬁce solution.
2. Deﬁnitions
Deﬁnition 1. A TU–cooperative game with restricted cooperation is a quadruple
(N,A, c, v), where N is a ﬁnite set of agents, A is a collection of coalitions of
agents, N ∈ A, c is a positive real number (the amount of resourses to be divided
by agents), v = {v(T )}T∈A, where v(T ) > 0 is a claim of coalition T .
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We assume that A covers N .
Deﬁnition 2. A solution F is a map that associates to any game (N,A, c, v) a
subset of its set of imputations {{yi}i∈N : yi ≥ 0,
∑
i∈N yi = c}. We denote
y(S) =
∑
i∈S yi.
Let U be a strictly increasing continuous function deﬁned on (0,+∞). Denote
U(0) = limt→0 U(t).
Deﬁnition 3. An imputation y = {yi}i∈N belongs to the U–equal sacriﬁce solution
of (N,A, c, v) iﬀ for all S, T ∈ A, y(T ) > 0 implies U(y(T ))−U(v(T )) ≤ U(y(S))−
U(v(S)).
Deﬁnition 4. An imputation y = {yi}i∈N belongs to the Proportional solution of
(N,A, c, v) iﬀ y(T )/v(T ) = y(S)/v(S) for all S, T ∈ A.
Deﬁnition 5. An imputation y = {yi}i∈N belongs to the Uniform Losses solution
of (N,A, c, v) iﬀ for all S, T ∈ A, y(T ) > 0 implies y(T )− v(T ) ≤ y(S)− v(S), i.e.,
y belongs to the U–equal sacriﬁce solution for U(t) = t.
Deﬁnition 6. An imputation y = {yi}i∈N belongs to the Weakly U–equal sacriﬁce
solution of (N,A, c, v) iﬀ for all S, T ∈ A with S ∩ T = ∅,
y(T ) > 0 implies U(y(T ))− U(v(T )) ≤ U(y(S))− U(v(S)).
Deﬁnition 7. An imputation y = {yi}i∈N belongs to the Weakly Proportional
solution of (N,A, c, v) iﬀ for S, T ∈ A with S ∩ T = ∅, y(T )/v(T ) = y(S)/v(S).
Deﬁnition 8. An imputation y = {yi}i∈N belongs to the Weakly Uniform Losses
solution of (N,A, c, v) iﬀ for all S, T ∈ A with S ∩ T = ∅,
y(T ) > 0 implies y(T )− v(T ) ≤ y(S)− v(S).
Remark 1. Let U(0) = −∞. Then for each x in the U–equal sacriﬁce solution,
U(x(Q)) − U(v(Q)) = U(x(S)) − U(v(S)) for all S,Q ∈ A. If x belongs to the
Weakly U–equal sacriﬁce solution, then for each S, Q in the same for each Q,S ∈ A
with Q∩P = ∅, either x(Q) = x(S) = 0 or U(x(Q))−U(v(Q)) = U(x(S))−U(v(S)).
Proof. Let x belong to the U–equal sacriﬁce solution. Since A covers N and x(N) >
0, there exists T ∈ A such that x(T ) > 0. For each S ∈ A, we have and U(x(T ))−
U(v(T )) ≤ U(x(S)) − U(v(S)), hence U(x(S)) > −∞ and x(S) > 0, then we get
the equality.
The case of Weakly U–equal sacriﬁce solution is considered similarly. 
unionsq
Therefore, the Proportional solution coincides with the ln–equal sacriﬁce solution
and the Weakly Proportional solution coincides with the Weakly ln–equal sacriﬁce
solution.
Deﬁnition 9. An imputation y = {yi}i∈N belongs to the Solidary solution of
(N,A, c, v) iﬀ x(Q) < v(Q) for some Q ∈ A implies x(T ) < v(T ) for all T ∈ A.
Deﬁnition 10. An imputation y = {yi}i∈N belongs to the Weakly Solidary solu-
tion of (N,A, c, v) iﬀ x(Q) < v(Q) for some Q ∈ A implies x(T ) < v(T ) for all
T ∈ A with Q ∩ T = ∅.
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Proposition 1. Each U–equal sacriﬁce solution is contained in the Solidary solu-
tion. Each Weakly U–equal sacriﬁce solution is contained in the Weakly Solidary
solution.
Proof. Let y belong to the U–equal sacriﬁce solution of (N,A, c, v) and y(Q) < v(Q).
Then U(y(Q)) − U(v(Q)) < 0. Let T ∈ A. If y(T ) = 0, then y(T ) < v(T ), and if
y(T ) > 0, then U(y(T ))− U(v(T )) ≤ U(y(Q))− U(v(Q)) < 0, hence y(T ) < v(T ).
The case of the Weakly Solidary solution is considered similarly. 
unionsq
Let U be a strictly increasing continuous function deﬁned on (0,+∞).
Deﬁnition 11. Let X ⊂ Rn, f1, . . . , fk be functions deﬁned on X . For z ∈ X , let π
be a permutation of {1, . . . , k} such that fπ(i)(z) ≤ fπ(i+1)(z), θ(z) = {fπ(i)(z)}ki=1.
Then y ∈ X belongs to the nucleolus with respect to f1, . . . , fk on X iﬀ θ(y) ≥lex
θ(z) for all z ∈ X.
Deﬁnition 12. A vector y = {yi}i∈N belongs to the U– nucleolus of (N,A, c, v) iﬀ
y belongs to the nucleolus w.r.t. {fT }T∈A on X , where fT (z) = U(z(T ))−U(v(T ))
and X is deﬁned as follows. If U(0) > −∞ then X is the set of imputations of
(N,A, c, v) and if U(0) = −∞ then X is the set of imputations z of (N,A, c, v) such
that z(T ) > 0.
For each A, c > 0, v with v(T ) > 0, the U–nucleolus of (N,A, c, v) is nonempty
and deﬁnes uniquely total amounts y(T ) for each T ∈ A.
Deﬁnition 13. An imputation y = {yi}i∈N belongs to the Proportional nucleolus
of (N,A, c, v) iﬀ y belongs to the nucleolus w.r.t. {fT }T∈A with fT (z) = z(T )/v(T )
on the set of imputations of (N,A, c, v).
The Proportional nucleolus coincides with the ln–nucleolus.
Deﬁnition 14. An imputation y = {yi}i∈N belongs to the Nucleolus of (N,A, c, v)
iﬀ y belongs to the nucleolus w.r.t. {fT}T∈A with fT (z) = z(T )− v(T ) on the set
of imputations of (N,A, c, v).
Note that even in the case when A = 2N \ {N, ∅}, the Nucleolus of (N,A, c, v)
does not coincide with the nucleolus of the corresponding TU game because the set
of imputations in our deﬁnition does not depend on the values of singletons.
q − U–solutions
Let U be a strictly increasing continuous function deﬁned on (0,+∞), Q(U) be a
class of strictly increasing continuous functions q deﬁned on (−∞,+∞) such that
q(0) = 0 and lim
x→0
x∫
a
q(U(t))dt < +∞ for each a > 0.
Deﬁnition 15. A vector y = {yi}i∈N belongs to the qU–solution of (N,A, c, v) iﬀ
y minimizes∑
S∈A
z(S)∫
v(S)
q(U(t) − U(v(S)))dt on the set of imputations of (N,A, c, v).
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Examples of qU-solutions
1. U(t) = ln t, q(t) = t, then
z(S)∫
v(S)
q(U(t)− U(v(S)))dt = z(S)[ln(z(S)/v(S))− 1] + v(S)
and the qU–solution is the Weighted Entropy solution (Naumova, 2000, 2008, 2010).
2. U(t) = ln t, q(t) = (exp(t))p−1, where p > 0, then we obtain the minimization
problem for
∑
S∈A
z(S)[ z(S)
p
(p+1)v(S)p − 1] that was considered in (Yanovskaya, 2002).
3. U(t) = t = q(t), then we obtain the Least Square solution that solves the
minimization problem for
∑
T∈A
(z(T )− v(T ))2 on the set of imputations.
3. Existence rezults
The U–nucleolus and the qU–solution are always nonempty sets. Now we describe
conditions on A which ensure that U–equal sacriﬁce solutions, Weakly U–equal
sacriﬁce solutions, Solidary solutions, Weakly Solidary solutions are nonempty sets.
We found that these conditions are the same for all U and coincide with the corre-
sponding versions for Solidarity solutions.
Theorem 1. Let U be a strictly increasing continuous function deﬁned on (0,+∞).
Then the following 3 statements are equivalent.
1. The U–equal sacriﬁce solution of (N,A, c, v) is nonempty for all c > 0, all v with
v(T ) > 0.
2. The Solidary solution of (N,A, c, v) is nonempty for all c > 0, all v with v(T ) > 0.
3. A is a minimal covering of N .
Proof. Let A be a minimal covering of N . Then for each S ∈ A there exists j(S) ∈
S \ ∪Q∈A\{S}Q. Denote J = {j(S) : S ∈ A}. For (N,A, c, v), take y = {yi}i∈N
such that yi = 0 for all i ∈ N \ J ,
∑
i∈N yi = c, and {yj(S)}S∈A is the U–equal
sacriﬁce solution of the claim problem (J, c, {v(S)}S∈A). Then y belongs to the U–
equal sacriﬁce solution of (N,A, c, v) and by Proposition 1, y belongs to the Solidary
solution of (N,A, c, v).
Let the Solidary solution of (N,A, c, v) be nonempty for all c > 0, all v with
v(T ) > 0. Suppose that A is not a minimal covering of N , then there exists S ∈ A
such that A \ {S} covers N . Take c > 0, v(S) > c, v(Q) = , where 0 <  < c/|A|
for all Q ∈ A \ {S}. Let y belong to the Solidary solution of (N,A, c, v). Then
y(S) ≤ c < v(S) and for each Q ∈ A \ {S}, y(Q) < , hence ∑i∈N yi ≤ |A| < c,
but this contradicts to
∑
i∈N yi = c. 
unionsq
Now we describe conditions on A that ensure existence of Weakly U–equal sac-
riﬁce solutions and Weakly Solidary solutions. The following result of the author
will be used.
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Theorem 2 (Naumova, 1978, Theorem 2 or 2008 Corollary 1). Let c > 0,
I(c) = {x ∈ R|N | : xi ≥ 0, x(N) = c}, Gr be an undirected graph with the set of
nodes A, {x}x∈I(c) be a family of relations on A, and for each K ∈ A
FK = {x ∈ I(c) : L x K for all L ∈ A}.
Let {x}x∈I(c) satisfy the following 5 conditions.
1. x is acyclic on A.
2. If K ∈ A and xi = 0 for all i ∈ K, then x ∈ FK .
3. The set FK is closed for each K ∈ A.
4. If K x L, then K and L are adjacent in the graph Gr.
5. If a single node is taken out from each component of Gr, then the remaining
elements of A do not cover N .
Then there exists x0 ∈ I(c) such that K x0 L for all K,L ∈ A.
Theorem 3. Let G(A) be the undirected graph, where A is the set of nodes and
K,L ∈ A are adjacent iﬀ K ∩ L = ∅. Let U be a strictly increasing continuous
function deﬁned on (0,+∞). Then the following 3 statements are equivalent.
1. The Weakly solidary solution of (N,A, c, v) is a nonempty set for all c > 0, all v
with v(T ) > 0.
2. The Weakly U–equal sacriﬁce solution of (N,A, c, v) is a nonempty set for all
c > 0, all v with v(T ) > 0.
3. A satisﬁes the following condition.
C0. If a single node is taken out from each component of G(A), then the remaining
elements of A do not cover N .
Proof. Suppose that A satisﬁes C0. Fix (N,A, c, v). For each imputation x, consider
the following relation on A: P x Q iﬀ P ∩ Q = ∅, x(Q) > 0, and U(x(P )) −
U(v(P )) < U(x(Q)) − U(v(Q)). Then x0 belongs to the Weakly U–equal sacriﬁce
solution of (N,A, c, v) iﬀ K x0 L for all K,L ∈ A. This family of relations and the
graph G(A) satisfy all conditions of Theorem 2, hence the Weakly U–equal sacriﬁce
solution of (N,A, c, v) is a nonempty set. In view of Proposition 1, this implies that
the Weakly Solidary solution of (N,A, c, v) is a nonempty set.
Now suppose that the Weakly Solidary solution of (N,A, c, v) is a nonempty set
for all c > 0, all v with v(T ) > 0 and let us prove that C0 is satisﬁed. Suppose
that A does not satisfy the condition C0. Let m be the number of components of
G(A), S1, . . . , Sm be the nodes taken out from each component of G(A) such that
A \ {S1, . . . , Sm} cover N .
Let us take c > 0, v(Si) = c for all i = 1, . . . ,m, v(Q) =  for remaining Q ∈ A,
where |A| < c. Let y belong to the Weakly Solidary solution of (N,A, c, v). If
Q ∩ Si = ∅, then y(Si) > 0 implies y(Si) < v(Si), therefore y(Q) <  for Q = Si,
and as such Q cover N , we get y(N) ≤ |A| < c = y(N). This contradiction
completes the proof. 
unionsq
4. Properties of qU–solutions
Property 1. Let U be a strictly increasing continuous function deﬁned on (0,+∞),
U(t) → −∞ as t→ 0, q ∈ Q(U), q →∞ as t→ ∞, and x belong to the qU–solution
of (N,A, c, v). Then x(S) > 0 for all S ∈ A.
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Proof. Suppose that there exist (N,A, c, v), S ∈ A, and x in qU–solution of (N,A, c, v)
such that x(S) = 0. Let 0 <  < min{xk : xk > 0}. Let
M = max
T :T∈A,x(T )>0
max
t∈[x(T )−,x(T )+]
|q(U(t)− U(v(T )))|.
Fix δ > 0 such that δ < min{,minT∈A v(T )} and |q(U(δ) − U(v(S)))| > 2|N |M .
Let i ∈ S, j ∈ N , xj > 0.
Take z ∈ R|N | such that zi = xi + δ, zj = xj − δ, zk = xk for k = i, j. Then∑
T∈A
z(T )∫
v(T )
q(U(t)− U(v(T )))dt− ∑
T∈A
x(T )∫
v(T )
q(U(t)− U(v(T )))dt =
∑
T∈A:i∈T,j 	∈T
x(T )+δ∫
x(T )
q(U(t)− U(v(T )))dt− ∑
T∈A:i	∈T,j∈T
x(T )∫
x(T )−δ
q(U(t)− U(v(T )))dt.
If i ∈ T , j ∈ T then |
x(T )∫
x(T )−δ
q(U(t)− U(v(T )))dt| ≤ δM .
If T = S then
x(S)+δ∫
x(S)
q(U(t)− U(v(S)))dt =
δ∫
0
q(U(t)− U(v(S)))dt < −2|N |Mδ.
If i ∈ T , j ∈ T , x(T ) = 0, then
x(T )+δ∫
x(T )
q(U(t)− U(v(T )))dt < 0 since δ < v(T ).
If i ∈ T , j ∈ T , x(T ) > 0, then |q(U(t) − U(v(T )))| ≤ M as t ∈ [x(T ), x(T ) + δ],
hence |
x(T )+δ∫
x(T )
q(U(t)− U(v(T )))dt| ≤ δM .
Thus,∑
T∈A
z(T )∫
v(T )
q(U(t)− U(v(T )))dt− ∑
T∈A
x(T )∫
v(T )
q(U(t)− U(v(T )))dt <
(|A| − 1)δM − 2|N |Mδ < 0 and x is not in the qU–solution of (N,A, c, v). 
unionsq
Property 2. Let U be a strictly increasing continuous function deﬁned on (0,+∞),
q ∈ Q(U), then f(z) = ∑
Q∈A
z(Q)∫
v(Q)
q(U(t)−U(v(Q)))dt is a continuous convex function
of z deﬁned on the set of imputations of (N,A, c, v) and for all A, c > 0, v with
v(T ) > 0, the qU–solution of (N,A, c, v) deﬁnes uniquely total amounts y(T ) for
each T ∈ A.
Proof. Let a > 0, ψ(r) =
r∫
a
q(U(t))dt for r ≥ 0. If lim
t→0
q(U(t)) > −∞, then ψ(r) is
a strictly convex function on [0,+∞). If lim
t→0
q(U(t)) = −∞, then ψ(r) is a convex
function on [0,+∞) and a strictly convex function on (0,+∞). Therefore f(z) is a
convex function of z and in view of Property 1, if y and z belong to qU–solution of
(N,A, c, v), then y(T ) = z(T ) for all T ∈ A. 
unionsq
Property 3. Let U be a strictly increasing continuous function deﬁned on (0,+∞),
q ∈ Q(U). Then for each x in the qU–solution of (N,A, c, v), xi > 0 implies∑
T∈A:i∈T
q(U(x(T ))− q(U(v(T ))) ≤
∑
T∈A:j∈T
q(U(x(T ))− U(v(T )))
for all j ∈ N .
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Proof. Let x belong to the qU–solution of (N,A, c, v). Note that in view of Prop-
erty 1, q(U(x(Q)) − U(v(Q))) are well deﬁned for all Q ∈ A. Let xi > 0. Suppose
that there exists j ∈ N such that∑
T∈A:j∈T
q(U(x(T ))− U(v(T ))) <
∑
T∈A:i∈T
q(U(x(T ))− U(v(T ))).
Consider  ≥ 0 and y() ∈ R|N | such that  < xi, y()i = xi − , y()j = xj + ,
y()k = xk for k = i, j. Let
F () =
∑
Q∈A
y()(Q)∫
v(Q)
q(U(t)− U(v(Q)))dt −
∑
Q∈A
x(Q)∫
v(Q)
q(U(t) − U(v(Q)))dt,
then
F () =
∑
Q∈A:i∈Q,j 	∈Q
x(Q)−∫
x(Q)
q(U(t)− U(v(Q)))dt+
∑
Q∈A:i	∈Q,j∈Q
x(Q)+∫
x(Q)
q(U(t)− U(v(Q)))dt,
F ′(0) = − ∑
Q∈A:i∈Q,j 	∈Q
q(U(x(Q)) − U(v(Q)))+∑
Q∈A:i	∈Q,j∈Q
q(U(x(Q))− U(v(Q))) < 0.
Hence, F () < 0 for some  > 0 and x does not belong to the qU–solution of
(N,A, c, v). 
unionsq
Property 4. Let U be a strictly increasing continuous function deﬁned on (0,+∞),
q ∈ Q(U), and x be an imputation of (N,A, c, v) such that xi > 0 implies∑
T∈A:i∈T
q(U(x(T ))− q(U(v(T ))) ≤
∑
T∈A:j∈T
q(U(x(T ))− U(v(T )))
for all j ∈ N .
Then x belongs to the qU–solution of (N,A, c, v).
Proof. For each imputation z of (N,A, c, v), let f(z) = ∑
Q∈A
z(Q)∫
v(Q)
q(U(t)−U(v(Q)))dt.
If zj > 0 for all j ∈ N then f is diﬀerentiable at z and
∂
∂zj
f(z) =
∑
T∈A:Tj
q(U(z(T ))− U(v(T ))). (1)
If z and w are imputations of (N,A, c, v) such that zj , wj > 0 for all j ∈ N , then,
in view of Property 2,
f(w) − f(z) ≥
∑
j∈N
∂f(z)
∂zj
(wj − zj). (2)
Note that if xi > 0 then for all Q  i, x(Q) > 0 and q(U(x(Q)) − U(v(Q))) are
well deﬁned. Hence for all j ∈ N , ∑
T∈A:Tj
q(U(x(T )) − U(v(T ))) are well deﬁned.
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Let y be an imputation of (N,A, c, v). There exist imputations zk and wk with
positive coordinates such that lim
k→+∞
zk = x, lim
k→+∞
wk = y, then it follows from (2)
and (1) that
f(y)− f(x) ≥
∑
j∈N
(yj − xj)
∑
T∈A: Tj
q(U(x(T ))− U(v(T ))). (3)
Let xi > 0, then (1) implies∑
j∈N
xj
∑
T∈A:Tj
q(U(x(T ))− U(v(T ))) = c
∑
T∈A:Ti
q(U(x(T ))− U(v(T ))), (4)
∑
j∈N
yj
∑
T∈A: Tj
q(U(x(T ))− U(v(T ))) ≥ c
∑
T∈A: Ti
q(U(x(T ))− U(v(T ))). (5)
It follows from (3),(4), (5) that f(y)− f(x) ≥ 0, i.e., x belongs to the qU–solution
of (N,A, c, v). 
unionsq
5. When generalized solutions satisfy solidarity properties?
We describe conditions on the collection of coalitions A that ensure the inclusion of
the U–nucleolus (qU–solution) in the U–equal sacriﬁce solution and in the Solidary
solution. We prove that these conditions depend neither on U nor on q and are the
same.
Theorem 4. Let U be a strictly increasing continuous function deﬁned on (0,+∞).
Then the following 3 statements are equivalent.
1. A is a partition of N .
2. The U–nucleolus of (N,A, c, v) is contained in the U–equal sacriﬁce solution of
(N,A, c, v) for all c > 0, all v with v(T ) > 0.
3. The U–nucleolus of (N,A, c, v) is contained in the Solidary solution of (N,A, c, v)
for all c > 0, all v with v(T ) > 0.
Proof. Let A be a partition of N , then the U–nucleolus always coincides with the
U -equal sacriﬁce solution, and by Proposition 1, it is contained in the Solidary
solution.
Let the U–nucleolus be always contained in the Solidary solution. Suppose that
there exist P,Q ∈ A such that P ∩ Q = ∅. We take the following v: v(P ) > 1,
v(T ) =  otherwise, where  < 1/(4|N |).
Let x belong to the U–nucleolus of (N,A, 1, v), then x(P ) < v(P ) and due to
the solidarity property this implies x(T ) <  for all T ∈ A\{P}, hence xi <  for all
i ∈ N \ P . As long as A covers N , x(P ) > 3/4. Since x belongs to the U–nucleolus
and AP = {T ∈ A \ {P} : T ∩ P = ∅} = ∅, we have xi = 0 for all i ∈ P \ ∪T∈AP T .
Then x(S) ≥ x(P )/|P | for some S ∈ AP . Therefore,
x(S) ≥ 3/(4|N |) > ,
but this contradicts to x(S) < . 
unionsq
326 Natalia Naumova
Theorem 5. Let U be a strictly increasing continuous function deﬁned on (0,+∞),
q ∈ Q(U). Then the following 3 statements are equivalent.
1. A is a partition of N .
2. The qU–solution of (N,A, c, v) is contained in the U–equal sacriﬁce solution of
(N,A, c, v) for all c > 0, all v with v(T ) > 0.
3. The qU–solution of (N,A, c, v) is contained in the Solidary solution of (N,A, c, v)
for all c > 0, all v with v(T ) > 0.
Proof. Let A be a partition of N . Then for each imputation x of (N,A, c, v),∑
T∈A: Ti
q(U(x(T ))− U(v(T ))) = q(U(x(S)) − U(v(S))) for all S ∈ A, i ∈ S.
Let x belong to the qU–solution of (N,A, c, v), then by Property 3, x(S) > 0
for some S ∈ A implies q(U(x(S)) − U(v(S))) ≤ q(U(x(T )) − U(v(T ))) for all
T ∈ A. As q is a strictly increasing function, this implies U(x(S)) − U(v(S)) ≤
U(x(T ))−U(v(T )). Thus, x belongs to the U–equal sacriﬁce solution of (N,A, c, v).
Then, by Proposition 1, x belongs to the Solidary solution of (N,A, c, v).
Let the qU–solution be always contained in the Solidary solution. Suppose that
A is not a partition of N , then there exist P,Q ∈ A such that P ∩Q = ∅. We take
the following v: v(P ) = 2, v(T ) =  otherwise, where  < 1/|N |.
Let x belong to the qU–solution of (N,A, 1, v). Then x(P ) < v(P ) and it follows
from the solidarity property that x(T ) <  for all T ∈ A \ {P}, hence xi <  for
all i ∈ N \ P . If xi ≤  for all i ∈ P , then x(N) ≤ |N | < 1, hence there exists
j0 ∈ P \ ∪T∈A\{P}T such that xj0 > . Let i0 ∈ P ∩Q. By Property 3,
q(U(x(P )) − U(v(P ))) = ∑
T∈A:Tj0
q(U(x(T )) − U(v(T ))) ≤∑
T∈A:Ti0
q(U(x(T ))− U(v(T ))).
Since x(T ) < v(T ) for all T ∈ A and q(0) = 0, this implies
0 ≤
∑
T∈A: Ti0 T 	=P
q(U(x(T ))− U(v(T ))) ≤ q(U(x(Q)) − U(v(Q)) < 0.
In view of this contradiction, A is a partition of N . 
unionsq
6. When generalized solutions satisfy weak solidarity properties?
In this section we obtain conditions on the collection of coalitions A that ensure
the inclusion of the U–nucleolus in the Weakly U–equal sacriﬁce solution and in the
Weakly Solidary solution. We prove that these conditions coincide. We also obtain
necessary and suﬃcient conditions on A that ensure the inclusion of qU–solutions
in the Weakly U–equal sacriﬁce solution. These conditions depend neither on U nor
on q and coincide with the conditions that ensure the inclusion of the qU–solutions
in the Weakly Solidary solution.
For i ∈ N , denote Ai = {T ∈ A : i ∈ T }.
Deﬁnition 16. A collection of coalitions A is weakly mixed at N if A = ∪ki=1Bi,
where
C1) each Bi is contained in a partition of N ;
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C2) Q ∈ Bi, S ∈ Bj, and i = j imply Q ∩ S = ∅;
C3) for each i ∈ N , Q ∈ Ai, S ∈ A with Q ∩ S = ∅, there exists j ∈ N such that
Aj ⊃ Ai ∪ {S} \ {Q}.
Remark 2. If k ≤ 2 then C3 follows from C1 and C2.
Remark 3. If A is a weakly mixed collection of coalitions, then it satisﬁes the
condition C0 of Theorem 3.
Proof. Let A be weakly mixed at N . Take j0 ∈ N such that |Aj0 | ≥ |Ai| for all
i ∈ N . Let Aj0 = {Qt}t∈M , where Qt ∈ Bt, M ⊂ {1, . . . , k}.
Let St ∈ Bt for all t ≤ k. Since A is weakly mixed, there exists io ∈
⋂
t∈M St. In
view of deﬁnition of j0, Ai0 = {St : t ∈ M}. Therefore, if for each t ∈ {1, . . . , k},
St is taken out from A, then the remaining elements of A do not cover i0. 
unionsq
Example 1. Let N = {1, 2, . . . , 5}, C = B1 ∪ B2, where
B1 = {{1, 2, 3}, {4, 5}},
B2 = {{1, 4}, {2, 5}},
then C is weakly mixed at N .
Example 2. N = {1, 2, . . . , 12}, A = B1 ∪ B2 ∪ B3, where
B1 = {{1, 2, 3, 4}, {5, 6, 7, 8}},
B2 = {{3, 5, 9, 10}, {4, 6, , 11, 12}},
B3 = {{1, 7, 9, 11}, {2, 8, 10, 12, 13}}.
Then A is weakly mixed at N .
Example 3. Let N = {1, 2, . . . , 6}, C = B1 ∪ B2 ∪ B3, where
B1 = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}},
B2 = {{1, 3}, {2, 4}},
B3 = {{1, 4, 5}, {2, 3, 6}},
then C satisﬁes C0, C1, and C2, but does not satisfy C3 (for i = 1 and Q = {1, 2}),
hence C is not weaky mixed at N .
Proposition 2. Let U be a strictly increasing continuous function deﬁned on (0,+∞)
and the U–nucleolus of (N,A, t, v) be contained in the Weakly Solidary solution of
(N,A, t, v) for all t > 0, all v with v(T ) > 0.
Then the case P,Q, S ∈ A, P = Q, P ∩S = Q∩S = ∅, P ∩Q = ∅ is impossible.
Proof. Suppose that there exist P,Q, S ∈ A such that P = Q, P ∩ S = Q ∩ S = ∅,
P ∩ Q = ∅. Let us take the following v: v(S) = v(P ) = 1, v(T ) =  for all T ∈
A \ {S, P}, where 0 <  < 1/2|N |. Let j ∈ P ∩Q.
Let x belong to the U–nucleolus of (N,A, 1, v). First, we prove that x(Q) ≥
x(P )/|P |. Assume the contrary, then x(P ∩ Q) < x(P )/|P |, hence there exists
i0 ∈ P \Q such that xi0 > x(P )/|P |.
Let i0 ∈ T for all T ∈ A \ {P} then we take y ∈ R|N |: yi0 = 0, yj = xj + xi0 ,
yi = xi otherwise. Then y(P ) = x(P ), y(Q) > x(Q), y(T ) ≥ x(T ) for all T ∈ A,
hence x does not belong to the U–nucleolus.
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Let i0 ∈ T for some T ∈ A \ {P}, then T = S and x(T ) > x(P )/|P | > x(Q).
This implies
U(x(T ))− U(v(T )) = U(x(T ))− U() > U(x(Q)) − U(v(Q)).
Let z = z(δ) ∈ R|N |, zi0 = xi0 − δ, zj = xj + δ, zi = xi otherwise. If δ > 0 and δ is
suﬃciently small, then for T ∈ Ai0 \ {P},
U(z(T ))− U(v(T )) > U(z(Q))− U(v(Q)) > U(x(Q))− U(v(Q)),
otherwise z(T ) ≥ x(T ), hence θ(z(δ)) >lex θ(x). Thus
x(Q) ≥ x(P )/|P |.
Weak solidarity condition for Q and S implies x(Q) < , hence x(P ) < |P |. We
consider 4 cases.
Case 1. There exists j0 ∈ P ∪ Q ∪ S such that xj0 > . Then for all T  j0,
x(T ) > v(T ). Let w = w(δ) ∈ R|N |, wj0 = xj0 − δ, wj = xj + δ, wi = xi otherwise.
Then for δ > 0, w(Q) > x(Q) and for suﬃciently small δ, w(Q) < v(Q), and
w(T ) > v(T ) for all T  j0, hence we get θ(w(δ)) >lex θ(x), and the Case 1 is
impossible.
Case 2. xi ≤  for all i ∈ P ∪Q ∪ S and x(S) ≤ x(P ). Then
x(N) ≤ x(Q) + 2|P |+ |N \ (P ∪ S ∪Q)| ≤ 2|N | < 1
and this contradicts x(N) = 1.
Case 3. xi ≤  for all i ∈ P ∪ Q ∪ S and xi ≤  for all i ∈ S. This implies
1 = x(N) ≤ |N | < 1, hence this case is impossible.
Case 4. xi ≤  for all i ∈ P ∪Q ∪ S, x(S) > x(P ) and xi0 >  for some i0 ∈ S.
Then x(T ) > v(T ) for T = S, T  i0. Let y = y(δ) ∈ R|N |, yi0 = xi0−δ, yj = xj+δ,
yi = xi otherwise. Then for δ > 0, y(Q) > x(Q), y(P ) > x(P ) and for suﬃciently
small δ > 0, we get θ(y(δ)) >lex θ(x). This contradiction completes the proof. 
unionsq
Theorem 6. Let U be a strictly increasing continuous function deﬁned on (0,+∞).
If A is a weakly mixed collection of coalitions at N then for all c > 0, all v
with v(T ) > 0, the U–nucleolus of (N,A, c, v) is contained in the Weakly U–equal
sacriﬁce solution of (N,A, c, v) and in the Weakly Solidary solution of (N,A, c, v).
Let, moreover, either U be a convex function or U(t) → +∞ as t → +∞.
Let the U–nucleolus of (N,A, c, v) be contained in the Weakly Solidary solution of
(N,A, c, v) for all c > 0, all v with v(T ) > 0. Then A is a weakly mixed collection
of coalitions at N .
Proof. Let A be weakly mixed at N and x belong to the U–nucleolus of (N,A, c, v).
We prove that x belongs to the Weakly U–equal sacriﬁce solution of (N,A, c, v).
Suppose the contrary, i.e., there exist S,Q ∈ A such that S ∩Q = ∅ and U(x(Q))−
U(v(Q)) < U(x(S)) − U(v(S)) and x(S) > 0. Take i0 ∈ S such that xi0 > 0. Since
A is weakly mixed, there exists j ∈ N such that Aj ⊃ Ai0 ∪ {S} \ {Q}. Take δ > 0
such that
U(x(Q) + δ)U(v(Q)) < U(x(S)− δ)− U(v(S))
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and δ < xi0 . Let y = {yi}i∈N , yi0 = xi0 − δ, yj = xj + δ, yt = xt otherwise.
Then y(P ) < x(P ) only for P = S and y(Q) > x(Q). Since U(y(Q)) − U(v(Q)) <
U(y(S))− U(v(S)), this contradicts the deﬁnition of the U -nucleolus. Therefore, x
belongs to the Weakly U–equal sacriﬁce solution of (N,A, c, v) and by Proposition 1,
x belongs to the Weakly Solidary solution of (N,A, c, v).
Let either U be is a convex function or U(t) → +∞ as t → +∞ and the
U–nucleolus be always contained in the Weakly Solidary solution. Let Bi be com-
ponents of the graph G(A) used in Theorem 3. Then A satisﬁes C2 by the deﬁnition
of G(A) and satisﬁes C1 in view of Proposition 2. Suppose that A is not weakly
mixed. Then there exist i0 ∈ N , Q ∈ Ai0 , and S ∈ A such that S ∩ Q = ∅ and
Aj ⊃ Ai0 ∪ {S} \ {Q} for all j ∈ N . Let 0 <  < 1/|N |. We can take v with the
following properties:
v(S) = 1,
U(v(P )) > 2U(1)− U(1/|N |) for P ∈ Ai0 \ {Q},
v(T ) =  otherwise.
Let x belong to the U–nucleolus and to the Weakly Solidary solution of (N,A, 1, v).
Since S ∩Q = ∅, x(N) = 1, and v(S) + v(Q) > 1, we have x(Q) < v(Q) = . There
exists j0 ∈ N such that xj0 ≥ 1/|N |. Then j0 ∈ Q and j0 = i0.
Take δ > 0 such that δ < 1/|N | and for each T, P ∈ A,
U(x(T ))− U(v(T )) < U(x(P ))− U(v(P ))
implies
U(x(T ) + δ)− U(v(T )) < U(x(P )− δ)− U(v(P )).
Let y = {yi}i∈N , yi0 = xi0 + δ, yj0 = xj0 − δ, yi = xi otherwise.
We prove that there exists P ∈ A such that y(P ) > x(P ) and U(x(P )) −
U(v(P )) < U(x(T )) − U(v(T )) for all T ∈ A with y(T ) < x(T ) and this would
imply that x does not belong to the U–nucleolus of (N,A, 1, v). Consider 2 cases.
Case 1. j0 ∈ S. Let y(T ) < x(T ), then T  j0 and v(T ) = , hence
U(x(T ))− U(v(T )) ≥ U(xj0 )− U > 0.
Since U(x(Q))− U(v(Q)) < 0 and y(Q) > x(Q), we can take P = Q, hence x does
not belong to the U–nucleolus of (N,A, 1, v) in this case.
Case 2. j0 ∈ S. Then there exists P ∈ Ai0 \ Aj0 \ {Q}, where y(P ) > x(P ). Let
us check that
y(T ) < x(T ) implies U(x(P )) − U(v(P )) < U(x(T ))− U(v(T )).
If T = S then
U(x(S))− U(v(S)) ≥ U(1/|N |)− U(1) > U(1)− U(v(P )) ≥ U(x(P ))− U(v(P )).
If T = S then v(T ) =  and U(x(T )) − U(v(T )) ≥ U(xj0 ) − U > 0. Since U is
strictly increasing, U(v(P )) > U(1), hence U(x(P ))− U(v(P )) < 0 and U(x(P ))−
U(v(P )) < U(x(T )) − U(v(T )). Thus, x does not belong to the U–nucleolus of
(N,A, 1, v) in this case. 
unionsq
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Corollary 1. The Proportional Nucleolus of (N,A, c, v) is contained in the Weakly
Proportional solution and in the Weakly Solidary solution of (N,A, c, v) for all c > 0,
v with v(T ) > 0 if and only if A is a weakly mixed collection of coalitions at N .
Corollary 2. The Nucleolus of (N,A, c, v) is contained in the Weakly Uniform
Losses solution and in the the Weakly Solidary solution of (N,A, c, v) for all c > 0,
v with v(T ) > 0 if and only if A is a weakly mixed collection of coalitions at N .
Deﬁnition 17. A collection of coalitions A is mixed at N if A = ∪ki=1Bi, where
C1) each Bi is contained in a partition of N ;
C2) Q ∈ Bi, S ∈ Bj, and i = j imply Q ∩ S = ∅;
C4) for each i ∈ N , Q ∈ Ai, S ∈ A with Q ∩ S = ∅, there exists j ∈ N such that
Aj = Ai ∪ {S} \ {Q}.
Note that if A is mixed at N then A is weakly mixed at N .
Example 4. If A is weakly mixed at N and all i ∈ N belong to the same number of
coalitions, then A is mixed at N .
Example 5. Let N = {1, 2, . . . , 6}, A = B1 ∪ B2, where
B1 = {{1, 2, 3}, {4, 5, 6}},
B2 = {{1, 4}, {2, 5}},
then A is mixed at N .
Example 6. Let N = {1, 2, . . . , 5}, C = B1 ∪ B2, where
B1 = {{1, 2, 3}, {4, 5}},
B2 = {{1, 4}, {2, 5}},
then C is weakly mixed at N but not mixed at N . (For i = 3, the condition C4 is
not realized.)
Proposition 3. Let the qU–solution of (N,A, c, v) be contained in the Weakly Sol-
idary solution of (N,A, c, v) for all c > 0, all v with v(T ) > 0. Then the case
P,Q, S ∈ A, P = Q, P ∩ S = Q ∩ S = ∅, P ∩Q = ∅ is impossible.
Proof. Suppose that there exist P,Q, S ∈ A such that P = Q, P ∩ S = Q ∩ S = ∅,
P ∩Q = ∅. Let i0 ∈ P ∩Q, A0 = {T ∈ A : i0 ∈ T, T ∩ S = ∅}.
Let 0 <  < 1/|N |. We take the following v:
v(T ) = 1 for T ∈ A0 ∪ {P},
v(T ) =  otherwise.
Let x belong to the qU–solution of (N,A, 1, v). Since x satisﬁes the weakly
solidarity property, v(P ) + v(S) > 1, and S ∩ P = ∅, we have x(S) < v(S). Since
Q ∩ S = ∅, we have x(Q) < v(Q) = . There exists j0 ∈ N such that xj0 ≥ 1/|N |.
Then j0 ∈ Q and j0 = i0.
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Let j0 ∈ T , i0 ∈ T . Then T ∈ A0 ∪ {P}, hence v(T ) =  and x(T )/v(T ) > 1.
Thus, ∑
T∈A: Tj0,T 	i0
q(U(x(T ))− U(v(T ))) ≥ 0. (6)
Let j0 ∈ T , i0 ∈ T . If v(T ) =  then T ∩ S = ∅ and it follows from the weak
solidarity property that x(T ) < v(T ). If v(T ) = 1, then v(T ) ≥ x(T ). Therefore∑
T∈A:T 	j0,Ti0
q(U(x(T ))− U(v(T ))) ≤ q(U(x(Q)) − U(v(Q))) < 0. (7)
It follows from (6) and (7) that∑
T∈A:Tj0
q(U(x(T )) − U(v(T ))) >
∑
T∈A:Ti0
q(U(x(T ))− U(v(T ))),
but this contradicts Property 3. 
unionsq
Theorem 7. Let U be a strictly increasing continuous function deﬁned on (0,+∞),
q ∈ Q(U).
The qU–solution of (N,A, c, v) is contained in the Weakly U–equal sacriﬁce so-
lution and in the Weakly Solidary solution of (N,A, c, v) for all c > 0, all v with
v(T ) > 0 if and only if A is a mixed collection of coalitions at N .
Proof. Let A be a mixed collection of coalitions. Let x belong to the qU–solution
of (N,A, c, v). We prove that x belongs to the Weakly U–equal sacriﬁce solution of
(N,A, c, v). Suppose that there exist Q,S ∈ A such that Q ∩ S = ∅, x(Q) > 0, and
U(x(Q)) − U(v(Q)) > U(x(S)) − U(v(S)). There exists i0 ∈ Q with xi0 > 0. Since
A is mixed, there exists j0 ∈ N such that Aj0 = Ai0 ∪ {S} \ {Q}. Then∑
T∈A: T 	j0,Ti0
q(U(x(T ))− U(v(T ))) = q(U(x(Q)) − U(v(Q))),
∑
T∈A:Tj0,T 	i0
q(U(x(T ))− U(v(T ))) = q(U(x(S)) − U(v(S))),
hence ∑
T∈A:Ti0
q(U(x(T ))− U(v(T ))) >
∑
T∈A:Tj0
q(U(x(T ))− U(v(T ))),
but this contradicts Property 3. Thus, x belongs to the Weakly U–equal sacriﬁce
solution of (N,A, c, v), and due to Proposition 1, x belongs to the Weakly Solidary
solution of (N,A, c, v).
Let the qU–solution be always contained in the Weakly Solidary solution. Let Bi
be components of the graph G(A) used in Theorem 3. By the deﬁnition of G(A), A
satisﬁes C2. In view of Proposition 3, A satisﬁes C1. Suppose that A is not mixed
at N . Then there exist i0 ∈ N , Q ∈ Ai0 , and S ∈ A with S ∩ Q = ∅ such that for
each j ∈ N , Aj = Ai0 ∪ {S} \ {Q}.
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Let L > 1. Since q and U are strictly increasing continuous functions, there
exists  > 0 such that
 < 1/|N |,
U(1)− U(1− |N |) ≤ U(L)− U(1),
q(U(1− |N |)− U(1)) + q(U(1/|N |)− U()) ≥ 0.
We take the following v:
v(S) = 1,
U(v(P )) = L for P ∈ Ai0 \ {Q},
v(T ) =  otherwise.
Let x belong to the qU–solution and to the Weakly Solidary solution of (N,A, 1, v).
Since v(S)+v(Q) > 1 and x(N) = 1, we have x(Q) < v(Q) = . There exists j0 ∈ N
such that xj0 ≥ 1/|N |. Then j0 ∈ Q. We shall prove that there exists j1 ∈ N such
that xj1 > 0 and∑
T∈A:Ti0
q(U(x(T ))− U(v(T ))) <
∑
T∈A:Tj1
q(U(x(T ))− U(v(T ))), (8)
and this would contradict Property 3 of qU–solutions.
The following 3 cases are possible.
1. There exists j1 ∈ S such that xj1 ≥ .
2. xj <  for all j ∈ S and Ai0 \ Aj0 = {Q}.
3. xj <  for all j ∈ S and Ai0 \ Aj0 = {Q}.
Case 1. Since v(P ) > 1 for all P ∈ Ai0 \ {Q},∑
T∈Ai0\Aj1
q(U(x(T ))− U(v(T ))) ≤ q(U(x(Q)) − U(v(Q))) < 0.
Since j1 ∈ S, x(T ) ≥ v(T ) =  for all T ∈ Aj1 \ Ai0 , therefore,∑
T∈Aj1\Ai0
q(U(x(T ))− U(v(T ))) ≥ 0,
this implies (8).
Case 2. We have x(S) ≥ 1− |N | and j0 ∈ S. There exists P 0 ∈ Ai0 \Aj0 \ {Q},
then
∑
T∈Ai0\Aj0
q(U(x(T ))− U(v(T ))) ≤ q(U(x(Q)) − U(v(Q)))+
q(U(x(P 0))− (v(P 0))) < q(U(x(P 0))− U(v(P 0))).
If T ∈ Aj0 \ Ai0 then either T = S or x(T ) > v(T ) = , therefore∑
T∈Aj0\Ai0
q(U(x(T ))− U(v(T ))) ≥ q(U(x(S)) − U(v(S))).
Since U(1− |N |)− U(1) ≥ U(1)− U(L), we get
q(U(x(S))−U(S)) ≥ q(U(1−|N |)−U(1)) ≥ q(U(1)−U(L)) ≥ q(U(x(P 0))−U(v(P 0)))
and this implies (8) for j1 = j0.
Case 3. Since Ai0\Aj0 = {Q} andAj0 = Ai0∪{S}\{Q}, there exists T0 ∈ A\Ai0
such that j0 ∈ T0 and T0 = S. Then∑
T∈Ai0\Aj0
q(U(x(T ))− U(v(T ))) = q(U(x(Q)) − U(v(Q))) < 0,
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In view of x(S) ≥ 1− |N |, x(T0) ≥ 1/|N |, v(T0) = , and restrictions on , we have∑
T∈Aj0\Ai0
q(U(x(T ))− U(v(T ))) ≥ q(U(x(S)) − U(v(S)))+
q(U(x(T0))− U(v(T0))) ≥ q(U(1− |N |)− U(1)) + q(U(1/|N |)− U()) ≥ 0.
Thus, we obtain (8) for j1 = j0. 
unionsq
Corollary 3. The Weighted Entropy solution of (N,A, c, v) is contained in the
Weakly Proportional solution and in the Weakly Solidary solution of (N,A, c, v)
for all c > 0, all v with v(T ) > 0 if and only if A is a mixed collection of coalitions
at N .
Corollary 4. The Least Square solution of (N,A, c, v) is contained in the Weakly
Uniform Losses solution and in the Weakly Solidary solution of (N,A, c, v) for all
c > 0, all v with v(T ) > 0 if and only if A is a mixed collection of coalitions at N .
7. When diﬀerent U–generalizations give the same result?
In this section necessary and suﬃcient conditions on A that provide the coincidence
of the U–nucleolus with the Weakly U–equal sacriﬁce solution and conditions on
A that provide the coincidence of the qU–solution with the Weakly U–equal sac-
riﬁce solution. These conditions are the same for all U and q ∈ Q(U). The result
concerning qU–solutions is a generalization of the corresponding results concern-
ing the Weighted Entropy solution (Naumova, 2011, Theorem 4) and g–solutions
(Naumova, 2012, Theorem 4), but the proof of this paper also permits to solve the
problem of coincidence the Least Square solution with the Uniform Losses solution.
The result concerning the U–nucleolus is completely new.
Deﬁnition 18. A collection of coalitions A is totally mixed at N if A = ∪ki=1P i,
where P i are partitions of N and for each collection {Si}ki=1 (Si ∈ P i), we have
∩ki=1Si = ∅.
Example 7. Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, C = B1 ∪ B2, where
B1 = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}},
B2 = {{1, 3}, {2, 4}},
then C is a totally mixed collection of coalitions at N .
Theorem 8. Let U be a continuous strictly increasing function deﬁned on (0,+∞)
and either U is a convex function or U(t) → +∞ as t→ +∞. Then the U–nucleolus
of (N,A, c, v) coincides with the Weakly U–equal sacriﬁce solution of (N,A, c, v) for
all c > 0, all v with v(T ) > 0 if and only if A is a totally mixed collection of coalitions
at N .
Proof. Let A be totally mixed at N . Then A is weakly mixed at N and it follows
from Theorem 4 that the U–nucleolus of (N,A, c, v) is always contained in the
Weakly U–equal sacriﬁce solution of (N,A, c, v). Since in this case for all x in the
Weakly U–equal sacriﬁce solution of (N,A, c, v), x(S) are uniquely deﬁned, this
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implies coincidence of the U–nucleolus and the Weakly U–equal sacriﬁce solution
of (N,A, c, v).
Now suppose that the Weakly U–equal sacriﬁce solution of (N,A, c, v) coincides
with the U–nucleolus of (N,A, c, v) for all c > 0, all v with v(T ) > 0. Note that for
each x in the U–nucleolus of (N,A, c, v),
xi > 0 and Aj ⊃ Ai imply Aj = Ai. (9)
By Proposition 2, A = ⋃ki=1 Bi, where Bi are subsets of partitions of N . If
each Bi is a partition P i of N then by Theorem 2, for each collection {Si}ki=1 with
Si ∈ P i, we have ∩ki=1Si = ∅, so A is totally mixed at N .
Let some Bi be not a partition of N . Then without loss of generality, there exists
q < k such that ∪qi=1Bi does not cover N and ∪qi=1Bi ∪Bj covers N for each j > q.
Denote N0 =
⋃
S∈∪qi=1Bi S. We consider 2 cases.
Case 1. For each j = q + 1, . . . , k, there exists Sj ∈ Bj, such that if Sj is taken
out from Bj for each j = q + 1, . . . , k, then the remaining elements of ∪kj=q+1Bj
cover (N \N0).
We prove that for each y in the U–nucleolus of (N,A, t, v), y(N \ N0) = 0.
Suppose that there exist x in the U–nucleolus of (N,A, t, v) and j0 ∈ N \N0 such
that xj0 > 0. Let Aj0 = {Qi}i∈M , then Qi ∈ Bi, i ∈ {q + 1, . . . , k}. Since A is
weakly mixed by Theorem 4, there exists j1 ∈ N such that Aj1 ⊃ {Si}i∈M .
If Aj1 = {Si}i∈M , then j1 ∈ N \N0 by the deﬁnition of N0, hence the Case 1
is impossible.
Let Aj1 = {Si}i∈M . Since A is weakly mixed, there exists j2 ∈ N such that
Aj2 ⊃ Aj1 ∪ {Qi}i∈M \ {Si}i∈M . Then Aj2 ⊃= Aj0 , but this contradicts (9).
Take v˜(S) = |S|/|N | for all S ∈ A, x˜i = 1/|N | for all i ∈ N , then x˜ belongs
to the Weakly U–equal sacriﬁce solution of (N,A, 1, v˜) Proportional solution of
(N,A, 1, v˜) and x˜(N \ N0) > 0. By the proved above, x˜ does not belong to the
U–nucleolus of (N,A, 1, v˜), hence Case 1 is impossible.
Case 2. If Sj ∈ Bj is taken out from Bj, for all j = q + 1, . . . , k, then the
remaining elements of ∪kj=q+1Bj do not cover N \N0.
For each j = q + 1, . . . , k, Sj ∈ Bj, we have Sj ∩ (N \N0) = ∅. Indeed, suppose
that Sj0 ⊂ N0 for some j0 > q. Then if we take Sj0 and arbitrary Sj ∈ Bj for j > q,
j = j0 out from ∪kj=q+1Bj, the remaining elements of ∪kj=q+1Bj cover N \N0 as if
{N0} ∪ Bj0 covers N .
Let
C = {(N \N0) ∩ S : S ∈ Bj, |Bj| > 1, j > q}.
Note that P, S ∈ ∪kj=q+1Bj, P = S, P ∩ (N \ N0) ∈ C imply P ∩ (N \ N0) =
S ∩ (N \N0).
Indeed, suppose that P ∩(N \N0) = S∩(N \N0). There exists P 1 ∈ A such that
P ∩P 1 = ∅. If we take S, P 1 and arbitrary Sj ∈ Bj for j > q with P ∈ Bj out from
∪kj=q+1Bj, the remaining elements of ∪kj=q+1Bj cover N \ N0 because {N0} ∪ Bj0
covers N , where Bj0  S, but this is impossible in the considered case.
For arbitrary problem (N,A, c, v), where A is under the Case 2, consider the
problem (N \ N0, C, c, w), where w(T ) = v(S) for T = S ∩ (N \ N0) ∈ C. As was
proved above, w is well deﬁned. Under the Case 2, due to Theorem 2, there exists
y in the Weakly U–equal sacriﬁce solution of (N \N0, C, c, w). Let x ∈ R|N |, xi = 0
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for i ∈ N0, xi = yi for i ∈ N \N0, then x belongs to the U–equal sacriﬁce solution
of (N,A, c, v) and x(T ) = 0 for all T ∈ ⋃qi=1 Bi.
Take c = 1 and v˜(S) = |S|/|N | for all S ∈ A, x˜i = 1/|N | for all i ∈ N . As
was proved above, there exists z in the Weakly U–equal sacriﬁce solution of of
(N,A, 1, v˜) with x(T ) = 0 for some T ∈ A. If U(0) = −∞, z does not belong to
the U–nucleolus by the deﬁnition of the U–nucleolus. Let U(0) > −∞. We have
U(z(T ))−U(v˜(T )) < 0 and U(x˜(S))−U(v˜(S)) = 0 for all S ∈ A, hence z does not
belong to the U–nucleolus of (N,A, 1, v˜). Thus, Case 2 is impossible. 
unionsq
Corollary 5. The Proportional Nucleolus of (N,A, c, v) coincides with the Weakly
Proportional solution of (N,A, c, v) for all c > 0, v with v(T ) > 0 if and only if A
is a totally mixed collection of coalitions at N .
Corollary 6. The Nucleolus of (N,A, c, v) coincides with the Weakly Uniform Losses
solution of (N,A, c, v) for all c > 0, v with v(T ) > 0 if and only if A is a totally
mixed collection of coalitions at N .
Theorem 9. Let U be a strictly increasing continuous function deﬁned on (0,+∞),
q ∈ Q(U).
The qU–solution of (N,A, c, v) coincides with the Weakly U–equal sacriﬁce so-
lution of (N,A, c, v) for all c > 0, v if and only if A is a totally mixed collection of
coalitions at N .
Proof. Let A be totally mixed at N . Then A is mixed at N and it follows from
Theorem 7 that the qU–solution of (N,A, c, v) is always contained in the Weakly
U–equal sacriﬁce solution of (N,A, c, v). Since x(S) are uniquely deﬁned for all x
in the Weakly U–equal sacriﬁce solution of (N,A, c, v), this implies coincidence of
the qU–solution and the Weakly U–equal sacriﬁce solution of (N,A, c, v).
Now suppose that the Wealky U–equal sacriﬁce solution of (N,A, c, v) coincides
with the qU–solution of (N,A, c, v) for all c > 0, all v with v(T ) > 0. By Propo-
sition 3, A = ⋃ki=1 Bi, where Bi are subsets of partitions of N . If each Bi is a
partition P i of N then by Theorem 3, for each collection {Si}ki=1 with Si ∈ P i, we
have ∩ki=1Si = ∅, so A is totally mixed at N .
Let some Bi be not a partition of N . Then without loss of generality, there exists
p < k such that ∪pi=1Bi does not cover N and ∪pi=1Bi ∪Bj covers N for each j > p.
Denote N0 =
⋃
S∈∪pi=1Bi S. We consider 2 cases.
Case 1. For each j = p+ 1, . . . , k, there exists Sj ∈ Bj, such that if Sj is taken
out from Bj for all j > p, then the remaining elements of ∪kj=p+1Bj cover (N \N0).
Let j0 ∈ N \ N0, Aj0 = {Qi}i∈M , then Qi ∈ Bi, i ∈ {p + 1, . . . , k}. Since
A is mixed by Theorem 7, there exists j1 ∈ N such that Aj1 = {Si}i∈M , then
j1 ∈ N \N0, hence Case 1 is impossible.
Case 2. If Sj ∈ Bj is taken out from Bj, j = p + 1, . . . , k, then the remaining
elements of ∪kj=q+1Bj do not cover N \N0.
For each j = p+ 1, . . . , k, Sj ∈ Bj, we have Sj ∩ (N \N0) = ∅. Indeed, suppose
that Sj0 ⊂ N0 for some j0 > p. Then if we take Sj0 and arbitrary Sj ∈ Bj for j > p,
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j = j0 out from ∪kj=p+1Bj, the remaining elements of ∪kj=p+1Bj cover N \N0 as if
{N0} ∪ Bj0 covers N .
Let
C = {(N \N0) ∩ S : S ∈ Bj, |Bj| > 1, j > p}.
Note that P, S ∈ ∪kj=p+1Bj, P = S, P ∩ (N \ N0) ∈ C imply P ∩ (N \ N0) =
S ∩ (N \N0).
Indeed, suppose that P ∩(N \N0) = S∩(N \N0). There exists P 1 ∈ A such that
P ∩P 1 = ∅. If we take S, P 1 and arbitrary Sj ∈ Bj for j > p with P ∈ Bj out from
∪kj=p+1Bj, the remaining elements of ∪kj=p+1Bj cover N \ N0 because {N0} ∪ Bj0
covers N , where Bj0  S, but this is impossible in the considered case.
For arbitrary problem (N,A, c, v), where A is under the Case 2, consider the
problem (N \ N0, C, c, w), where w(T ) = v(S) for T = S ∩ (N \ N0) ∈ C. As was
proved above, w is well deﬁned. Under the Case 2, due to Theorem 3, there exists
y in the Weakly U–equal sacriﬁce solution of (N \N0, C, c, w). Let x ∈ R|N |, xi = 0
for i ∈ N0, xi = yi for i ∈ N \N0, then x belongs to the Weakly U–equal sacriﬁce
solution of (N,A, c, v), x(N0) = 0.
Let v˜(S) = |S|/|N | for all S ∈ A, x˜i = 1/|N | for all i ∈ N , then x˜ belongs to the
U–equal sacriﬁce solution of (N,A, 1, v˜) as if U(x˜(S)) − U(v˜(S)) = 0 for all S ∈ A
and x˜(N0) > 0. By Property 2 of qU–solutions, for z in the qU–solution, z(S) are
uniquely deﬁned at each S ∈ A, but 0 = x(T ) = x˜(T ) > 0 for T ∈ Bp. Thus, in
Case 2, qU–solution does not coincide with the Weakly U–equal sacriﬁce solution
for some problem. 
unionsq
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Abstract The informational aspect for the non-cooperative games becomes
an important element for the most of the make decision problems. In this
article the informational extended games 1Γ and 2Γ are deﬁned. For these
informational extended bimatrix games we present two modes for construc-
tion of the extended matrices and an algorithm for determination of Nash
equilibria. For this algorithm we make some modiﬁcations and present an al-
gorithm for determination of Nash equilibria in the informational extended
bimatrix games in the case, in which the dimensions of the matrices are
too big. Using this algorithm we can also determine the number of Nash
equilibria in the informational extended game, without using the extended
matrices.
Keywords: Informational extended bimatrix games, Nash equilibria, so-
lution in pure strategies, extended matrices, algorithm of Nash equilibria
determination
1. Introduction
Usually the information to make decision problems is the most import "element".
Especially this is important if we consider the case of non-cooperative games. Thus
the informational aspect represents a real ﬁllip for the elaboration of new study
methods for the non-cooperative theory. The informational aspect in the game the-
ory may be manifested by: the devise of possession information about strategy’s
choice, the payoﬀ functions, the order of moves, and optimal principles of players;
using methods of possessed information in the strategy’s choice by players (Hâncu,
Novac, 2005). The inclusion of information as an important element of the game
have imposed a new structure to the game theory: the games in complete infor-
mation (the games in extended form), the games with not complete information,
the games in imperfect information (the Bayes games). The player’s possession of
supplementary information about unfolding of the game can inﬂuence appreciably
the player’s payoﬀs.
An important element for the players represent the possession of information
about the behaviour of his opponents. Thus for the same sets of strategies and
same payoﬀ functions it is possible to obtain diﬀerent results, if the players have
supplementary information. So the information for the players about the strategy’s
choice by the others players have a signiﬁcant role for the unfolding of the game.
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2. Basic deﬁnitions
Consider bimatrix game in the normal form Γ = 〈N,X1, X2, A,B〉 , where, A =
{aij} , B = {bij} , i = 1,m, j = 1, n (A andB are the payoﬀmatrices for the ﬁrst and
the second player respectively. Each player can choose one of his strategies and his
purpose is to maximize his payoﬀ. The player can choose his strategy independently
of his opponent and the player does not know the chosen strategy of his opponent.
In this article we will determine the Nash equilibria for the informational ex-
tended bimatrix games using the well known deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 1. The pair (i∗, j∗) , i∗ ∈ X1, j∗ ∈ X2 is called Nash equilibrium (NE)
for the game Γ, if the next relations hold{
ai∗j∗  aij∗ , ∀i ∈ X1,
bi∗j∗  ai∗j , ∀j ∈ X2.
Notation: (i∗, j∗) ∈ NE (Γ ) .
There are bimatrix games for which the set of Nash equilibria is empty: NE (Γ ) = ∅
(i.e. solutions do not exist in pure strategies).
However for every bimatrix game we can construct some informational extended
games. If one of the players knows the strategy chosen by the other, we consider
that it is one form of the informational extended bimatrix game for the initial
game. Even if the initial bimatrix game has no solutions in pure strategies, for
the informational extended games at least one solution in pure strategies (Nash
equilibria) always exists. Proof of this assertion we will present below. In the case
of informational extended games the player which knows the chosen strategy of his
opponent has one advantage and he will obtain one of his greater payoﬀ.
According to (Kukushkin and Morozov, 1984), let us deﬁne two forms of infor-
mational extended games 1Γ and 2Γ . We consider that for the game 1Γ the ﬁrst
player knows the chosen strategy of the second player, and for the game 2Γ the
second player knows the chosen strategy of the ﬁrst player.
If one of players knows the chosen strategy of the other, then the set of strategies
for this player can be represented by a set of mappings deﬁned on the set of his
opponent’s strategies.
Deﬁnition 2 (The game 1Γ according to Kukushkin and Morozov, 1984).
The informational extended bimatrix game 1Γ can be deﬁned in the normal form by:
1Γ =
〈
N,X1, X2, A,B
〉
, where N = {1, 2} , X1 = {ϕ1 : X2 −→ X1} , A = {aij} ,
B =
{
bij
}
, i = 1,mn, j = 1, n.
For the game 1Γ we have X1 = {1, 2, . . . ,mn} , X2 = {1, 2, . . . , n} ,
∣∣X1∣∣ = mn, and
the matrices A and B have dimension [mn × n] and are formed from elements of
initial matrices A and B respectively.
The matrices A and B will be constructed in the next mode:
Let us denote by Ai· = {ai1, ai2, . . . , ain}, Bi· = {bi1, bi2, . . . , bin}, i = 1,m the
rows i in the matrices A and B, respectively.
Choosing one element from each of these rows A1·, A2·, . . . , Am·, we will build
one column in the matrix A. The columns from the matrix B are built in the same
mode, choosing one element from each of the rows B1·, B2·, . . . , Bm·.
Thus, the matrices A and B have the dimension [mn × n] .
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Example 1 (For the game 1Γ ).
We consider the game Γ deﬁned by the matrices:
A =
(
5 3 5
2 1 6
)
, B =
(
4 7 5
3 9 2
)
.
For this game we build the matrices for the informational extended bimatrix
game 1Γ .
A =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
5 3 5
5 3 6
5 1 5
5 1 6
2 3 5
2 3 6
2 1 5
2 1 6
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
, B =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
4 7 5
4 7 2
4 9 5
4 9 2
3 7 5
3 7 2
3 9 5
3 9 2
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
.
The underlined elements (in the matrices above) represent the player’s payoﬀ
corresponding to the Nash equilibria of the game.
Deﬁnition 3 (The game 2Γ according to Kukushkin and Morozov, 1984).
The informational extended bimatrix game 2Γ can be deﬁned in the normal form by:
2Γ =
〈
N,X1, X2, A˜, B˜
〉
, where X2 = {ϕ2 : X1 −→ X2} ,
∣∣X2∣∣ = nm, A˜ = {a˜ij} ,
B˜ =
{
b˜ij
}
, i = 1,m, j = 1, nm.
For the game 2Γ we have X1 = {1, 2, . . . ,m} , X2 = {1, 2, . . . , nm} and the
matrices A˜ and B˜ have dimension [m× nm] and are formed from elements of initial
matrices A and B respectively.
The extended matrices A˜ and B˜ will be built in analogical mode as in the case
of the game 2Γ .
Let us denote by A·j = {a1j , a2j , . . . , amj}, B·j = {b1j, b2j , . . . , bmj}, j = 1, n
the columns j in the initial matrices A and B, respectively). Each of rows in the
matrix A˜ (or in the matrix B˜, respectively) will be built choosing one element from
each of the columns A·j (or from the columns B·j , respectively).
Example 2 (For the game 2Γ ).
We consider the game Γ deﬁned by the matrices:
A =
⎛⎝ 3 54 6
1 9
⎞⎠ , B =
⎛⎝ 5 09 7
1 5
⎞⎠ .
For this game we build the matrices for the informational extended bimatrix
game 2Γ .
A˜ =
⎛⎝ 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 54 4 6 6 4 4 6 6
1 9 1 9 1 9 1 9
⎞⎠ , B˜ =
⎛⎝ 5 5 5 5 0 0 0 09 9 7 7 9 9 7 7
1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5
⎞⎠ .
As in the ﬁrst example, here the underlined elements (in the matrices) represent
the player’s payoﬀ corresponding to the Nash equilibria of the game.
3. Properties of the informational extended bimatrix games
The next theorem represents the condition of the Nash equilibria existence for the
informational extended bimatrix games 1Γ and 2Γ (according to Novac, 2009).
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Theorem 1. For every bimatrix game Γ we have the following:
NE (1Γ ) = ∅, NE (2Γ ) = ∅; and NE (Γ ) ⊂ NE (1Γ ) , NE (Γ ) ⊂ NE (2Γ ) .
Proof (According to Novac, 2009).
We will prove the theorem for the game 2Γ, i.e. we will build the Nash equilibrium
for this informational extended game, using the initial matrices for the game Γ.
Let us to denote by Ai· = {ai1, ai2, . . . , ain} , and Bi· = {bi1, bi2, . . . , bin} the row i
from the matrices A and B, respectively, i = 1,m. Next we determine the maximum
element from each row Bi·,
(
i = 1,m
)
.We denote the maximum elements from each
row by biji = max
j
{bi1, bi2, . . . , bin} ,
(
i = 1,m
)
. Using this maximum elements
b1j1 , b2j2 , . . . , bmjm , we build a column in the extended matrix B˜, (this column
will be one of columns from the extended matrix B˜ according to the building of
extended matrices, described above). Next we build a sequence of elements, using
the corresponding elements from the matrix A (i.e. from the same rows and columns
as the maximum elements determined above from matrix B); these elements are:
a1j1 , a2j2 , . . . , amjm , which will represent a column from the extended matrix A˜
corresponding to the same column from the extended matrix B˜. We denote by
ai∗j∗ = max
i
{a1j1 , a2j2 , . . . , amjm} the maximum element from this new obtained
column. The index of the row i∗ will represent the strategy of the ﬁrst player and
this index will correspond to the same row from the extended matrices which will
contain these maximum elements; then j∗ = ji∗ will represent the column from the
matrixA which contains the element ai∗j∗ determined above. The pair of determined
elements ai∗j∗ and bi∗j∗ from the initial matrices will represent the payoﬀ for the
ﬁrst and the second player, respectively (for the informational extended game 2Γ ).
Remark, that because the extended matrices will contain nm columns, thus the
index of the column (from the extended matrices) which will contain the determined
elements ai∗j∗ or bi∗j∗ will not correspond to the same index of the column j∗ from
the initial matrices, i.e. j′ = j∗, where j′ ∈ X2, j∗ ∈ X2, and bi∗j∗ = bi∗j′ (because
this element will be from the column built above using the maximum elements from
each row of the matrix B).
So, it follows that (i∗, j′) is a Nash equilibrium for the game 2Γ and the elements
ai∗j∗ = a˜i∗j′ and bi∗j∗ = b˜i∗j′ will be the payoﬀ for the ﬁrst and the second player,
respectively. The optimal strategy j′ for the second player in this case can be deter-
mined using the indexis j1,j2, ..., jm (according to the algorithm which is presented
below in the next section). Thus, there exists (at least one) Nash equilibrium for the
informational extended game 2Γ and this Nash equilibrium is (i∗, j′) ∈ NE(2Γ ).
The proof for the game 1Γ , can be done in analogical mode, building a row
from the extended matrices, using the maximum elements from each column of the
matrix A. 
unionsq
For the informational extended games 1Γ and 2Γ we can prove the following state-
ments (according to Novac, 2004, 2009).
Assertion 1. If ∃i∗ ∈ X1, ∃j∗ ∈ X2 for which ai∗j∗ = max
i
max
j
aij , bi∗j∗ =
min
i
min
j
bij and ∀i ∈ X1, ∀j ∈ X2 : (i, j) = (i∗, j∗) so that aij < ai∗j∗ , bij > bi∗j∗ ;
then:
1) in the game 2Γ all columns k (from A˜ which contain the element ai∗j∗ , and
from B˜ which contain the element bi∗j∗) do not contain NE equilibria;
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2) in the game 1Γ the column j∗ (in the matrices A and B ) do not contains
NE equilibria.
Assertion 2. If ∃i∗ ∈ X1, ∃j∗ ∈ X2 so that ai∗j∗ = min
i
min
j
aij and bi∗j∗ =
max
i
max
j
bij , and ∀i ∈ X1, ∀j ∈ X2 : (i, j) = (i∗, j∗) so that aij > ai∗j∗ , bij < bi∗j∗ ;
then:
1) in the game 2Γ the row i∗ (the A˜i∗· and the B˜i∗· ) does not contain NE
equilibria;
2) in the game 1Γ all rows k (the Ak·, and the Bk· which contain the elements
ai∗j∗ and bi∗j∗ , respectively) do not contain NE equilibria.
From the assertions 1 and 2 the next two statements result.
Assertion 3. Consider that ∃i∗ ∈ X1, ∃j∗ ∈ X2 so that ai∗j∗ = max
i
max
j
aij
and bi∗j∗ = min
i
min
j
bij.
1) If ∀i ∈ X1\ {i∗} , ∀j ∈ X2 : aij < ai∗j∗ , and ∀j ∈ X2\ {j∗} : bi∗j > bi∗j∗ ,
then in the game 2Γ each of columns k ( A˜·k, B˜·k which contains the elements ai∗j∗
and bi∗j∗ , respectively) does not contain NE equilibria.
2) If ∀i ∈ X1, ∀j ∈ X2\ {j∗} : bij > bi∗j∗ and ∀i ∈ X1\ {i∗} : aij∗ < ai∗j∗ ,
then in the game 1Γ the column j∗ ( A·j∗ and B·j∗ ) does not contain NE equilibria.
Assertion 4. Consider that ∃i∗ ∈ X1, ∃j∗ ∈ X2 so that ai∗j∗ = min
i
min
j
aij
and bi∗j∗ = max
i
max
j
bij.
1) If ∀i ∈ X1\ {i∗} , ∀j ∈ X2 : aij > ai∗j∗ , and ∀j ∈ X2\ {j∗} : bi∗j < bi∗j∗ ,
then in the game 2Γ the row i∗ ( A˜i∗·, B˜i∗·) does not contain NE equilibria.
2) If ∀i ∈ X1, ∀j ∈ X2\ {j∗} : bij < bi∗j∗ and ∀i ∈ X1\ {i∗} : aij∗ > ai∗j∗ ,
then in the game 1Γ each of rows k (Ak·, Bk· which contains the elements ai∗j∗
and bi∗j∗ , respectively) does not contain NE equilibria.
For proof of the Assertions 1-4 see (Novac, 2009).
Example 3 (For Assertions 2 and 4). Consider the game Γ deﬁned by:
A =
(
0 3 1
5 2 4
)
, B =
(
7 3 6
1 5 0
)
.
For this game NE(Γ ) = ∅.
For the game 2Γ there are two Nash equilibria (2, 2), (2, 8) ∈ NE (2Γ ).
For the game 1Γ there is only one Nash equilibrium (6, 2) ∈ NE (1Γ ) .
In this game, for i = 1, j = 1 : min
i
min
j
aij = 0, max
i
max
j
bij = 7. According to
Assertion 2 and 4, it follows that: for the game 2Γ the ﬁrst row does not contain
Nash equilibria and for the game 1Γ the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th rows do not contain Nash
equilibria. The extended matrices for the game 2Γ are:
A˜ =
(
0 0 0 3 3 3 1 1 1
5 2 4 5 2 4 5 2 4
)
, B˜ =
(
7 7 7 3 3 3 6 6 6
1 5 0 1 5 0 1 5 0
)
.
The extended matrices for the game 1Γ are:
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A =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
0 3 1
0 3 4
0 2 1
0 2 4
5 3 1
5 3 4
5 2 1
5 2 4
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
, B =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
7 3 6
7 3 0
7 5 6
7 5 0
1 3 6
1 3 0
1 5 6
1 5 0
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
.
Example 4 (For Assertions 1 and 3).
Consider the game Γ deﬁned by:
A =
(
7 3 6
1 5 0
)
; B =
(
0 3 1
4 2 5
)
.
For this game NE(Γ ) = ∅, and for the informational extended games there are
some solutions (1, 4), (1, 6) ∈ NE (2Γ ) , (3, 2) ∈ NE (1Γ ) .
In this game, for i = 1, j = 1 : max
i
max
j
aij = 7, min
i
min
j
bij = 0. According
to Assertions 1 and 3, it follows that: for the game 2Γ the 1st, 2d, 3d columns do
not contain Nash equilibria and for the game 1Γ the ﬁrst column does not contain
Nash equilibria. The extended matrices for the games 2Γ and 1Γ are, respectively:
A˜ =
(
7 7 7 3 3 3 6 6 6
1 5 0 1 5 0 1 5 0
)
B˜ =
(
0 0 0 3 3 3 1 1 1
4 2 5 4 2 5 4 2 5
) A =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
7 3 6
7 3 0
7 5 6
7 5 0
1 3 6
1 3 0
1 5 6
1 5 0
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
, B =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
0 3 1
0 3 5
0 2 1
0 2 5
4 3 1
4 3 5
4 2 1
4 2 5
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
.
Example 5 (For Assertions 2 and 4). Consider the game Γ deﬁned by:
A =
⎛⎝1 00 2
4 0
⎞⎠ , B =
⎛⎝2 63 1
1 4
⎞⎠ , NE(Γ ) = ∅.
The extended matrices for the game 2Γ are: A˜ =
⎛⎝1 1 1 1 0 0 0 00 0 2 2 0 0 2 2
4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0
⎞⎠ , B˜ =⎛⎝2 2 2 2 6 6 6 63 3 1 1 3 3 1 1
1 4 1 4 1 4 1 4
⎞⎠ .
In this game, for the pairs (i∗, j∗) : (1, 2) , (2, 1) , (3, 2) we have min
i
min
j
aij = 0,
and for each row max
j
bij = bi∗j∗ , but because each of rows from the matrix A
contains the minimum element a12 = 0, for the 6th column the conditions from
assertions 2 and 4 do not hold, and (1, 6) , (2, 6), (3, 6) ∈ NE (2Γ ) . 
4. Main results. The algorithm of Nash equilibria determination
4.1. The generation of the extended matrices
For the generation of the extended matrices A and B (or the A˜ and the B˜, respec-
tively) we can use the next methods.
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The ﬁrst method is based on the representation of decimal numbers in the
base which represent the number of rows or the number of columns in the initial
matrices.
For the game 1Γ we need to represent the numbers 0, 1, . . . , (mn−1) in the base
m with n components: Nm = (C0C1 . . . Cn−1)m, where Cj ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m− 1}, j =
0, n− 1, that is (C0m0 + C1m1 + . . .+ Cn−1mn−1) = N10. Each of these numbers
Nm represented in the basem will correspond to one column in the extended matrix.
Then for the elements from column j it must to replace:
0 → a1j , 1 → a2j , . . . , i → a(i+1)j , . . . , (m − 1) → amj (similarly for the matrix
B).
For the game 2Γ it must to represent the numbers 0, 1, . . . , (nm− 1) in the base
n with m components: Nn = (C0C1 . . . Cm−1)n, where Ci ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1}, i =
0,m− 1, that is (C0n0 + C1n1 + . . .+ Cm−1nm−1) = N10. Each of these numbers
Nn represented in the base n will correspond to one row into the extended matrix.
Then for the elements from the row i it must to replace:
0 → ai1, 1 → ai2, . . . , j → ai(j+1), . . . , (n − 1) → ain (similarly for the matrix
B).
The second method consists in assigning two numbers to each of the elements
from the initial matrices. One of these numbers represents the number of blocks
(series) formed by this element, and the second number represents the length of the
block (that is, the number of repetitions of this element in the block).
Denote by nrbl the number of blocks for some element aij (bij) and by L the
length of each of blocks (the number of repetitions of this element in the block).
Thus for the game 2Γ we assign to each element from the row i: (ni−1) blocks
(series), each of them with the length (nm−i).
So for all elements aij , bij , i = 1,m, j = 1, n we can determine the indices of
columns k of this element in the extended matrix. Thus for the element from the row
i and from the column j and for all nrbl = 1, ni−1, L = 1, nm−i, we can calculate
the number k by:
k = n · nm−i · (nrbl − 1) + (j − 1) · nm−i + L. (1)
In such mode we can construct the extended matrices A˜ and B˜: A˜ [i, k] = A [i, j] ,
B˜ [i, k] = B [i, j] .
Similarly, for the game 1Γ we assign to each element from the column j: (mj−1)
blocks (series) each of them with the length (mn−j).
Thus for all elements ∀i = 1,m, j = 1, n, we can determine the indices of the
rows k of this element in the extended matrix.
In such mode for the element from the row i and from the column j and for all
nrbl = 1,mj−1, L = 1,mn−j we can calculate the number k by:
k = m ·mn−j · (nrbl − 1) + (i− 1) ·mn−j + L. (2)
In such mode, we can construct the extended matrices A and B (for each determined
k): A [k, j] = A [i, j] , B [k, j] = B [i, j] .
Remark. These two diﬀerent methods may be used independently. Using it we can
construct the extended matrices entirely or partly. If the initial matrices are very
big, we can use these methods for partial construction of the extended matrices.
Thus the ﬁrst method may be used when we need to construct only one row (for
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the informational extended game 1Γ ), or only one column (for the game 2Γ ), and
the second method may be used when we need to determine the position of some
element in the extended matrix, i.e. the index of the row (in the game 1Γ ) or the
index of the column (in the game 2Γ , respectively).
Example 6. (The generation of the extended matrices).
Consider the game Γ deﬁned by:
A =
(
0 3 1
5 2 4
)
, B =
(
7 3 6
1 5 0
)
m = 2, n = 3.
For the ﬁrst method:
For the game 1Γ the matrices have the dimension
[
23 × 3] . We construct the
5th row from the extended matrix A:
410 = (100)2, next we do the substitution with corresponding elements and we
obtain the 5th row with elements (5,3,1).
In the same mode we can construct the 8th row: 710 = (111)2 and we obtain the
row (1,5,0) from the extended matrix B.
For the game 2Γ the matrices have the dimension
[
2× 32] . We construct the
6th column:
510 = (12)3, next we do the substitution with corresponding elements and we
obtain the 6th column: (3,4) from the extended matrix A˜ and the 6th column (3,0)
from the matrix B˜.
In the same mode we can construct the 9th column: 810 = (22)3 and we obtain
the columns (1,4) and (6,0) from the extended matrices (A˜ and B˜, respectively).
For the second method:
For the same game we determine the positions in the extended matrices for the
elements a21 = 5 and b21 = 1.
For the game 1Γ , the ﬁrst column will contain one series (20 blocks) which will
have 22 elements; the indices of rows are k = 5, 6, 7, 8.
For the game 2Γ the second row will contain (31) series (blocks) and each of them
will have one element (i.e. 30 elements); so, the indices of columns are k = 1, 4, 7. 
4.2. The algorithm for determination of the Nash equilibria
Using these methods we can construct an algorithm for determination of the NE
equilibrium. This algorithm does not need the integral construction of the extended
matrices, and need only the partial construction of them.
Thus in the case when the dimension of the initial matrices A and B are very
big we avoid using a big volume of memory, since the extended matrices will have
a bigger dimensions ([m× nm] and [mn × n] , respectively).
The following algorithm can be used for determination of Nash equilibria in the
informational extended bimatrix games 1Γ and 2Γ.
Algorithm.
Consider the extended game 2Γ .
Using the ﬁrst method we represent the numbers from 0 to (nm− 1) in the base
n. Each of these representations will correspond to one column in the extended
matrix A˜. For each of these representations it must do the substitutions with the
corresponding elements from the initial matrix A.
For each column j0 = 1, nm, obtained in such mode, from the extended matrix
A˜ we will do the next operations.
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1. We determine the maximum element from this column of the extended matrix
A˜, and the corresponding element with the same indices from the matrix B˜; let them
a˜i0j0 and b˜i0j0 .
2. We determine the maximum element from the row i0 in the initial matrix B:
let it be bi0j∗ .
3. If b˜i0j0 = bi0j∗ , then (i0, j0) is NE equilibrium for the extended game 2Γ :
(i0, j0) ∈ NE (2Γ ), and the elements a˜i0j0 and b˜i0j0 will be the payoﬀs values for
the ﬁrst and for the second player respectively.
For the informational extended game 1Γ we can construct the algorithm in the
same mode.
Consider now the extended game 1Γ .
Using the ﬁrst method we represent the numbers from 0 to (mn − 1) in the
base m. For each of these representations it must do the substitutions with the
corresponding elements from the initial matrix B. Each of these representations
will correspond to one row in the extended matrix B.
For each row i0 (i0 = 1,mn) from the matrix B (thus obtained) we will do the
next operations.
1. We determine the maximum element from this row of the extended matrix B,
and the corresponding element with the same indices from the matrix A; let them
be bi0j0 and ai0j0 .
2. We determine the maximum element from the column j0 in the initial matrix
A : let’s consider this element ai∗j0 .
3. If ai0j0 = ai∗j0 , then (i0, j0) is NE equilibrium for the extended game 1Γ :
(i0, j0) ∈ NE (1Γ ), and the elements ai0j0 and bi0j0 will be the payoﬀs values for
the ﬁrst and for the second player respectively.
Example 7. Consider the game Γ deﬁned by:
A =
⎛⎝2 54 1
3 7
⎞⎠ , B =
⎛⎝5 92 1
6 4
⎞⎠ .
This game has only one Nash equilibrium.
We can determine the Nash equilibria without using the extended matrices. For
the game 2Γ we need to represent the numbers from 0 to 8 = 23 in the base 2.
For the ﬁrst column: 010 =(0,0,0)2 we do the substitution with the corresponding
elements (2,4,3), max {2, 4, 3} = 4 = a21, and the corresponding element b21 is the
maximum element from the second row from the matrix B, thus it follows that:
(2, 1) ∈ NE(2Γ );
- for the second column : 110 =(0,0,1)2 the corresponding elements are (2,4,7),
for which max {2, 4, 7} = 7 = a32, but the corresponding element b32 is not the
max {6, 4} from the third row of the matrix B, so (3, 2) /∈ NE(2Γ );
- for the third column 210=(0,1,0)2 for which max {2, 1, 3} = 3 = a31 we have
b31 = max {6, 4} , thus (3, 3) ∈ NE(2Γ );
- for the 5th column 410=(1,0,0)2 we have max {5, 4, 3} = 5 = a12 and b12 =
max {5, 9} , so it follows that (1, 5) ∈ NE(2Γ );
- for the 7th column 610 =(1,1,0)2 we have max {5, 1, 3} = 5 = a12 and b12 =
max {5, 9}, so (1, 7) ∈ NE(2Γ ).
If we will build the extended matrices, we will see that for the informational
extended game 2Γ there are only four Nash equilibria.
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3 7 3 7 3 7 3 7
⎞⎠ ,
⎛⎝ 5 5 5 5 9 9 9 92 2 1 1 2 2 1 1
6 4 6 4 6 4 6 4
⎞⎠ .
If we need to determine the indices of the columns in the extended matrices in
the game 2Γ for the elements a21, b21, and we know that (2, 1) ∈ NE (Γ ) , we can
use relation (f1) from the second method. So in this case indices of columns are k =
1, 2, 5, 6, but only one of these columns contains NE equilibrium (2, 1) ∈ NE(2Γ ).

Remark. In the case when the numbers nm and mn are very big this algorithm
for determination of NE equilibria for the informational extended games and the
generation methods of the extended matrices are more complex. But all these op-
erations can be executed operating with the corresponding numbers represented in
the base m or n respectively to the informational extension (1Γ or 2Γ respectively).
The operating with numbers represented in the base n.
Consider the informational extended game 2Γ.
For the game 2Γ the extended matrices will have the dimension [m× nm] (by
deﬁnition).
According to the second method, to each element from the row i we assign two
numbers : nrbl = ni−1 blocks and each of them has the length L = nm−i.
The relation (1) used in the second method for the game 2Γ can be written in
the next form:
k = nm−i · (n · nrbl − n+ (j − 1)) + L. (3)
We will represent all numbers from the relation (3) in the base n with m com-
ponents:
n =
(
00 . . .01
2
0
)
n
;
ni−1 = Nn =
(
0 . . . 01
i
0 . . . 0
1
)
n
, i = 1,m;
nm−i = Nn =
(
0 . . . 0 1
m−i+1
0 . . . 0
1
)
n
, i = 1,m;
the number of blocks is determined by: nrbl = 1, ni−1, so
nrbl = (00 . . . 01)n , . . . ,
(
0 . . . 01
i
0 . . . 0
1
)
n
;
the length of blocks is determined by: L = 1, nm−i, thus
L = (00 . . . 01)n , . . . ,
(
0 . . . 0 1
m−i+1
0 . . . 0
1
)
n
.
Using the relation (3) all operations can be done, operating with numbers rep-
resented in the base n.
Thus, in the relation (3) using the numbers represented in the base n, we deter-
mine k.
All arithmetic operations (*,+,-) will be executed in the base n.
Remark. The operation ”*” in the base n for one number with other number in the
form
(
0 . . . 0 1
i+1
0 . . . 0
1
)
n
= ni is equivalent to moving to the left with i positions of
the components from the ﬁrst number (so add i zeroes to the right).
Remark. The operations (+,-) for two numbers in the base n are done according
to the well-known rules characteristic for the base 10.
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Example 8. Consider that the game Γ have matrices of dimension [6× 6] , i.e. m =
6, n = 6, and we need to determine the index of the column k for the elements a25
and b25 in the extended matrices for the game 2Γ (i.e. i = 2, j = 5), m−i+1 = 5; it is
known that for the number of blocks (series) it holds next (1  nrbl  ni−1 = n), so
we have nrbl = (0...01)6, ..., (0...010)6 in the base 6, and nm−i = (010000)6. Consider
that nrbl = 000005 and L = (015355)6. Using the relation (3), all operations can
be done operating with numbers represented in the base 6 :
000005 = nrbl
∗000010 = n
000050
+000004 = j − 1
000054
−000010 = n
000044
∗010000 = nm−i
440000
+015355 = L
455355 = k
Thus, we just have obtained one of the indices (represented in the base 6: k =
455355) of the columns for the elements a25, b25 in the extended matrices for the
game 2Γ.
Remark. In this algorithm we can do operations in other order for determination
Nash equilibria in the informational extended games 1Γ, 2Γ. Using this modiﬁed
algorithm, we can determine also the number of Nash equilibria in the games 1Γ,
2Γ, without using the extended matrices. Thus for the game 1Γ, (2Γ ) ﬁrstly we de-
termine the maximum payoﬀ for the ﬁrst (or second) player and the corresponding
strategy for this maximum element; then we determine the corresponding combi-
nations for that we obtain the maximum payoﬀ and the corresponding strategy for
the second (ﬁrst) player, respectively.
In this way for the game 1Γ, we can ﬁrstly to determine the maximum elements
for the ﬁrst player, and for the corresponding elements we determine if there ex-
ist some combinations in the matrix of the second player for that we have Nash
equilibria.
4.3. The modiﬁed algorithm
For the game 1Γ, we determine the maximum element in each column from the
matrix A, i.e. aijj = max
i
{a1j , a2j , . . . , amj} , for ∀j = 1, n.
For each element aijj , j = 1, n thus obtained, we determine the corresponding
elements with the same indices from the matrix B : bijj , j = 1, n.
For each of these pairs aijj , bijj ,
(
j = 1, n
)
we determine if these values can be
the payoﬀs for players for some Nash equilibria.
Thus if ∀k ∈ X2\ {j} ∃bik : bik  bijj , then the pair aijj , bijj can be the payoﬀs
for players for some Nash equilibria in the game 1Γ ; consider this pair ai∗j∗ , bi∗j∗ .
It is possible that for the pair ai∗j∗ , bi∗j∗ there are more Nash equilibria.
If we wish to determine how many Nash equilibria there are in the game 1Γ for
the pair ai∗j∗ , bi∗j∗ we determine the number of elements which there are in each
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column k ∈ X2\ {j} from the matrix B for that bik  bi∗j∗ . Denote by nj , j = 1, n
the number of elements bij from the column j for that bij  bi∗j∗ , and for j∗ we
have n(j∗) = 1.
Then the number of Nash equilibria corresponding to the payoﬀs ai∗j∗ and bi∗j∗ ,
can be determined by:
Nj∗ = n1 · n2 · . . . · n(j∗−1) · 1 · n(j∗+1) · . . . nn, (4)
And the number of all Nash equilibria in the game 1Γ can be determined by:
N =
∑
j
Nj .
If the pair of elements aijj , bijj can be the payoﬀs, corresponding to some Nash
equilibrium in the informational extended game 1Γ , then j will be the strategy
for the second player. And because X1 = X1, we have to determine the strategy
for the ﬁrst player, for which the elements ai∗j∗ , bi∗j∗ will correspond to one Nash
equilibrium.
In this way we determine the elements bi11, bi22, . . . , bijj , . . . , binn, for that
bikk  bijj , ∀k ∈ X2\ {j}.
Then using the indices of the rows of these elements, we can determine the
strategy for the ﬁrst player by:
i′ = (i1 − 1)mn−1+(i2 − 1)mn−2+ . . .+(ij − 1)mn−j+ . . .+(in − 1)m0+1. (5)
So, the pair i′, j is Nash a equilibrium for the informational extended game
1Γ : (i
′, j) ∈ NE (1Γ ) . Similarly, for the game 2Γ , we can determine the strategy
for the second player by:
j′ = (j1 − 1)nm−1+(j2 − 1)nm−2+ . . .+(ji − 1)nm−i+ . . .+(jm − 1)n0+1, (6)
where the indices ji
(
i = 1,m
)
are determined by the indices of columns of the
elements biji = max
j
{bi1, bi2, . . . , bin} , ∀i = 1,m.
Example 9. Consider the game Γ deﬁned by:
A =
⎛⎜⎜⎝
9 2 6 0
2 7 7 2
5 4 9 5
3 5 4 1
⎞⎟⎟⎠ , B =
⎛⎜⎜⎝
3 5 3 9
8 2 5 7
7 5 4 1
2 3 1 4
⎞⎟⎟⎠ .
For this game NE(Γ ) = ∅. For the informational extended games 1Γ, 2Γ the
extended matrices will have the dimension [256× 4] and [4× 256] , respectively.
For the game 1Γ we determine the maximum elements in each column from
the matrix A, and for the corresponding elements we determine if there are some
combinations in the matrix B such that the pair (ai∗j∗ , bi∗j∗) will be the payoﬀs for
the players.
So, the pair (a11, b11) = (9, 3) will be the payoﬀs for the players, and the strategy
for the second player will be j∗ = 1.
We determine the combination of elements for which we have NE in the game
1Γ : (b11, b22, b13, b34) = (3, 2, 3, 1) , for that
i′ = (i1 − 1) 43+(i2 − 1) 42+(i3 − 1) 41+(i4 − 1) 40+1 = 0+1·42+0+2·40+1 =
19, so (19, 1) ∈ NE (1Γ ) .
For the pair (a11, b11) = (9, 3)we have {(19, 1), (31, 1), (51, 1), (63, 1)} ∈ NE (1Γ ) .
350 Ludmila Novac
Similarly, for the pair (a33, b33) = (9, 4) we obtain
{(27, 3), (28, 3), (59, 3), (60, 3), (219, 3), (220, 3), (251, 3), (252, 3)} ∈ NE (1Γ ) ;
for the pair (a22, b22) = (7, 2) we obtain {(223, 2)} ∈ NE (1Γ ) .
Thus, in the game 1Γ there are 13 Nash equilibria.
Similarly, for the game 2Γ we can determine the set of Nash equilibria.
In this case for the pair (a31, b31) = (5, 7) we obtain the follow Nash equilibria:
(3, 65), (3, 66), (3, 67), (3, 68), (3, 113), (3, 114), (3, 115), (3, 116), (3, 193), (3, 194),
(3, 195), (3, 196), (3, 241), (3, 242), (3, 243), (3, 244) in the game 2Γ.
Thus, in the game 2Γ there are 16 Nash equilibria.
5. Conclusions
The deﬁnitions of the informational extended bimatrix games are presented in this
paper. The properties of the Nash equilibrium for this type of informational ex-
tended bimatrix games are given and two methods for the generation of the extended
matrices are described. The algorithm for determination of Nash equilibrium is con-
structed, using the combination of this two methods for generation of the extended
matrices. The algorithm for determination of the Nash equilibria is modiﬁed and it
is presented in other form for the case when the extended matrices have the dimen-
sion too big. The numerical examples for the properties of the Nash equilibria in the
informational extended bimatrix games, for the methods of the matrices generation,
and for the both algorithms are given.
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Abstract In this paper, we generalize the well-known mountain situations
by introducing multiple sources called the forest situations. We deal with
the cost sharing problem by introducing the cooperative cost game. We
show that the Bird allocation is a special core element of the related cost
game corresponding to the forest situation. Further, we give solutions for
the cost game corresponding to the forest situation. Finally, we show that
these solutions satisfy the cost monotonicity property.
Keywords: forest situations, bird allocation, shapley value, cost monotonic-
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1. Introduction
In a classical mountain situation which is studied in (Moretti et al., 2002) a group
of people whose houses lie on mountains surrounding a valley or a part of a coast
are considered. They want to be connected to a drainage system, where they have
to empty their sewage. It is obvious that the sewage has to be puriﬁed before
introduction into the environment. So, the sewage has to be collected downhill in a
water puriﬁer in the valley or along the coast. Consequently, each player wants to
connect his house with a drain pipe to the water puriﬁer.
The problem is the higher costs of direct connection to water puriﬁer and pump-
ing water from the houses at lower heights to the houses at upper heights. Further,
being connected to the houses at the same height may be dangerous. Figure 1
illustrates a possible situation.
The network drawn in the Figure 1 is a directed weighted graph, whose vertices
are the houses, root is the water puriﬁer and edges are the drain pipes which are
allowed to be built. The numbers indicate the cost of building to the corresponding
pipe. Sometimes connection from the higher houses to lower houses is impossible.
However, it is always possible to connect a house directly with the root.
A mountain situation as described above leads to a connection problem of a di-
rected graph without cycles and with some other properties. A connection situation
takes place in the presence of a group of agents, each of which needs to be connected
to a source. This connection may be directly or via links to other agents. If links
are costly, then the agents prefer to cooperate in order to reduce costs.
In this study, we model mountain situations by introducing multiple sources
which is called a forest situation. Further, we use the notion of cooperative games
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Fig. 1: A possible mountain situation
(Branzei et al., 2005; Tijs, 2003) to tackle the cost sharing problem to a forest sit-
uation.
In this context, the distribution of collective gains and costs is the main ques-
tion to be answered for the individuals and organizations. The theory of cooperative
games provides suitable tools for answering this question. Further, cooperative game
theory and its solution concepts have had broad applicability in Operational Re-
search, economy, modern ﬁnance, climate negotiations and policy, environmental
management and pollution control, etc.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we recall basic notions and facts
from graph theory and the theory of cooperative games. In Section 3, the notion
of forest situations are introduced. At the same section, an interesting method to
ﬁnd the spanning forest with minimum costs is described. Section 4 deals with the
cost sharing problem by introducing the cooperative cost game corresponding to
a forest situation. Section 5 gives the Shapley value and the Bird rule which are
solutions for the cooperative cost game corresponding to the forest situation. These
allocations satisfy interesting cost monotonicity properties.
2. Preliminaries
In this section we give some terminology on graph theory and the theory of cooper-
ative games (Branzei et al., 2005; Diestel, 2000; Moretti et al., 2002; Norde et al.,
2001; Tijs, 2003).
A graph is a pair G = < N ′, E > of sets such that E ⊆ [N ′]2; thus, the elements
of E are 2−element subsets of N ′. The elements of N ′ are the nodes of the graph
G, the elements of E are its edges (or lines). A complete weighted graph is a tuple
< N ′, w >, where
i) N ′ = {0, 1, ..., n} ,
ii) w : E → R+.
Node 0 is called the source and N = {1, ..., n} the set of players. Also, for an
l ∈ E the nonnegative number w (l) represents the weight or cost of edge l. A
directed graph is a pair < N ′, E > of disjoint sets (of vertices and edges) together
with two maps init : N ′ → E and ter : N ′ → E assigning to every edge e an initial
vertex init (e) and a terminal vertex ter (e) .
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A subset of Γ ofE is called a network. The cost of network Γ is w (Γ ) =
∑
l∈Γ
w (l) .
A path from i to j in Γ is a sequence of nodes i = i0, i1, ..., ik = j such that
{is, is+1} ∈ Γ for every s ∈ {0, ..., k − 1} . A network Γ is a spanning network for
S (S ⊆ N) if for every l ∈ Γ we have l ⊆ S ∪ {0} and if every i ∈ S there is a path
in Γ from i to 0.
A nonempty graph < N ′, w > is called connected if any two of its vertices are
linked by a path in < N ′, w >. An acyclic graph, one not containing any cycles,
is called a forest. A connected forest is called a tree. Sometimes it is convenient to
consider one vertex of a tree as special; such a vertex is then called the root of tree.
A tree with ﬁxed root is a rooted tree.
A cooperative (cost) game in coalitional form is an ordered pair < N, c >, where
N = {1, 2, ..., n} is the set of players, and c : 2N → R is a map, assigning to each
coalition S ∈ 2N a real number, such that c (∅) = 0.
Often, we refer to such a game as a TU (transferable utility) game, and we
identify cooperative cost game < N, c > with its characteristic function c. The
family of all games with player set N is denoted by GN .
Now, we recall that a core allocation of < N, c > is a vector x ∈ Rn satisfying
eﬃciency :
n∑
i=1
xi = c (N) ,
stability :
∑
i∈S
xi ≤ c (S) for each S ∈ 2N .
The core (Gillies, 953) of c ∈ GN is denoted by C (N, c) and consists of all core
allocations.
The subgame of < N, c > with player set T ∈ 2N\ {∅} is the cooperative cost
game < T, c >, where c : 2T → R is the restriction of c : 2N → R.
We call a game < N, c > as concave iﬀ
c (S) + c (T ) ≥ c (S ∪ T ) + c (S ∩ T ) ∀S, T ∈ 2N .
We denote by CGN the class of concave games with player set N. It is well known
that a concave game has a non-empty core. In this paper, we focus on the class of
concave games.
We call a game < N, c > monotonic if c(S) ≤ c(T ) for all S, T ∈ 2N with S ⊂ T .
For further use we denote by MGN the class of monotonic games with player set
N . For monotonic games < N, c >, c (T ) − c (S) is well deﬁned for all S, T ∈ 2N
with S ⊂ T. Now, we deﬁne for each c ∈ MGN and each i ∈ N, the marginal
contribution of i in the game c by Mi(N, c) = c (N)− c (N\ {i}) .
Let c ∈ GN . A scheme a = (aiS)i∈S, S∈2N\{∅} of real numbers is a population
monotonic allocation scheme (pmas) of c for cost games if
i)
∑
i∈S
aiS = c (S) for all S ∈ 2N\ {∅} ,
ii) aiS ≥ aiT for all S, T ∈ 2N\ {∅} with S ⊂ T and i ∈ S.
Let π (N) be the set of all permutations σ : N → N of N. The set P σ (i) :={
r ∈ N : σ−1 (r) < σ−1 (i)} consists of all predecessors of i with respect to the per-
mutation σ.
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Let c ∈ GN and σ ∈ π (N). The marginal contribution vector mσ (c) ∈ RN with
respect to σ and has the i−th coordinate
mσi (c) := c(P
σ (i) ∪ {i})− c(P σ (i))
for each i ∈ N.
3. Forest Situations
Consider a tuple given by < N, {0i}, A, w >, where N = {1, 2, ..., n} , is the set
of players, 〈N ∪ {0i}, A〉 is a rooted directed graph with N ∪ {0i} a set of points
(vertices), A ⊂ N × (N ∪ {0i}) a set of arcs, where for i ∈ N, 0i is the roots. We
assume also that the following conditions F.1 and F.2 hold.
F.1 (Direction connection possibility) For each k ∈ N and ∃i ∈ N, (k, 0i) ∈ A.
F.2 (No cycles) For each s ∈ N and v1, v2, ..., vs ∈ N ∪ {0i} such that (v1, v2) ∈
A, (v2, v3) ∈ A, ..., (vs−1, vs) ∈ A we have (vs, v1) /∈ A.
Further, w : A → R is a non-negative function on the set of arcs. Next, we
introduce the genericity condition:
F.3 (Genericity condition) For each k ∈ N and all i, j ∈ N ∪ {0i} , i = j : (k, i) ∈
A, (k, j) ∈ A =⇒ w (k, i) = w (k, j)
Notice that, F.3 gives us the possibility to speak of the best connection b (k) of
k ∈ N, where
b (k) = argmin
i∈N∪{0i}:(k,i)∈A
w (k, i) .
We call such a tuple < N, {0i}, A, w > with the properties F.1, F.2 and F.3 a forest
situation.
Each mountain problem as described in Section 1 leads to the forest situation
by introducing multiple sources, where N corresponds to the of agents (houses) in
the mountain, 0i to the puriﬁers, A to the set of allowed connections determined
by the gravity condition
(i, j) ∈ A =⇒ h (i) > h (j) (3.1)
where h (i) is the height of house i) and by reefs, etc.. Further w (i, j) describes the
cost of connecting i with j via a pipe line. F.1 is demanded and F.2 follows from
(3.1) .
On other hand, given a forest situation < N, {0i}, A, w > with the properties F.1
and F.2, there exists an intrinsic height function h0 : N ∪{0i} → N∪{0i} such that
(k, l) ∈ A implies h0 (k) > h0 (l) . Here, h0 is deﬁned as follows: for k ∈ N ∪ {0i},
h0 (k) is the length of a longest path from k to 0i.
There are two interesting problems related to such a forest situation. One of
them is ﬁnding a 0−connecting subforest < N ∪ {0i} , T > of
< N ∪ {0i} , A >, i.e., a subforest connecting each k ∈ N with 0, with minimum
cost; and the other is allocating the connection costs in such a forest among the
agent.
This section deals with the ﬁrst problem; and the next sections deal with the
second one.
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The next theorem shows that there is a unique optimal forest, connecting all
players in N with the root 0i. This forest corresponds to the situation where each
agent k ∈ N connects himself with his best connection point b (k) ∈ N ∪ {0i} .
The proof of the following theorem is straightforward (see (Moretti et al., 2002)).
Theorem 1. Let < N, {0}, A, w > be a forest situation. Let T = {(k, b (k)) | k ∈
N}. Then
(i) < N ∪ {0i} , T > is a 0−connecting subforest of < N ∪ {0i} , A >.
(ii) The forest < N ∪ {0i} , T > is the unique 0−connecting subforest with min-
imum cost.
Example 1. Figure 2 corresponds to a forest situation < N, {0i} , A, w >, where
N = {1, 2, 3} , A = {(1, 01) , (2, 0) , (2, 1) , (3, 02) , (3, 1) , (3, 2)} . Then the intrinsic
height function h0 is described by h0 (k) = k for each k ∈ N. Since b (1) = 01, b (2) =
1, b (3) = 2, the tree 〈N ∪ {0i} , T 〉 with T = {(1, 01) , (2, 1) , (3, 2)} is an optimal
0−connecting tree with costs 10+15+20 = 45. The payoﬀ vectorB(N, {0i} , A, w) =
(10, 15, 20) corresponding to the situation where each player i pays w(i, b (i)) will
be called the Bird allocation (Bird, 1976).
Fig. 2: The forest situation of Example 2
In the next section, we see that the Bird allocation is a special core element of
the cost game, corresponding to the forest situaton.
Example 2. Figure 3 corresponds to a forest situation < N, {0i} , A, w >, where
N = {1, 2, 3} , A = {(1, 01) , (2, 0) , (2, 1) , (3, 02) , (3, 1) , (3, 2)} . Then the intrinsic
height function h0 is described by h0 (k) = k for each k ∈ N. Since b (1) = 01, b (2) =
1, b (3) = 02, the forest 〈N ∪ {0i} , T 〉 with T = {(1, 01) , (2, 1) , (3, 02)} is an optimal
0−connecting tree with costs 10+15+15 = 40. The payoﬀ vectorB(N, {0i} , A, w) =
(10, 15, 15) is corresponding to the situation as represented in Figure 3.
Notice that both of the examples illustrated above correspond to a forest sit-
uation. In Example 2, player 2 prefers cooperation because of the higher cost of
connecting to 02, but in Example 3, player 3 does not prefer to cooperate because
of the lower cost of connecting to 02.
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Fig. 3: The forest situation of Example 3
4. Cooperative cost games
In this section, we show that the games introduced for forest situations have non-
empty cores. Let < N, {0i}, A, w > be a forest situation. Then the corresponding
cost game < N, c > is given by c (∅) = 0 and for T ∈ 2N\ {∅} the cost c (T ) of
coalition T is the cost of the optimal 0−connecting forest in the forest problem
< T, {0} , A (T ) , wT >, where
A (T ) = {(i, j) ∈ A | i ∈ T, j ∈ T ∪ {0}} ,
and wT : A (T )→ R is the restriction of w : A→ R to A (T ). For the determination
of c (T ) only forests are considered which do not contain nodes outside T ∪ {0}.
Note that for each T ∈ 2N\ {∅} ,
c (T ) =
∑
k∈T
w(k, bT (k)),
where
bT (k) = argmin
l∈T∪{0}:(k,l)∈A
w (k, l) ,
the cheapest connection point of k in T∪{0} . The introduced number b (k) in Section
3 is equal to bN (k) . One core element of < N, c > can be easily described by taking
the Bird allocation B(N, {0} , A, w) ∈ RN with Bk(N, {0} , A, w) = w(k, bN (k)).
Then B(N, {0} , A, w) is a core element of < N, c >, since
c (N) =
∑
k∈N
w(k, bN (k)) =
∑
k∈N
Bk(N, {0} , A, w)
by Theorem 1. Further,
c (T ) =
∑
k∈T
w(k, bT (k)) ≥
∑
k∈T
w(k, bN (k)) =
∑
k∈T
Bk(N, {0} , A, w)
for each T ∈ 2N\ {∅} . This core element corresponds to the situation where the
player bN (k) to which k connects himself does not ask a compensation for this
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service to k. Further, there are other interesting core allocations, corresponding to
the situations where compensation plays a role. In the description of these core
elements, the second cheapest connection point of k in T ∪ {0},
sT (k) =
{
argmin
l∈(T∪{0})\{bT (k)}:(k,l)∈A
w (k, l) , if bT (k) = 0,
0, if bT (k) = 0,
plays a role.
Suppose that the player k wants to connect to bN (k) = 0 and the player bN (k)
wants to ask a price pk ≥ 0 from k for connecting k. The question is which price
bN (k) can ask for his service to k such that k connects with bN (k) and does not go,
e.g., to the second best connection point sN (k) for a connection. The price should
be an element of the closed [0, w (k, sN (k)) − w(k, bN (k))]. A price pk larger than
w (k, sN (k))−w(k, bN (k)) can lead to a connection to sN (k) and if sN (k) = 0 even
to a positive compensation for sN (k) , e.g.,
1
2
(pk−w (k, sN (k))+w(k, bN (k))), and
then both players k and sN (k) are better oﬀ. The allocations (x1, ..., xn) corre-
sponding to such competitive prices in the given closed turn out to be just the core
allocations of the k-connection game < N, c > to be introduced now.
The k-connection game < N, c > is the cooperative cost game with ck (s) = 0 if
k /∈ S and ck (s) = w(k, bS (k)) otherwise. Notice that, if bN (k) = 0, then
MbN (k) (N, ck) = ck (N)− ck(N\{bN (k)}) = w(k, bN (k))− w (k, sN (k)) .
It is easy show that the proof of the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Let < N, c1 >, ..., < N, cn > be the connection games corresponding
to the forest situation < N, {0i}, A, w > and < N, c > the corresponding cost game.
Then,
(i) c =
n∑
k=1
ck,
(ii) for every T ∈ 2N\ {∅} ,
C (T, ck) =
⎧⎨⎩
0, if k /∈ T,
w(k, bT (k))e
k − p(ebT (k) − ek), if k ∈ T, bT (k) = 0,
w (k, 0) ek, if k ∈ T, bT (k) = 0,
where
0 ≤ p ≤ w (k, sT (k))− w(k, bT (k)).
Here, ek ∈ RT is the k-th standard basis vector with k-th coordinate 1 and the
other coordinates 0.
Example 3. Consider again the forest situation in Example 2. The cost game <
N, c > corresponds to the situation and the related k-connection games are given
in the next table:
S = (1) (2) (3) (1, 2) (1, 3) (2, 3) (1, 2, 3)
c (S) = 10 20 30 25 35 40 45
c1 (S) = 10 0 0 10 10 0 10
c2 (S) = 0 20 0 15 0 20 15
c3 (S) = 0 0 30 0 25 20 20
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It is obvious that c = c1 + c2 + c3. We have;
C (N, c1) = {(10, 0, 0)}, C (N, c2) = {(0, 15, 0), (−5, 20, 0)}, and
C (N, c3) = {(0, 0, 20), (0,−5, 25)}.
Example 4. Consider again the forest situation in Example 3. The cost game <
N, c > corresponds to the situation and the related k-connection games are given
in the next table:
S = (1) (2) (3) (1, 2) (1, 3) (2, 3) (1, 2, 3)
c (S) = 10 20 15 25 25 35 40
c1 (S) = 10 0 0 10 10 0 10
c2 (S) = 0 20 0 15 0 20 15
c3 (S) = 0 0 15 0 15 15 15
It is obvious that c = c1 + c2 + c3. We have;
C (N, c1) = {(10, 0, 0)}, C (N, c2) = {(0, 15, 0), (−5, 20, 0)}, and
C (N, c3) = {(0, 0, 15)}.
5. Cost monotonic solutions of the forest situations: Shapley value and
the Bird rule
Now, we turn to the second basic question in this paper: “How to allocate the
connection costs in such a forest among the agents?” This question is approached
with the aid of solution concepts in cooperative game theory. A solution concept
gives an answer to the question of how the rewards (cost savings) obtained when
all players in N cooperate should be distributed among the individual players while
taking account of the potential rewards (cost savings) of all diﬀerent coalitions of
players.
Monotonicity is a general principle of fair division which states that as the
underlying data of a problem change, the solution should change in parallel fashion.
It is particularly germane to applications in which allocations are not made once
and for all, but are reassessed periodically as new information emerges. This is the
case, for example, in dividing the joint beneﬁts or costs of a cooperative enterprise
fairly among the partners when the underlying structure of the enterprise is evolving
over time. Such a situation can be modelled by a cooperative game. The principle
of monotonicity for cooperative games states that if a game changes so that some
player’s contribution to all coalitions increases or stays the same then the player’s
allocation should not decrease. There is a unique symmetric and eﬃcient solution
concept that is monotonic in this most general sense - the Shapley value.
The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953), one of the most interesting one-point solution
concepts in cooperative game theory, is introduced and characterized for cooperative
games with TU-games with a ﬁnite player set and where coalition values are real
numbers. Subsequently, it has captured much attention being extended in new game
theoretic models and widely applied for solving reward/cost sharing problems in
Operations Research (OR) and economic situations. The Shapley value associates
to each cooperative TU -game one payoﬀ vector whose components are real numbers.
To be more precise, the Shapley value associates to each game c ∈ GN one payoﬀ
vector in x ∈ RN . For a very extensive and interesting discussion on this value the
reader is referred to (Roth, 1988). The ﬁrst formulation of the Shapley value uses
the marginal vectors of a cooperative TU-game.
Forest Situations and Cost Monotonic Solutions 359
Deﬁnition 1. The Shapley value Φ (c) of a game c ∈ GN is the average of the
marginal vectors of the game, i.e.,
Φ (c) :=
1
n!
∑
σ∈π(N)
mσ (c) . (5.1)
With the aid of (5.1) one can provide a probabilistic interpretation of the Shapley
value as follows. Suppose we draw from an urn, containing the elements of π (N),
a permutation σ (with probability 1/(n!)). Then we let the players enter a room
one by one in the order σ and give each player the marginal contribution created
by him. Then, for each i ∈ N , the i−th coordinate Φi (c) of Φ (c) is the expected
payoﬀ of player i according to this random procedure.
By using Deﬁnition 7, one can rewrite (5.1) obtaining
Φi (c) =
1
n!
∑
σ∈π(N)
(c(P σ (i) ∪ {i})− c(P σ (i))). (5.2)
We simply write c (i) instead of c ({i}) and c (ij) instead of c ({i, j}) along this
paper.
Example 5. Consider again the forest situation in Example 2. In such a situation,
N = {1, 2, 3} , c (1) = 10, c (2) = 20, c (3) = 30, c (12) = 25, c (13) = 35, c (23) = 40
and c (123) = 45. Then, the Shapley value is the average of the vectors (10, 15, 20) ,
(10, 10, 25) , (5, 20, 20) , (5, 20, 20) , (5, 10, 30) and (5, 10, 30) , i.e.,
Φ (c) =
(
40
6
,
85
6
,
145
6
)
.
On other hand, cost allocation scheme, which coincides with the Shapley value of
the cost game, is an example of a population monotonic allocation scheme (pmas),
i.e.,
N
(12)
(13)
(23)
(1)
(2)
(3)
1 2 3
40/6 85/6 145/6
45/6 105/6 ∗
45/6 ∗ 165/6
∗ 90/6 150/6
60/6 ∗ ∗
∗ 120/6 ∗
∗ ∗ 180/6
As we can see that the cost allocation rule, which coincides with the Shapley
value of the cost game, satisﬁes cost monotonicity (Kent and Skorin-Kapov, 1997).
Here, a cost allocation rule is called cost monotonic if the decrease (or increase) in
the cost of any arc does not increase (or decrease) the cost of any player. On the
contrary, the Bird rule does not satisfy cost monotonicity.
However, the Bird rule, which assigns to each forest situation to the correspond-
ing cost game, satisﬁes interesting monotonicity property, called cost monotonicity.
This can also be explained by the concavity of the game. Recall that, the cooperative
cost game corresponding to a forest situation is concave (Tijs, 2003).
Suppose a forest situation < N, {0i} , A, w > changes to < N, {0i} , A, w′ >,
where w′ (i, j) = w (i, j) for all (i, j) ∈ A\ {(k, l)} and w′ (k, l) > w (k, l) . Suppose
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that B and B′ are the corresponding Bird allocations. Then, obviously, Bi = B′i for
all i ∈ N\ {k} , and Bk = w (k, b (k)) = B′k if b (k) = l, while B′k > Bk if b (k) = l.
So the Bird rule is cost monotonic. The following examples illustrate this result.
Example 6. Consider again the forest situation in Example 2. The Bird rule assings
to the forest situation the allocation (10, 15, 20). If we change the forest situation
in this example such that the cost of (3, 2) raises to 40 then we obtain the Bird
allocation B(N, {0i} , A, w) = (10, 15, 25). It is easy to show that the Bird rule is
cost monotonic.
Now, we give to the Bird allocation scheme for the forest situation in Example
2.
Example 7. Consider again the forest situation in Example 2. In such a situation,
N = {1, 2, 3} , c (1) = 10, c (2) = 20, c (3) = 30, c (12) = 25, c (13) = 35, c (23) =
40, c (123) = 45. Then the Bird allocation to the forest situation, looks as follows:
N
(12)
(13)
(23)
(1)
(2)
(3)
1 2 3
10 15 20
10 15 ∗
10 ∗ 25
∗ 20 20
10 ∗ ∗
∗ 20 ∗
∗ ∗ 30
On other hand, we can see that the Bird allocation scheme is an example of a
population monotonic allocation scheme (pmas).
6. Conclusion and Outlook
We studied optimal connection problems and related cost sharing problems for forest
situations with the properties F.1, F.2 and F.3. In this context, we show that the
Bird allocation is a special core element of the related cost game, corresponding
to the forest situation. We deal with cost monotonic allocation rules for forest
situations. The Bird rule and the Shapley value play here a special role. Further, it
is shown that the Bird allocation and the Shapley value are examples of a pmas for
the cost game, corresponding to the forest situation.
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Abstract In this paper we study a game of group pursuit in which players
move on a plane with bounded velocities. The game is supposed to be a
nonzero-sum simple pursuit game between a pursuer and m evaders acting
independently of each other. The case of complete information is considered.
Here we assume that the evaders are discriminated. Two diﬀerent approaches
to formalize this pursuit problem are considered: noncooperative and coop-
erative. In a noncooperative case we construct a Nash equilibrium, and in
a cooperative case we construct the core. We proved that the core is not
empty for any initial positions of the players.
Keywords: group pursuit game, Nash equilibrium, realizability area, TU-
game, core.
1. Introduction
The process of pursuit represents a typical conﬂict situation. When only two players
are involved in the process of pursuit we deal with a classical zero-sum diﬀerential
pursuit game. These games grew out of the military problems and were developed
by Isaaks (1965).
When more than two players participate in a game and the players’ objec-
tives are not strictly opposite it is rather reasonable to consider such a game as a
nonzero-sum one. This approach for solving a group pursuit problem was introduced
in (Petrosjan and Shirjaev, 1981) and further applied in works (Tarashnina, 1998),
(Pankratova and Tarashnina, 2004).
It is obvious that players’ goals are not always strictly opposed. We want to
illustrate how diﬀerential games can be used for solving diﬀerent kind of problems. In
this case under "capture" we can understand just meeting of players and delivering
some goods or information. In terms, players are not aimed to destruct each other.
Moreover, players in a nonzero-sum game may cooperate with each other to get a
maximal proﬁt.
We investigate a nonzero-sum group pursuit game using two diﬀerent approaches.
We construct a game in normal form and its TU-cooperative version and ﬁnd their
solutions.
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2. Nonzero-sum group pursuit game
In the work we study a game of pursuit in which n players − the pursuer
P and evaders E1, . . . , Em − move on a plane with constant velocities with the
possibility of changing the direction of their motion at each time instant (simple
motion). We consider the case of complete information. This means that each player
at each time instant t ≥ 0 knows the moment t and his own as well as all other
player’s positions. Additionally, we assume that the pursuer uses strategies with
discrimination against the evaders. This means that at each instant t the pursuer
P knows the vector-speeds chosen by the evaders at that time moment.
The players start their motion at moment t = 0 at the initial positions
z0P = (x
0
P , y
0
P ), z
0
i = (x
0
i , y
0
i ), i = 1,m.
Let α and βi are velocities of P and Ei (i = 1,m), respectively. Suppose that
α > max
i=1,...,m
βi. Denote by Eti = zti = (xti, yti) and P t = ztP = (x
t
P , y
t
P ) the current
positions of evader Ei and pursuer P at the moment t > 0, respectively.
The motion of players is described by the following system of diﬀerential equa-
tions ·
zP = uP , uP ∈ UP ,
·
zi = uEi , uEi ∈ UEi , i = 1,m,
(1)
with initial conditions
zP (0) = z
0
P , zi(0) = z
0
i , i = 1,m, (2)
where zP , z1, . . . , zm ∈ R2. The vectors uP ∈ UP and uEi ∈ UEi are control vari-
ables of P and Ei (i = 1,m), respectively. The set of control variables UP , UEi have
the following forms
UP = {uP = (u1P , u2P ) : (u1P )2 + (u2P )2 = α2},
UEi = {uEi = (u1Ei , u2Ei) : (u1Ei)2 + (u2Ei)2 = β2i }, i = 1,m.
We need to explain how the players choose their control variables throughout
the game according to the incoming information. Deﬁne a strategy of the evader
as a function of time and current positions of the players. A strategy of player Ei
is a function uEi(t, ztP , z
t
1, . . . , z
t
m) with values in UEi . The evaders use piecewise
open-loop strategies. Denote by UEi the set of admissible strategies of player Ei,
i = 1,m.
A strategy of player P is a function of time, players’ positions and velocity-
vectors of the evaders, i.e.
uP (t, z
t
P , z
t
1, . . . , z
t
m,u
t
E1 , . . . ,u
t
Em).
That means, that the class of admissible strategies of the pursuer consists of strate-
gies with discrimination (counterstrategies).
The game is played as follows: at the initial time instant the pursuer dictates
to the evaders E1, . . . , Em a certain behaviour and chooses some pursuit order. In
other words, the pursuer ﬁxes some pursuit order and calculates the total pursuit
time taking into account that the evaders use the prescribed behaviour. After that,
P consequently pursues the evaders according to the chosen order and changes it
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as soon as any of the evader chooses a direction of motion diﬀerent from the one
dictated by the pursuer. So, the pursuer punishes deviated evader, changing pursuit
order by starting the pursuit of defected evader. If group of evaders is deviated then
the pursuer punishes anyone of this group.
Let Π be the set of all possible orders. Now we deﬁne a notion of a punishment
strategy of the pursuer.
Deﬁnition 1. We say that the triple uπP = 〈π, uP , p〉 is a punishment strategy of
pursuer P with
– π(z0P , z
0
1 , . . . , z
0
m, uE1 , . . . , uEm) is a pursuit order chosen by the pursuer at the
initial instant t = 0 for some ﬁxed strategy proﬁle of the evaders uE1 , . . . , uEm ;
– uP (t, ztP , z
t
1, . . . , z
t
m,utE1 , . . . ,u
t
Em
), t ≥ 0, is a pursuit strategy of P that consists
in consequent pursuit of the evaders according to the chosen order;
– p = p(t,utE1 , . . . ,u
t
Em
) is an element of punishment that consists in changing the
pursuit order at the moment t by starting the pursuit of defected evader in case
any of the evaders chooses a direction of motion diﬀerent from (utE1 , . . . ,u
t
Em
)
dictated by the pursuer.
Denote by UP = {uπP }π∈Π the set of punishment strategies of the pursuer.
Evader Ei is considered caught if the positions of P and Ei coincide at some
time instant. We say that the game is over if the pursuer captures all the evaders.
Let π = {1, . . . , i, . . . ,m} be a pursuit order chosen by pursuer P .
Denoting by KP the payoﬀ function of P , and by KEi the payoﬀ function of
evader Ei, i = 1,m, we have
KEi(u
π
P , uE1, . . . , uEi , . . . , uEm) =
∑
k≤i, k=1,m
T πk , (3)
where T πk is the time spent by the pursuer for capture of the evader Ek (k = 1,m)
minus time according to the pursuit order π ∈ Π. Here i is a number of the evader
Ei in the pursuit order π = {1, . . . , i, . . . ,m} and k (k ≤ i) is a number of the evader
which is pursued before Ei inclusively.
The payoﬀ of P is deﬁned as the negative value of the payoﬀ of evader Ei that
is caught last. Thus,
KP (u
π
P , uE1 , . . . , uEm) = −T π, (4)
where T π =
m∑
k=1
T πk is the total pursuit time, and π is the chosen pursuit order.
So, we deﬁne the nonzero-sum pursuit game as a normal form game as follows
Γ (z0P , z
0
1 . . . , z
0
m) = 〈N, {Ui}i∈N , {Ki}i∈N〉, (5)
where N = {P,E1, . . . , Em} is the set of players, Ui is the set of admissible strategies
of player i and Ki is a payoﬀ function of player i (i ∈ N), deﬁned by (3) and (4).
Each game depends on a choice of the initial positions of the players. Let us ﬁx the
players’ initial positions and consider the game Γ (z0P , z
0
1 , . . . , z
0
m).
Two Approaches for Solving a Group Pursuit Game 365
3. Nash equilibrium in the game Γ (z0P , z
0
1, . . . , z
0
m)
In nonzero-sum games there is a number of solution concepts that are based on some
additional assumptions for players’ behaviour and structure of the game. One of
them is the well-known concept of Nash equilibrium. In considered game there exists
a whole family of Nash equilibria that includes some which are extremely adverse to
the evaders’ interests, and some which are favorable for them, as well as all interme-
diate equilibria. Diﬀerent kind of Nash equilibria in the game Γ (z0P , z
0
1 , . . . , z
0
m) were
constructed in (Petrosjan and Shirjaev, 1981), (Tarashnina, 1998),
(Pankratova and Tarashnina, 2004). In this game we consider the extremely odd
Nash equilibrium that is the most disadvantageous for the evaders among all the
equilibria.
The strategy set of pursuer P consists of uπP corresponding to the pursuit order
π ∈ Π. The pursuer aims to minimize the total pursuit time and each evader wants
to avoid his own capture as long as possible and does not care about the other
evaders. Denote by π∗ the pursuit order which minimizes the total pursuit time and
by uπ
∗
P the corresponding strategy of the pursuer.
Let Ej
′
i be the evader who is currently pursued, j
′ ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Eji is the j-th
in the line of pursuit evader among the ones not yet caught, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, j > j′.
Now let us describe two types of behaviours of evader Ei (i = 1,m):
– Ej
′
i , j
′ ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, uses behaviour [uj′Ei ] that prescribes to move along the
straight line connecting his own and the pursuer’s current positions in the di-
rection from P (to the current capture point N j
′
).
– Eji , j ∈ {1, . . .m}, uses behaviour [ujEi ] that prescribes to move along the
straight line to the capture point of the currently pursued evader Ej
′
i , j > j
′,
namely, to the current capture point N j
′
, where N j
′
= PT
π
j′ .
It is obvious that throughout the game at some moment tEi > 0 each evader Ei
changes its type from Eji into E
j′
i . So, the strategy u
∗
Ei
(t, ·) of evader Ei (i = 2,m)
can be describe as
u∗Ei(t, ·) =
{
[ujEi ], 0 ≤ t < tEi ,
[uj
′
Ei
], t ≥ tEi .
During the game each evaders, accept E1, consequently applies both types of be-
haviours. The player E1 uses just type [uj
′
Ei
], i.e. his strategy is u∗E1(t, ·) = [uj
′
E1
],
t ≥ 0.
Suppose that T 0 = 0, N0 = P 0 = (0, 0).
The following theorem (Tarashnina, 1998) deﬁnes the conditions that support
the described Nash equilibrium (uπ
∗
P , u
∗
E1
, . . . , u∗Em) in the game Γ (z
0
P , z
0
1 , . . . , z
0
m).
Theorem 1. In the game Γ (z0P , z
0
1 , . . . , z
0
m) in case the conditons
T π
∗
= min
π∈Π
T π, (6)
and
α− βi
α− βi−1
∣∣∣N i−2ETi−2i−1 ∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣N i−1ETi−1i ∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣N i−2ETi−2i ∣∣∣ , i = 2,m. (7)
hold for all i = 1,m there exists a Nash equilibrium that is constructed as follows:
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1. Ei (i = 1,m) chooses the strategy u∗Ei that dictates to him
– according to the behaviour [uj
′
Ei
] to move along the straight line connecting
current positions Ej
′
i and P at the moment Ti−1 in the direction from P if
i = j′, where j′ ∈ {1, ...,m};
– according to the behaviour [ujEi ] to move along the straight line to the capture
point of the currently pursued evader Ej
′
i , j
′ ∈ {1, ...,m}, j > j′, i.e. to point
N j
′
, where N j
′
= PTj′ , if i = j, where j > j′.
2. P chooses the strategy uπ
∗
P that minimizes the total pursuit time if each Ei
(i = 1,m) adheres to the strategy u∗Ei , and P changes the pursuit order as soon
as any of the evaders Eji (i > j
′) that are not yet caught deviates from the
strategy u∗Ei and pursuits the deviated evader the ﬁrst.
Now we introduce the notion of a realizability area. For this purpose we associate
with each evader Ei an area Ωi of initial positions of evaders that support the Nash
equilibrium and refer to it as the realizability area of the punishment strategy of
the pursuer with respect to evader Ei, (i = 1,m).
In words, area Ωi is the set of all Ei’s initial positions such that, when there,
evader Ei has to adhere the strategy u∗Ei dictated to him by the pursuer.
Deﬁnition 2. The punishment strategy of pursuer P is called realizable with re-
spect to evader Ei, if the life time of evader Ei, i ∈ {2, . . . ,m}, in case Ei adheres
to the strategy u∗Ei is larger then if Ei deviates, i. e. inequality (7) holds for ﬁxed i.
Deﬁnition 3. The punishment strategy of pursuer P is called realizable in the
game Γ (z0P , z
0
1 , . . . , z
0
m) if inequality (7) holds for all i = 2,m.
In (Pankratova and Tarashnina, 2004) some illustrative examples for construct-
ing of realizability areas of the punishment strategy are have been presented.
4. Cooperative pursuit game Γv(z0P , z
0
1 , . . . , z
0
m)
Let us suppose that the players in the game can form a coalitions. Construct a
cooperative game between pursuer P and evaders E1, . . ., Em in assumption the
players use the strategies described in the previous paragraph without the threat of
punishment.
Assume that utility of any player is transferable.
Let 2N be the set of all subsets of N. The function v : 2N → R1 with the
following two properties
1. v(∅)=0, where ∅ is an empty set,
2. v(S ∪R) ≥ v(S) + v(R) for all R,S ⊂ N with S⋂R = ∅,
is called the characteristic function of the game . Condition 2 is a superadditivity
property.
For any coalition S ⊂ N we deﬁne the characteristic function as follows
v(S) = max
uS
min
uN\S
∑
i∈S
Ki
(
uS, uN\S
)
,
where uS and uN\S are vectors of admissible strategies of the coalitions S and N\S,
respectively. Using this approach, we construct the characteristic function v for the
game Γ (z0P , z
0
1 , . . . , z
0
m).
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Consider an arbitrary permutation π of the ordered set of indexesM = {1, 2, . . . ,m}.
With this permutation we associate a substitution kπ , i.e. kπ : M →M . This means
that k ∈M goes to kπ ∈M in permutation π.
The characteristic function of the game has the form
v({Ei1}; z0P , z01 , . . . , z0m) = min
π∈Π
{ ∑
kπ≤i1
T πkπ
}
, i1 = 1,m.
v({Ei1 , Ei2}; z0P , z01 , . . . , z0m) = min
π∈Π
{ ∑
kπ≤i1
T πkπ +
∑
kπ≤i2
T πkπ
}
, where i1, i2 = 1,m,
i1 = i2.
v({Ei1 , Ei2 , Ei3}; z0P , z01 , . . . , z0m) = min
π∈Π
{ ∑
kπ≤i1
T πkπ +
∑
kπ≤i2
T πkπ +
∑
kπ≤i3
T πkπ
}
, where
i1, i2, i3 = 1,m, i1 = i2 = i3.
. . .
v({E1, . . . , Em}; z0P , z01 , . . . , z0m) = min
π∈Π
{
T πi1 +
i2∑
kπ=i1
T πkπ + . . .+
im−1∑
kπ=i1
T πkπ +
im∑
kπ=i1
T πkπ
}
.
v({P}; z0P , z01 , . . . , z0m) = max
π∈Π
{−T π}.
v({P,Ei1}; z0P , z01 , . . . , z0m) = max
π∈Π
{
−T π + ∑
kπ≤i1
T πkπ
}
= 0, where i1 = 1,m.
v({P,Ei1 , Ei2}; z0P , z01 , . . . , z0m) = max
π∈Π
{
−T π + ∑
kπ≤i1
T πkπ +
∑
kπ≤i2
T πkπ
}
, where i1, i2 =
1,m, i1 = i2.
. . .
v({P,E1, . . . , Em}; z0P , z01 , . . . , z0m) =
= max
π∈Π
{
−T π + T πi1 +
i2∑
k=i1
T πk + . . .+
im−1∑
k=i1
T πk +
im∑
k=i1
T πk
}
=
= max
π∈Π
{
T πi1 +
i2∑
k=i1
T πk + . . .+
im−1∑
k=i1
T πk
}
.
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For simplicity denote by
Tˆi1 = min
π∈Π
{ ∑
kπ≤i1
T πkπ},
Tˆi1i2 = min
π∈Π
{ ∑
kπ≤i1
T πkπ +
∑
kπ≤i2
T πkπ
}
,
Tˆi1i2i3 = min
π∈Π
{ ∑
kπ≤i1
T πkπ +
∑
kπ≤i2
T πkπ +
∑
kπ≤i3
T πkπ
}
,
...
Tˆi1i2...im = min
π∈Π
{
T πi1 +
i2∑
kπ=i1
T πkπ + . . .+
im−1∑
kπ=i1
T πkπ +
im∑
kπ=i1
T πkπ
}
,
T˜ = max
π∈Π
{−T π},
T˜i1 = max
π∈Π
{
−T π + ∑
kπ≤i1
T πkπ
}
,
T˜i1i2 = max
π∈Π
{
−T π + ∑
kπ≤i1
T πkπ +
∑
kπ≤i2
T πkπ
}
,
T˜i1i2i3 = max
π∈Π
{
−T π + ∑
kπ≤i1
T πkπ +
∑
kπ≤i2
Tkπ +
∑
kπ≤i3
T πkπ
}
,
...
T ∗ = max
π∈Π
{
T πi1 +
i2∑
kπ=i1
T πkπ + . . .+
im−1∑
kπ=i1
Tkπ
}
.
(8)
The characteristic function v can be described in the following form
v({P}; z0P , z01 , . . . , z0m) = T˜ ,
v({Ei1}; z0P , z01 , . . . , z0m) = Tˆi1 , i1 = 1,m,
v({P,Ei1}; z0P , z01 , . . . , z0m) = T˜i1 = 0, i1 = 1,m,
v({Ei1 , Ei2}; z0P , z01 , . . . , z0m) = Tˆi1i2 , i1, i2 = 1,m, i1 = i2,
v({P,Ei1 , Ei2}; z0P , z01 , . . . , z0m) = T˜i1i2 , i1, i2 = 1,m, i1 = i2,
v({Ei1 , Ei2 , Ei3}; z0P , z01 , . . . , z0m) = Tˆi1i2i3 , i1, i2, i3 = 1,m, i1 = i2 = i3,
v({P,Ei1 , Ei2 , Ei3}; z0P , z01 , . . . , z0m) = T˜i1i2i3 , i1, i2, i3 = 1,m, i1 = i2 = i3,
...
v({E1, . . . , Em}; z0P , z01 , . . . , z0m) = Tˆ1...m,
v({P,E1, . . . , Em}; z0P , z01 , . . . , z0m) = T ∗.
(9)
Here and then we will use following designation v({Ei1 , . . . , Eik}; z0P , z01 , . . . , z0m) =
v(Ei1 , . . . , Eik) and v({P,Ei1 , . . . , Eik}; z0P , z01 , . . . , z0m) = v(P,Ei1 , . . . , Eik)
Deﬁnition 4. The pair
〈
N, v(S; z0P , z
0
1 , . . . , z
0
m), S ⊂ N
〉
, where N is the set of
players, and v is the characteristic function deﬁned by (8)-(9) is called a cooperative
pursuit game in characteristic function form and denoted by Γv(z0P , z
0
1 , . . . , z
0
m).
Example 1. let us construct the characteristic function for a pursuit game with a
pursuer and three evaders according to formulas (8) and (9). Let α = 1 and βi =
1
2
,
i = 1, 2, 3.
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Fix the initial positions of the players: P 0 = (0, 0), E01 = (1, 0), E02 = (−2, 4),
E03 = (5, 7). Note that for the chosen initial positions of the players the punishment
strategy of P is realizable. First of all, we compose a table with the players’ payoﬀs
for all pursuit orders πi ∈ {1, . . . , 6}.
Table 1: The players’ payoﬀs for diﬀerent pursuit orders.
Payoﬀ π1 = {1, 2, 3} π2 = {1, 3, 2}
KE1 T
π1
1 = 2 T
π2
1 = 2
KE2 T
π1
12 = 2 + 9, 31 = 11, 31 T
π2
132 = 2 + 13, 23 + 11, 34 = 26, 57
KE3 T
π1
123 = 2 + 9, 31 + 9, 09 = 20, 4 T
π2
13 = 2 + 13, 23 = 15, 23
KP T
π1
P = 20, 4 T
π2
P = 26, 57
π3 = {2, 3, 1} π4 = {2, 3, 1}
KE1 T
π3
21 = 8, 94 + 9, 92 = 18, 86 T
π4
231 = 8, 94 + 9, 7 + 9, 73 = 28, 37
KE2 T
π3
2 = 8, 94 T
π4
2 = 8, 94
KE3 T
π3
213 = 8, 94 + 9, 92 + 26, 03 = 44, 89 T
π4
23 = 8, 94 + 9, 7 = 18, 64
KP T
π3
P = 44, 89 T
π4
P = 28, 37
π5 = {3, 1, 2} π6 = {3, 2, 1}
KE1 T
π5
31 = 17, 2 + 16, 08 = 33, 28 T
π6
321 = 17, 2 + 14, 04 + 27, 23 = 58, 47
KE2 T
π5
312 = 17, 2 + 16, 08 + 33, 52 = 66, 8 T
π6
31 = 17, 2 + 14, 04 = 31, 24
KE3 T
π5
3 = 17, 2 T
π6
3 = 17, 2
KP T
π5
P = 66, 8 T
π6
P = 58, 47
The characteristic function, according to formulas (8) and (9), has the following
form
v(P ) = max{−20, 4; −26, 57; −44, 89; −28, 37; −66, 8; −58, 47} = −20, 4,
v(E1) = min{2; 2; 18, 86; 28, 37; 33, 28; 58, 47} = 2,
v(E2) = min{11, 31; 26, 57; 8, 94; 8, 94; 66, 8; 31, 24} = 8, 94,
v(E3) = min{20, 4; 15, 23; 44, 89; 18, 64; 17, 2; 17, 2} = 15, 23,
v(P,E1) = max{−20, 4 + 2; −26, 57 + 2; −44, 89 + 18, 86;
−28, 37 + 28, 37; −66, 8 + 33, 28;−58, 47+ 58, 47} = 0,
v(P,E2) = max{−20, 4 + 11, 31; −26, 57 + 26, 57; −44, 89 + 8, 94;
−28, 37 + 8, 94; −66, 8 + 66, 8; −58, 47 + 31, 24} = 0,
v(P,E3) = max{−20, 4 + 20, 4; −26, 57 + 15, 23; −44, 89 + 44, 89;
−28, 37 + 18, 64; −66, 8 + 17, 2; −58, 47 + 17, 2} = 0,
v(E1, E2) = min{2 + 11, 31; 2 + 26, 57; 18, 86 + 8, 94;
28, 37 + 8, 94; 33, 28 + 66, 8; 58, 47 + 31, 24} = 13, 31,
v(E1, E3) = min{2 + 20, 4; 2 + 15, 23; 18, 86 + 44, 89;
28, 37 + 18, 64; 33, 28 + 17, 2; 58, 47 + 17, 2} = 17, 23,
v(E2, E3) = min{11, 31 + 20, 4; 26, 57 + 15, 23; 8, 94 + 18, 64;
8, 94 + 44, 89; 66, 8 + 17, 2; 31, 24 + 17, 2} = 27, 58,
v(P,E1, E2) = max{−20, 4 + 2 + 11, 31; −26, 57 + 2 + 26, 57;
−44, 89 + 18, 86 + 8, 94;−28, 37+ 28, 37 + 8, 94;
−66, 8 + 33, 28 + 66, 8; −58, 47 + 58, 47 + 31, 24} = 33, 28,
v(P,E1, E3) = max{−20, 4 + 2 + 20, 4; −26, 57 + 2 + 15, 23;
−44, 89 + 18, 86 + 44, 89; −28, 37 + 28, 37 + 18, 64;
−66, 8 + 33, 28 + 17, 2;−58, 47+ 58, 47 + 17, 2} = 18, 86,
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v(P,E2, E3) = max{−20, 4 + 11, 31 + 20, 4; −26, 57 + 26, 57 + 15, 23;
−44, 89 + 8, 94 + 44, 89;−28, 37+ 8, 94 + 18, 64;
−66, 8 + 66, 8 + 17, 2;−58, 47+ 31, 24 + 17, 2} = 17, 2,
v(E1, E2, E3) = min{2 + 11, 31 + 20, 4; 2 + 26, 57 + 15, 23;
18, 86 + 8, 94 + 44, 89; 28, 37+ 8, 94 + 18, 64;
33, 28 + 66, 8 + 17, 2; 58, 47 + 31, 24 + 17, 2} = 33, 71,
v(P,E1, E2, E3) = max{−20, 4 + 2 + 11, 31 + 20, 4;
−26, 57 + 2 + 26, 57 + 15, 23; −44, 89 + 18, 86 + 8, 94 + 44, 89;
−28, 37 + 28, 37 + 8, 94 + 18, 64; −66, 8 + 33, 28 + 66, 8 + 17, 2;
−58, 47 + 58, 47 + 31, 24 + 17, 2} = 50, 48.
Finelly, we construct a cooperative pursuit game in the characteristic function form.
That is
v(P ) = −20, 4,
v(E1) = 2,
v(E2) = 8, 94,
v(E3) = 15, 23,
v(P,E1) = 0,
v(P,E2) = 0,
v(P,E3) = 0,
v(E1, E2) = 13, 31,
v(E1, E3) = 17, 23,
v(E2, E3) = 27, 58,
v(P,E1, E2) = 33, 28,
v(P,E1, E3) = 18, 86,
v(P,E2, E3) = 17, 2,
v(E1, E2, E3) = 33, 71,
v(P,E1, E2, E3) = 50, 48.
On this example we can see that the characteristic function of the game is super-
additive.
Further we proof that it is true for any number of evaders and any initial posi-
tions of the players.
Theorem 2. In the game Γv(z0P , z
0
1 , . . . , z
0
m) the characteristic function v that is
constructed by formulas (8) and (9) is superadditive.
Proof. In order to prove the theorem we have to show that inequality
v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T )
holds for all coalitions S, T ⊂ N , S ∩ T = ∅.
In fact, the following inequalities are fulﬁlled.
Tˆi1 = min
π∈Π
{ ∑
kπ≤i1
T πkπ
}
≤ Tˆi1i2 = min
π∈Π
{ ∑
kπ≤i1
T πkπ +
∑
kπ≤i2
T πkπ
}
≤ Tˆi1i2i3 =
= min
π∈Π
{ ∑
kπ≤i1
T πkπ +
∑
kπ≤i2
T πkπ +
∑
kπ≤i3
T πkπ
}
≤ . . . ≤ Tˆi1...im−1 =
= min
π∈Π
{ ∑
kπ≤i1
T πkπ + . . .+
∑
kπ≤im−1
T πkπ
}
≤
≤ Tˆi1...im = min
π∈Π
{ ∑
kπ≤i1
T πkπ + . . .+
∑
kπ≤im
T πkπ
}
.
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It can be easily shown that
−T˜ = max
π∈Π
{−T π} ≤ T˜i1i2 = max
π∈Π
{
−T π + ∑
kπ≤i1
T πkπ +
∑
kπ≤i2
T πkπ
}
≤ . . . ≤
≤ T˜i1...im−1 = max
π∈Π
{
−T π + ∑
kπ≤i1
T πkπ + . . .+
∑
kπ≤im−1
T πkπ
}
≤
≤ T ∗ = max
π∈Π
{
−T π + T πi1 +
i2∑
k=i1
T πk + . . .+
im−1∑
k=i1
T πk +
im∑
k=i1
T πk
}
.
So, we have
Tˆi1 ≤ Tˆi1i2 ≤ Tˆi1i2i3 ≤ . . . ≤ Tˆi1...im−1 ≤ Tˆi1...im , (10)
−T˜ ≤ T˜i1i2 ≤ T˜i1i2i3 ≤ . . . ≤ T˜i1i2...im−1 ≤ T ∗. (11)
Let S = {P} and T = {Ei1}. Since T˜ = min
π∈Π
{T π} ≥ Tˆi1 , we have v(P )+v(Ei1 ) =
−T˜ + Tˆi1 ≤ 0 = v(P,Ei1 ), i1 = 1,m.
For S = {Ei1} and T = {Ei2} we have v(Ei1 ) + v(Ei2) = Tˆi1 + Tˆi2 ≤ Tˆi1i2 =
v(Ei1 , Ei2), i1, i2 = 1,m, i1 = i2. This follows from (10).
For S = {P} and T = {Ei1 , Ei2} we have v(P ) + v(Ei1 , Ei2) = −T˜ + Tˆi1i2 =
= max
π∈Π
{−T π}+ min
π∈Π
⎧⎨⎩ ∑
kπ≤i1
T πkπ +
∑
kπ≤i2
T πkπ
⎫⎬⎭ =
= −T π∗ + min
π∈Π
⎧⎨⎩ ∑
kπ≤i1
T πkπ +
∑
kπ≤i2
T πkπ
⎫⎬⎭ ≤ −T π∗ + ∑
kπ∗≤i1
T π
∗
kπ∗ +
∑
kπ∗≤i2
T π
∗
kπ∗ ≤
≤ max
π∈Π
⎧⎨⎩−T π + ∑
kπ≤i1
T πkπ +
∑
kπ≤i2
T πkπ
⎫⎬⎭ = T˜i1i2 = v(P,Ei1 , Ei2),
i1, i2 = 1,m, i1 = i2.
Now consider S = {Ei1} and T = {P,Ei2}. Then
v(Ei1) + v(P,Ei2 ) = Tˆi1 + T˜i2 = min
π∈Π
{ ∑
kπ≤i1
T πkπ
}
+max
π∈Π
{
−T π + ∑
kπ≤i2
T πkπ
}
=
= min
π∈Π
⎧⎨⎩ ∑
kπ≤i1
T πkπ
⎫⎬⎭− T π∗ + ∑
kπ∗≤i2
T π
∗
kπ∗ ≤
∑
kπ∗≤i1
T π
∗
kπ∗ − T π
∗
+
∑
kπ∗≤i2
T π∗kπ∗ ≤
≤ max
π∈Π
⎧⎨⎩−T π + ∑
kπ≤i1
T πkπ +
∑
kπ≤i2
Tkπ
⎫⎬⎭ = T˜i1i2 , i1, i2 = 1,m, i1 = i2.
For S = {P,Ei1} and T = {Ei2 , Ei3} we have
v(P,Ei1 ) + v(Ei2 , Ei3) = T˜i1 + Tˆi2i3 = max
π∈Π
{−T π +∑ kπ ≤ i1T πkπ}+
+min
π∈Π
{ ∑
kπ≤i2
T πkπ +
∑
kπ≤i3
T πkπ
}
= −T π∗+ ∑
kπ∗≤i1
T π
∗
kπ∗+minπ∈Π
{ ∑
kπ≤i2
T πkπ +
∑
kπ≤i3
T πkπ
}
≤
≤ −T π∗ +
∑
kπ∗≤i1
T π
∗
kπ∗ +
∑
kπ∗≤i2
T π
∗
kπ∗ +
∑
kπ∗≤i3
T π
∗
kπ∗ ≤
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≤ max
π∈Π
⎧⎨⎩−T π + ∑
kπ≤i1
T πkπ +
∑
kπ≤i2
T πkπ +
∑
kπ≤i3
T πkπ
⎫⎬⎭ =
= T˜i1i2i3 = v(P,Ei1 , Ei2 , Ei3), i1, i2, i3 = 1,m, i1 = i2 = i3.
Now consider two coalitions each of which includes only evaders:El = {Ei1 , . . . , Eil}
and Es = {Ej1 , . . . , Ejs}, El
⋂
Es = ∅, ik, jq = 1,m, ik = jq, i1 = . . . = il,
j1 = . . . = js, k = 1, l è q = 1, s. For this coalitions we get
v(Ei1 , . . . , Eil) + v(Ej1 , . . . , Ejs) = Tˆi1...il + Tˆj1...js =
= min
π∈Π
⎧⎨⎩ ∑
kπ≤i1
T πkπ + . . .+
∑
kπ≤il
T πkπ
⎫⎬⎭+ minπ∈Π
⎧⎨⎩ ∑
kπ≤j1
T πkπ + . . .+
∑
kπ≤js
T πkπ
⎫⎬⎭ ≤
≤ min
π∈Π
⎧⎨⎩ ∑
kπ≤i1
T πkπ + . . .+
∑
kπ≤il
T πkπ +
∑
kπ≤j1
T πkπ + . . .+
∑
kπ≤js
T πkπ
⎫⎬⎭ =
= Tˆi1...ilj1...js = v(Ei1 , . . . , Eil , Ej1 , . . . , Ejs).
It remains to consider the coalitions S = {P,Ei1 , . . . , Eil} and T = {Ej1 , . . . , Ejs},
ik, jq = 1,m, ik = jq, i1 = . . . = il, j1 = . . . = js, k = 1, l and q = 1, s.
Then
v(P,Ei1 , . . . , Eil) + v(Ej1 , . . . , Ejs) = T˜i1...il + Tˆj1...js =
= max
π∈Π
⎧⎨⎩−T π + ∑
kπ≤i1
T πkπ + . . .+
∑
kπ≤il
T πkπ
⎫⎬⎭+minπ∈Π
⎧⎨⎩ ∑
kπ≤j1
T πkπ + . . .+
∑
kπ≤js
T πkπ
⎫⎬⎭ =
= −T π∗ +
∑
kπ∗≤i1
T π
∗
kπ∗ + . . .+
∑
kπ∗≤il
T π
∗
kπ∗ + minπ∈Π
⎧⎨⎩ ∑
kπ≤j1
T πkπ + . . .+
∑
kπ≤js
T πkπ
⎫⎬⎭ ≤
≤ −T π∗ +
∑
kπ∗≤i1
T π
∗
kπ∗ + . . .+
∑
kπ∗≤il
T π
∗
kπ∗ +
∑
kπ∗≤j1
T π
∗
kπ∗ + . . .+
∑
kπ∗≤js
T π
∗
kπ∗ ≤
≤ max
π∈Π
⎧⎨⎩−T π + ∑
kπ≤i1
T πkπ + . . .+
∑
kπ≤il
T πkπ +
∑
kπ≤j1
T πkπ + . . .+
∑
kπ≤js
T πkπ
⎫⎬⎭ =
= T˜i1...ilj1...js = v(P,Ei1 , . . . , Eil , Ej1 , . . . , Ejs).
Finally, we consider S = {P} and T = {Ei1 , Ei2 , . . . , Eim}. Hence,
v(P ) + v(Ei1 , Ei2 , . . . , Eim) = −T˜ + Tˆi1i2...im =
≤ max
π∈Π
{−T π}+ min
π∈Π
{
T πi1 +
i2∑
k=i1
T πk + . . .+
im−1∑
k=i1
T πk +
im∑
k=i1
T πk
}
=
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≤ −T π∗ + min
π∈Π
{
T πi1 +
i2∑
k=i1
T πk + . . .+
im−1∑
k=i1
T πk +
im∑
k=i1
T πk
}
≤
≤ −T π∗ + T π∗i1 +
i2∑
k=i1
T π
∗
k + . . .+
im−1∑
k=i1
T π
∗
k +
im∑
k=i1
T π
∗
k ≤
≤ max
π∈Π
{
−T π + T πi1 +
i2∑
k=i1
T πk + . . .+
im−1∑
k=i1
T πk +
im∑
k=i1
T πk
}
=
= T ∗ = v(P,E1, . . . , Em).
This completes the proof.
It follows from the superadditivity of v that it is proﬁtable for the players to
form the maximal coalition N and obtain the maximal total payoﬀ that is possible
in the game.
There exist various methods for distribution of the total payoﬀ between the
players in a cooperative TU-game. In our paper we consider the core as a solution
concept of the game.
5. The core in the game Γv(z0P , z
0
1 , . . . , z
0
m)
Let us describe the imputation set in the game Γv(z0P , z
0
1 , . . . , z
0
m). Denote by ξ =
(ξP , ξE1 , . . . , ξEm) an imputation in the game. The imputation set is deﬁned as
follows
Ev(z
0
P , z
0
1 , . . . , z
0
m) =
{
ξ : ξEi ≥ Tˆi, i ∈ 1,m, ξP ≥ −T˜ ;
∑
i∈N
ξi = T
∗
}
. (12)
From (Bondareva, 1963) and (Shapley, 1967) follows the result. For an impu-
tation ξ to belong to the core of the game Γv(z0P , z
0
1 , . . . , z
0
m) it is necessary and
suﬃcient that the following system of inequalities holds
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
ξP ≥ T˜,
ξEi1 ≥ Tˆi1 , i1 = 1,m,
ξP + ξEi1 ≥ T˜i1 = 0, i1 = 1, m,
ξEi1 + ξEi2 ≥ Tˆi1i2 , i1, i2 = 1, m, i1 = i2,
ξP + ξEi1 + ξEi2 ≥ T˜i1i2 , i1, i2 = 1, m, i1 = i2,
ξEi1 + ξEi2 + ξEi3 ≥ Tˆi1i2i3 , i1, i2, i3 = 1, m, i1 = i2 = i3,
ξP + ξEi1 + ξEi2 + ξEi3 ≥ T˜i1i2i3 , i1, i2, i3 = 1, m, i1 = i2 = i3,
. . .
ξP + ξEi1 + . . .+ ξEim−1 ≥ T˜i1...im−1 , i1, . . . , im−1 = 1, m, i1 = . . . = im−1,
ξEi1 + . . .+ ξEim ≥ Tˆi1...im .
(13)
Denote by Cv(z0P , z
0
1 , . . . , z
0
m) the core of the game Γv(z0P , z
0
1 , . . . , z
0
m).
The following theorem holds.
Theorem 3. In the cooperative pursuit game Γv(z0P , z
0
1 , . . . , z
0
m) there exists the
non-empty core for any initial positions of the players.
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Proof. First of all, we show that any imputation from the core satisﬁes the sys-
tem (13). Suppose that imputation ξ = (ξP , ξE1 , . . . , ξEm) belongs to the core
Cv(z
0
P , z
0
1 , . . . , z
0
m). We have to show that system (13) is combined.
Summing the inequalities of system (13), we obtain
(1 + C1m + C
2
m + . . .+ C
m−1
m ) · (ξP + ξE1 + ...+ ξEm) ≥ T˜ +
m∑
k=1
Tˆk+
+
m∑
k=1
T˜k + (Tˆ12 + Tˆ13 + . . .+ Tˆm−1,m)︸ ︷︷ ︸
C2m
+(T˜12 + T˜13 + . . .+ T˜m−1,m)︸ ︷︷ ︸
C2m
+
+(Tˆ123 + Tˆ124 + . . .)︸ ︷︷ ︸
C3m
+(T˜123 + T˜134 + . . .)︸ ︷︷ ︸
C3m
+
(14)
+(Tˆ1234 + Tˆ1235 + . . .)︸ ︷︷ ︸
C4m
+(T˜1234 + T˜1234 + . . .)︸ ︷︷ ︸
C4m
+
+ . . .+ (Tˆ12...m−1 + Tˆ12...m−2m + . . .)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cm−1m
+(T˜12...m−1 + T˜12...m−2m + . . .)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cm−1m
+
+ Tˆ12...m︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cmm
.
Let us consider of the left part of inequality (14). Taking into account v(N) = T ∗
and 1 + C1m + . . .+ Cm−1m = 2m − 1, we have
(2m − 1) · T ∗ ≥
m∑
k=1
Tˆk +
m∑
k=1
T˜k
+(Tˆ12 + Tˆ13 + . . .+ Tˆm−1,m)︸ ︷︷ ︸
C2m
+(T˜12 + T˜13 + . . .+ T˜m−1,m)︸ ︷︷ ︸
C2m
+(Tˆ123 + Tˆ124 + . . .)︸ ︷︷ ︸
C3m
+(T˜123 + T˜134 + . . .)︸ ︷︷ ︸
C3m
+
+(Tˆ1234 + Tˆ1235 + . . .)︸ ︷︷ ︸
C4m
+(T˜1234 + T˜1234 + . . .)︸ ︷︷ ︸
C4m
+
(15)
+ . . .+ (Tˆ12...m−1 + Tˆ12...m−2m + . . .)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cm−1m
+(T˜12...m−1 + T˜12...m−2m + . . .)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cm−1m
−
+T˜ + Tˆ1...m.
Let us consider the following of values
– Tˆji and T˜j1...ji−1ji+1...jm (m = C1m pairs);
– T˜ji and Tˆj1...ji−1ji+1...jm (m = Cm−1m pairs);
– Tˆjijk and T˜j1...ji−1ji+1...jk−1jk+1...jm (C2m pairs);
– T˜jijk and Tˆj1...ji−1ji+1...jk−1jk+1...jm (Cm−2m pairs);
– . . .
– T˜ and Tˆ1...m (1 pair).
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By superadditivity of the game, we get
Tˆji + T˜j1...ji−1ji+1...jm ≤ T ∗
T˜ji + Tˆj1...ji−1ji+1...jm ≤ T ∗
Tˆjijk + T˜j1...ji−1ji+1...jk−1jk+1...jm ≤ T ∗
T˜jijk + Tˆj1...ji−1ji+1...jk−1jk+1...jm ≤ T ∗
. . .
T˜ + Tˆ1...m ≤ T ∗.
The right side of (15) can be estimated as follows:
((Tˆ1 + T˜23...m) + . . .+ (Tˆm + T˜12...m−1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
C1m
+
+((Tˆ12 + T˜34...m) + . . .+ (Tˆm−1,m + T˜12...m−2))︸ ︷︷ ︸
C2m
+
+((Tˆ123 + T˜4...m) + . . .+ (Tˆm−1m−2m + T˜1...m−3))︸ ︷︷ ︸
C3m
+ . . .+
+((T˜123 + Tˆ4...m) + . . .+ (T˜m−2m−1m + Tˆ1...m−3))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cm−3m
+
(16)
+((T˜12 + Tˆ34...m) + . . .+ (T˜m−1,m + Tˆ12...m−2))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cm−2m
+
+(T˜1 + Tˆ23...m + . . . Tˆm + Tˆ12...m−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cm−1m
+
+(T˜ + Tˆ1,2,...,m) ≤
≤ (C1m + C2m + C3m + . . .+ Cm−1m + Cmm ) · T ∗.
It remans to show that the following inequality holds
(2m − 1) · T ∗ ≥ (C1m + C2m + C3m + . . .+ Cm−1m + Cmm ) · T ∗.
If the last inequality is true then (16) is fulﬁlled. Taking into account that C1m +
C2m + C
3
m + . . .+ C
m−1
m + C
m
m = 2
m − 1, we get
(2m − 1) · T ∗ ≥ (2m − 1) · T ∗.
It is obvious that the last inequality holds for any m. So, inequality (15) is satisﬁed.
This means that inequality (14) is also satisﬁed for any initial positions of the
players. Hence, system (13) is combined.
It remains to show that any vector satisfying the system (13) is an imputation
of the game Γv(z0P , z
0
1 , . . . , z
0
m). Indeed, it can be easily checked that the vector
η0 = (T ∗ −
m∑
i=1
Tˆi, Tˆ1, Tˆ2, . . . , Tˆm−1, Tˆm) satisﬁes system (13) and is an imputation
of this game. This completes the proof.
6. Conclusion
The considered cooperative and noncooperative approaches to investigation of group
pursuit games with one pursuer and m-evaders give us various interesting solutions
and allow to look at the same problem from diﬀerent points of view. This paper
extends an application area of group pursuit games.
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Abstract The new class of voting games, in which the number of players
and their power indexes are changing coherently, is considered. As a power
index Shapley–Shubik value is taken. The following problem is considered:
how to ﬁnd a minimal investment, which guarantees the given value of the
Shapley–Shubik power index for the newcomer. This value depends on the
distribution of weights of players before entering of newcomer and on the
capital that can be used to purchase shares of weights from diﬀerent players.
Keywords: voting game, Shapley–Shubic value, proﬁtable investment, per-
spective coalitions, veto-player, Monte–Carlo method.
1. Introduction
The solution of voting game was formulated by Shubik on the basis of the Shapley
value and was called the Shapley–Shubik value (Shapley and Shubik, 1954; Hu,
2006; Shapley and Shubik, 1969).
In the modernized or extended game for the newcomer it is natural to minimize
the capital to purchase the shares from other players to enter the voting game
aiming to receive as a result of cooperation a given income as his component of
Shapley–Shubik value. This value depends on the distribution of weights of players
before entering the newcomer and on the capital that can be used to purchase shares
of weights from diﬀerent players.
In section 2. a description of voting game and its extension is given, in section
3. the essantional propositions are proved and the problem is formulated — the
problem of minimization of capital to reach a given component of the Shapley–
Shubik value for (n + 1)-st player, in section 4. the method and algorithm for
solving the problem, and also an example illustrating the realization of algorithm
is proposed.
2. Voting games
2.1. Essential deﬁnitions
Deﬁnition 1. Weight ai of the player i — share which belongs to the player i and
satisﬁes the following condition:⎧⎨⎩
n∑
i=1
ai = 1,
ai >= 0, i = 1, . . . , n,
(1)
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where N = {1, . . . , n} — the set of players, a = (a1, . . . , an) — distribution of
players weights.
Deﬁnition 2. Perturbed voting game is deﬁned as:
Γ = [ω, a1, . . . , an], where ω — quota in the voting game — share of total capital,
such that if the sum of weights of players in the coalition is strictly greater than
this share, the coalition is winning, otherwise the coalition is losing. Also in the
pertrubed voting game the following deﬁnition is used: "veto-player in the coalition
S" — player, without which the coalition S is losing, and with him is winning.
Note 1. Perturbed voting game diﬀers from the usual voting game, by the fact that
the coalition is winning if the sum of weights of players in the coalition is greater
when the quota. It is appropriate to consider the perturbed voting game, because
of properties of characteristic function. In the perturbed voting game characteristic
function is super additive, and in the initial voting game may be not:
Example 1. Let Γ = [0.5; 0.5, 0.5] (ω = 0.5, a1 = 0.5, a2 = 0.5), then
v({1}) = 1, v({2}) = 1, v({1, 2}) = 1
But the super additivity is not satisﬁed, because:
v({1, 2}) < v({1}) + v({2})
And for the perturbed voting game:
v({1}) = 0, v({2}) = 0, v({1, 2}) = 1
Super additivity is satisﬁed:
v({1, 2}) >= v({1}) + v({2})
In what follows by voting game we shall understande the pertrubed voting game.
The component of the Shapley–Shubik value of i-th player is known as:
ϕi =
∑
Si:
S∈W,{S\i}/∈W
(|S| − 1)!(n− |S|)!
n!
, (2)
where W = {S :∑i∈S ai > ω}, i.e. W — the set of winning coalitions in the voting
game Γ , ai satisﬁes (1).
Note 2. It is known from the deﬁnition (2), that the summation in (2) is taken only
over the coalitions in which i-th player is a veto-player.
2.2. Extension of the voting game
The n player voting game Γ is considered. Consider the extended (n + 1) player
voting game with the newcomer. Let M be the capital of (n+ 1)-st player, deﬁned
as a weight, that (n+ 1)-st player posses. Suppose that M ∈ (0, 1].
Deﬁnition 3. Investment — vector α = (α1, . . . , αn), characterizing the parts of
shares purchased by (n+ 1)-th player from other players and satisfying:⎧⎨⎩
n∑
i=1
αi <= M,
0 <= αi
<
= ai, i = 1, . . . , n,
(3)
(here αi — part of share, purchased by (n+ 1)-st player from i-th player).
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To join the voting game Γ , the newcomer is implementing the investment α.
Then player i will get the weight (ai − αi) in the extended voting game Γ ′ for all
i = 1, . . . , n and (n+1)-st player will get the weight
∑n
i=1 αi. Then the new vector
of weights wil be:
a′ = (a′1, . . . , a
′
i, . . . , a
′
n, a
′
n+1) =
= (a1 − α1, . . . , ai − αi, . . . , an − αn,
n∑
i=1
αi).
The extended voting game Γ ′ has the form:
Γ ′ = [ω, a′1, . . . , a
′
i, . . . , a
′
n, a
′
n+1] =
= [ω, a1 − α1, . . . , ai − αi, . . . , an − αn,
n∑
i=1
αi].
Deﬁnition 4. The set of possible investments I = I(a,M) — the set of invest-
ments, satisfying (3) for given weights of players a = (a1, . . . , an) and capital M of
(n+ 1)-st player.
Deﬁne a set of coalitions, such that in each of them player (n + 1) can be a
veto-player in the extended voting game Γ ′. The condition for investment α of the
newcomer to be a veto-player in coalition S ∪ {n+ 1}, where S ⊆ N is following:⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
∑
i∈S
a′i + a′n+1 =
∑
i∈S
ai +
∑
i/∈S
αi > ω, α ∈ I∑
i∈S
a′i =
∑
i∈S
ai −
∑
i∈S
αi <= ω
(4)
Note 3. First inequality in (4) shows, that with the (n + 1)-st player coalition S
from the voting game Γ will become a winning coalition in the voting game Γ ′.
Second inequality in (4) shows, that coalition S from the voting game Γ become a
losing coalition in the voting game Γ ′.
Based on formula (2), it is clear, that by each coalition, in which (n+1)-st player
is a veto-player the incremention of (n + 1)-st component of the Shapley–Shubik
value in the voting game Γ ′ is provided:
(|S + 1| − 1)!(n+ 1− |S + 1|)!
(n+ 1)!
=
|S|!(n− |S|)!
(n+ 1)!
. (5)
Deﬁnition 5. The set of coalitions, for which the set of solutions of (4), i.e. the set
of vectors α, satisfying the system (4), is not empty, is called the set of perspective
coalitions (PC).
Note 4. The subset of coalitions S ⊆ PC, which satisﬁes (4), is uniquely deﬁned
for a given investment α. This subset deﬁnes the component of the Shapley–Shubik
value of (n+ 1)-st player. Denote this subset as αPC. We also say that subset of a
set PC corresponds to the given value h of component of the Shapley–Shubik value
of (n + 1)-st player, if in all coalitions belonging to this subset (n + 1)-st player
will be a veto-player and the sum of all increments (4) is equal to h. This subset is
called SPC(h).
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Compute now the (n+1)-st component of the Shapley–Shubik value in extended
voting game, using notions introduced above. For this, let
W ′ — set of winning coalitions in the game Γ ′,
S′ ⊆ {1, . . . , n, n+ 1} — coalition in the game Γ ′.
Then:
ϕn+1 =
∑
S′{n+1}:
S′∈W ′,{S′\{n+1}}/∈W ′
(|S′| − 1)!(n+ 1− |S′|)!
(n+ 1)!
=
=
∑
S∈PC
|S|!(n− |S|)!
(n+ 1)!
·KS(α) =
∑
S∈αPC
|S|!(n− |S|)!
(n+ 1)!
, (6)
where S = S′\{n+ 1}, set PC is deﬁned by (4).
KS(α) =
{
1, if α ∈ I : α satisﬁes (4) for S ⊆ N
0, in other cases
or KS(α) = 0, for S : S ∈ PC\αPC and KS(α) = 1, for each S : S ∈ αPC.
Note 5. It is obvious that function KS takes non-zero values only for coalitions S,
for which i-th player in the extended voting game Γ ′ is a veto-player, which follows
from the deﬁnition of the Shapley–Shubik value.
In (Petrosian, 2013) it was proved that:
Proposition 1. The function ϕn+1(α), where α ∈ I, takes ﬁnite set of values.
Deﬁnition 6. Proﬁtable Investment (PI) — the set of investments α ∈ I, such
that for each of them the component of the Shapley–Shubik value of (n + 1)-st
player takes its maximum value in the voting game Γ ′.
Denote by α∗ any investment which belongs to the set PI and denote by α∗PC the
subset of the set PC which correspond to α∗, then:
max
α∈I
ϕn+1 = max
α∈I
∑
S∈PC
|S|!(n− |S|)!
(n+ 1)!
·KS(α) =
=
∑
S∈PC
|S|!(n− |S|)!
(n+ 1)!
·KS(α∗) =
∑
S∈α∗PC
|S|!(n− |S|)!
(n+ 1)!
= ϕ∗n+1 = F (M).
Note 6. Obviously, the function ϕ∗n+1 = F (M) depends on M . The function F (M)
will be called the Bellman function.
In (Petrosian, 2013), the following problem was considered:
The distribution of weights a = (a1, . . . , an), quota ω, capital of (n+1)-st player
are given. It is necessary to deﬁne the set PI and corresponding component of the
Shapley–Shubik value of (n+ 1)-st player.
3. Problem of ﬁnding a minimal investment, which guarantees the
given value of the Shapley–Shubik power index for the newcomer
Use the notation introduced in the previous paragraph: F (M) — maximum value
of ϕn+1 for a given capital M . Let h ∈ [0, 1] be a desired component of the Shapley–
Shubik value of (n+ 1)-st player. We need some properties of function F (M).
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3.1. Properties of function F(M)
Proposition 2. Function F (M) — non decreasing function.
The following statement is given without proof, because it follows from the
deﬁnition.
Proposition 3. Function F (M) — ﬁnite-valued function.
Proof. Consider the function ϕn+1(α) for the value of capital M = 1. This function
takes all the values that the function F (M) may take, where M ∈ [0, 1]. According
to Proposition (1): the function ϕn+1(α) takes a ﬁnite number of values over the
set
∑n
i=1 αi
<
= 1. Consequently, the function F (M) with M ∈ [0, 1] takes a ﬁnite
number of values.
Note 7. Function F (M) — step function.
Example 2. Two person voting game is given:
Γ = [0.5; 0.5, 0.5], (ω = 0.5; a1 = 0.5, a2 = 0.5).
The voting game is extended by the third player. It is necessary to ﬁnd the set
of values for the capital M , to get a given numerical value of component of the
Shalpey–Shubik value for the third player, which is equal to 13 in the extended
voting game:
Γ ′ = [0.5; 0.5− α1, 0.5− α2,
2∑
i=1
αi].
The given component of the Shapley–Shubik value in the voting game Γ ′ is achieved
by incrementing (5) for the coalition S1 = {1} and S2 = {2} of Γ . Write the system
(4) for each of coalitions:
S1 :
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
∑
i∈S1
ai +
∑
i/∈S1
αi = 0.5 + α1 > 0.5∑
i∈S1
ai −
∑
i∈S1
αi = 0.5− α1 <= 0.5
→
{
α1 ∈ [0, 1− α2]
α2 ∈ (0, 1− α1]
(7)
S2 :
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
∑
i∈S2
ai +
∑
i/∈S2
αi = 0.5 + α2 > 0.5∑
i∈S2
ai −
∑
i∈S2
αi = 0.5− α2 <= 0.5
→
{
α1 ∈ [0, 1− α2]
α2 ∈ (0, 1− α1]
(8)
Possible values of function F (M) are:
F (M) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
0, M = 0
1
3 , M ∈ (0, 0.5)
1
2 , M = 0.5
1, M > 0.5
Here, the value 13 is attained for M ∈ (0, 0.5), because the investment which corre-
sponds to this capital is a solution of systems (8), (7) and the third player becomes a
veto-player with the capital M = 0.5 in the coalition {1, 2}. When capital M > 0.5
the value function F (M) is equal to 1 (see (Petrosian, 2013)).
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Note 8. It is seen from the example that minimum of capitalM for ﬁxed component
of the Shapley–Shubik value of third player may not be achieved.
Example 3. Two person voting game is given:
Γ = [0.5; 0.6, 0.4].
The voting game is extended by the third player. It is necessary to ﬁnd a set
of values for the capital M , to get a given numerical value of component of the
Shapley–Shubik value for the third player, which is equal to 16 in the extended
voting game:
Γ ′ = [0.5; 0.6− α1, 0.4− α2,
2∑
i=1
αi].
Given component of the Shapley–Shubik value in the voting game Γ ′ is achieved
by incrementing (5) for the coalition S1 = {1} of Γ . Write the system (4) for the
coalition: ⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
∑
i∈S
ai +
∑
i/∈S
αi = 0.6 > 0.5∑
i∈S
ai −
∑
i∈S
αi = 0.6− α1 <= 0.5
→
{
α1 ∈ [0, 1− α2]
α2 ∈ [0, 1− α1]
(9)
Possible values of function F (M) are:
F (M) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0, M = 0
1
6 , M = 0.1
1
3 , M ∈ (0.1, 0.5)
1
2 , M = 0.5
1, M > 0.5
Here, the value 16 is achieved forM = 0.1, because the investment which corresponds
to this capital is a solution of system (9), the third player becomes a veto-player
with the capital M ∈ (0, 0.5) in the coalition {2} and in the coalition {1, 2} with
the capital M = 0.5. When capital M > 0.5 the value function F (M) is equal to 1
(see (Petrosian, 2013)).
Note 9. The set of values for M for a ﬁxed component of the Shapley–Shubik value
of third player can be a singleton.
3.2. Propositions
Derive the necessary condition for the existence of a "minimal capital" of (n+1)-st
player to reach the desirable component of the Shapley–Shubik value h. Since F (M)
is a step function the solution M ′ of the equation F (M) = h may not exist.
What is understood by "minimal capital" in this case? It is necessary to consider
diﬀerent cases:
1. The solution M ′ of the equation F (M) = h exists. Then two cases are possible:
– inf{M : F (M) = h} is attained and is equal to M∗ = min{M : F (M) = h},
then M∗ — minimal capital.
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– M∗ = inf{M : F (M) = h} is not attained, then the deﬁnition of minimal
capital is to be considered with ε — accuracy (ε > 0), and denoted by M∗ε ,
M∗ < M∗ε < M∗ + ε, M∗ε — ε minimal capital.
2. The solution M ′ of the equation F (M) = h does not exist, consider M∗ =
inf{M : F (M)}, then two cases are possible:
– min{M : F (M) > h} is attained and is equal toM∗ = min{M : F (M) > h},
then M∗ — minimal capital.
– M∗ = min{M : F (M) > h} is not attained, then the deﬁnition of minimal
capital is to be considered with ε — accuracy (ε > 0), and denoted by M∗ε ,
M∗ < M∗ε < M∗ + ε, M∗ε — ε minimal capital.
Deﬁne h∗ = min{F (M) : F (M) >= h}, if the solution M ′ of equation F (M) = h
exists, then h∗ = h, but in general h∗ >= h.
Proposition 4. To reach M∗ = min{M : F (M) = h∗} it is necessary that at least
one winning coalition must belong to SPC(h∗).
Proof. In the section 2.2. it was shown that the component of the Shapley–Shubik
value of (n + 1)-st player depends on coalitions of original game Γ , in which the
entered — (n+1)-st player can become a veto-player in the extended game Γ ′, i.e.
depends on set PC. Consequently, the function ϕn+1 and F (M) depend on set PC.
Each component of the Shapley–Shubik value, and hence F (M) corresponds to one
or more subsets of PC (due to the fact that the increment for the component of the
Shapley–Shubik value (5) depends only on the dimension of perspective coalition).
Consider one of sets SPC(h∗). Consider one coalition from SPC(h∗). Derive
the conditions for which the minimum of
n∑
i=1
αi is attained on the subset deﬁned by
inequality (4) for coalition S.⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
∑
i∈S
ai +
∑
i/∈S
αi > ω∑
i∈S
ai −
∑
i∈S
αi <= ω
(10)
Analyze the inequalities:
1. First inequality. Note that min{∑
i/∈S
αi :
∑
i∈S
ai +
∑
i/∈S
αi > ω} is reached and
equals zero only if
∑
i∈S
ai > ω, i.e. when the coalition S is a winning coalition in
the original game Γ .
2. Second inequality. Note that min{∑
i∈S
αi :
∑
i∈S
ai −
∑
i∈S
αi <= ω} is reached and
equals
∑
i∈S
ai − ω.
Conditions for minimum of
∑
i/∈S
ai and
∑
i∈S
ai under condition (10) are obtained.
But
n∑
i=1
αi =
∑
i/∈S
αi +
∑
i∈S
αi. (11)
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Using the independence of two terms in (11), we obtain the condition for a minimum
of
n∑
i=1
αi = M under (10). The condition is that S is a winning coalition. Note that
the set of investments which determines the value of component of the Shapley–
Shubik value of (n + 1)-st player equal to h∗ is the intersection of solution sets
of inequalities for each of coalitions, corresponding to the value h∗. In this case
at least one of the systems of inequalities (4) corresponds to a winning coalition
in the original game Γ . Indeed, if this is not the case, then
n∑
i=1
αi will not reach
its minimum value (see (10)) on the set of investments described above . Hence it
follows, that if M∗ = min{M : F (M) = h∗} is reached, then there is at least one
coalition S ∈ SPC(h∗), which is winning.
Derive suﬃcient conditions for the existence of a minimum capital of (n+ 1)-st
player to reach the component of the Shapley–Shubik value equal to h∗. Consider
the following sets:
Set IPC — set of investments α, for which (n+1)-st component of the Shapley–
Shubik value takes the same value equal to h∗. This set is given by a system of
inequalities (4). Deﬁne now the set IPC(ε), where ε = (ε1, . . . , εk) and k — number
of losing coalitions of the game Γ — set of investments α, for which component of
the Shapley–Shubik value is h∗, but structure of inequalities (4) changed. For all
losing coalitions in the original game Γ it takes the form:⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
∑
i∈Sj
ai +
∑
i/∈Sj
αi >= ω + εj , j = 1, . . . , k∑
i∈Sj
ai −
∑
i∈Sj
αi <= ω
where Sj — losing coalition in the game Γ , εj > 0 — increment, corresponding to
each losing coalition in the game Γ .
Proposition 5. To achieve M∗ = min{M : F (M) = h∗} it is suﬃcient that ∃ε =
(ε1, . . . , εk) : ∀εj > 0, j = 1, . . . , k such that:
inf{
n∑
i=1
αi : α ∈ IPC} = inf{
n∑
i=1
αi : α ∈ IPC(ε)} (12)
Proof. Assume that (12) holds. Then the set of investments α, which corresponds
to the (n+1)-st component of the Shapley–Shubik value equal to h∗, for each losing
coalition in the original game Γ is deﬁned by a system of inequalities :⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
∑
i∈S
ai +
∑
i/∈S
αi >= ω + εj , j = 1, . . . , k∑
i∈S
ai −
∑
i∈S
αi <= ω
(13)
And each winning coalition in the original game Γ is deﬁned by a system of in-
equalities:⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
∑
i∈S
ai +
∑
i/∈S
αi > ω, ãäå
∑
i∈S
ai > ω∑
i∈S
ai −
∑
i∈S
αi <= ω
⇐⇒
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
∑
i/∈S
αi >= 0∑
i∈S
ai −
∑
i∈S
αi <= ω
(14)
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If only losing coalitions in the original game Γ belong to the subset of PC, which
corresponds to component of (n + 1)-st Shapley–Shubik value equal to h∗, then
M∗ = min{M : F (M) = h∗} will be achieved (from the system (13)), but according
to 3.2. SPC(h∗) must belong at least one winning coalition in the original game Γ .
Consider system (14), for it M∗ = min{M : F (M) = h∗} will be achieved, as
the coalition S — winning coalition in the voting game Γ . Consequently, M∗ =
min{M : F (M) = h∗} will be achieved for all coalitions from SPC(h∗), generally.
3.3. Statement of the problem
Distribution of weights a = (a1, . . . , an) and the quota ω, are given. It is necessary
to deﬁne a capital of (n + 1)-st player M∗ (M∗ε ), which corresponds as close as
possible to the given (n+ 1)-st component of the Shapley–Shubik value, i.e. h∗.
4. Monte – Carlo method to ﬁnd the approximate optimal solution of
the problem
The method consists in the generation of random vector ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξi, . . . , ξn),
where i-th component have a uniform probability distribution on the interval [0, ai].
To each ξ = α corresponds the component of the Shapley–Shubik value of (n+1)-st
player: ϕn+1. Choose the obtained values of ϕn+1 close to a given h: h∗. Further
compute α∗, such that
n∑
i=1
α∗i is minimal. Then
n∑
i=1
α∗i = M
∗ — will be approximate
solution of problem.
Deﬁne a set COI, which is necessary for realization the Monte–Karlo method:
COI = {α : αi ∈ [0, ai]}.
The following statement is without proof, since it is obvious:
Proposition 6. For any a = (a1, . . . , an), satisfying (1), and for every M the
following inclusition holds:
I ⊆ COI.
4.1. Algorithm for ﬁnding approximate minimal capital
This section contains an algorithm for ﬁnding capital M∗.
1. Sample of R random vectors with a uniform probability distribution over the
set COI is generated.
2. For each vector the extended voting game Γ ′ is formed, to each game Γ ′ corre-
sponds (n+ 1)-st component of the Shapley–Shubik value.
3. The approximate (n+1)-st component of the Shapley–Shubik value to the value
of h and the corresponding investments α is selected.
4. From the resulting sample of investments select the investment, for which
n∑
i=1
αi
is minimal — α∗. Then the approximate solution of the problem M∗ =
n∑
i=1
α∗i
is obtained.
Example 4. The numerical simulation by Monte–Carlo method for the perturbed
three person voting game is performed:
[0.5; 0.3, 0.6, 0.1].
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Voting game extends by fourth player. It is necessary to ﬁnd minimal capital M∗,
for which the closest to the given component of the Shapley–Shubik value of 4-th
player h = 0.1, i.e. h∗ = 16 = 0.167, in the extended voting game is achieved:
[0.5; 0.3− α1, 0.6− α2, 0.1− α3].
Set of values for the capital M , which corresponds to the h∗ = 0.167 was found:
F−1(h∗) = {0.176, 0.161, 0.189, 0.157, 0.101, 0.113, 0.127} (15)
From the resulting set of values is appropriate to select the ﬁfth estimate, which is
M̂∗ = 0.101.
Example 5. The numerical simulation by Monte–Carlo method for the perturbed
ﬁve person voting game is performed:
[0.5; 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2].
Voting game extends by sixth player. It is necessary to ﬁnd minimal capital M∗,
for which the closest to the given component of the Shapley–Shubik value of 6-th
player h = 0.6, i.e. h∗ = 0.6, in the extended voting game is achieved:
[0.5; 0.2− α1, 0.2− α2, 0.2− α3, 0.2− α4, 0.2− α5].
Set of values for the capital M , which corresponds to the h∗ = 0.6 was found:
F−1(h∗) = {0.411, 0.354, 0.42, 0.436, 0.423, 0.449, 0.412} (16)
From the resulting set of values is appropriate to select the second estimate, which
is M̂∗ = 0.354.
Example 6. The numerical simulation by Monte–Carlo method for the perturbed
seven person voting game is performed:
[0.5; 0.02, 0.11, 0.38, 0.06, 0.08, 0.21, 0.14].
Voting game extends by eighth player. It is necessary to ﬁnd minimal capital M∗,
for which the closest to the given component of the Shapley–Shubik value of 8-th
player h = 0.28, i.e. h∗ = 59210 = 0.2809, in the extended voting game is achieved:
[0.5; 0.02− α1, 0.11− α2, 0.38− α3, 0.06− α4, 0.08− α5, 0.21− α6, 0.14− α7].
Set of values for the capital M , which corresponds to the h∗ = 0.2809 was found:
F−1(h∗) = {0.312, 0.293, 0.253, 0.233, 0.324, 0.338, 0.328} (17)
From the resulting set of values is appropriate to select the fourth estimate, which
is M̂∗ = 0.233.
5. Conclusion
In this paper and in (Petrosian, 2013), a complex of problems aimed to expand a
set of players in the voting game is investigated. Conditions of optimal behavior of
the newcomer is perfermed. The approach will be probably used for a wider class
of cooperative games.
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Abstract The problem of strategically supported cooperation in 2-person
diﬀerential games with integral payoﬀs is considered. Based on initial dif-
ferential game the new associated diﬀerential game (CD-game) is designed.
In addition to the initial game it models the players actions connected with
transition from the strategic form of the game to cooperative with in advance
chosen principle of optimality. The model provides possibility of refusal from
cooperation at any time instant t for each player. As cooperative principle
of optimality the Shapley value is considered. In the bases of CD-game con-
struction lies the so-called imputation distribution procedure described ear-
lier in (Petrosjan and Zenkevich, 2009). The theorem established by authors
says that if at each instant of time along the conditionally optimal (cooper-
ative) trajectory the future payments to each player according to the impu-
tation distribution procedure exceed the maximal guaranteed value which
this player can achieve in CD-game, then there exist a Nash equilibrium in
the class of recursive strategies ﬁrst introduced in (Chistyakov, 1981) sup-
porting the cooperative trajectory. In the present paper the results similar
to (Chistyakov and Petrosyan, 2011) are obtained without the requirement
of independent motions and for the more general type of payoﬀ functions.
Keywords: strong Nash equilibrium, time-consistency, core, cooperative
trajectory.
1. Introduction
Similar to (Petrosjan and Zenkevich, 2009; Chistyakov and Petrosyan, 2011) in this
paper the problem of strategically support of cooperation in diﬀerential 2-person
game with prescribed duration T and dependent motions is considered.
dx
dt
= f(t, x, u(1), u(2)), i ∈ I = [1, 2], (1)
x ∈ Rn, u(i) ∈ P (i) ⊂ CompRk(i), i ∈ I
x(t0) = x0. (2)
The payoﬀs of players i ∈ I = [1, 2] have integral form
H
(i)
t0,x0(u
(1)(·), u(2)(·)) =
∫ T
t0
h(i)
(
t, x(t), u(1)(t), u(2)(t)
)
dt, (3)
where u(·) = (u(1)(·), u(2)(·)) is a given vector-function of open loop controls,
x(t) = x(t, t0, x0, u
(1)(·), u(2)(·)) is the solution of the Cauchy problem (1) with cor-
responding initial conditions (2) and admissible open loop controls u(1)(·), u(2)(·) of
players.
Strategic Support of Cooperative Solutions in 2-Person Diﬀerential Games 389
Admissible open loop controls of players i ∈ I are Lebesgue measurable open
loop controls
u(i)(·) : t → u(i)(t) ∈ Rk(i), i ∈ I = {1, 2}
such that
u(i)(t) ∈ P (i) for almost all t ∈ [t0, T ], i ∈ I.
It is supposed that the function f : R × Rn × P (1) × P (2) → Rn is continuous,
locally Lipschitz with respect to x and satisﬁes the following condition: ∃λ > 0 such,
that
||f(t, x, u(1), u(2))|| ≤ λ(1 + ||x||) ∀x ∈ Rk(i), ∀u(1) ∈ P (1), u(2) ∈ P (2).
Each of the functions
h(i) : R×Rn × P (1) × P (2) → R, i ∈ I
are also continuous.
For all t ∈ R+, x ∈ Rn,  ∈ Rn
max
u(1)∈P (1)
min
u(2)∈P (2)
(
<  , f(t, x, u(1), u(2)) > +h(1)(t, x, u(1), u(2))
)
=
min
u(2)∈P (2)
max
u(1)∈P (1)
(
<  , f(t, x, u(1), u(2)) > +h(1)(t, x, u(1), u(2))
)
and
max
u(2)∈P (2)
min
u(1)∈P (1)
(
<  , f(t, x, u(1), u(2)) > +h(2)(t, x, u(1), u(2))
)
=
min
u(1)∈P (1)
max
u(2)∈P (2)
(
<  , f(t, x, u(1), u(2)) > +h(2)(t, x, u(1), u(2))
)
,
here < ·, · > is scalar product in Rn.
It is supposed that at each time instant t ∈ [t0, T ] the players have information
about the current position (t, x(t)) on the time interval [t0, t] and use recursive
strategies (Chistyakov, 1977; Chistyakov, 1999).
2. Recursive strategies
Recursive strategies were ﬁrst introduced in (Chistyakov, 1977) for justiﬁcation of
dynamic programming approach in zero sum diﬀerential games, known as method
of open loop iterations in non regular diﬀerential games with non smooth value
function. The ε-optimal strategies constructed with the use of this method are
universal in the sense that they remain ε-optimal in any subgame of the previously
deﬁned diﬀerential game (for every ε > 0). Exploiting this property it became
possible to prove the existence of ε-equilibrium (Nash equilibrium) in non zero sum
diﬀerential games (for every ε > 0) using the so called "punishment strategies"
(Chistyakov, 1981).
The basic idea is that when one of the players deviates from the conditionally
optimal trajectory other players after some small time delay start to play against
the deviating player. As result the deviating player is not able to get much more
than he could get using the conditionally optimal trajectory. The punishment of the
deviating player at each time instant using one and the same strategy is possible
because of the universal character of ε-optimal strategies in zero sum diﬀerential
games.
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In this paper the same approach is used to testify the stability of cooperative
agreements in the game Γ (t0, x0) and as in mentioned case the principal argument
is the universal character of ε-optimal recursive strategies in specially deﬁned zero
sum games Γi(t0, x0), i ∈ I = [1, 2] associated with the non-zero sum game Γ (t0, x0).
The recursive strategies lie somewhere in-between piecewise open loop strategies
(Petrosyan, 1993) and ε-strategies introduced by B. N. Pshenichny (Pschenichny,
1973). The diﬀerence from piecewise open loop strategies consists in the fact that like
in the case of ε-strategies of B. N. Pshenichny the moments of correction of open loop
controls are not prescribed from the beginning of the game but are deﬁned during
the game process. In the same time they diﬀer from ε-strategies of B. N. Pshenichny
by the fact that the formation of open loop controls happens in ﬁnite number of
steps.
Recursive strategies U (n)i of player i with maximal number of control corrections
n is a procedure for the admissible open loop formation by player i in the game
Γ (t0, x0), (t0, x0) ∈ D.
At the beginning of the game Γ (t0, x0) player i using the recursive strategy U
(n)
i
deﬁnes the ﬁrst correction instant t(i)1 ∈ (t0, T ] and his admissible open loop control
u(i) = u(i)(t) on the time interval [t0, t
(i)
1 ]. Then if t
(i)
1 < T having the information
about state of the game at time instant t(i)1 he chooses the next moment of correction
t
(i)
2 and his admissible open loop control u(i) = u(i)(t) on the time interval (t
(i)
1 , t
(i)
2 ]
and so on. Then whether on k-th step (k ≤ n − 1) the admissible control will be
formed on the time interval [tk, T ] or on the step n player i will end up with the
process by choosing at time instant t(i)n−1 his admissible control on the remaining
time interval (t(i)n−1, T ].
3. Associated games and corresponding solutions
For each given state (t∗, x∗) ∈ D and i ∈ I = [1, 2] consider zero sum diﬀerential
game Γi(t∗, x∗) between player i and I\{i} with the same dynamics as in Γ (t∗, x∗)
and payoﬀ of player i equal to:
H
(i)
t∗x∗(u
(1)(·), u(2)(·)) =
∫ T
t0
h(i)(t, x(t), u(1)(t), u(2)(t))dt.
The game Γi(t∗, x∗), i ∈ I, (t∗, x∗) ∈ D, as Γ (t∗, x∗), (t∗, x∗) ∈ D we consider in
the class of recursive strategies. Under the above formulated conditions each of the
games Γi(t∗, x∗), i ∈ I, (t∗, x∗) ∈ D has a value
valΓi(t∗, x∗),
and optimal strategies (saddle point).
Consider also the following optimization problem ΓI(t∗, x∗):
max
u(1)(·),u(2)(·)
2∑
i=1
H
(i)
t0,x0
(
u(1)(·), u(2)(·)
)
,
denoting the resulting maximal value as vI(t0, x0). We suppose that this optimiza-
tion problem has an optimal open-loop solution.
Strategic Support of Cooperative Solutions in 2-Person Diﬀerential Games 391
The corresponding trajectory — solution of (1), (2) on the time interval [t0, T ]
we denote by x0(·) and call ”conditionally optimal cooperative trajectory”. This tra-
jectory may not be necessary unique. Thus on the set D the mapping
v(·) : D → R3
is deﬁned with coordinate functions
vI(·), v1(·), v2(·) : D → R,
vi(t∗, x∗) = valΓi(t∗, x∗), i ∈ I, vI(t∗, x∗).
This mapping correspond to each state (t∗, x∗) ∈ D a characteristic function v(t∗, x∗) :
2I → R of non zero-sum game Γ (t∗, x∗) and thus 2-person classical cooperative game
(I, v(t∗, x∗)).
Let E(t∗, x∗) = {α = (α1, α2) : αi ≥ vi(t∗, x∗), α1 + α2 = vI(t∗, x∗)} be the set
of all imputations in the game (I, v(t∗, x∗)). Multivalue mapping
M : (t∗, x∗) →M(t∗, x∗) ⊂ E(t∗, x∗) ⊂ R2,
M(t∗, x∗) = Λ ∀(t∗, x∗) ∈ D,
is called ”optimality principle” (deﬁned over the family of games Γ (t∗, x∗),
(t∗, x∗) ∈ D) and the set M(t∗, x∗) ”cooperative solution of the game Γ (t∗, x∗)
corresponding to this principle”.
As it follows from (Fridman, 1971) under the above imposed conditions the
following Lemma holds.
Lemma 1. The functions vI(·), v1(·), v2(·) : D → R, are locally Lipschitz.
Since the solution of the Cauchy problem (1), (2) in the sense of Caratheodory
is absolutely continuous, from Lemma 1 it follows.
Theorem 1. For every solution of the Cauchy problem (1), (2) in the sense of
Caratheodory x(·) corresponding to the open loop controls u(·) = (u(1)(·), u(2)(·))
functions
ϕi : [t0, T ]→ R, i ∈ I, ϕi(t) = vi(t, x(t)), ϕI (t) = vI(t, x(t))
are absolutely continuous functions on the time interval [t0, T ].
As deﬁned let E(t∗, x∗) be the set of imputations in the game Γ (t∗, x∗), and let
ξ(t∗, x∗) = {ξ1(t∗, x∗), ξ2(t∗, x∗)} ∈ E(t∗, x∗).
Then we have
ξi(t∗, x∗) ≥ vi(t∗, x∗).
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4. Realization of cooperative solutions
The realization of the solution of the game Γ (t0, x0) we shall connect with the known
”imputation distribution procedure” (IDP) (Petrosjan and Danilov, 1979; Petrosjan,
1995).
Under IDP of the imputation ξ(t0, x0) from the solution M(t0, x0) of the game
Γ (t0, x0) along conditionally optimal trajectory x0(·) we understand such function
β(t) = (β1(t), β2(t)), t ∈ [t0, T ], (4)
that
ξ(t0, x0) =
∫ T
t0
β(t)dt (5)
and ∫ T
t
β(t)dt ∈ E(t, x0(t)) ∀t ∈ [t0, T ] (6)
where E(t, x0(t)) is the set of imputations in the game (I, v(t, x0(t))).
The IDP β(t), t ∈ [t0, T ] of the imputation ξ(t0, x0) ∈ M(t0, x0) of the game
Γ (t0, x0) is called dynamically stable (time-consistent) along the conditionally op-
timal trajectory x0(·) if∫ T
t
β(t)dt ∈ M(t, x0(t)) ∀t ∈ [t0, T ] (7)
The solution M(t0, x0) of the game Γ (t0, x0) is dynamically stable (time-con-
sistent) if for all ξ(t0, x0) ∈ M(t0, x0) along at least one conditionally optimal
trajectory the dynamically stable IDP exist.
If M(t, x0(t)) = E(t, x0(t)), t ∈ [t0, T ], then M(t, x0(t)) = ∅ (M(t, x0(t)) is the
set of imputations in the subgame Γ (t, x0(t)) with initial conditions on conditionally
optimal cooperative trajectory with duration T − t), and ξ(t, x0(t)) ∈ M(t, x0(t))
can be selected as absolutely continuous function of t. Then the following theorem
holds.
Theorem 2. For any conditionally optimal trajectory x0(·) the following IDP of
the solution ξ(t0, x0) ∈M(t0, x0) of the game Γ (t0, x0)
β(t) = − d
dt
ξ(t, x0(t)), t ∈ [t0, T ], (8)
is the dynamically stable IDP along this trajectory. Therefore the solution M(t0, x0)
of the game Γ (t0, x0) is dynamically stable.
As ξi(t0, x0) we can take the Shapley value:
ξi(t0, x0) = Shi(t0, x0) = vi(t0, x0) +
vI(t0, x0)−
2∑
i=1
vi(t0, x0)
2
and for subgame along cooperative trajectory
ξi(t, x0(t)) = Shi(t, x0(t)) = vi(t, x0(t)) +
vI(t, x0(t))−
2∑
i=1
vi(t, x0(t))
2
.
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From Theorem 1 it follows that the function Shi(t, x0(t)) is absolutely continuous
and thus diﬀerentiable along x0(t). This shows that IDP β(t) for ξi(t, x0(t)) =
Shi(t, x0(t)) can be computed by (8) according to Theorem 2.
5. About the strategically support of the imputation ξ(t0, x0)
If in the game the cooperative agreement is reached and each player gets his payoﬀ
according to the IDP (8), then it is natural to suppose that those who violate
this agreement are to be punished. The eﬀectiveness of the punishment (sanctions)
comes to question of the existence of Nash Equilibrium in the following diﬀerential
game Γ ξ(t0, x0) which diﬀers from Γ (t0, x0) only by payoﬀs of players.
The payoﬀ of player i in Γ ξ(t0, x0) is equal to
H
(ξ, i)
t0,x0(u(·)) = −
∫ t(u(·))
t0
d
dt
ξi(t, x0(t))dt+
∫ T
t(u(·))
h(i)(t, x(t, t0, x0, u(·)))dt
where t(u(·)) is the last time instant t ∈ [t0, T ] for which
x0(τ) = x(τ, t0, x, u(·)) ∀τ ∈ [t0, t].
Theorem 3. In the game Γ ξ(t0, x0) for each ε > 0 there exist ε-Nash equilibrium
with outcomes (payoﬀs) of players in this equilibrium equal to
ξ(t0, x0) = {ξ1(t0, x0), ξ2(t0, x0)} ∈ E(t0, x0).
The idea of the proof is following. Since ξ(t0, x0) belongs to the imputation set
of the game Γ (t0, x0) we have
ξi(t, x0(t)) ≥ vi(t, x0(t)) ∀i ∈ I ∀t ∈ [t0, T ] (9)
This means that at each time instant t ∈ [t0, T ] moving along conditionally
optimal trajectory x0(·) no player i ∈ I can guarantee himself the payoﬀ [t, T ] more
than according to IDP (8), i.e. more than∫ T
t
β(τ)dτ = −
∫ T
t
d
dt
ξ(τ, x0(τ))dτ = ξi(t, x0(t))
since if player i deviates from cooperative trajectory at some time instant t, this
will be immediately seen by his opponent 3 − i (since both players know x(t) at
each time instant t, and deviation of one player will cause the change of x(t)) and
he will use punishment strategy in the zero-sum game Γ3−i(t, x0(t)) (his optimal
strategy in zero-sum game Γ3−i(t, x0(t))). Therefore, the player i will get no more
then vi(t+ δ, x0(t+ δ)) ≤ ξi(t, x0(t) + ε.
In the same time on the time interval [t0, t] according to the IDP she already
got the payoﬀ equal to∫ t
t0
βi(τ)dτ = −
∫ t
t0
d
dt
ξi(τ, x0(τ))dτ = ξi(t0, x0)− ξi(t, x0(t))
Consequently no player can guarantee in the game Γ ξ(t0, x0) the payoﬀ more than
ξi(t0, x0).
According to the cooperative solution x0(·) but moving always in the game
Γ ξ(t0, x0) along conditionally optimal trajectory each player will get his payoﬀ ac-
cording to the imputation ξ(t0, x0). Thus no player can beneﬁt from the deviation
from the conditionally optimal trajectory which in this case is natural to call ”equi-
librium trajectory”.
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Abstract We consider a problem of construction of preference relations
for models of decision making with quality criteria. A quality criterion one
means as a function from a set of alternatives in some chain (i.e. linearly
ordered set). A system of axioms for rule of preferences is given. It is shown
that any rule for preferences satisfying these axioms can be presented as
a rule for preferences based on some pseudoﬁlter of winning coalitions of
criteria. The section 4 contains main results of the article. In particular,
necessary and suﬃcient conditions for transitive and for linear preferences
are found. An interpretation of Arrow paradox in terms of ﬁlters is given.
Keywords: Rule for preference relations, Axiom for preferences, Pseudoﬁl-
ters and ﬁlters of winning coalitions.
1. Introduction
We study a general model of multi-criteria decision making with quality criteria in
the form of a system
G = 〈A, (qj)j∈J 〉 , (1)
where A is an arbitrary set with |A| ≥ 2 (named a set of alternatives or outcomes)
and (qj)j∈J are criteria for valuation of these alternatives. Formally every criterion
qj , j ∈ J can be presented as a function from A in some scale, points of which are
results of measurement for criterion qj . It is well known that any scale has some
set of acceptable transformations and measurements produce up a some acceptable
transformation.
A criterion qj is called a quality one if its scale is some linearly ordered set
〈Cj ,≤j〉, i.e. a chain. In this case acceptable transformations are all isotonic func-
tions deﬁned on Cj .
In this article, we consider some problems concerning of preference relations for
model (1).
Deﬁnition 1. A pair 〈A, ρ〉, where A is an arbitrary set with |A| ≥ 2 and ρ a
reﬂexive binary relation on A is called a space of preferences.
For any a, a′ ∈ A put
a  a′ ⇔ (a, a′) ∈ ρ,
a < a′ ⇔ (a, a′) ∈ ρ, (a′, a) /∈ ρ,
a ∼ a′ ⇔ (a, a′) ∈ ρ, (a′, a) ∈ ρ.
(2)
In (2), the sign  means a preference,< strict preference and ∼ indiﬀerence
between elements a and a′. A preference relation  is well deﬁned by the pair
(<,∼), namely  is the union of relations < and ∼.
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Given a model G in the form (1), one can deﬁne a preference relation on the set
of alternatives A in diﬀerent manners. Let K be the class of models of the form (1).
We say that a rule R for preferences in the class K is given if for each G ∈ K some
reﬂexive binary relation R(G) = ρ on the set of alternatives of model G is deﬁned.
Indicate some known rules for preferences.
1. The most important rule for preferences is Pareto-preference Par which is
given by the formula
a1 Par a2 ⇔ (∀j ∈ J) qj (a1) ≤j qj (a2) . (3)
2. Strict Slater preference is deﬁned by
a1 <
Sl a2 ⇔ (∀j ∈ J) qj (a1) <j qj (a2) . (4)
In this case, indiﬀerence is the identity relation.
3. Rule of simple majority can be introduced in the following way. Assume in
model G the set of criteria is ﬁnite and |J | = n. For any alternatives a, a′ ∈ A we
denote
n (a, a′) = |j ∈ J : qj (a) ≥j qj (a′)| ,
n∗ (a, a′) = |j ∈ J : qj (a) >j qj (a′)| .
One can deﬁne two rules of simple majority M1 and M2 by formulas
a1 M1 a2 ⇔ n (a1, a2) ≥ n (a2, a1) ,
a1 M2 a2 ⇔ n (a1, a2) ≥ n/2.
It is easy to show that M1 coincides with M2 for any elements a, a′ ∈ A in the
case when all inequalities for n (a, a′) and n (a′, a) are strict. In general case these
relations are diﬀerent. Particularly the condition a >M1 a′ holds if n∗ (a, a′) >
n∗ (a′, a) and the condition a >M2 a′ if n∗ (a, a′) > n/2.
4. Rule of α-majority is deﬁned as follows. Fix a real number α > 1/2. For any
a, a′ ∈ A put a > a′ ⇔ n (a, a′) ≥ r where r = αn, if αn is integer and r = [αn] + 1
otherwise. The indiﬀerence relation can be given here by two manners: a) a ∼ a′ if
and only if neither a > a′ nor a′ > a; b) a ∼ a′ if and only if a = a′.
In this article, we study a construction of preference relation with help of some
family of criteria, indices of which form so-called pseudoﬁlter. Remark that pseud-
oﬁlter is a certain generalization of well known conception of ﬁlter which is made
use in algebra, mathematical logic and topology (see Birkhoﬀ, 1967; Kelley, 1957;
Kuratowsski and Mostowski, 1967). Using some properties of ﬁlters, we indicate an
interpretation of Arrow paradox.
2. Axioms for rules of preference relations
We now state axioms for a rule R of preferences in the class K deﬁned above.
(A1) Axiom of independence. Consider two models G = 〈A, (qj)j∈J 〉 and G1 =〈
B, (q1j )j∈J
〉
of classK. Suppose for elements a1, a2 ∈ A and b1, b2 ∈ B the following
equivalence
qj (a1) ≤j qj (a2) ⇔ q1j (b1) ≤j q1j (b2)
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holds (j ∈ J). Then the equivalence a1 ρ a2 ⇔ b1 ρ1 b2 is truth (we denote by
ρ = R (G) , ρ1 = R
(
G1
)
).
Axiom of independence means that the preference between two alternatives in
any model of class K is well deﬁned by the set of criteria under which one of them
is more preferential than another and does not depend on comparison of these
alternatives with other alternatives of the model.
(A2) Axiom of monotony. Consider two models G = 〈A, (qj)j∈J 〉 and G1 =〈
A, (q1j )j∈J
〉
of class K. Fix two elements a1, a2 ∈ A and assume for any j ∈ J the
following implication
qj (a1) ≤j qj (a2) ⇒ q1j (a1) ≤j q1j (a2)
holds. Then the condition a1 ρ a2 implies the condition a1 ρ
1
a2.
Axiom of monotony states that the preference between two alternatives in models
of class K is increasing under an enlargement the set of corresponding criteria.
(A3) Axiom of strict monotony. Consider two models G = 〈A, (qj)j∈J 〉 and
G1 =
〈
A, (q1j )j∈J
〉
of class K. Fix two elements a1, a2 ∈ A and suppose for any
j ∈ J the following implication
qj (a1) ≤j qj (a2) ⇒ q1j (a1) <j q1j (a2)
holds. Then the condition a1 ρ a2 implies the condition a1 <ρ
1
a2.
Remark 1. Formally, axioms (A2) and (A3) are independent one from another
since (A3) has more strong assumption but more strong consequence also.
(A4) Axiom for absence of attachment. Let A be an arbitrary set. Fix two ele-
ments a1, a2 ∈ A with a1 = a2. Then there exist two models G = 〈A, (qj)j∈J 〉 and
G1 =
〈
A, (q1j )j∈J
〉
of class K such that conditions
a1 ρ a2 and ¬
(
a1 ρ
1
a2
)
hold.
We now show that a rule R for preferences satisfying axioms (A1) – (A4) can
be deﬁned for models of the form
GQ = 〈A, (σj)j∈J 〉 (5)
where σj is some linear quasi-order on A. Indeed, let G = 〈A, (qj)j∈J 〉 be a model
of class K. Put
J(a1,a2) = {j ∈ J : qj (a1) ≤j qj (a2)} .
It follows from axiom (A1) that for any ﬁx elements a1, a2 ∈ A, truth of asser-
tions a1 ρ a2 (where ρ = R (G)) is well deﬁned by the subset J(a1,a2). Deﬁne a
linear quasi-ordering σj on A by the formula
a ≤σj a′ ⇔ qj (a) ≤j qj (a′) .
It is evident that subsets J(a1,a2) can be presented in the form
J(a1,a2) = {j ∈ J : a1 ≤σj a2} . (6)
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Thus any rule R for preferences in the class K can be given as a mapping which
for each model GQ = 〈A, (σj)j∈J 〉 some reﬂexive preference relation R (GQ) = ρ
on the set A assigns. By this reason, sometimes we will consider the class K as a
class of models of the form (5). Axioms (A1) – (A4) in this case can be written as
follows.
(A1)* Consider two models GQ = 〈A, (σj)j∈J 〉 and G1Q =
〈
B, (σ1j )j∈J
〉
of class
K. Denote by R (GQ) = ρ,R
(
G1Q
)
= ρ1. Assume for elements a1, a2 ∈ A and
b1, b2 ∈ B the following equivalence
a1 ≤σj a2 ⇔ b1 ≤σ1j b2
holds for each j ∈ J . Then the equivalence a1 ρ a2 ⇔ b1 ρ1 b2 is truth also.
(A2)* Consider two models GQ = 〈A, (σj)j∈J 〉 and G1Q =
〈
A, (σ1j )j∈J
〉
of class
K. Fix elements a1, a2 ∈ A and assume for any j ∈ J the following implication
a1 ≤σj a2 ⇒ a1 ≤σ1j a2
holds. Then the condition a1 ρ a2 implies the condition a1 ρ
1
a2.
(A3)* Consider two models GQ = 〈A, (σj)j∈J 〉 and G1Q =
〈
A, (σ1j )j∈J
〉
of class
K. Assume for elements a1, a2 ∈ A and any j ∈ J the following implications
a1 ≤σj a2 ⇒ a1 <σ1j a2
hold. Then the condition a1 ρ a2 implies the condition a1 <ρ
1
a2.
(A4)* Let A be an arbitrary set. Fix two elements a1, a2 ∈ A with a1 = a2.
Then there exist two models GQ = 〈A, (σj)j∈J 〉 and G1Q =
〈
A, (σ1j )j∈J
〉
of class K
such that conditions
a1 ρ a2 and ¬
(
a1 ρ
1
a2
)
hold.
We now indicate some consequences of axioms (A1)* – (A4)*.
Corollary 1. Consider two models GQ = 〈A, (σj)j∈J 〉 and G1Q =
〈
B, (σ1j )j∈J
〉
of
class K. Assume for elements a1, a2 ∈ A and b1, b2 ∈ B the following equivalences
a1 ≤σj a2 ⇔ b1 ≤σ1j b2
a2 ≤σj a1 ⇔ b2 ≤σ1j b1
hold for each j ∈ J . Then the equivalences
a1 ∼ρ a2 ⇔ b1 ∼ρ1 b2
a1 <
ρ a2 ⇔ b1 <ρ1 b2
(7)
are truth also.
For the proof put
J+(a1,a2) = {j ∈ J : a1 <σj a2}
J+(a2,a1) = {j ∈ J : a2 <σj a1}
J0(a1,a2) = {j ∈ J : a1 ∼σj a2} .
(8)
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Assumption of corollary 1 means J(a1,a2) = J(b1,b2) and J(a2,a1) = J(b2,b1). Hence
J0(a1,a2) = J(a1,a2) ∩ J(a2,a1) = J(b1,b2) ∩ J(b2,b1) = J0(b1,b2).
We obtain J0(a1,a2) = J
0
(b1,b2)
that is the ﬁrst equivalence in (7). It follows from the
assumption of corollary 1 and the equality J0(a1,a2) = J
0
(b1,b2)
that J+(a1,a2) = J
+
(b1,b2)
that is the second equivalence in (7).
Corollary 2 (Pareto optimality). For each model GQ = 〈A, (σj)j∈J 〉 of class K
following inclusions hold: ⋂
j∈J
σj ⊆ R (GQ) ⊆
⋃
j∈J
σj . (9)
Proof (of corollary 2). Fix a pair (a1, a2) ∈
⋂
j∈J
σj . By axiom (A4)* there exists
a family of linear quasi-orders
(
σ1j
)
j∈J on A such that (a1, a2) ∈ R
(
G1Q
)
where
G1Q =
〈
A, (σ1j )j∈J
〉
. For arbitrary j ∈ J the following implication
a1 ≤σ1j a2 ⇒ a1 ≤σj a2
holds (since the conclusion of this implication is truth). Put ρ = R (GQ) and ρ1 =
R
(
G1Q
)
. According to axiom (A2)* the condition a1 ρ
1
a2 implies the condition
a1 ρ a2. Because the ﬁrst condition is truth by assumption, we have that the second
condition is truth also. Thus the ﬁrst inclusion in (9) is proved. To prove the second
inclusion, ﬁx a pair (a3, a4) /∈
⋃
j∈J
σj . By axiom (A4)* there exists a family of linear
quasi-orders
(
σ2j
)
j∈J on A such that (a3, a4) /∈ R
(
G2Q
)
where G2Q =
〈
A, (σ2j )j∈J
〉
.
For arbitrary j ∈ J the following implication
a3 ≤σj a4 ⇒ a3 ≤σ2j a4 (10)
holds (since the condition of this implication is false). Assume (a3, a4) ∈ R (GQ).
Then using (10) we receive by axiom (A2)* (a3, a4) ∈ R
(
G2Q
)
in contradiction with
our assumption. Hence (a3, a4) /∈ R (GQ) and the implication
(a3, a4) /∈
⋃
j∈J
σj ⇒ (a3, a4) /∈ R (GQ) (11)
is shown. It remains to note that (11) is equivalent to the second inclusion in (9).
3. Pseudoﬁlters and ﬁlters
In this section we will study a notion of pseudoﬁlter which can be used for construc-
tion of some rule of preferences in models of the form (1).
Deﬁnition 2. Let J be an arbitrary set. A family W of its subsets is called a
pseudoﬁlter over J if it satisﬁes the following conditions:
(PF1) Nonemptiness: W = ∅;
(PF2) Majorant stability: S ∈W,T ⊇ S ⇒ T ∈W ;
(PF3) Anticomplement: S ∈ W ⇒ S′ /∈W .
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Let us note some consequences of these axioms.
(C1) J ∈W .
(C2) ∅ /∈ W .
(C3) S, T ∈W ⇒ S ∩ T = ∅.
Indeed, by (PF1) there exists a subset S ⊆ J with S ∈ W . By (PF2) we have
J ∈ W , i.e. (C1). Using (C1) and (PF3) we obtain (C2). Prove (C3). Suppose
S ∩ T = ∅ then T ⊆ S′ and by (PF2) we obtain S′ ∈ W . Because S ∈ W that
contradict (PF3).
Example 1. A game in the form of characteristic function can be given as a pair
〈J, v〉 where J is an arbitrary set (named a set of players) and v is a function which
any subset S ⊆ J assigns a real number v (S). In the game theoretical terminology,
any subset S ⊆ J is called a coalition. The characteristic function v is said to be
superadditive if for any subsets S, T ⊆ J with S ∩ T = ∅ the inequality
v (S) + v (T ) ≤ v (S ∪ T ) (12)
holds. A game 〈J, v〉 is called prime one if values of the function v are 0 and 1 only.
The following assertion is noted by Herve Moulin (Moulin, 1981).
Lemma 1. Let 〈J, v〉 be a prime game and W be a family of winning coalitions
(i.e. coalitions S ⊆ J with v (S) = 1). The characteristic function v is superadditive
if and only if W satisﬁes conditions (PF2) and (PF3).
Proof (of lemma 1). Let v be superadditive. Check (PF2). Suppose S ∈ W and
T ⊇ S. Put T1 = T ∩ S′. Since S ∩ T1 = ∅ and S ∪ T1 = T , by using (12) we have
v (S) + v (T1) ≤ v (T ). Because S ∈ W , we obtain v (S) = 1 and v (T ) ≥ 1 i.e.
T ∈ W . Check now (PF3). Suppose S ∈ W and S′ ∈ W for some coalition S ⊆ J .
Then by using (12) we have v (J) ≥ v (S) + v (S′) = 1 + 1 = 2, i.e. v (J) ≥ 2, that
is impossible. Necessity is proved.
To prove the suﬃciency consider two coalitions S, T ⊆ J with S ∩ T = ∅. The
case S, T /∈ W is trivial. In the opposite case according the condition (C3) we can
put S ∈ W,T /∈W . Then by (PF2) we have S ∪ T ∈W hence the left and the right
parts of (12) are equal to 1 and (12) holds. 
unionsq
A prime game 〈J, v〉 is said to be trivial, if v (S) = 0 for all coalitions S ⊆ J .
Obviously, a prime game is non-trivial if and only if W = ∅ i.e. when axiom (PF1)
holds. Then using Lemma 1, we obtain
Lemma 2. Let 〈J, v〉 be a prime game and W be a family of its winning coalitions.
A game G is non-trivial with superadditive characteristic function v if and only if
W is pseudoﬁlter.
We now consider some questions concerning a construction of pseudoﬁlters. First
of all note an important connection between the notion of pseudoﬁlter and the notion
of ﬁlter; the last is made use in various branches of algebra, mathematical logic and
topology.
Deﬁnition 3. Let J be an arbitrary set. A nonempty family F of subsets J is
called a ﬁlter over J if the following conditions hold:
(F1) S ∈ F, T ∈ F ⇒ S ∩ T ∈ F ;
(F2) S ∈ F, T ⊇ S ⇒ T ∈ F ;
(F3) ∅ /∈ F .
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Lemma 3.
1. Any ﬁlter is a pseudoﬁlter.
2. A pseudoﬁlter is a ﬁlter if and only if it is stable under intersection of its subsets.
Proof (of lemma 3). 1. Let F be a ﬁlter. Then axioms (PF1), (PF2) evidently hold.
Check (PF3). Assume S, S′ ∈ F . Then by (F1) we have ∅ = S ∩ S′ ∈ F that
contradicts (F3).
2. If a pseudoﬁlter W is a ﬁlter the required condition holds (see (F1)). Con-
versely letW be a pseudoﬁlter for which axiom (F1) holds. Axiom (F2) is equivalent
to (PF2). Axiom (F3) is a consequence of (PF1) and (PF2) (see (C2)). 
unionsq
We now consider some method for construction of pseudoﬁlters. Let J be an
arbitrary set and B a family of its subsets. We denote by M (B) the family of all
oversets for sets belonging to B:
M (B) = {T ⊆ J : (∃S ∈ B)S ⊆ T } .
Deﬁnition 4. Let W be a pseudoﬁlter over J and B a non empty family of some
sets belonging to W i.e. B ⊆ W . We say that B forms a base of the pseudoﬁlter W
if M (B) = W .
Remark that any pseudoﬁlterW has a base (for example B = W ) and psedoﬁlter
is well deﬁned by any its base. A base B0 is called the smallest base of pseudoﬁlter
W , if B0 ⊆ B for any base B. In the case the set J is ﬁnite, each pseudoﬁlter W
has the smallest base consisting of all minimal (under inclusion) subsets of W .
Lemma 4. Let J be an arbitrary set and B some family of its subsets. Then
1. B forms a base of some pseudoﬁlter over J if and only if the following condition
holds
S ∈ B, T ∈ B ⇒ S ∩ T = ∅; (13)
2. B forms the smallest base of some pseudoﬁlter over J if and only if the condition
(13) and the following condition
S ∈ B, T ∈ B,S ⊆ T ⇒ S = T (14)
holds.
Proof (of lemma 4). 1. Let B be a base of some pseudoﬁlter. Because (13) holds in
each pseudoﬁlter (see (C3)) it holds for any its subset. Conversely, let B be some
family of subsets of J for which (13) holds. Put W = M (B) and show that W is
a pseudoﬁlter. Axioms (PF1) and (PF2) are evident. Check (PF3). Fix T ∈ W ,
i.e. T ⊇ S where S ∈ B. Suppose T ′ ∈ W i.e. T ′ ⊇ S1 for some S1 ∈ B. Then
S ∩ S1 ⊆ T ∩ T ′ = ∅ hence S ∩ S1 = ∅ that is contradiction with (13). Thus W is
pseudoﬁlter and B is its base.
2.The necessity of condition (13) have shown above. To prove (14) remark that
the smallest base of pseudoﬁlter W consists of all minimal subsets of W hence the
condition (14) for smallest base holds. Let us prove suﬃciency. Put W = M (B).
It is shown that W is pseudoﬁlter and B is its base. We need to prove that B is
the set of all minimal subsets of W . Indeed, ﬁx S0 ∈ B. Assume for T ∈ W the
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inclusion T ⊆ S0 holds. We need to check the equality T = S0. By deﬁnition of
mapping M (B) we have T ⊇ S for some S ∈ B. Then S ⊆ T ⊆ S0 hence S ⊆ S0
and by (14) S = S0. Thus T ⊇ S0 and because the inclusion T ⊆ S0 also holds we
obtain the equality T = S0.
It remains to prove that each minimal subset of W belongs to B. Indeed let
subset T1 ∈ W be a minimal in W . We have T1 ⊇ S1 where S1 ∈ B. The strict
inclusion T1 ⊃ S1 is impossible and we obtain T1 = S1 ∈ B. 
unionsq
4. Rules for preferences based on pseudoﬁlters of winning coalitions
Consider the class K of models G = 〈A, (qj)j∈J 〉 of the form (1). Associate with
each model G ∈ K a model GQ = 〈A, (σj)j∈J 〉 where σj is a linear quasi-order on
A deﬁned by
a ≤σj a′ ⇔ qj (a) ≤j qj (a′) . (15)
It is shown above that we can consider K as a class consisting of models of the
form GQ. The aim of this section is to introduce a fairly general rule for preferences
in class K satisfying to some natural axioms. We solve this problem in the following
manner.
Deﬁnition 5. Let W be a pseudoﬁlter over J . Subsets belonging to W are called
winning coalitions of criteria (brieﬂy, winning coalitions).We now deﬁne a rule RW
for preferences in the class K which any model G ∈ K assigns a binary preference
relation RW (G) = RW (GQ) = ρW on A given by the formula:
a ρW a′ ⇔ {j ∈ J : a ≤σj a′} ∈W. (16)
The rule given by deﬁnition 5 is called a rule deﬁned by pseudoﬁlter W .
Example 2. Put W = {J} (obviously,W is a pseudoﬁlter). Then preference relation
ρW coincides with Pareto-preference.
Example 3. Fix a real number α > 1/2. Let r = αn if αn is integer and r = [αn]+1
otherwise (where n = |J |). Now put W = {S ⊆ J : |S| ≥ r} (it is easy to show that
W is a pseudoﬁlter). Then preference relation ρW coincides with rule of α–majority,
see section 1.
Remark 2. Because J ∈W for any pseudoﬁlter (see (C1), section 3), a preference
relation ρW is reﬂexive always. But axiom of transitivity for ρW need not be holds.
For example, preference relation for rule of α–majority is not transitive in general
case.
It follows from the deﬁnition 5
Corollary 3. Fix a models GQ of class K and let for some a, a′ ∈ A the condition
{j ∈ J : a <σj a′} ∈W holds. Then a <ρW a′ holds.
Proof (of corollary 3). We have T = {j ∈ J : a ≤σj a′} ⊇ {j ∈ J : a <σj a′} = S.
Since S ∈ W , by axiom (PF2) we obtain T ∈ W hence a ρW a′ holds. On the
other hand {j ∈ J : a ≥σj a′} = {j ∈ J : a <σj a′}′ = S′ /∈ W hence by deﬁnition 5
the condition a′ ρW a does not hold. Thus we obtain a <ρW a′. 
unionsq
We now state the following important result.
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Theorem 1. Any rule for preferences in class K deﬁned by a pseudoﬁlter W sat-
isﬁes axioms (A1)*–(A4)*.
Proof (of theorem 1). We need to check these axioms for rule (16).
(A1)* Consider two models GQ = 〈A, (σj)j∈J 〉 and G1Q =
〈
B, (σ1j )j∈J
〉
of class
K. Denote by RW (GQ) = ρW , RW
(
G1Q
)
= ρ1W . Suppose for elements a1, a2 ∈ A
and b1, b2 ∈ B the following equivalences
a1 ≤σj a2 ⇔ b1 ≤σ1j b2
hold for each j ∈ J . Then {j ∈ J : a1 ≤σj a2} =
{
j ∈ J : b1 ≤σ1j b2
}
hence condi-
tions
{j ∈ J : a1 ≤σj a2} ∈W and
{
j ∈ J : b1 ≤σ1j b2
}
∈W
are equivalent and by (16) conditions a1 ρW a2 and b1 ρ
1
W b2 are equivalent also.
(A2)* Consider two models GQ = 〈A, (σj)j∈J 〉 and G1Q =
〈
A, (σ1j )j∈J
〉
of class
K. Fix elements a1, a2 ∈ A and let for every j ∈ J the following implication
a1 ≤σj a2 ⇒ a1 ≤σ1j a2
holds. Then we have
S = {j ∈ J : a1 ≤σj a2} ⊆
{
j ∈ J : a1 ≤σ1j a2
}
= T.
By (16) the condition a1 ρW a2 means S ∈ W ; using the inclusion S ⊆ T and
axiom (PF2) we obtain T ∈W , that is a1 ρ1W a2.
(A3)* Consider two models GQ = 〈A, (σj)j∈J 〉 and G1Q =
〈
A, (σ1j )j∈J
〉
of class
K. Assume for elements a1, a2 ∈ A and all j ∈ J following implications
a1 ≤σj a2 ⇒ a1 <σ1j a2 (17)
hold. Then as above we obtain that a1 ρW a2 implies a1 ρ
1
W a2. On the other
hand, the condition a1 ρW a2 means that {j ∈ J : a1 ≤σj a2} ∈ W then by axiom
(PF3) U = {j ∈ J : a1 ≤σj a2}′ /∈ W .
It follows from (17) that
{
j ∈ J : a1 <σ1j a2
}′
⊆ {j ∈ J : a1 ≤σj a2}′ = U /∈ W .
Then we have
V =
{
j ∈ J : a2 ≤σ1j a1
}
=
{
j ∈ J : a1 <σ1j a2
}′
⊆ U /∈W
and by axiom (PF2) V /∈ W , i.e. the condition a2 ρ1W a1 does not hold. Thus the
assumption a1 ρW a2 implies a1 <ρ
1
W a2 which was to be proved.
(A4)* Let A be an arbitrary set. Fix two elements a1, a2 ∈ A with a1 = a2.
Consider two families of linear quasi-orders (σ′j)j∈J and (σ′′j )j∈J on A such that for
any j ∈ J conditions a1 <σ′j a2 and a2 <σ′′j a1 hold. Then we have{
j ∈ J : a1 ≤σ′j a2
}
= J ∈W and
{
j ∈ J : a1 ≤σ′′j a2
}
= ∅ /∈W.
Put ρ′W = RW
(〈
A, (σ′j)j∈J
〉)
and ρ′′W = RW
(〈
A, (σ′′j )j∈J
〉)
. According with
(16) we obtain that the condition a1 ρ
′
W a2 holds and the condition a1 ρ
′′
j a2
does not hold which completes the proof of Theorem 1. 
unionsq
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We now state the converse of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. Fix a family of scales
〈
Cj , (≤j)j∈J
〉
for measurement of quality cri-
teria. Let R be a rule for preferences which every models GQ = 〈A, (σj)j∈J 〉 of class
K assigns some reﬂexive preference relation R (GQ) = ρ on A and for R axioms
(A1)* – (A4)* hold. Then there exists a pseudoﬁlter W over J such that R = RW .
Proof (of theorem 2). Let us deﬁne a family W of winning coalitions of criteria in
the following manner. For any subset S ⊆ J , the condition S ∈ W means that there
exists a model GQ =
〈
A, (σj)j∈J
〉
of class K and elements a1, a2 ∈ A such that
a1 ρ a2 and
{
j ∈ J : a1 ≤σj a2
}
= S (18)
(we denote by ρ = R
(
GQ
)
).
Further we deﬁne a rule RW for preferences in class K and write RW (G) =
RW (GQ) = ρW by setting for anyGQ = 〈A, (σj)j∈J 〉 of classK and every a1, a2 ∈ A
a1 ρW a2 ⇔ {j ∈ J : a1 ≤σj a2} ∈W.
As the ﬁrst step, we show the equality RW = R. It suﬃces to prove that for
each model GQ = 〈A, (σj)j∈J 〉 of class K the equivalence
a1 ρ a2 ⇔ {j ∈ J : a1 ≤σj a2} ∈W. (19)
holds. In fact, the implication ⇒ in (19) is truth by deﬁnition of family W . Con-
versely, suppose the right part of (19) holds. Then there exists a model GQ =〈
A, (σj)j∈J
〉
of class K and elements a1, a2 ∈ A such that
a1 ρ a2 and
{
j ∈ J : a1 ≤σj a2
}
= {j ∈ J : a1 ≤σj a2} .
Then conditions a1 ≤σj a2 and a1 ≤σj a2 are equivalent for any j ∈ J ; by axiom
(A1)* the propositions a1 ρ a2 and a1 ρ
1
a2 are equivalent also and because
a1 ρ a2 is truth we obtain that a1 ρ a2 is truth.
It remains to be shown that W is a pseudoﬁlter. Check axioms (PF1)–(PF3).
(PF1) Let A be an arbitrary set with |A| ≥ 2. Fix two elements a1, a2 ∈ A.
For any j ∈ J let σj be a linear quasi-order on A with a1 ≤σj a2. Then con-
dition (a1, a2) ∈
⋂
j∈J
σj holds and using Corollary 2 we obtain a1 ρ a2; since
{j ∈ J : a1 ≤σj a2} = J then by (18) J ∈W , i.e. W = ∅.
(PF2) Suppose S ∈ W and T ⊇ S. We need to prove T ∈ W . In fact, by (18)
there exists a model GQ = 〈A, (σj)j∈J 〉 of class K and elements a1, a2 ∈ A such
that a1 ρ a2 and {j ∈ J : a1 ≤σj a2} = S. Consider a family of linear quasi-orders(
σ1j
)
j∈J on A deﬁned as follows. For j ∈ T ∩ S′, the quasi-order σ1j the condition
a1 ≤σ1j a2 satisﬁes and σ1j = σj for other j ∈ J . Then{
j ∈ J : a1 ≤σ1j a2
}
= (T ∩ S′) ∪ S = T. (20)
Let us show the following implication
a1 ≤σj a2 ⇒ a1 ≤σ1j a2. (21)
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Indeed, for j ∈ T ∩ S′ the implication (21) holds since its consequence is truth;
in other cases the condition and the consequence of (21) are equivalent. Denote by
G1Q =
〈
A, (σ1j )j∈J
〉
, R (GQ) = ρ,R
(
G1Q
)
= ρ1. Since a1 ρ a2 then by axiom (A2)*
and (21) we have a1 ρ
1
a2; using (20) and (18) we obtain T ∈ W .
(PF3) Suppose S ∈ W i.e. there exists a model GQ = 〈A, (σj)j∈J 〉 of class
K and elements a1, a2 ∈ A such that a1 ρ a2 and {j ∈ J : a1 ≤σj a2} = S. As-
sume S′ ∈ W . Consider a family (σ1j )j∈J of linear quasi-orders on A satisfying{
j ∈ J : a1 <σ1j a2
}
= S. Then for any j ∈ J the implication
a1 ≤σj a2 ⇒ a1 <σ1j a2. (22)
is truth. Put G1Q =
〈
A, (σ1j )j∈J
〉
, R (GQ) = ρ,R
(
G1Q
)
= ρ1. Using (22) and the
condition a1 ρ a2 we obtain by axiom (A3)* the condition a1 <ρ
1
a2. On the other
hand, since {
j ∈ J : a2 ≤σ1j a1
}
=
{
j ∈ J : a1 <σ1j a2
}′
= S′ ∈ W
we have a2 ρ
1
W a1; because RW = R we obtain a2 ρ
1
a1 in contradiction with
condition a1 <ρ
1
a2 proved above. 
unionsq
To conclude this section we consider a construction of rules for preferences based
on ﬁlters of winning coalition.
Theorem 3. Let RW be a rule for preferences in class K which based on pseudoﬁl-
ter W . Then for every model GQ = 〈A, (σj)j∈J 〉 of class K the preference relation
ρW = RW (GQ) is transitive if and only if the pseudoﬁlter W is a ﬁlter.
Proof (of theorem 3). Necessity. Suppose W is not a ﬁlter then by Lemma 3 there
exist subsets S, T ∈ W such that S ∩ T /∈ W . Put A = {a1, a2, a3} and for every
j ∈ J let us deﬁne a linear order relation σj as follows:
a3 <
σj a1 <
σj a2 for all j ∈ S ∩ T ′;
a1 <
σj a2 <
σj a3 for all j ∈ S ∩ T ;
a2 <
σj a3 <
σj a1 for all j ∈ T ∩ S′;
a3 <
σj a1 for all j ∈ J ∩ (S ∪ T )′ .
Then we have
{j ∈ J : a1 ≤σj a2} ⊇ (S ∩ T ′) ∪ (S ∩ T ) = S ∈ W ;
{j ∈ J : a2 ≤σj a3} ⊇ (S ∩ T ) ∪ (T ∩ S′) = T ∈W ;
{j ∈ J : a1 ≤σj a3} = S ∩ T /∈ W.
(23)
According with Deﬁnition 5 and using (23) and axiom (PF2) we obtain a1 ρW a2,
a2 ρW a3 but the condition a1 ρW a3 does not hold.
Suﬃciency. Let GQ = 〈A, (σj)j∈J 〉 be any model of class K. Put RW (GW ) =
ρW . Suppose a1 ρW a2, a2 ρW a3. Then by deﬁnition 5 we have {j ∈ J : a1 ≤σj a2} =
S ∈ W , {j ∈ J : a2 ≤σj a3} = T ∈ W hence by axiom (F2) S ∩ T ∈ W . Obviously,
S ∩ T ⊆ {j ∈ J : a1 ≤σj a3} and by axiom (F2) we obtain {j ∈ J : a1 ≤σj a3} ∈W ,
i.e. a1 ρW a3 which was to be proved. 
unionsq
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We now consider the condition of linearity of preference relations. It connects
with condition of maximality for ﬁlters. Recall that a ﬁlter W over J is a maximal
one (or ultraﬁlter) if it satisﬁes the condition
either S ∈W or S′ ∈ W for every S ⊆ J. (24)
Theorem 4. Let RW be a rule for preferences in class K which based on pseudoﬁl-
ter W . Then for every model GQ = 〈A, (σj)j∈J 〉 of class K the preference relation
ρW = RW (GQ) is linear if and only if the pseudoﬁlter W the condition (24) satis-
ﬁes.
Proof (of theorem 4). Necessity. Assume (24) does not hold for pseudoﬁlter W then
there exists a subset S ⊆ J such that S /∈ W and S′ /∈ W . Consider a model
GQ = 〈A, (σj)j∈J 〉 of class K where A = {a1, a2} and linear quasi-orders (σj)j∈J
the following conditions satisfy:
a1 <
σj a2 for each j ∈ S;
a2 <
σj a1 for each j ∈ S′.
Then {j ∈ J : a1 ≤σj a2} = S /∈W and {j ∈ J : a2 ≤σj a1} = S′ /∈ W . Hence by
deﬁnition5 both conditions a1 ρW a2 and a2 ρW a1 are false, i.e. the preference
relation ρW is not linear.
Suﬃciency. Let GQ = 〈A, (σj)j∈J 〉 be an arbitrary model of class K. Put
RW (GQ) = ρW . Fix two elements a1, a2 ∈ A and suppose the condition a1 ρW a2
does not hold, i.e. {j ∈ J : a1 ≤σj a2} /∈ W . Then by assumption of Theorem 4
{j ∈ J : a1 ≤σj a2}′ ∈ W , i.e. {j ∈ J : a2 <σj a1} ∈ W ; since {j ∈ J : a2 <σj a1} ⊆
{j ∈ J : a2 ≤σj a1} by axiom (PF2) we obtain {j ∈ J : a2 ≤σj a1} ∈ W , that is
a2 ρW a1. Thus the relation ρW is linear. 
unionsq
It follows from Theorem 3 and Theorem 4
Corollary 4. Let RW be a rule for preferences in class K which based on pseudoﬁl-
ter W . Then for every model GQ = 〈A, (σj)j∈J 〉 of class K the preference relation
ρW = RW (GQ) is a linear quasi-order if and only if the pseudoﬁlter W is an
ultraﬁlter.
It follows from results of this section an interpretation of Arrow paradox in terms
of ﬁlters. In fact, any rule for preferences in class models K which leads to linear
quasi-order can be given by some ultraﬁlter. Since the set of criteria J is ﬁnite, every
ﬁlter W over J is a principal one and a principal ultraﬁlter consists of all subsets
which contain some ﬁx element j∗ ∈ J ; namely this element j∗ is called a dictator
in terms of Arroy.
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Abstract Cooperative games with coalition structures are considered and
the principle of coalition structure stability with respect to cooperative so-
lution concepts is determined. This principle is close to the concept of Nash
equilibrium. The existence of a stable coalition structure with respect to the
Shapley value and the equal surplus division value for the cases of two- and
three-person games is proved. We also consider a speciﬁc model of cooper-
ative cost-saving game among banks as an application. In the model, the
characteristic function assigning the cost-saving game has a special form.
For the model the software product is developed and illustrative examples
are provided.
Keywords: coalition structure, stability, Shapley value, equal surplus divi-
sion value
1. Introduction
Many conﬂict problems which allow cooperation among players can be modeled
with the help of cooperative TU-games. The basic idea of cooperation is that if
all players form the unique grand coalition, they immediately start to behave in
the interests of this coalition, i. e. try to maximize the grand coalition payoﬀ. The
next step of cooperative game theory is to ﬁnd a proper allocation of the achieved
payoﬀ using a priori chosen solution concept. Some of the most commonly known
single-valued solution concepts in practice are the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953), the
equal surplus division value or the ES-value (Driessen and Funaki, 1991) and the
nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969). If we do not take into account axiomatic properties of
the solution concepts and do not compare them, the ﬁrst two solution concepts have
some advantage over the nucleolus: they have explicit formulas which signiﬁcantly
simplify computations.
If we allow cooperation among players in the game, it is naturally to suggest
that not only grand coalition but smaller ones should be formed. It is a common
situation in politics because of the diﬃculty of joining all politicians together and,
moreover, forcing them to behave in the interests of the unique grand coalition. To
describe the model more particulary with these assumptions, we use the theory of
games with coalition structure.
In games with coalition structure one coalition might be more preferable for a
player than others. That is why it is reasonable to ﬁnd a coalition structure in which
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each player does not have any beneﬁt deviating from his coalition. We call this coali-
tion structure stable. The general idea of stability is based on comparing players’
payoﬀs but not coalition payoﬀs. Some ideas of stability concepts of coalition struc-
tures are introduced in (Haeringer, 2001; Tiebout, 1956; Hart and Kurz, 1983). The
stable coalition structure must satisfy three basic assumptions proposed in (Car-
raro, 1997). More speciﬁcally, it must be (i) internally stable, i. e. each player
looses if he leaves his coalition becoming a singleton, (ii) externally stable, i. e.
each player-singleton looses if he joins any coalition or another singleton, and, ﬁ-
nally, (iii) intracoalitionally stable, i. e. each player from a coalition looses if he
leaves his coalition and joins another one. Here we may ﬁnd some similarities with
the Nash equilibrium concept. There exist papers in which the stability of a coali-
tion structure is investigated in a strategic way assuming that coalitions play the
Nash equilibrium, and then payoﬀ of each coalition is allocated by the Shapley
value (Petrosyan and Mamkina, 2006). In the present paper we follow the idea of
Aumann and Dreze (Aumann and Dreze, 1974) supposing that the characteristic
(value) function is given. We consider the Shapley value as well as the equal sur-
plus division value (the ES-value) as solution concepts and examine the stability of
coalition structures with respect to these two solution concepts.
The paper has the following structure. In Section 2. the setting of the game with
coalition structure is considered. Single-valued solution concepts like the Shapley
value and the ES-value are provided. The deﬁnition of the stable coalition structure
with respect to the single-valued solution concept is introduced. In Section 3. it is
proved that for at least two and three-person games there always exists at least
one stable coalition structure in terms of the stability concept. In Section 4. a
speciﬁc model of bank cooperation is proposed. In this setting a cost-saving game
with the characteristic function of a special form is constructed. With the help of
a developed software product for the speciﬁc model, one can easily extract stable
coalition structures with respect to the Shapley value and the ES-value. Section 4.
also contains the description and screenshots of the product.
2. Game with coalition structure
2.1. Deﬁnitions
In a classical setting, a cooperative game is determined by a tuple (N, v) where N
is a set of players and v : 2N → R is a characteristic function deﬁned for every
nonempty set S ⊂ N called coalition. In this setting one may suggest that grand
coalition N should be formed and then players from N allocate their total payoﬀ
v(N) according to some solution concept. Unlike classic assumption (Owen, 1995),
we suppose that the characteristic function might not be supperadditive, i. e. there
exist at least two disjoint coalitions S, T ⊂ N such as v(S ∪ T ) < v(S) + v(T ).
Therefore, in general not only the grand coalition but smaller ones can be formed.
It can take place when some players get larger payoﬀ if they form a smaller coalition.
Therefore, we allow formation of not only grand coalition, and consider games with
coalition structure.
Deﬁnition 1. Coalition structure π is a partition {B1, . . . , Bm} of the set N , i. e.
B1 ∪ . . . ∪Bm = N , and Bi ∩Bj = ∅ for all i, j = 1, . . . ,m, i = j.
Denote a game with player set N , characteristic function v and coalition struc-
ture π by (N, v, π).
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Deﬁnition 2. A proﬁle xπ = (xπ1 , . . . , xπn) ∈ Rn is a payoﬀ distribution in the game
(N, v, π) with coalition structure π if the eﬃciency condition, i. e.
∑
i∈Bj x
π
i = v(Bj)
holds for all coalitions Bj ∈ π, j = 1, . . . ,m.
Deﬁnition 3. A payoﬀ distribution xπ is an allocation in the game (N, v, π) with
coalition structure π if the individual rationality condition, i. e. xπi ≥ v({i}) holds
for any player i ∈ N .
Denote the coalition partition π−Bi = π \ Bi ⊂ π by π−Bi , and the coalition
which contains player i ∈ N by B(i) ∈ π.
In the game (N, v, π) with coalition structure π = {B1, . . . , Bm} we can choose
any cooperative solution concept from the classical cooperative game theory for
payoﬀ distribution calculation. If we choose the Shapley value φπ = (φπ1 , . . . , φπn),
its components are calculated as follows:
φπi =
∑
S⊆B(i),i∈S
(|B(i)| − |S|)!(|S| − 1)!
|B(i)|! [v(S)− v(S \ {i})] (1)
for any i ∈ N . As an alternative solution concept, we use the ES-value:
ψπi = v({i}) +
v(B(i)) − ∑
j∈B(i)
v({j})
|B(i)| (2)
for any i ∈ N .
2.2. Stable coalition structures
The determination of stable coalition structures is an actual problem. Here we use an
approach which takes into account the player’s payoﬀ as a member of his coalition.
Therefore, the player compares his payoﬀ according to the current coalition structure
with the payoﬀs that he can obtain if he deviates from his coalition and other
players do not deviate. So, he can change coalition structure becoming a singleton
or joining another coalition from the current coalition structure. And if any player
cannot increase his payoﬀ by the way describing above, the coalition structure is
stable. Deﬁne this principle as follows:
Deﬁnition 4. Coalition structure π = {B1, . . . , Bm} is said to be stable with re-
spect to a single-valued cooperative solution concept if for any player i ∈ N the
inequality
xπi ≥ xπ
′
i holds for all Bj ∈ π ∪ ∅, Bj = B(i).
Here xπ and xπ
′
are two payoﬀ distributions calculated according to the chosen
cooperative solution concept for games (N, v, π) and (N, v, π′) with coalition struc-
tures π, π′ respectively, where π′ = {B(i) \ {i}, Bj ∪ {i}, π−B(i)∪Bj}.
The stability concept from Deﬁnition 4 is similar to the Nash equilibrium concept.
Consider stable coalition structure π and calculate player i’s payoﬀ according to
the some cooperative solution concept like the Shapley value. Now imagine that
player i has the following set of strategies: to stay in a current coalition, to become
a singleton or to join any other existing coalition in the coalition structure. If each
player compares his payoﬀ xπi , i ∈ N with all the possible payoﬀs that he can obtain
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using one of the above mentioned strategies (when all other players do not deviate)
and ﬁnds out that he cannot get larger payoﬀ, then the current players’ strategies
form the Nash equilibrium. In other words, the current coalition structure is stable
with respect to the chosen cooperative solution concept.
As single-valued cooperative solution concepts we can consider concepts as the
Shapley value (Shapley, 1953), nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969), the equal surplus di-
vision value (Driessen and Funaki, 1991).
In Deﬁnition 4 we make the following assumption which seems to be natural. If
player i ∈ B(i) leaves coalition B(i), coalition B(i) \ {i} does not break, and is still
the part of a new coalition structure, so player i can join any existing coalition in
the current coalition structure without any restrictions or become a singleton.
3. Existence of stable coalition structures
3.1. Transformation of characteristic function
Assume that coalition structure π is stable with respect to a single-valued solution
concept and xπ = (xπ1 , . . . , xπn) is the allocation calculated according to this solution
concept.
Construct new characteristic function u(·) by a transformation of the function
v(·) as follows:
u(S) = v(S) +
∑
i∈S
ci, S ⊆ N,
and setting u({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N , constants ci can be deﬁned below. From the
equation u({i}) = v({i}) + ci conclude that ci = −v({i}), for all i ∈ N . Therefore,
u(S) = v(S)−
∑
i∈S
v({i}), S ⊆ N (3)
Following (Petrosyan and Zenkevich, 1996), there is a mapping that each pair
(v(·), xπ) corresponds to a pair (u(·), yπ), where components of allocation yπ are
deﬁned by
yπi = x
π
i − v({i}), i ∈ N (4)
and function u(·) is deﬁned by (3).
Lemma 1. If in game (N, v, π) coalition structure π = {B1, . . . , Bm} is stable with
respect to a single-valued solution concept with allocation xπ, then in game (N, u, π)
coalition structure π is also stable with respect to the same solution concept with an
allocation yπ and vice versa. Here u(·) and yπ are deﬁned by equations (3) and (4)
respectively.
Proof. If π is stable with respect to a single-valued solution concept with an allo-
cation xπ , then xπi ≥ xπ
′
i for all Bj ∈ π ∪ ∅, Bj = B(i). Here xπ and xπ
′
are two
allocations calculated according to the same solution concept for games (N, v, π)
and (N, v, π′) respectively, and π′ = {B(i) \ {i}, Bj ∪{i}, π−B(i)∪Bj}. Using (4) the
stability condition can be rewritten as:
yπi + v({i}) ≥ yπ
′
i + v({i}) or yπi ≥ yπ
′
.
Here yπ and yπ
′
are two allocations calculated according to the same solution con-
cept for games (N, u, π) and (N, u, π′) respectively. It means that coalition structure
π is also stable in modiﬁed game (N, u, π).
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On the other hand, if π is stable with respect to a solution concept with allocation
yπ in modiﬁed game (N, u, π), then yπi ≥ yπ
′
i for all Bj ∈ π ∪ ∅, Bj = B(i). Here
yπ and yπ
′
are two allocations calculated according to the solution concept for
games (N, u, π) and (N, u, π′) respectively. Using (4) the stability condition can be
rewritten as:
xπi − v({i}) ≥ xπ
′
i − v({i}) or xπi ≥ xπ
′
.
Here xπ and xπ
′
are two allocations calculated according to the same solution con-
cept for games (N, v, π) and (N, v, π′) respectively. We obtain that coalition struc-
ture π is also stable in game (N, v, π).
These both facts prove the lemma. 
unionsq
3.2. Stable coalition structures in two-person games
Following Lemma 1 it is suﬃcient to consider two-person cooperative games with
characteristic function determined by the following way: v({1, 2}) = c and v({1}) =
v({2}) = 0.
In the case of the two-person game there are two possible coalition structures:
π1 = {{1, 2}}, π2 = {{1}, {2}}. It is obvious that the Shapley value and the ES-value
coincide and are calculated by formulas:
φπ11 = φ
π1
2 = ψ
π1
1 = ψ
π1
2 = c/2,
φπ21 = φ
π2
2 = ψ
π2
1 = ψ
π2
2 = 0.
Proposition 1. In the game (N, v, π) where N = {1, 2} there always exists stable
coalition structure with respect to the Shapley value and the ES-value.
Proof. It is obvious that if c < 0, then coalition structure π2 is stable with respect
to the Shapley value and the ES-value. If c > 0, then coalition structure π1 is stable
with respect to the Shapley value and the ES-value. And, ﬁnally, if c = 0, both
coalition structures π1 and π2 are stable with respect to the Shapley value and the
ES-value. 
unionsq
3.3. Stable coalition structures with respect to the Shapley value in
three-person games
Following Lemma 1, in case of three-person game it is suﬃcient to consider charac-
teristic function v(·) deﬁned like this: v({1, 2, 3}) = c, v({1, 2}) = c3, v({1, 3}) = c2,
v({2, 3}) = c1, v({1}) = v({2}) = v({3}) = 0. The Shapley values calculated for all
possible coalition structures are represented in Table 1.
Table 1: The Shapley value for a three-person coalition game
π φπ1 φ
π
2 φ
π
3
{{1, 2, 3}} (2c− 2c1 + c2 + c3)/6 (2c− 2c2 + c1 + c3)/6 (2c− 2c3 + c1 + c2)/6
{{1, 2}, {3}} c3/2 c3/2 0
{{1, 3}, {2}} c2/2 0 c2/2
{{1}, {2, 3}} 0 c1/2 c1/2
{{1}, {2}, {3}} 0 0 0
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Table 2: The "Stable if" conditions
π "Stable if" condition
π1 = {{1, 2, 3}}
⎛
⎝ 2 −1 −1−1 2 −1
−1 −1 2
⎞
⎠
⎛
⎝ c1c2
c3
⎞
⎠ ≤
⎛
⎝ 2c2c
2c
⎞
⎠
π2 = {{1, 2}, {3}}
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
0 0 −1
0 1 −1
1 0 −1
1 1 −2
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
⎛
⎝ c1c2
c3
⎞
⎠ ≤
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
0
0
0
−2c
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
π3 = {{1, 3}, {2}}
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
0 −1 0
1 −1 0
0 −1 1
1 −2 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
⎛
⎝ c1c2
c3
⎞
⎠ ≤
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
0
0
0
−2c
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
π4 = {{1}, {2, 3}}
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
−1 0 0
−1 1 0
−1 0 1
−2 1 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
⎛
⎝ c1c2
c3
⎞
⎠ ≤
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
0
0
0
−2c
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
π5 = {{1}, {2}, {3}}
⎛
⎝ c1c2
c3
⎞
⎠ ≤
⎛
⎝ 00
0
⎞
⎠
Notice that if ci ≤ 0, i = 1, 2, 3, then coalition structure {{1}, {2}, {3}} is stable
with respect to the Shapley value for any c.
Consider the case when c1, c2, c3 ≥ 0 and c ≥ 0. Obviously, coalition structure
π5 is not stable with respect to the Shapley value. Using Table 2 and Fig. 1, we
can observe that solutions of the ﬁrst four systems of inequalities cover the ﬁrst
octant. Here assuming that c ≥ 0, region I is the set {c1 ≥ 0, c2 ≥ 0, c3 ≥ 0} where
coalition structure π1 is stable with respect to the Shapley value; region II is the
set {c1 ≥ 0, c2 ≥ 0, c3 ≥ 0} where coalition structure π2 is stable with respect to
the Shapley value; region III is the set {c1 ≥ 0, c2 ≥ 0, c3 ≥ 0} where coalition
structure π3 is stable with respect to the Shapley value, and, ﬁnally, region IV is
the set {c1 ≥ 0, c2 ≥ 0, c3 ≥ 0} where coalition structure π4 is stable with respect
to the Shapley value.
Now consider the case when c1, c2, c3 ≥ 0 and c < 0. In this case, additionally, the
coalition structure π1 is always unstable. Using the analysis similar to the analysis
in the previous case and Fig. 2, we can see that solutions of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th
systems of inequalities from Table 2 cover the ﬁrst octant. Here assuming that
c < 0, region II is the set {c1 ≥ 0, c2 ≥ 0, c3 ≥ 0} s. t. coalition structure π2 is
stable with respect to the Shapley value; region III is the set {c1 ≥ 0, c2 ≥ 0, c3 ≥ 0}
s. t. coalition structure π3 is stable with respect to the Shapley value; and, ﬁnally,
region IV is the set {c1 ≥ 0, c2 ≥ 0, c3 ≥ 0} s. t. coalition structure π4 is stable
with respect to the Shapley value.
When c1 < 0, c2, c3 ≥ 0, and c ≥ 0 using Fig. 3 we conclude that systems of
inequalities from Table 2 also cover the octant. Obviously, coalition structures π4
and π5 are always unstable with respect to the Shapley value. Here region I is the
set {c1 < 0, c2 ≥ 0, c3 ≥ 0}, and c ≥ 0 s. t. the coalition structure π1 is stable with
respect to the Shapley value; II is the set {c1 < 0, c2 ≥ 0, c3 ≥ 0}, and c ≥ 0 s. t.
coalition structure π2 is stable with respect to the Shapley value; region III is the
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Fig. 1: Case when c1, c2, c3 ≥ 0 and c ≥ 0
Fig. 2: Case when c1, c2, c3 ≥ 0 and c < 0
set {c1 < 0, c2 ≥ 0, c3 ≥ 0}, and c ≥ 0 s. t. coalition structure π3 is stable with
respect to the Shapley value.
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Fig. 3: c1 < 0, c2, c3 ≥ 0, and c ≥ 0
When c1 < 0, c2, c3 ≥ 0, and c < 0 using Fig. 4 we conclude that systems
of inequalities from Table 2 also cover the octant. Obviously, in this case coalition
structures π1, π4 and π5 are always unstable with respect to the Shapley value. Here
Fig. 4: c1 < 0, c2, c3 ≥ 0, and c < 0
region II is the set {c1 < 0, c2 ≥ 0, c3 ≥ 0}, and c < 0 s. t. coalition structure π2 is
stable with respect to the Shapley value; region III is the set {c1 < 0, c2 ≥ 0, c3 ≥ 0},
and c < 0 s. t. the coalition structure π3 is stable with respect to the Shapley value.
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When c1, c2 < 0, c3 ≥ 0, and c ≥ 0 using Fig. 5 we conclude that systems of
inequalities from Table 2 also cover the octant. Obviously, in this case coalition
structures π3, π4 and π5 are always unstable with respect to the Shapley value.
Fig. 5: c1, c2 < 0, c3 ≥ 0, and c ≥ 0
Fig. 6: c1, c2 < 0, c3 ≥ 0, and c < 0
Here region I is the set {c1 < 0, c2 < 0, c3 ≥ 0}, and c ≥ 0 s. t. the coalition
structure π1 is stable with respect to the Shapley value; II is the set {c1 < 0, c2 <
416 Artem Sedakov, Elena Parilina, Yury Volobuev, Daria Klimuk
0, c3 ≥ 0}, and c ≥ 0 s. t. the coalition structure π2 is stable with respect to the
Shapley value.
When c1, c2 < 0, c3 ≥ 0, and c < 0 using Fig. 6 we conclude that systems of
inequalities from Table 2 and also cover the octant. Here region II, i. e. the set
{c1 < 0, c2 < 0, c3 ≥ 0}, and c < 0 covers the octant, and coalition structure π2 is
unique stable with respect to the Shapley value.
For brevity, we omit the cases with another possible values of c1, c2, c3 and c.
The analysis for another cases is very similar to the one described above. In any
possible cases the systems of inequalities from Table 2 cover an octant and it can be
divided into the regions where always exists at least one stable coalition structure.
The case when more than one stable coalition structures exist is also possible. For
example, consider the case c1, c2, c3 ≥ 0 and c ≥ 0. If we add the condition c1 = c3,
then from Fig. 1 the set {c1 ≥ 0, c2 ≥ 0, c3 ≥ 0, c1 = c3}, and c ≥ 0 represents
the region where both coalition structures π2 and π4 are stable with respect to the
Shapley value. This region corresponds to the border between regions II and IV.
Therefore, the previous analysis proves the following proposition.
Proposition 2. In three-person coalition game (N, v, π) there always exists a stable
coalition structure with respect to the Shapley value.
3.4. Stable coalition structures with respect to the ES-value in
three-person games
Table 3 contains the components of the ES-values calculated for all possible coalition
structures. We can notice that if c ≥ 0 coalition structure π1 is stable. And if ci < 0,
i = 1, 2, 3, then coalition structure π5 is stable with respect to the ES-value.
Table 3: The ES-value for a three-person coalition game and "Stable if" conditions
π ψπ1 ψ
π
2 ψ
π
3 "Stable if" condition
π1 = {{1, 2, 3}} c/3 c/3 c/3 c ≥ 0
π2 = {{1, 2}, {3}} c3/2 c3/2 0
{
c3 ≥ max{0, c1, c2}
c ≤ 0
π3 = {{1, 3}, {2}} c2/2 0 c2/2
{
c2 ≥ max{0, c1, c3}
c ≤ 0
π4 = {{1}, {2, 3}} 0 c1/2 c1/2
{
c1 ≥ max{0, c2, c3}
c ≤ 0
π5 = {{1}, {2}, {3}} 0 0 0
⎛
⎝ c1c2
c3
⎞
⎠ ≤
⎛
⎝ 00
0
⎞
⎠
Consider the case when c < 0 and ci ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, 3. Using Table 3, stability
of coalition structures π2, π3 and π4 can be proved when c3 ≥ max{c1, c2}, c2 ≥
max{c1, c3} and c1 ≥ max{c2, c3} respectively. All these three inequalities cover the
ﬁrst octant, and the graphic solution is the same as in Fig. 2. In this case region
II is the set {c1 ≥ 0, c2 ≥ 0, c3 ≥ 0} s. t. coalition structure π2 is stable with
respect to the ES-value; region III is the set {c1 ≥ 0, c2 ≥ 0, c3 ≥ 0} s. t. coalition
structure π3 is stable with respect to the ES-value; and, ﬁnally, region IV is the
set {c1 ≥ 0, c2 ≥ 0, c3 ≥ 0} s. t. coalition structure π4 is stable with respect to the
ES-value.
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When c1 < 0, c2, c3 ≥ 0 from Table 3 we conclude that we have the same graphic
solution as in Fig. 4 and systems of inequalities also cover the octant. Here region
II is the set {c1 < 0, c2 ≥ 0, c3 ≥ 0}, and c < 0 s. t. coalition structure π2 is stable
with respect to the ES-value; III is the set {c1 < 0, c2 ≥ 0, c3 ≥ 0}, and c < 0 s. t.
the coalition structure π3 is stable with respect to the ES-value.
And, ﬁnally, when c1, c2 < 0, c3 ≥ 0 from Table 3 we conclude that we have the
same graphic solution as in Fig. 6 and systems of inequalities also cover the octant.
Here region II is the set {c1 < 0, c2 < 0, c3 ≥ 0}, and c < 0 s. t. coalition structure
π2 is the unique stable with respect to the ES-value.
For brevity, in case of the ES-value we also omit the cases with another possible
values of c1, c2, c3 and c. The analysis for another cases is very similar to the one
described above. In any possible case the systems of inequalities from Table 3 cover
an octant and it can be divided into the regions where always exists at least one
stable coalition structure.
Proposition 3. In three-person coalition game (N, v, π) there always exists at least
one stable coalition structure with respect to the ES-value.
4. One speciﬁc model of bank cooperation
4.1. Problem statement
In this section we consider a model of bank cooperation for cost reduction. Let N =
{1, . . . , n} be a set of banks which operate in a region, and banks from A ⊆ N have
ATMs in the region. Here we consider the simple case when banks are supposed to be
focused on the cost reduction of cash withdrawal using ATMs (Bjorndal et al., 2004;
Parilina, 2007; Parilina and Sedakov, 2012).
For bank i ∈ N , let ni > 0 be a number of transactions, ki > 0 be a number of
ATMs owned by bank i ∈ A and kj = 0 for j ∈ N \ A. These parameters may be
diﬀerent for all banks, while three other parameters 0 < α < β < γ are the same.
Here α is bank transaction costs for a single cash withdrawal using his ATMs, β
is bank transaction costs for a single cash withdrawal using the ATMs of another
bank if both banks have an agreement allowing their clients to withdraw cash from
their ATMs without any additional fees. Finally, bank transaction costs are equal
to γ in any other cases.
There are two additional assumptions: (i) if a bank has ATMs, clients use only
them for cash withdrawal and (ii) if two or more banks consolidate their ATMs in
one network, clients choose ATMs for cash withdrawal from the network with equal
probabilities.
Taking into account the notations and assumptions, one can calculate trans-
action costs of coalition S ⊆ N if all its members consolidate their ATMs in one
network:
c(S) =
⎧⎨⎩α
∑
i∈S
ki
k(S)
ni + β
∑
i∈S
(
1− ki
k(S)
)
ni, if S ∩ A = ∅,
γn(S), if S ∩ A = ∅.
(5)
Here n(S) =
∑
i∈S ni, and k(S) =
∑
i∈S ki.
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Using the expression (5) for costs of coalition S we can deﬁne a characteristic
function for the cost-saving game:
v(S) =
∑
i∈S
c({i})− c(S) = (6)
=
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩(γ − β)
∑
i∈S\A
ni − (β − α)
∑
i∈S∩A
(
1− ki
k(S)
)
ni, if S ∩ A = ∅,
0, if S ∩ A = ∅.
Value v(S), the worth of coalition S ⊆ N , represents the costs that coalition S
saves if all members of S consolidate their ATMs in one network. Therefore, it is
interesting to ﬁnd stable coalition structures with respect to the Shapley value and
the ES-value for this speciﬁed characteristic function.
Notice that for v(·) deﬁned by (6), v({i}) = 0, i. e. any single bank saves nothing
by itself. Moreover, the ES-value calculated for a coalition structure π coincides with
the equal division value (the ED-value):
ψπi =
v(B(i))
|B(i)| , for all i ∈ N and B(i) ∈ π. (7)
4.2. Program realization
To simplify numerical calculations, for the speciﬁc model of bank cooperation a
software product is developed using C#. In particular, it allows to ﬁnd all possible
coalition structures for a given set of players, calculate payoﬀ distributions according
to the Shapley value or the ES-value and check coalition structures for stability with
respect to the payoﬀ distribution rule.
One of the complicated components of the source code is an algorithm for ﬁnding
coalition structures. It is known that number of diﬀerent coalition structures B(n)
for n players is the n-th Bell number recursively calculated according to the formula:
B(n) =∑n−1k=0 Ckn−1B(k) s. t. B(0) = 1, and the value B(n) increases extremely fast
as n increases. So if B(3) = 5, B(4) = 15, B(5) = 52, the number B(15) exceeds one
billion.
Fig. 7: List of coalition structures for three players
In Fig. 7 there is a screenshot with the number of coalition structures, searching
time and a list of all coalition structures for three players. More details regarding
to the speciﬁed model are presented in the numerical example below.
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A recursive algorithm for ﬁnding coalition structures is realized in the source
code. Knowing coalition structures for one and two players, all coalition structures
for three players are found by combining diﬀerent coalition structures containing
one or two players and the structure where all three players belong to the same
coalition. More generally, the problem of ﬁnding coalition structures for n players
can be solved only if the same problem is solved for any number of players less
than n. However, recursion is a recourse-costly mechanics. Therefore, the search of
coalition structures may require more time if the number of players is large enough.
Implementation of the software product is represented by the following algo-
rithm.
# Algorithm for finding coalition structures
Step 1.1. Initialize N;
Step 1.2. Find n = |N |;
Step 1.3. If n = 0 return empty set;
Step 1.4. If n = 1 return a player;
Step 1.5. If n > 1 find all coalition structures of a form
{{S}, {π−S}}. Here S is a coalition which contains the
first element of set N, and π−S is the set of all
coalition structures for the set N \ S;
Solve the subproblem for set N \ S (Step 1.2.);
Step 1.6. Return all coalition structures found on Step 1.5.;
# Algorithm for payoff distribution computation
Step 2.1. Initialize N, α, β, γ, ki, ni, i ∈ N;
Step 2.2. Choose a cooperative solution concept (the Shapley
value or the ES-value);
Step 2.3. Find coalition structures;
Step 2.4. For all coalition structures compute payoff
distribution according to the chosen cooperative
solution concept;
# Algorithm for finding stable coalition structures
Step 3.1. Choose coalition structure π and calculate the payoff
distribution;
Step 3.2. Fix player i = 1;
Step 3.3. do
{
Find coalition B(i);
For i find a set of coalition structures {π′} which
can be formed if i leaves B(i);
For each coalition structure π′ from the set check the
stability condition xπi ≥ xπ
′
i ;
Once the stability condition fails, π is unstable.
Otherwise i = i+ 1;
}
while i ≤ n;
Step 3.4. If i = n+ 1, π is stable;
Example 1. Here we illustrate how the software product works on a numerical ex-
ample. Let us have three banks, i. e. N = {1, 2, 3} and parameters of the game are
as follows:
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– Costs are α = 0.5, β = 1, γ = 1.5.
– Number of transactions are n1 = 3 000, n2 = 4 000, n3 = 6 000.
– Number of ATMs are k1 = 5, k2 = 3, k3 = 0.
Fig. 8: Stable coalition structures with respect to the Shapley value for Example 1
Fig. 9: Stable coalition structures with respect to the ES-value for Example 1
When all required data is entered, the product shows the result. In Fig. 8 payoﬀ
distributions calculated according to the Shapley value for all ﬁve possible coalition
structures are shown. It is also speciﬁed whether the coalition structure is stable
with respect to the Shapley value or not. Here we may notice that we have two
stable coalition structures {{1}, {2, 3}} and {{1, 3}, {2}}. The corresponding payoﬀ
distributions are (0, 1500, 1500) and (1500, 0, 1500).
The similar result for the ES-value is presented in a screenshot in Fig. 9. In this
case we obtain the unique stable coalition structure {{1, 2, 3}} with respect to the
ES-value with payoﬀ distribution (395.83, 395.83, 395.83).
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Example 2. Consider the game with the set of players N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and param-
eters of the game are as follows:
– Costs are α = 1, β = 2, γ = 3.
– Number of transactions are n1 = 2, n2 = 5, n3 = 3, n4 = 4.
– Number of ATMs are k1 = 6, k2 = 3, k3 = 2, k4 = 0.
In this example there are no stable coalition structures with respect to the ES-value
as we can see in Fig. 10.
Fig. 10: Stable coalition structures with respect to the ES-value for Example 2
Let us consider the Shapley value as a cooperative solution concept for this
example. There are three stable coalition structures with respect to this concept:
{{1}, {2}, {3, 4}}, {{1}, {2, 4}, {3}} and {{1, 4}, {2}, {3}}. The corresponding play-
ers’ payoﬀs are (0, 0, 2, 2), (0, 2, 0, 2) and (2, 0, 0, 2).
5. Conclusion
We considered the problem of stability of coalition structures with respect to the
some cooperative solution concepts, i. e. the Shapley value and the ES-value. The
approach to deﬁne stable coalition structure is similar to the approach of the deﬁ-
nition of the Nash equilibrium for non-cooperative games. This approach seems to
be natural when the problem of possible players’ deviation is considered.
It is important for our analysis that two cooperative solution concepts consid-
ered in the paper are single-valued, otherwise, the deﬁnition of coalition structure
stability is needed to be improved and extended to the multi-valued case.
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Example 2 shows that stable coalition structures with respect to the ES-value
do not always exist for more than three players. The open question of the work is
the existence of stable coalition structures for more than three players with respect
to the Shapley value. This result has not been proved yet.
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Abstract The problem of customer optimal behavior in the service market
where two service company operate to handling customer orders is consid-
ered. Each company has its own method of forming ﬁnal cost of service
order. The main peculiarity of considering problem is the presence of big
customer losses if the lead time of fulﬁllment its order become very large. In
this paper we formulate and prove the theorem for ﬁnding optimal strategies
for players behavior when choosing a service provided with non-linearity of
the loss function.
Keywords: game-theoretical approach, optimal behavior, probability mod-
eling, construction market, nonlinear penalty, n persons game, Nash equi-
librium, the fully-mixed strategies.
1. Introduction
At present days more and more gaining global popularity problems are associated
with searching the optimal behavior of the player in the market, minimizing the
overall cost and time of turnover. To solve such problems is widely used the game-
theoretic approach. The widespread problems of the buyer in the market looking for
a service provider to perform the customer order continuously take much interest.
The present work is based on (Bure and Sergeeva, 2011) and (Bure and Sergeeva,
2012).
An important feature of the problem is the possibility of the client to incur heavy
costs if the duration of work exceeds a certain pre-deﬁned limit. We consider the
optimal choice of the client in terms of cost minimization. Costs consist of direct
client costs orders for the scheme which sets by the provider speciﬁc losses and
penalties which are charged to the client for delay in delivery of work. In this case
under penalty meant extra money that is paid to the contractor if the nature of the
work is too diﬃcult. Each contractor shall determine its own policy formation of
the ﬁnal price. Costs consist of ﬁxed clients and temporary component.
 This work was supported by the Russian Foundation for Fundamental Researches under
grant No.12-01-00747a.
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2. The problem statement
Lets consider service market with two providers. Each provider has its own funda-
mentally diﬀerent pricing policy.
Customers try to choose the service way under minimizing total costs of the
order. An important feature of discussed service scheme is the existence of feasibility
for customer to take big losses if the full time spending on service will be more than
some deﬁnite limit. So each customer take into account not only the cost of service
but also the time of order duration. The economic explanation of big losses existence
will discuss later.
Denote by τ1 - the full time of customer service fulﬁllment in selecting the ﬁrst
service provider which consists of two components τ1 = τ11+τ12, where τ11 - waiting
time of the order , τ12 - the service time by ﬁrst provider. τ2 = τ22 is the full time of
customer service fulﬁllment in selecting the second service provider which contains
only service time τ22 since waiting time of service is zero. The parameters τ1, τ2 are
random variables.
Processing times of client service described by exponential distribution with
density functions
f1(t) =
1
μ1
e
− 1μ1 t, t > 0,
f2(t) =
1
μ2
e
− 1μ2 t, t > 0,
where μ1 and μ2 are intensities of the service.
Let c1 - the cost of customer order fulﬁlment by ﬁrst provider, it is ﬁxed and
does not depend on the duration of the customer order. Assume further that c2 -
the cost of customer order fulﬁlment by second provider depending on the duration
of customer service: c2 = c21 + c22τ22, where c21 - ﬁxed price charged for customer
order, c22 - the cost per unit customer service time by second provider.
Each client losing time that could be used for the completion or delivery while
waiting for their order fulﬁllment. In addition to the cost of customer order ful-
ﬁllment denote by r the speciﬁc losses incurred by the client while waiting for the
order. It is a time associated with missed opportunities under choosing this particu-
lar contractor. Then we can determine the total loss associated with the expectation
of the order. Which will be determined by the following formulas:
rτ1 = r(τ11 + τ12),
rτ2 = rτ22.
These expressions will be used late for describing the total loss function.
3. The problem of big losses
We consider the optimal choice of the client in terms of cost minimization. Costs
consist of direct client costs orders for the scheme which sets by the provider speciﬁc
losses and penalties which are charged to the client for delay in delivery of work.
In this case under penalty meant extra money that is paid to the contractor if the
nature of the work is too diﬃcult. It is prescribed in the contract with the contractor.
If it appears that under the objective reasons additional time for work through is
no fault of the contractor, for example due to renegotiation of the project, from a
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determined point of time the customer start to pay for the time on other rates, i.e.
pay a ﬁne. The customer is an intermediate in the overall chain of interaction and
has an obligation to its clients. Therefore, in order delays he incurs all the costs.
In this case we are interested only in the loss of a client as we are looking for his
best behavior and the sanctions that are applied at the same time to the provider
we are not interested.
The value of penalty will founded as follows. Lets ﬁx T and introduce the indi-
cator:
I(t, T ) =
{
1, t ≥ T,
0, t < T.
Denote by R1, R2 the penalties which customer starts to pay in excess of the
service time of more than T1 for the ﬁrst and T2 for the second provider respectively.
We assume that R1 and R2 large enough.
Denote J1 = EI{τ (1)i , T1}, J2 = EI{τ (2)i , T2} as expected value of indicators.
Now it is possible to calculate the full loss of clients to service for each provider
respectively:
Q˜1 = rτ1 + c+R1J1,
Q˜2 = (r + c22)τ22 + c21 +R2J2.
Then the average customer losses for services provided by diﬀerent providers are
determined by the following expectations:
Q1 = EQ˜1 = r(Eτ11 + Eτ12) + c1 +R1J1,
Q2 = EQ˜2 = (r + c22)Eτ22 + c21 +R2J2.
4. The game-theoretical model
Game-theoretical approach and probabilistic modeling are more appropriate for
solving this problem. Lets formulate this problem in terms of game theory.
Γ =< N, {pi}i∈N , {Hi}i∈N > - the non-antagonistic game in normal form where
N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of players,
{pi}i∈N is the set of strategies, pi ∈ [0, 1], where pi is the probability that player
i choose the ﬁrst provider,
{Hi}i∈N is the set of payoﬀ functions.
Hi = −(piQ1i + (1 − pi)Q2i) = −(pi(Q1i −Q2i) +Q2i).
The aim of each customer is to minimize his payoﬀ function by choosing the
optimal decision on the construction market.
Before we formulate the main statement about ﬁnding the optimal customer
behavior we have to determine following deﬁnition which can also be ﬁned in
(Vorobev, 1985).
Deﬁnition 1. The strategies for which the probabilities of selection of each of
provider are strictly positive, i.e. pi > 0, 1 − pi > 0, i = 1, . . . , n, are called fully-
mixed strategies.
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5. The Nash equilibria for problem with big losses
The following statement establishes the points of Nash equilibria for some conditions
which cover all possible situations.
Theorem 1. There exists a unique point of equilibrium (p1, . . . , pn), i = 1, . . . , n
in the game Γ deﬁned as follows.
The following situations are possible:
1. if r((k + 1)μ1 + 12μ1(n− 1))− (r + c22)μ2 +R1J1(k)−R2J2 + c1 − c21 < 0,
then there exists a unique point of equilibrium in the game Γ : p∗i = 1,
i = 1, . . . , n which means that player i choose the ﬁrst service provider;
2. if r(k + 1)μ1 − (r + c22)μ2 +R1J1(k)− R2J2 + c1 − c21 > 0,
then there exists a unique point of equilibrium in the game Γ : p∗i = 0,
i = 1, . . . , n which means that player i choose the second service provider;
3. and the last if r(k + 1)μ1 ≤ (r + c22)μ2 + R1J1(k)− R2J2 + c21 − c1 ≤ r((k +
1)μ1 +
1
2μ1(n− 1)),
then in the class of fully-mixed strategies there exists a unique point of equilib-
rium Γ : (p∗1, . . . , p∗n), p
∗
i =
2((r + c22)μ2 − r(k + 1)μ1 −R1J1 +R2J2 − c1 + c21)
rμ1(n− 1) ,
i = 1, . . . , n,
where k = 0 if no customers on service and in the line at ﬁrst provider, k = 1
if there is one customer on service at provider and no customers in line, k > 1 if
there are one customer on service and some customers in line at provider.
Proof. If m players including the player i choose ﬁrst provider then player i occupy
any of m places in line for service with probability 1m according (Bure, 2002). Con-
ditional expectation waiting time before service player i without the service time
players already in service by ﬁrst provider provided that l players of the m proceed
player i:
m−1∑
l=0
lμ1
1
m
=
1
m
μ1
m−1∑
l=0
l =
1
m
μ1
m(m− 1)
2
=
1
2
μ1(m− 1) (1)
Let Pr(l) be the probability of event that r players from set of l players choose
the ﬁrst provider. Then using (1) we can ﬁnd:
n∑
m=1
1
2
μ1(m− 1)Pm−1(n− 1) =
n−1∑
m=0
1
2
μ1mPm(n− 1) (2)
Now we can use that expression (2) to determine conditional mean time till
order complete for the ﬁrst provider
t1i = kμ1+
1
2
μ1
n∑
m=1
(m−1)Pm−1(n−1)+μ1 = kμ1+1
2
μ1
n−1∑
l=0
lPl(n−1)+μ1, i = 1, . . . , n.
If customer choose the second provider he doesn’t have to wait the beginning
of service because he comes to service immediately. So conditional mean time till
order complete for the second provider deﬁned as
t2i = μ2, i = 1, . . . , n.
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Lets show that vector (p∗1, . . . , p∗n) is really the point of equilibrium. Assume
that p1 = . . . = pi−1 = pi+1 = . . . = pn = p than under this assumption and using
the Bernoulli scheme for Binomial distribution we can easily ﬁnd the expression
according (Feller, 1984)
n−1∑
m=0
mCmn−1p
m(1 − p)n−1−m = p(n− 1).
The next step is determination the mean values J1 = EI{τ1, T1} = P{τ1 > T1}
and J2 = EI{τ2, T2} = P{τ2 > T2}.
Since the ﬁrst provider serve all clients one by one from queue then the dura-
tion of their service can be described by Erlang distribution which is the Gamma-
distribution with an integer value of the shape parameter. We assume that there
are k + 1 clients in the system. Given a τ1 =
∑k+1
i =1 τ1i where τ1i is the client i ser-
vice time. Then τ1 distributed under Gamma-distribution G( 1μ1 , k+1) with density
function fG( 1μ1 ,k+1)
(t) =
{
( 1μ1 )
k+1 tke
− t
μ1
Γ (k+1) , t > 0
0, t ≤ 0.
Let’s proceed J1(k) by induction.
When k = 1
J1(k) =
∫ ∞
T1
( 1
μ1
)2 te− tμ1
Γ (2)
dt =
(T1
μ1
+ 1
)
e−
T1
μ1 .
When k = 2
J1(k) =
∫ ∞
T1
( 1
μ1
)3 t2e− tμ1
Γ (3)
dt =
1
Γ (3)
e−
T1
μ1
((T1
μ1
)2
+2
T1
μ1
+ 2
)
.
When k = 3
J1(k) =
∫ ∞
T1
( 1
μ1
)4 t3e− tμ1
Γ (4)
dt =
1
Γ (4)
e
−T1μ1
((T1
μ1
)3
+3
(T1
μ1
)2
+6
T1
μ1
+ 6
)
.
So the general expression for J1(k + 1) is:
J1(k + 1) =
∫ ∞
T1
fG( 1μ1 ,k+1)
(t)dt =
1
Γ (k + 1)
e−
T1
μ1
((T1
μ1
)k
+k
(T1
μ1
)k−1
+
+k(k − 1)
(T1
μ1
)k−2
+ . . .+ (k)!
(T1
μ1
)
+(k)!
)
.
As the second provider don’t have any queue we can deﬁne J2 as follows:
J2 =
∫ ∞
T2
f2(t)dt =
∫ ∞
T2
1
μ2
e
− 1μ2 tdt = e−
T2
μ2 .
Then the average customer loss for services by ﬁrst provider is:
Q1i = r(kμ1 +
1
2
μ1p(n− 1) + μ1) + c1 +R1J1,
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and for the second provider:
Q2i = (r + c22)μ2 + c21 +R2J2.
Since customer trying to minimize total losses so we will consider the function
hi = piQ1i + (1− pi)Q2i = pi(Q1i −Q2i) +Q2i.
To analyze this expression we will consider the following term
Q1i −Q2i = r(kμ1 + 1
2
μ1p(n− 1) + μ1) + c1 + R1J1 − (r + c22)μ2 − c21 −R2J2 =
= r(k + 1)μ1 +
1
2
rμ1p(n− 1)− (r + c22)μ2 − c21 + c1 +R1J1 −R2J2.
Three situations are possible:
1. If all players except i choose the ﬁrst provider, i.e. they choose the strategy
p = 1 then if Q1i −Q2i < 0 player i had to choose the same strategy.
2. If all players except i choose the second provider, i.e. they choose the strategy
p = 0 then if Q1i −Q2i > 0 player i had to choose the same strategy.
3. If the above conditions are not met then if in the class of fully-mixed strategies
when all players except i choose strategy
p = p∗i =
2((r + c22)μ2 − r(k + 1)μ1 − c1 −R1J1 + c21 +R2J2)
rμ1(n− 1)
player i is in the situation when the selection of any strategy leads to same
result. Therefore player i can not reduce its losses so so it also does not make
sense to deviate from strategy p∗i .
Since the strategy is the probability so we have to prove p ∈ (0, 1). Because the
next inequality is true
rμ1(k + 1) ≤ (r + c22)μ2 + c21 − c1 +R2J2 −R1J1 ≤ rμ1(n
2
+ k +
1
2
))
thus we have following expression
0 ≤ (r+c22)μ2+c21−c1+R2J2−R1J1−rμ1(k+1) ≤ rμ1(n
2
+k+
1
2
))−rμ1(k+1).
By transforming this expression we obtain:
0 ≤ (r + c22)μ2 + c21 − c1 +R2J2 −R1J1 − rμ1(k + 1) ≤ 1
2
rμ1(n− 1).
Given a 12rμ1(n − 1) = 0 thus by dividing both parts of the inequality to this
equation we can receive
0 ≤ 2((r + c22)μ2 − r(k + 1)μ1 − c1 + c21) +R2J2 −R1J1
rμ1(n− 1) ≤ 1.
Thereby we prove that p ∈ (0, 1).
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At the rest part of the proof we will show the uniqueness of the found point of
equilibrium.
Suppose that all customers could choose diﬀerent strategies so we can not use
Bernoulli scheme already. In general, the process of selecting one of the two provider
is a sequence of independent events when each player chooses either the ﬁrst provider
or the second. Suppose, in contrast to the previous, that the probabilities pi, i =
1, . . . , n of the choice the ﬁrst provider may be diﬀerent, i.e. strategies of the players
are diﬀerent, therefore, considered sequence of independent events is a Bernoulli
scheme. We calculate the expectation of time before the customer service i provided
that he has chosen the ﬁrst provider without customers previously adopted for
provider service. To calculate the sum
n−1∑
l=0
lPl(n−1) which represent the mean value
of amount of players picking the ﬁrst provider at the set of n − 1 player without
the player i as well as customers came previous to service by ﬁrst provider we can
use the following method. Considered mean value equals to sum of mathematical
expectation of the number of success (we mean by success the choice of ﬁrst provider)
in each single test, i.e. each player from the set of n− 1 thus
n−1∑
l=0
lPl(n− 1) =
n∑
m =1,m 	=i
pm.
Then the mean time till order complete by the ﬁrst provider is
t1i = kμ1 +
1
2
μ1
n∑
m =1,m 	=i
pm + μ1,
and the mean time till order complete by the second provider is
t2i = μ2.
Hence we have the average customer loss for services by the ﬁrst provider:
Q1i = r
(
kμ1 +
1
2
μ1
n∑
m =1,m 	=i
pm + μ1
)
+ c1 +R1J1,
and the average customer loss for services by the second provider:
Q2i = (r + c22)μ2 + c21 +R2J2.
So the function of customer i total losses is
hi = pi(Q1i −Q2i) +Q2i.
Let consider the equation
Q1i−Q2i = r
(
kμ1+
1
2
μ1
n∑
m =1,m 	=i
pm+μ1
)
+c1+R1J1−(r+c22)μ2−c21−R2J2 = 0.
(3)
The following three situations are possible
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1. if rμ1(n2 + k +
1
2 )− (r + c22)μ2 + c1 − c21 +R1J1 −R2J2 < 0 then (3) doesn’t
have solution on
n∑
m =1,m 	=i
pm. In this case all players have to choose the strategy
pi = 1, i.e. they select the ﬁrst provider.
2. if rμ1(k + 1)− (r + c22)μ2 − c21 + c1 +R1J1 −R2J2 > 0 then (3) doesn’t have
solution on
n∑
m =1,m 	=i
pm. In this case all players have to choose the strategy
pi = 0, i.e. they select the second provider.
3. r(k+1)μ1 ≤ (r+c22)μ2+R1J1(k)−R2J2+c21−c1 ≤ r((k+1)μ1+ 12μ1(n−1)) that
means that both conditions 1. and 2. are violated then the value
n∑
m =1,m 	=i
pm
deﬁned uniquely as a solution of (3).
All sums
n∑
m =1,m 	=i
pm should be equal to each other for every possible i =
1, . . . , n, i.e.
n∑
m =1,m 	=i
pm =
n∑
m =1,m 	=j
pm, i = j.
Hence we have
pi = pj , i = j.
According with the above considerations we ﬁnally show that the point of equi-
librium consists only of the same probabilities for each customer in the class of
fully-mixed strategies thus it is coincides with p∗.
The theorem is proved.
Remark 1. Obviously all three conditions based in the Theorem are mutually
incompatible and together represent all possible options.
Remark 2. In a situation when the cost of service by both providera are equal
for customer then the equilibrium deﬁned in Theorem is unique only in the class
of fully-mixed strategies. Generally speaking, in this situation the player does not
have to adhere to the strategy of choice for other players.
Lets consider the simple case of two construction companies in the market se-
lecting provider, i.e. the number of players n = 2.
For the ﬁrst player the average customer losses for services are calculated as
follows:
Q11 = r(kμ1 +
1
2
μ1p2 + μ1) + c1 +R1J1,
Q21 = (r + c22)μ2 + c21 +R2J2.
For the second player the average customer losses for services are calculated as
follows:
Q12 = r(kμ1 +
1
2
μ1p1 + μ1) + c1 +R1J1,
Q22 = (r + c22)μ2 + c21 +R2J2.
Then the deviation of losses functions for both players are
Q11 −Q21 = r(kμ1 + 1
2
μ1p2 + μ1) + c1 +R1J1 − (r + c22)μ2 − c21 −R2J2,
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Q12 −Q22 = r(kμ1 + 1
2
μ1p1 + μ1) + c1 +R1J1 − (r + c22)μ2 − c21 −R2J2.
Lets show that under condition that is subject of consideration rμ1(32+k)+c1 ≥
(r + c22)μ2 + c21 ≥ rμ1(k + 1) + c1 the existence of diﬀerent points of equilibrium
is possible.
At ﬁrst consider the situation (1, 0) when the ﬁrst player comes to ﬁrst provider
with probability equals to 1 and the second player comes to second provider with
probability equals to 1. Lets show that this strategy is the point of equilibrium
under the condition above. This situation occurs in the game if under the selection
of the second player the second provider then the ﬁrst player better to choose the
ﬁrst provider. And on the contrary, if under the selection of the ﬁrst player the
ﬁrst provider then the second player better to choose the second provider. Thus the
situation (1, 0) is a Nash equilibrium under the following conditions:
Q11(p2 = 0) ≤ Q21(p2 = 0),
Q12(p1 = 1) ≥ Q22(p1 = 1),
or the same:
rμ1(k + 1) + c1 +R1J1 ≤ (r + c22)μ2 + c21 +R2J2,
rμ1(k +
3
2
) + c1 + R1J1 ≥ (r + c22)μ2 + c21 +R2J2.
This condition is equals to the third condition from the Theorem.
Now consider the situation (0, 1) when the ﬁrst player comes to ﬁrst provider
with probability equals to 1 and the second player comes to second provider with
probability equals to 1. Lets show that this strategy is the point of equilibrium
under the condition above. This situation occurs in the game if under the selection
of the second player the ﬁrst provider then the ﬁrst player better to choose the
second provider. And on the contrary, if under the selection of the ﬁrst player the
second provider then the second player better to choose the ﬁrst provider. Thus the
situation (0, 1) is a Nash equilibrium under the following conditions:
Q11(p2 = 1) ≥ Q21(p2 = 1),
Q12(p1 = 0) ≤ Q22(p1 = 0),
or the same:
rμ1(k +
3
2
) + c1 + R1J1 ≥ (r + c22)μ2 + c21 +R2J2,
rμ1(k + 1) + c1 +R1J1 ≤ (r + c22)μ2 + c21 +R2J2.
This condition is equals to the third condition from the Theorem too.
Therefor if the third condition from the Theorem is true then the following
strategies are the points of equilibrium:
(1, 0), (0, 1),(2((r + c22)μ2 − r(k + 1)μ1 − c1 + c21) +R1J1 −R2J2
rμ1(n− 1) ),
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1− 2((r + c22)μ2 − r(k + 1)μ1 − c1 + c21 +R1J1 −R2J2)
rμ1(n− 1)
)
.
Thus we conclude that if not to content oneself with the class of fully-mixed
strategies, in a situation where the player does not care which of the provider apply
there may be several Nash equilibrium. This is the case when depending on the
number of customers already in services the player may be advantageous to apply
in the ﬁrst and the second provider, i.e. when the ﬁrst two conditions of Theorem
are not satisﬁed.
Generally speaking, this observation can be formulated for the case n = 3, 4, . . .,
but on the structure of reasoning they will be similar, so we will not give them.
Remark 3. Lets consider the special case of the construction market when in the
market there is only one client select the service between the two providers. Obvi-
ously, the player just need to calculate the expected cost of service in each of the
ﬁrms with knowledge that he was the only one of its customer service and choose
the lowest cost.
In this case the loss functions described:
Q1 = rμ1(k + 1) + c1 +R1J1
Q2 = (r + c22)μ2 + c21 +R2J2.
The situations are possible:
1. If rμ1 + c1 + R1J1 < (r + c22)μ2 + c21 + R2J2 then customer choose the ﬁrst
provider for service
2. If rμ1 + c1 +R1J1 > (r+ c22)μ2 + c21 +R2J2 then customer choose the second
provider for service
3. If rμ1+c1+R1J1 = (r+c22)μ2+c21+R2J2 then the client does not care which
of the ﬁrms choose to serve him then he is likely to be any contact either the
ﬁrst or the second provider.
5.1. Conclusion
Throughout the paper, we have deﬁned the problem of customer behavior in the con-
struction market of two service providers. The game-theoretical approach and prob-
abilistic modelling used as a way of representing such an issue. The two providers
are the service companies in the construction market which provide repairs and cos-
metic ﬁnishing works for clients. Each of provider has its own scheme of customer
order fulﬁllment and own cost policy. There is introduced the class of fully-mixed
strategies. The theorem which determine points of Nash equilibrium under three
possible cases is formulated and proved. The optimal behavior of customers in terms
of fully-mixed strategies is found.
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Abstract The paper deals with polar representation formula for the Shap-
ley value, established in (Vasil’ev, 1998). Below, we propose a new, simpliﬁed
proof of the formula for nonatomic polynomial games. This proof relies on
the coincidence of generalized Owen extension and multiplicative Aumann-
Shapley expansion for polynomial games belonging to pNA (Vasil’ev, 2009).
The coincidence mentioned makes it possible to calculate Aumann-Shapley
expansion in a straightforward manner, and to complete new proof of the po-
lar representation formula for nonatomic case by exploiting the generalized
Owen integral formula, established in (Aumann and Shapley, 1974).
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1. Introduction
The paper deals with the polar representation formula for the Shapley value, es-
tablished under rather general assumptions in (Vasil’ev, 1998). In order to simplify
a proof of this formula for some special classes of games, we continue our investi-
gation on the generalized Owen extension for regular polynomial games started in
(Vasil’ev, 2009). Main attention is paid to the nonatomic cooperative games. Our
approach is based on the principal result from (Vasil’ev, 2009), demonstrating that
the above-mentioned generalized Owen extension coincides with the multiplicative
Aumann-Shapley expansion for some types of nonatomic games, including polyno-
mial games from pNA. This coincidence makes it possible to calculate the Aumann-
Shapley expansion in a straightforward manner by applying the corresponding gen-
eralized Owen extension. To complete new proof of the polar representation formula
for the Shapley value of nonatomic homogeneous game we exploit the famous gen-
eralized Owen integral formula from (Aumann and Shapley, 1974), given in terms
of the multiplicative Aumann-Shapley expansion.
2. Generalized Owen Extension for Regular Polynomial Games
Below, some main constructions of an explicit deﬁnition of the generalized Owen
extension, introduced in the paper, are given (for the sake of brevity, we restrict
ourselves to the case of regular polynomial games).
Let (Q, d) be an arbitrary nonempty metric compactum with distance function d.
Denote by B its Borel σ-algebra and consider a collection V = V(Q) of set functions
 This work was supported by the Russian Foundation for Fundamental Researches under
the grant No.10-06-00168.
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v : B → R satisfying the requirement v(∅) = 0. As usual, a triplet Γ = (Q,B, v)
with v ∈ V is said to be a cooperative game (with elements of Q being players, and
elements of B treated as their coalitions). Remind, that we pay attention, mostly,
to the case of inﬁnite cooperative games (when Q is an inﬁnite set).
To characterize cooperative games under considerations in more details, we intro-
duce ﬁrst some technical notations and deﬁnitions (most of them, including vector
lattice terms, can be found in more details in (Vasil’ev, 1998)). Fix S ∈ B and
denote by H(S) a set of ﬁnite B-measurable partitions of S. Put H = ∪S∈BH(S).
For any η = {Si}i∈Ω ∈ H with |Ω| = m, and v ∈ V denote by v(η) = v({Si}i∈Ω) a
polynomial m-diﬀerence, deﬁned by the formula
v(η) :=
∑
ω⊆Ω
(−1)|Ω|−|ω|v(∪i∈ωSi), (1)
where, as usual, |ω| denotes the number of elements of a ﬁnite set ω.
Remark 1. Directly from (1) it follows that polynomial diﬀerences satisfy the re-
cursion formula
v({S1, . . . , Sm−1, Sm, Sm+1}) = v({S1, . . . , Sm−1, Sm ∪ Sm+1})
−v({S1, . . . , Sm−1, Sm})− v({S1, . . . , Sm−1, Sm+1}), m ≥ 2,
with v({S1}) = v(S1), and v({S1, S2}) = v(S1
⋃
S2)−v(S1)−v(S2). Note also, that
for any S ∈ B and η = {Si}mi=1 ∈ H(S), an equality
v(S) =
∑
ω⊆Ωη
v(ηω) (2)
is valid, where Ωη := {1, . . . ,m}, and ηω := {Si}i∈ω for any ω ⊆ Ωη.
Recall (Vasil’ev, 1975a), that polynomial variation ||v||0 of v ∈ V is deﬁned by
the formula
‖v‖o := sup {
∑
ω⊆Ω
|v(ηω)|
∣∣∣ η = {Si}i∈Ω ∈ H(Q)}
with v(ηω) determined as above. We say that a function v ∈ V is of bounded
polynomial variation if ||v||0 < ∞. Put
V = V (Q) := {v ∈ V | ‖v‖o < ∞}
and deﬁne a cone V+ = V+(Q) of positive elements of V in order to equip the
collection V with the structure of a vector lattice. Recall (Vasil’ev, 1975a), that
a game v ∈ V is said to be totally positive if v(η) ≥ 0 for any η ∈ H. A cone
of positive elements, mentioned above, is taken to be a convex cone of the totally
positive games:
V+ = V+(Q) := {v ∈ V | v(η) ≥ 0 for any η ∈ H}.
It is not very hard to verify that V+ ⊆ V and partial order u ≥0 v ⇐⇒ u− v ∈ V+,
induced by V+ (along with the norm of polynomial variation ‖ · ‖0), endows V
with the structure of Banach vector lattice. To be exact (Vasil’ev, 1998), V is norm
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complete and Dedekind complete vector lattice with the norm ‖·‖0 compatible with
partial order ≥0: monotone order convergence vn ↓ 0 (vn ↑ ∞) implies monotone
norm convergence ‖vn‖0 ↓ 0 (‖vn‖0 ↑ ∞).
Following notations of the vector lattice theory (Aliprantis and Border, 1994),
for any function v ∈ V , denote by v+ = v ∨ 0, v− = −v ∨ 0, and |v| = −v ∨ v
the positive, negative, and total variations of v, respectively (as usual, u ∨ w :=
sup {u,w}, and u ∧ w := inf {u,w} with respect to the partially ordered vector
space (V,≥0). Let F be the collection of all closed subsets of Q. The basic type of
games we are going to deal with is given by the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 1 (Vasil’ev, 1975a). A game v ∈ V is said to be regular, if its total
variation |v| meets the requirement:
|v|({Si}m1 ) = sup { |v|({Fi}m1 )
∣∣∣ Fi ⊆ Si, Fi ∈ F , i = 1, . . . ,m}
for any partition η = {Si}m1 ∈ H. A set of regular games is denoted by rV = rV (Q).
Deﬁnition 2 (Vasil’ev, 1975a). A game v ∈ rV is called a (regular) polynomial
game of order n, if all the polynomial n+ 1-diﬀerences of v are equal to zero:
v({Si}n+11 ) = 0 for any {Si}n+11 ∈ H.
Denote by rV n = rV n(Q) a space of all regular polynomial games of order n, and
put
rpV := ∪∞n=1rV n.
We say that v is a (regular) polynomial game, if v belongs to rpV .
Passing on directly to the generalization of the Owen multilinear extension, we
introduce ﬁrst a concept of integration with respect to polynomial set function.
To this end ﬁx some v ∈ rV n, and construct an extension of v to the n-th sym-
metric power B[n] of algebra B. In turn, to introduce deﬁnition of B[n], we recall
(Vasil’ev, 1975a), that the n-th symmetric power S[n] of a coalition S ∈ B is given
by the formula
S[n] = {τ ⊆ S
∣∣∣ |τ | ≤ n},
where, as before, we denote by |τ | the number of elements of τ .
Deﬁnition 3 (Vasil’ev, 1975a). The n-th symmetric power B[n] of an algebra B
is the smallest algebra that includes the collection {S[n]
∣∣∣S ∈ B}.
By applying a description of B[n], given in (Vasil’ev, 1975a), one can prove that
there exists a unique additive set function λv : B[n] → R, satisfying the requirement:
λv(S
[n]) = v(S) for any S ∈ B. Moreover, by taking into account regularity of v and
compactness of Q one can establish that there exists a unique σ-additive extension
μv of λv to the smallest σ-algebra σB[n] that includes B[n] (for more details, see
(Vasil’ev, 1975a)). Interestingly to note that σ-algebra σB[n] admits rather simple
description.
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Proposition 1 (Vasil’ev, 1975a). Algebra σB[n] coincides with the Borel σ-algebra
of the compact metric space (Q[n], d[n]), where d[n] is the Hausdorﬀ metric
d[n](τ, τ ′) := min {
∣∣∣ τ ⊆ τ ′, τ ′ ⊆ τ}
with τ, τ ′ to be -neighborhoods of τ, τ ′ ∈ Q[n].
Let now f be an arbitrary element of the vector space I(Q,B) of bounded B-
measurable functions, deﬁned on Q. We introduce a polynomial extension f [n]ρ of
the function f to Q[n], determined by the formula
f [n]ρ (τ) :=
∏
t∈τ
f(t), τ ∈ Q[n].
It is not very hard to verify that for any f ∈ I(Q,B) its polynomial extension
belongs to the vector space I(Q[n], σB[n]) of bounded σB[n]-measurable functions,
deﬁned on Q[n]. Hence, for any f ∈ I(Q,B) its extension f [n]ρ is a μv-integrable
function. Consequently, for any v ∈ rV n, a functional Pv : I(Q,B) → R, given by
the formula
Pv(f) :=
∫
f [n]ρ dμv, f ∈ I(Q,B), (3)
is well deﬁned.
Remark 2. Certainly, apart from f [n]ρ , some other extensions of f ∈ I(Q,B) may
be of interest. For example, extensions f [n]max(τ) = max{f(t) | t ∈ τ}, and f [n]σ (τ) =∑
t∈τ f(t)/|τ | proved to be very useful in description of the Shapley functional (see
(Vasil’ev, 1998; Vasil’ev, 2001)) and support function of the core of a convex game
((Vasil’ev, 2006) and (Vasil’ev and Zuev, 1988)), respectively.
Now we are in position to introduce one of the main concept of the paper.
Deﬁnition 4 (Vasil’ev, 1998). For any v ∈ rV n, the functional Pv, deﬁned by
formula (3), is said to be a generalized Owen extension of a cooperative game v.
It can easily be checked that in case Q is ﬁnite we have that the generalized Owen
extension of any cooperative game v coincides with its classical Owen multilinear
extension, given in (Owen, 1972). As to the inﬁnite set of players, we just mention
several most important properties of the functional Pv. To this end we need one
more fundamental concept.
Deﬁnition 5 (Vasil’ev, 1975a). A game v ∈ rV n is said to be a homogeneous
regular game of order n if it belongs to the disjoint complement of rV n−1 : |v|∧|u| =
0 for any u ∈ rV n−1. Denote by rV (n) = rV (n)(Q) a space of all homogeneous
regular games of order n ( rV 0 = rV (0) := {0}).
Proposition 2 (Vasil’ev, 1975a). For any n ≥ m subspace rV (m) is a band in
rV n.
From Proposition 2 it follows that by the well-known Riesz theorem (see, e.g.,
(Aliprantis and Border, 1994)), for any n ≥ m, the space rV (m) is a projection
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band in rV n. Consequently, for any n ≥ m and v ∈ rV n there exists a projection
v(m) of v on rV (m), deﬁned by the formula
v(m) := sup {u ∈ rV (m)
∣∣∣v+ ≥0 u} − sup {u ∈ rV (m)∣∣∣v− ≥0 u} (4)
(for more details concerning the homogeneous components v(m) of v, given by (4),
see (Vasil’ev, 1998)).
To present several useful properties of the generalized Owen extension Pv, we
introduce ﬁrst some additional functional spaces, associated with cooperative games
of bounded polynomial variation. First, put I = I(Q,B), and denote by U(I) the
set of continuous functionals l : I → R such that l(0) = 0. Recall (Vasil’ev, 1998),
that I supposed to be endowed with the standard norm
‖f‖∞ = sup{ |f(t)| | t ∈ Q}, f ∈ I.
Following (Frechet, 1910) we introduce a polynomial m-diﬀerence l({f1, . . . , fm})
of the functional l ∈ U(I) with respect to f1, . . . , fm ∈ I by the formula
l
({f1, . . . , fm}) = ∑
ω⊆{1,...,m}
(−1)m−|ω| l
(∑
i∈ω
fi
)
.
Denote by U+(I) the cone of totally positive functionals (Vasil’ev, 1998) belonging
to U(I) :
U+(I) := {l ∈ U(I) | l
({f1, . . . , fm}) ≥ 0 for any m ≥ 1 and f1, . . . , fm ∈ I+}
(with I+ := {f ∈ I| f(t) ≥ 0, t ∈ Q}). Further, put U(I) = U+(I) − U+(I), and
recall the deﬁnitions of polynomial and homogeneous polynomial functionals from
U(I).
Deﬁnition 6 (Frechet, 1910). An element l ∈ U(I) is said to be a polynomial
functional of order n, if l
({f1, . . . , fn, fn+1}) = 0 for any f1, . . . , fn, fn+1 ∈ I. For
any n ≥ 1, denote by Pn(I) the space of all polynomial functionals of order n,
deﬁned on I.
Deﬁnition 7 (Hille and Phillips, 1957). An element l ∈ U(I) is said to be a
homogeneous polynomial functional of order n, if l ∈ Pn(I), and l(λf) = λnl(f) for
any λ ∈ R and f ∈ I. For any n ≥ 1, by P(n)(I) denote the space of all homogeneous
polynomial functionals of order n, deﬁned on I.
Below, we apply notations: rV n+ = rV n ∩ V+, and Pn+(I) = Pn(I) ∩ U+(I). Put
P(I) = ∪∞n=1Pn(I).
An element p ∈ P(I) is said to be a polynomial functional. Finally, as usual, by χS
we denote the indicator function of coalition S ∈ B : χS(t) = 1 whenever t ∈ S,
and χS(t) = 0 otherwise.
In the notations, given above, the most important properties of the generalized
Owen extension we use in the sequal are as follows.
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Theorem 1 (Vasil’ev, 1998). Generalized Owen extension Pv is a continuous
polynomial functional on (I, ‖ · ‖∞) having the properties
(P .1) Pv(χS) = v(S) for any S ∈ B;
(P .2) Pv ∈ Pn+(I) for any v ∈ rV n+ ;
(P .3) Pv ∈ P(n)(I) for any v ∈ rV (n);
(P .4) |Pv(f)| ≤
∑n
m=1 ‖v(m)‖o‖f‖m∞ for any f ∈ I.
Remark 3. By applying argumentation, similar to that employed for the proof of
Theorem 1 one can demonstrate the following useful properties of the generalized
Owen extension Pv :
(P .5) Pαu+βw = αPu + βPw for any α, β ∈ R and u,w ∈ rpV ;
(P .6) Pu·w = Pu · Pw for any u,w ∈ rpV
with u ·w and Pu ·Pw to be pointwise products of set functions u,w and functionals
Pu, Pw, respectively.
3. Axiomatization of Generalized Owen Extension
In this section, like in (Aumann and Shapley, 1974), we assume for simplicity that
Q = [0, 1], and, respectively, B is the Borel σ-algebra of the unit interval [0, 1].
Recall (Aumann and Shapley, 1974), that by ‖ · ‖ we denote the variation norm
‖v‖ := inf{u(Q) + w(Q) | v = u− w, u, w ∈ M}
with M to be a cone of increasing set functions from V . One of the most important
vector spaces investigated in (Aumann and Shapley, 1974) is pNA being the closure
(w.r.t. the variation norm ‖·‖) of linear span of powers μk with k ≥ 1 and μ to be any
nonnegative nonatomic measure deﬁned on B. Below, to mitigate argumentation,
we restrict our study to the space
rpNA := rpV ∩ pvNA
with pvNA to be the closure (w.r.t. the norm of polynomial variation ‖ · ‖0, deﬁned
in Sect. 2) of linear span of powers μk, k ≥ 1, where μ is any nonnegative nonatomic
measure deﬁned on B. Note, that due to the inequalities ‖v‖ ≤ ‖v‖0, v ∈ V , we
have inclusion rpNA ⊆ pNA. Nevertheless, these spaces are not very far from each
other: obviously, the closure of rpNA w.r.t. the variation norm ‖ · ‖ coincides with
pNA.
Slightly modifying deﬁnitions from (Aumann and Shapley, 1974) we say that a
functional l : I → R is increasing if l(0) = 0 and l(f) ≥ l(g) whenever f ≥ g with
f, g ∈ I+. We denote a cone of all the increasing functionals by M = M(I), and
put
B = M−M.
An element l ∈ B is said to be a functional of bounded variation; its norm ‖l‖ is
deﬁned by the formula:
‖l‖ = inf{m(χQ) + n(χQ) | l = m− n, m, n ∈ M}.
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Finally, put U = U+−U+ and for any functional p ∈ U denote by ‖p‖0 its polynomial
variation norm
‖p‖0 = inf{q(χQ) + r(χQ) | p = q − r, q, r ∈ U+}.
Due to the obvious inclusion U+ ⊆M we have that U ⊆ B and, besides, ‖l‖ ≤ ‖l‖0
for any l ∈ U. Moreover, for the Aumann-Shapley multiplicative expansion v∗ ∈ B
it holds: ‖v∗‖ = ‖v‖ for any v ∈ pNA (Aumann and Shapley, 1974). Hence, for any
v ∈ rpNA we get: ‖Pv‖ ≤ ‖Pv‖0 ≤ Pv+(χQ) + Pv−(χQ) = ‖v‖0 (the last equality
follows from (P .1) and deﬁnition of the norm ‖ · ‖0). Summarizing, we obtain
‖Pv‖ ≤ ‖v‖0 for any v ∈ rpNA. (5)
By applying the same argumentation as in (Vasil’ev, 2009), one can show that (5)
makes it possible to give an axiomatization of the generalized Owen extension Pv,
based on the well-known axiomatic characterization of multiplicative expansion of
nonatomic cooperative games, proposed in (Aumann and Shapley, 1974). Recall,
that the expansion mentioned was aimed at the generalization of the famous Owen
integral formula (Owen, 1972) to the case of nonatomic cooperative games. It was
already mentioned in Sect. 1 that this integral formula plays a crucial role in the new
proof of polar representation of the Shapley value for nonatomic homogeneous game.
Therefore, axiomatic description of the Aumann-Shapley expansion is closely related
to the main problem of our paper. Slightly modifying corresponding deﬁnitions
from (Aumann and Shapley, 1974), we recall that Aumann-Shapley multiplicative
expansion v∗ = ϕ(v) of a game v is given implicitly, via indicating the properties
of the operator ϕ, which takes v ∈ rpNA to the functional ϕ(v) : I → R. In the
notations, given above, properties mentioned are as follows (below, as before, v · w
and ϕ(v) · ϕ(w) are pointwise products of the corresponding functions):
(Qw.1) ϕ(v)(χS) = v(S) for any v ∈ rpNA and S ∈ B;
(Ow.2) ϕ(αv + βw) = αϕ(v) + βϕ(w), α, β ∈ R, v, w ∈ rpNA;
(Ow.3) ϕ(v · w) = ϕ(v) · ϕ(w), v, w ∈ rpNA;
(Ow.4) ϕ(v)(f) =
∫
fdv, f ∈ I(Q,B), v ∈ rV 1;
(Ow.5) ϕ(v) ∈ P+, v ∈ rpNA+,
with P+(I) := P(I) ∩ U+(I) and rpNA+ := rpNA ∩ V+.
To conclude this section, let us present a version of Theorem 4.1 (Vasil’ev, 2009), fol-
lowing directly from Theorem 1 (Sect. 2), Theorem G (Aumann and Shapley, 1974),
inequality (5), and continuity of the operators v → v∗, v ∈ pNA, and v → Pv, v ∈
rpNA, in variation and polynomial variation norms, respectively. Here, as before,
we denote by v∗ the Aumann-Shapley multiplicative expansion of a game v ∈ pNA.
Theorem 2. A mapping ϕ : rpNA→ P(I) satisﬁes assumptions (Ow.1)− (Ow.5)
if and only if ϕ(v) = Pv for any v ∈ rpNA.
Note,that Remark 3, properties (Ow.3), (Ow.4), and Theorem G on the existence
and uniqueness of the multiplicative expansion from (Aumann and Shapley, 1974)
implies equalities: ϕ(μk) = Pμk for any nonnegative nonatomic measure μ and
integer k ≥ 1. Hence, we have the following consequence of Theorem 2.
Corollary 1. Aumann-Shapley multiplicative expansion coincides with the gener-
alized Owen extension on rpNA.
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4. Polar Form of Homogeneous Game
Let us call to mind ﬁrst some deﬁnitions from (Aumann and Shapley, 1974) and
(Vasil’ev, 2009). Note, that a distinctive feature of the notions from (Vasil’ev, 2009)
is their orientation to the regular games deﬁned on the Borel σ-algebra of some met-
ric compactum, while the main concepts from (Aumann and Shapley, 1974) are,
mostly, adapted to the nonatomic games of bounded variation. Hence, we need
more detailed argumentation than sometimes proposed below, in order to properly
transfer corresponding results from (Aumann and Shapley, 1974) to the case con-
sidered in the paper. Nevertheless, for the sake of brevity, we leave the additions
needed for readers.
As usual, a real-valued set function ψ : Bn → R is said to be polyadditive,
if it is additive with respect to each variable. Further, a polyadditive function
(S1, . . . , Sn) → ψ(S1, . . . , Sn) is called a regular polyadditive function, if it is regular
with respect to each variable:
ψ(S1, . . . , Si, . . . , Sn) = sup{ψ(S1, . . . , Fi, . . . , Sn) | Fi ∈ F , Fi ⊆ Si}
for any (S1, . . . , Sn) ∈ Bn and i = 1, . . . , n (as before, F is the family of closed
subsets of Q). In the sequel, we consider symmetric polyadditive functions only, i.e.
polyadditive functions ψ : Bn → R such that for any elements S1, . . . , Sn ∈ Bn it
holds:
ψ(S1, . . . , Sn) = ψ(Si1 , . . . , Sin)
for any permutation (i1, . . . , in) of the set {1, . . . , n}.
We denote by rΨn+ a cone of all the nonnegative regular symmetric polyadditive
functions ψ : Bn → R. Put rΨn := rΨn+ − rΨn+, and isolate a special subspace
rΨ (n) ⊆ rΨn similar to the space rV (n) of the regular homogeneous set functions.
To this end, following (Vasil’ev, 1998), consider the set Hn(Q) of all B-measurable
partitions η = {Si}i∈Ω ∈ H(Q) such that |Ω| ≥ n. For any partition η = {Si}i∈Ω ∈
Hn(Q) (by deﬁnition, consisting of not less than n elements) denote by Πηn the set
of all its ordered n-element subsets (Si1 , . . . , Sin). Further, ﬁx some ψ ∈ rΨn+, and
deﬁne generalized sequence {ψη}η∈Hn(Q) with ψη given by the formula
ψη :=
∑
(Si1 ,...,Sin)∈Πηn
ψ(Si1 , . . . , Sin).
Taking into account nonnegativity and polyadditivity of ψ, it is quite easy to check
that the sequence {ψη}η∈Hn(Q) is increasing: ψη′ ≥ ψη whenever η′ ≥ η. Conse-
quently, for any function ψ ∈ rΨn+ there exists a limit
ψ(n)(Q) = lim
η∈Hn(Q)
ψη
(as in (Vasil’ev, 1998), we suppose that the sequence {ψη}η∈Hn(Q) is ordered by the
relation: η′ ≥ η whenever η′ is a reﬁnement of η). Let Ψ (n)+ be the set of all functions
ψ ∈ rΨn+ satisfying the requirement
ψ(n)(Q) = ψ(Q, . . . , Q).
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Put rΨ (n) := rΨ (n)+ − rΨ (n)+ , and recall (Vasil’ev, 1998) that any function ψ ∈ rΨ (n)
is said to be a homogeneous polyadditive set function from rΨn.
Now we are ready to present one of the main deﬁnitions of the paper (cf. Deﬁ-
nition 11 from (Vasil’ev, 1998)).
Deﬁnition 8. For any v ∈ rV (n), a polyadditive set function ψv ∈ rΨ (n) is said to
be a polar form of the game v, if ψv meets the requirement
v(S) = ψv(S, . . . , S) for any S ∈ B.
Speaking diﬀerently, for any v ∈ rV (n), a polyadditive set function ψv ∈ rΨ (n) is
a polar form of v if the diagonalization of ψv (i.e. restriction ψv to the diagonal
D = {(S1, . . . , Sn) ∈ Bn | S1 = . . . = Sn}) coincides with v.
Remark 4. Note, that in case Q is a metric compactum, regularity of polar form
ψv is equivalent to its countable additivity with respect to each variable Si (see, for
example, (Neveu, 1965)).
The well-known polar existence theorem for the homogeneous polynomial func-
tionals (Hille and Phillips, 1957), together with Theorem 1 made it possible to es-
tablish a polar existence theorem for rather general class of homogeneous polynomial
set functions (see (Vasil’ev, 1998) and (Vasil’ev, 2001)). By applying regularity and
compactness assumptions imposed on v and Q, respectively, one can quite easily
derive from (Vasil’ev, 1998) the following modiﬁed version of general polar existence
theorem (cf. Theorem 5 from (Vasil’ev, 1998)).
Theorem 3. For any n ≥ 1 and v ∈ rV (n), there exists a unique polar form ψv of
the game v.
To present one of the main results, relating to the interconnection between the
Shapley value and polar form of homogeneous polynomial game, remind ﬁrst the
deﬁnition of the modiﬁed Shapley value Φ∗, introduced in (Vasil’ev, 1998) (see,
also, (Vasil’ev, 2001)), and covering both nonatomic an mixed games. Recall brieﬂy
(Vasil’ev, 1998), that a linear operator Φ∗ : W → rV 1, deﬁned on a symmetric
subspaceW ⊆ V, is to be a modiﬁed Shapley value onW, if it is an eﬃcient, positive,
support preserving, and commuting with any measurable automorphism θ of the
measurable space (Q,B). To be precise, denote by T the set of this automorphisms,
and for any θ ∈ T and v ∈ rV deﬁne a composition θ ◦ v by the formula
θ ◦ v(S) = v(θ(S)), S ∈ B.
Further, recall (Aumann and Shapley, 1974) that a linear subspaceW ⊆ V is called
symmetric, if a set function θ ◦ v belongs to W for any v ∈ W and θ ∈ T .
Deﬁnition 9 (Vasil’ev, 1975b). A modiﬁed Shapley value on a symmetric sub-
space W ⊆ V is a linear operator Φ∗ : W → rV 1, satisfying assumptions
(Sh.1) Φ∗(v) ≥o 0, v ∈ W+;
(Sh.2) Φ∗(θ ◦ v) = θ ◦ Φ∗(v), θ ∈ T , v ∈ W ;
(Sh.3) Φ∗(v)(R) = v(R), R ∈ Supp v, v ∈W ;
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where, as before, rV 1 is a space of all regular additive set functions on B, and W+
is a "positive part" of W : W+ := W ∩ V+. As to the collection Supp v consisting
of the supports of v, it is deﬁned by the formula
Supp v := {R ∈ B | v(S ∩R) = v(S) for any S ∈ B}.
By applying regularity of functions from rpV and compactness of metric space
(Q, d), one can prove that rpV itself, and rV (n), rV n, n ≥ 1, are symmetric
subspaces of V . Further, in (Vasil’ev, 1998) some special construction was proposed
that ensures existence of modiﬁed value for rV (n), rV n, and rpV . Hence, combining
this fact together with Theorem 3, and making use of corresponding argumentation
yielding Theorem 6 from (Vasil’ev, 1998), one can get the following version of the
tatter theorem.
Theorem 4. Let Q be a nonempty metrisable compactum. For any n ≥ 1 and
v ∈ rV (n)(Q) it holds
Φ∗(v)(S) = ψv(S,Q, . . . , Q), S ∈ B,
where, as before, ψv is the polar form of a game v.
5. Polar Representation of the Shapley Value: Nonatomic Games
Turn now to the main part of the paper devoted to the short proof of Theorem 4
in case v ∈ rpNA = rpNA(Q) with Q = [0, 1]. Note ﬁrst, that rather simple
argumentation, based on the well-known Aumann-Shapley existence and unique-
ness theorem (Theorem A from (Aumann and Shapley, 1974)), proves the coinci-
dence of the modiﬁed Shapley value Φ∗ and classic Shapley value Φ on the space
rpNA. The reason is the coincidence of the modiﬁed value Φ∗ and the Shapley
value Φ on the linear hull of degrees of nonatomic probabilistic measures. Namely,
from the results obtained in (Aumann and Shapley, 1974) and (Vasil’ev, 1998) it
follows that Φ∗(μk) = Φ(μk) = μ for any k ≥ 1 and nonatomic probabilistic mea-
sure μ on B. Further, let us stress once more that instead of complicated combi-
natorial consideration applied in general situation (see proof of Theorem 6 from
(Vasil’ev, 1998)), we plan to exploit the generalized Owen integral formula estab-
lished in (Aumann and Shapley, 1974). Due to the coincidence of generalized Owen
extension and Aumann-Shapley expansion for games from rpNA (Corollary 1 in
Sect. 3) we have that integrand in the generalized integral formula mentioned above
is quite easy to calculate. In fact, by Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 this calculation can
be reduced to elementary problem of ﬁnding directional derivatives of the continuous
symmetric multilinear form, generated by the homogeneous polynomial functional
Pv.
To justify a version of the generalized Owen integral formula applied below, let us
mention ﬁrst that Theorem G from (Aumann and Shapley, 1974) implies existence
and uniqueness of the Aumann-Shapley expansion for the space rpNA. Really, the
latter follows directly from Theorems 1 and 2 of this paper. As to the generalized
integral formula itself (Theorem H from (Aumann and Shapley, 1974)), it holds for
rpNA due to the inclusion rpNA ⊆ pNA. Therefore, we get the following analog
of the Owen integral formula for the homogeneous games from rpNA.
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Theorem 5. For any game v ∈ rpNA, and for any coalition S ∈ B, directional
derivative
∂Pv(t, S) :=
d
dτ
Pv(tχQ + τχS),
calculated at τ = 0, exists at each point t ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, this derivative is
integrable as a function of t ∈ [0, 1]. In addition, for any n ≥ 1, the Shapley value
Φ : rpNA ∩ rV (n) → rV 1, and derivatives of Pv in the direction of χS satisfy the
equalities
Φ(v)(S) =
∫ 1
0
∂Pv(t, S)dt, S ∈ B. (6)
Recall (Vasil’ev, 1998), that a symmetric multilinear functional p̂ : In → R is
said to be a polar form of homogeneous polynomial functional p ∈ P(n) if
p(f) = p̂(f, . . . , f) for any f ∈ I.
It is well-known that polar form p̂ exists whenever polynomial functional p is ho-
mogeneous and continuous (see, e.g., (Hille and Phillips, 1957)). Note, that due
to Theorem 1 polynomial functional Pv is continuous and homogeneous for any
v ∈ rV (n). In fact, taking into account that ‖v‖0 = ‖v(n)‖0 for any v ∈ rV (n), we
have by (P .4) : |Pv(f)| ≤ ‖v‖0‖f‖n∞ for any v ∈ rV (n) and f ∈ I. Therefore, Pv
is continuous for any v ∈ rV (n). As to the homogeneity of Pv in case v ∈ rV (n),
it follows directly from the property (P .3). Hence, for any v ∈ rV (n) there exists
a polar form P̂v of the generalized Owen extension Pv and, consequently, for any
v ∈ rV (n) it holds
Pv(f) = P̂v(f, . . . , f), f ∈ I. (7)
Keep in mind (7), let us mention that according to (6) to prove Theorem 4
in case Q = [0, 1] and v ∈ rpNA ∩ rV (n) it is enough to calculate corresponding
directional derivatives of Pv at each point of the diagonal {tχQ | t ∈ [0, 1]} of the
unit supercube I = {f ∈ I+ | ‖f‖∞ ≤ 1}, and then to demonstrate that Lebesgue
integral of the directional derivative coincides with the marginal value of the polar
form of generalized Owen extension Pv. In order to carry out this program we
rewrite integrand in (6) in terms of the polar form P̂v of the functional Pv :
∂ϕ(t, S) := lim
τ→0
Pv(tQ + τS)− Pv(tQ)
τ
=
lim
τ→0
[
P̂v(tQ+ τS, . . . , tQ+ τS︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
)− P̂v(tQ, . . . , tQ︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
)
]
/τ (8)
with a standard shortening S := χS when indicator function χS is replaced by the
set S itself. Since P̂v is symmetric and multilinear, under condition n ≥ 2 we get
P̂v(tQ+ τS, . . . , tQ+ τS)− P̂v(tQ, . . . , tQ) =
C1nP̂v(τS, tQ, . . . , tQ︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1
) +
n∑
k=2
CknP̂v(τS, . . . , τS︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
, tQ, . . . , tQ︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−k
) =
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nτtn−1P̂v(S,Q, . . . , Q︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1
) +
n∑
k=2
Cknτ
ktn−kP̂v(S, . . . , S︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
, Q, . . . , Q︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−k
). (9)
For n = 1 we have that P̂v is a linear form. Hence, in this case we obtain
P̂v(τS + tQ)− P̂v(tQ) = τP̂v(S).
After dividing the last term in (9) into τ, and calculating the limit under τ → 0,
we obtain by (8)
∂ϕ(t, S) = ntn−1P̂v(S,Q, . . . , Q︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1
) + lim
τ→0
τ
[ n∑
k=2
Cknτ
k−2tn−kP̂v(S, . . . , S︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
, Q, . . . , Q︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−k
)
]
.
Hence, the boundedness of the polynomial
n∑
k=2
Cknτ
k−2tn−kP̂v(S, . . . , S︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
, Q, . . . , Q︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−k
)
(as a function depending on τ ∈ [0, 1]) implies
∂ϕ(t, S) = ntn−1P̂v(S,Q, . . . , Q︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1
). (10)
By applying (6) and (10), we deduce the required representation for the Shapley
value of nonatomic homogeneous cooperative game v ∈ rpNA ∩ rV (n) :
Φ(v)(S) =
∫ 1
0
∂ϕ(t, S)dt = nP̂v(S,Q, . . . , Q)
∫ 1
0
tn−1dt = P̂v(S,Q, . . . , Q).
Summarizing, we have that Theorems 1 and 5 together with the straightforward
calculation of directional derivatives of the generalized Owen extension Pv yields
the polar representation of the Shapley value in case v ∈ rpNA ∩ rV (n).
References
Aliprantis, C.D. and K.C. Border (1994). Inﬁnite Dimensional Analysis. Springer-Verlag:
Berlin.
Aumann, R. J. and L. S. Shapley (1974). Values of Nonatomic Games, Princeton University
Press: Princeton, NJ.
Frechet, M. (1910). Sur les functionelles continues, Ann. Sci. Ecole Norm. Sup., 37, 193–
234 (in French).
Harsanyi, J. A. (1959). A bargaining model for cooperative n-person games. In: Contri-
butions to the Theory of Games IV (Tucker, A.W. and R.D. Luce, eds), Vol. 40,
pp. 325–355.
Hille, E. and R. S. Phillips (1957). Functional Analysis and Semi-groups, Amer. Math. Soc.
Colloquium Publishers, Providence, RI.
Neveu, J. (1965). Mathematical Foundations of the Calculus of Probability, Holden Day:
San Francisco, CA.
Owen, G. (1972). Multilinear extensions of games. J. Manag. Sci., 18(5), 64–79.
Vasil’ev, V.A. (1975a). On a space of nonadditive set functions. Optimization, 16(33),
99–120 (in Russian).
446 Valeri A. Vasil’ev
Vasil’ev, V.A. (1975b). The Shapley value for cooperative games of bounded polynomial
variation. Optimization, 17(34), 5–26 (in Russian).
Vasil’ev, V.A. (1998). The Shapley functional and polar forms of homogeneous polynomial
games. Siberian Adv. in Math., 8(4), 109–150.
Vasil’ev, V.A. (2001). Polar forms, p-values, and the core. In: Approximation, Optimi-
sation and Mathematical Economics (Lassonde, M. ed), pp. 357–368. Physica-Verlag:
Heidelberg-New York.
Vasil’ev, V.A. (2006). Cores and generalized NM-solutions for some classes of cooper-
ative games. In: Russian Contributions to Game Theory and Equilibrium Theory
(Driessen,T. G. van der Laan, V. Vasil’ev, and E. Yanovskaya, eds), pp. 91–149.
Springer-Verlag: Berlin-Heidelberg-New York.
Vasil’ev, V.A. (2009). An axiomatization of generalized Owen extension. Math. Game Th.
and Appl., 1(2), 3 – 13 (in Russian).
Vasil’ev, V.A. and M.G. Zuev (1988). Support function of the core of a convex game on a
metric compactum. Optimization, 44(61), 155–160 (in Russian).
A Simple Way to Obtain the Suﬃcient Nonemptiness
Conditions for Core of TU Game
Alexandra B. Zinchenko
Southern Federal University,
Faculty of Mathematics, Mechanics and Computer Science,
Milchakova, 8"a", Rostoov-on Don, 344090, Russia
E-mail: zinch46@gmail.com
Abstract The system of linear constraints like one that determines the core
of TU game is considered. Expressing its basis solutions through character-
istic function we obtain a list of suﬃcient conditions under which the core
is nonempty. Some of them are the generalizations of known results.
Keywords: cooperative TU game, core, balancedness, suﬃcient conditions.
1. Introduction
The core (Gillies, 1953) is the most frequently applied multivalued solution of co-
operative game theory. Under the grand coalition advantageous the analysis of any
TU game usually begins with veriﬁcation of core existence. For concrete game this
possible to do by means of linear programming problem with constraint set cov-
ers the core. The core of TU game is empty if and only if the optimal value of
this problem is strictly greater than a grand coalition’s weight. If we try to prove
the core non-emptiness for certain class of games we need condition, expressed
through characteristic function. Such is Bondareva-Shapley balancedness condition
(Bondareva, 1963; Shapley, 1967). That condition is equivalent to linear system with
entries corresponding to the extreme points of polytope in R2
n−1. The number of
extreme points and their explicit representation known only for small n.
There exist more simple but only suﬃcient conditions. The most known is the
convexity of game. The minimal convexity test consists of 2
nn(n−1)
8 inequalities
(Voorneveld and Grahn, 2001). In this paper the simple procedure to generate suf-
ﬁcient nonemptiness conditions for core of TU game is described. For any basis
matrix consisting of coalitional characteristic vectors we can obtain suﬃcient condi-
tion deﬁned by a system of 2n−n−1 linear inequalities. So each condition determines
a cone in linear space of all TU games.
The following table illustrates what increases the number of inequalities in con-
ditions mentioned above when n increase.
n 3 4 5 6 7
balancedness condition 5 41 1291 200213 132422035
minimal convexity test 6 24 80 240 672
suﬃcient condition 4 11 26 57 120
The paper has the following contents. Next section recalls the standard facts of
cooperative game theory which are useful later. The balancedness condition, mini-
mal balanced sets and some classes of balanced games are described in third section.
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The last section contains the set of suﬃcient nonemptiness conditions correspond-
ing to special bases and shows that some of them are the generalizations of known
results.
2. Preliminaries
A cooperative TU game is a pair (N, ν) where N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is a player set,
n ≥ 2, ν : 2N → R is a set function satisfying ν(∅) = 0. Throughout the paper
we identify (N, ν) and ν. The class of TU games with player set N will be denoted
by GN . A payoﬀ vector for a game ν ∈ GN (ore allocation) is a vector x ∈ Rn. A
subset of N is called a coalition, ν(S) expresses the worth of coalition S and eS is
the characteristic vector of coalition S, i.e. (eS)i = 1 if i ∈ S, (eS)i = 0 otherwise.
Sometimes (for simplicity) we shall write N \ i instead of N \ {i}, ν(123) instead
of ν({1, 2, 3}) and so on. For any S ∈ 2N and x ∈ Rn let x(S) = ∑i∈S xi and
x(∅) = 0. The cardinality of coalition S is written as |S|. The rank of matrix A is
denoted as rank(A). The dual game ν∗ of ν ∈ GN is determined by
ν∗(S) = ν(N)− ν(N \ S) for every S ⊆ N.
A game ν ∈ GN is called:
• zero-normalized if ν(i) = 0 for all i ∈ N ,
• nonnegative if ν(S) ≥ 0 for all S ⊆ N ,
• monotonic if ν(S) ≤ ν(T ) for all S ⊂ T ⊆ N ,
• N-essential if ∑i∈N ν(i) < ν(N),
• convex (concave) if
ν(S) + ν(T ) ≤ (≥) ν(S ∪ T ) + ν(S ∩ T ) for all S, T ⊆ N.
If the grand coalition is formed then players can divide the amount ν(N). The order
on N is a bijection π : N → N . The set of all orders π = {π1, . . . , πn} is given by
Π(N). The Weber set of game ν ∈ GN , denoted by W (ν), is the convex hull in Rn
of all π-marginal vectors
W (ν) = conv{mπ(ν) | π ∈ Π(N)}
were
mπi (ν) = ν(S
π
i )− ν(Sπi−1), Sπi = {π1, . . . , πi}, i ∈ N.
W (ν) = ∅ for any game ν ∈ GN . For the description of other set-valued solution
concepts is used the set
X(ν) = {x ∈ RN | x(N) = ν(N)}
of eﬃcient payoﬀ distributions of ν(N) named the preimputation set and its sub-
sets: the imputation set
I(ν) = {x ∈ X(ν) | xi ≥ ν(i), i ∈ N},
the dual imputation set
I∗(ν) = {x ∈ X(ν) | xi ≤ ν∗(i), i ∈ N}.
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I(ν) = ∅ iﬀ ∑i∈N ν(i) ≤ ν(N). If a game ν ∈ GN is N -essential then I(ν) is an
(n− 1)-dimensional simplex with extreme points f i(ν) ∈ Rn, i ∈ N , where
(f i(ν))j =
{
ν(j), i = j,
ν(N)−∑k∈N\i ν(k), i = j, for all i ∈ N.
I∗(ν) = ∅ iﬀ ∑i∈N ν∗(i) ≥ ν(N). In case of strict inequality I∗(ν) is an (n− 1)-
dimensional simplex with extreme points gi(ν) ∈ Rn, i ∈ N , where
(gi(ν))j =
{
ν∗(j), i = j,
ν(N)−∑k∈N\i ν∗(k), i = j. for all i ∈ N.
The core of a game ν ∈ GN is a subset of core cover (Branzei and Tijs, 2001)
CC(ν) = I(ν) ∩ I∗(ν) deﬁned by
C(ν) = {x ∈ I(ν) | x(S) ≥ ν(S), S ⊆ N}.
Thus ν(i) ≤ xi ≤ ν∗(i) for all i ∈ N and x ∈ C(ν). Web(ν), I(ν), I∗(ν), CC(ν)
and C(ν) are the polytopes in Rn. The set of extreme points of polytope P will be
denoted by ext(P).
Two players i, j ∈ N are symmetric in ν ∈ GN if ν(S ∪ i) = ν(S ∪ j) for every
S ⊆ N \ {i, j}. A player i ∈ N is a veto player in ν ∈ GN if ν(S) = 0 for each
S  i. The set of veto players is denoted by V eto(ν).
3. Balancedness
Let
Ω1 = 2N \ {∅}, Ω2 = 2N \ {N, ∅}, Ω(k1, k2) = {S ∈ 2N | k1 ≤ |S| ≤ k2}
are the sets of nonempty coalitions, proper coalitions and coalitions with restricted
size. It is proved (Bondareva, 1963; Shapley, 1967) that the core of a game ν ∈ GN
is nonempty iﬀ ∑
S∈Ω1
λSν(S) ≤ ν(N) for all λ ∈ ext(Λn) (1)
where
Λn = {λ ∈ R2n−1+ |
∑
S∈Ω1
eSλS = e
N}.
A game ν ∈ GN satisfying (1) is called balanced game. The condition (1) is called
balancedness condition. In some game theory literature a game is balanced if it have
a nonempty core.
A collection F = {F}mi=1 of coalitions Fi ∈ Ω2 is called minimal balanced set
if there exists λ ∈ ext(Λn) such that λS > 0 for S ∈ F and λS = 0 otherwise
(this deﬁnition can be given in alternative form). The vector α(F ) = (α(Fi))mi=1
with α(Fi) = λFi is called weight vector for F . In terms of minimal balanced sets
a necessary and suﬃcient condition for nonemptiness of the core of game ν ∈ GN
can be written as ∑
Fi∈F
α(Fi)ν(Fi) ≤ ν(N) for all F ∈ Fn, (2)
where Fn denotes a family of all minimal balanced sets on N .
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Deﬁnition 1. A linear inequality is called convexity-inequality, concavity-inequality,
union-inequality ore balancedness-inequality if it contains in system deﬁning corre-
sponding property of game ν.
The number of balancedness-inequalities grows very rapidly with n. Some of
them deﬁne necessary and suﬃcient nonemptiness conditions for other sets. I(ν) = ∅
(I∗(ν) = ∅ ) iﬀ the corresponding to {{1}, . . . , {n}} ({N \ {1}, . . . , N \ {n}})
balancedness-inequality is satisﬁed. CC(ν) = ∅ iﬀ a game ν ∈ GN satisﬁes inequal-
ities corresponding to {{1}, . . . , {n}}, {N \ {1}, . . . , N \ {n}} and {{i}, N \ {i}},
i ∈ N .
Let us list some types of balanced games which characterization yields a suﬃcient
conditions for core existence. A game is T -simplex (Branzei and Tijs, 2001) where
T ∈ Ω1 if its core is a subsimplex of imputation set, i.e. a game is N -essential and
C(ν) = conv{f i(ν)|i ∈ T }.
A game is dual-simplex (Branzei and Tijs, 2001) if its core is a subsimplex of dual
imputation set, i.e. ν(N) <
∑
i∈N ν
∗(i) and there is a coalition T ∈ Ω1 such that
C(ν) = conv{gi(ν)|i ∈ T }.
A balanced game satisﬁes the CoMa-property (Hamers et al., 2002) iﬀ the extreme
points of its core are marginal vectors, i.e. ext(C(ν)) ⊆ ext(Web(ν)). The convex
games satisfy the CoMa-property because for them C(ν) = Web(ν) (Shapley, 1971).
The non-convex games that satisfy the CoMa-property are: information games
(Kuipers, 1993), assignment games (Hamers et al., 2002), cost spanning tree games
(Granot and Huberman, 1981). If a game ν ∈ GN is permutationally convex with
respect to an order π ∈ Π(N) then corresponding marginal vector mπ(ν) is a core
allocation (in other words ext(C(ν))∩ext(Web(ν)) = ∅). But the reverse is not true
in general (Velzen et al., 2005).
A game ν ∈ GN is clan game with coalition CL = ∅ as clan (Potters et al., 1989)
if: it satisﬁes the union property
ν(N)− ν(S) ≥
∑
i∈N\S
ν∗(i) for all S ⊆ N with CL ⊆ S;
ν and ν∗(i), i ∈ N , are non-negative; ν(S) = 0 if CL ⊂ S (clan property).
A game ν ∈ GN (n ≥ 3) is called a big boss game with player 1 as big boss
(Muto, et al., 1988) if: ν is monotonic; ν(S) = 0 for all S ⊂ N with 1 /∈ S (boss
property); ν(N)−ν(S) ≥∑i∈N\S ν∗(i) for all S ⊆ N with 1 ∈ S (union property).
4. Suﬃcient conditions
Consider the system
x(S) ≥ ν(S), S ∈ Ω2, −x(N) ≥ −ν(N) (3)
diﬀers from one determines the core of game ν ∈ GN that eﬃciency condition
x(N) = ν(N) (4)
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is replaced with inequality x(N) ≤ ν(N). If the system (3) is non-solvable than the
core of game ν ∈ GN is empty. Let xˆ is a solution to system (3). If it satisﬁes (4)
than xˆ ∈ C(ν). Otherwise the payoﬀ vectors xi, i ∈ N , where
xij =
{
xˆj , i = j,
ν(N) −∑k∈N\i xˆk, i = j,
are the core allocations. The system (3) can be presented in the form
Ax ≥ ν, (5)
where x ∈ Rn, ν = (ν(S))S∈Ω1 , ν(S) = ν(S), S ∈ Ω2, ν(N) = −ν(N), A is the
(2n− 1)×n matrix with row vectors AS refering to S ∈ Ω1. The ﬁrst (2n− 2) rows
of matrix A are the characteristic vectors eS of coalitions S ∈ Ω2. The last row
AN = −eN of A corresponds to the grand coalition. Obviously rank(A) = n.
Let B = (bij)n be a basis of A. By transposition of rows the matrix A can be
represented in the form A = (B D)T and system (3) becomes
Bx ≥ νB, Dx ≥ νD,
where νB = (ν(S))S∈B , νD = (ν(S))S∈D is a basis, nonbasis partition of variables
in the vector ν . The system Bx = νB determines the unique basis solution xB =
B−1νB . If xB satisﬁes DxB ≥ νD then it is the feasible solution to system (5).
The following provides a simple suﬃcient condition. Let ν ∈ GN and B is a basis
of matrix A in (5). If ν satisﬁes
D(B−1νB) ≥ νD (6)
then C(ν) = ∅.
The next two examples illustrate the above technique for the most simple bases.
Example 1. Take basis
B = {A{1}, . . . , A{n}}T
with characteristic vectors of single player coalitions as rows. Thus B and B−1 are
the n× n identity matrixes, xB = (ν(1), . . . .ν(n)). Condition (6) becomes
ν(S) ≤
∑
i∈S
ν(i), S ∈ Ω1.
It determines the set ofN -simplex games. For all i ∈ N the payoﬀ vector xi coincides
with extreme point f i(ν) of imputation set.
Example 2. Basis
B = {A{1}, . . . , A{n−1}, AN}T
diﬀers from previous one that A{n} is replaced on AN = −eN . The matrixes B,
B−1 = (b−1ij )n and basis solution x
B are determined by
bij = b
−1
ij =
⎧⎨⎩ 1, (i = j) ∧ (i = n),−1, i = n,
0, otherwise.
xBi =
{
ν(i), i = n,
ν(N) −∑n−1i=1 ν(i), i = n,
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xB is a core allocation and coincide with extreme point fn(ν) of imputation set.
Condition (6) becomes
ν(S) ≤
∑
i∈S
ν(i) if n /∈ S, ν(S) ≤ ν(N)−
∑
i∈N\S
ν(i) if n ∈ S, S ∈ Ω(2, n− 1).
We obtain the description of subcone of balanced games containing the set of such
T -simplex games that T  n.
Deﬁnition 2. Let F ∈ Fn is a minimal balanced set and β ∈ R. A linear inequality∑
Fi∈F
α(Fi)ν(Fi) ≤ β
is called strengthened-balancedness-inequality if β ≤ ν(N).
The next theorem provides an explicit representation the condition (6) for basis
B = (AN\1 AN\2 . . . AN\n)T (7)
consisting of characteristic vectors for all coalitions of size (n − 1). The corollary
1 show that this condition consists of balancedness-inequality and strengthened-
balancedness-inequalities only.
Theorem 1. Let ν ∈ GN . The following two conditions∑
i∈N
ν(N \ i)
n− 1 ≤ ν(N), (8)
ν(S) ≤ (|S|+ 1− n)
∑
i∈S ν(N \ i) + |S|
∑
i∈N\S ν(N \ i)
n− 1 , S ∈ Ω(1, n− 2) (9)
imply that C(ν) = ∅.
Proof. Consider the basis (7). The matrix B and inverse matrix B−1 have the form
bij =
{
0, i = j,
1, i = j, b
−1
ij =
{ 2−n
n−1 , i = j,
1
n−1 , i = j.
Therefor, xB = B−1νB is determined by
xBi =
∑
j∈N\i ν(N \ j) + (2− n)ν(N \ i)
n− 1 , i ∈ N. (10)
Obviously, xB(N) is equal to the left side of inequality (8). The equality∑
i∈S
∑
j∈N\i
ν(N \ j) = |S|
∑
i∈N\S
ν(N \ i) + (|S| − 1)
∑
i∈S
ν(N \ i)
implies that xB(S) is equal to the right side of inequality in (9). Thus condition (6)
holds. 
unionsq
A Simple Way to Obtain the Suﬃcient Nonemptiness Conditions for Core 453
Corollary 1. The conditions in Theorem 1 consist of one balancedness-inequality
and 2n − n− 2 strengthened-balancedness-inequalities
ν(S) +
∑
i∈S ν(N \ i)
|S| ≤ x
B(N), S ∈ Ω(1, n− 2), (11)
with identical right side, where xB is determined by (10).
Proof. Known that F 1 =
⋃
i∈N{N \ i} is minimal balanced set with weight vector
α(F 1) = ( 1n−1 , . . . ,
1
n−1 ). Corresponding to F
1 inequality in (2) coincides with (8).
Therefore, (8) is balancedness-inequality. Take S ∈ Ω(1, n−2). After transformation
the right side of inequality in (9)
(|S|+ 1− n)∑i∈S ν(N \ i) + |S|∑i∈N\S ν(N \ i)
n− 1 =
|S|∑i∈N ν(N \ i)− (n− 1)∑i∈S ν(N \ i)
n− 1 =
|S|∑i∈N ν(N \ i)
n− 1 −
∑
i∈S
ν(N \ i) =
|S|xB(N)−
∑
i∈S
ν(N \ i),
we obtain that the system (9) is equivalent with (11). The collection of coalitions
F 1 = {{N \S}∪(⋃i∈S{i})} belongs to Fn because it is the partition of N , α(F 1) =
(1, . . . , 1). The complementation gives minimal balanced set
F 2 = {S ∪ (
⋃
i∈S
{N \ i})}
with weight vector α(F 2) where
α(F 2i ) =
α(F 1i )∑|F 1|
i=1 α(F
1
i )− 1
=
1
|S| .
According to (8), xB(N) ≤ ν(N). In view of deﬁnition 2 any inequality in (11)
is strengthened-balanced-inequality. The number of such inequalities is equal to
|D| − 1 = 2n − n− 2. 
unionsq
The following theorem show that it is possible to replace all (ore some) inequalities
in system (9) by union-inequalities.
Theorem 2. Let ν ∈ GN . For any ﬁxed r ∈ {0, . . . , n − 2} the balancedness-
inequality (8) together with strengthened-balancedness-inequalities
ν(S) +
∑
i∈S ν(N \ i)
|S| ≤
∑
i∈N ν(N \ i)
n− 1 , S ∈ Ω(1, r), (12)
and union-inequalities
ν(N)− ν(S) ≥
∑
i∈N\S
ν∗(i), S ∈ Ω(r + 1, n− 2), (13)
imply than C(ν) = ∅.
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Proof. Of course every inequality in (13) is a union-inequality (for CL = S). In
view of corollary 1 it is suﬃcient to prove that from (13) follows
ρS = |S|
∑
i∈N
ν(N \ i)− (n− 1)(ν(S) +
∑
i∈S
ν(N \ i)) ≥ 0, S ∈ Ω(r + 1, n− 2)
ore
|S|
∑
i∈N\S
ν(N \ i)− (n− 1)ν(S)+ (|S|−n+1)
∑
i∈S
ν(N \ i) ≥ 0, S ∈ Ω(r+1, n− 2).
From (8) it follows that
(|S| − n+ 1)
∑
i∈S
ν(N \ i) ≥ (n− |S| − 1)
∑
i∈N\S
ν(N \ i) + (|S| − n+ 1)(n− 1)ν(N).
Two last inequalities implies
ρS
n− 1 ≥
∑
i∈N\S
ν(N \ i)− ν(S)− (n− |S| − 1)ν(N) =
ν(N)− ν(S)− (
∑
i∈N\S
(ν(N)− ν(N \ i)) = ν(N)− ν(S)−
∑
i∈N\S
ν∗(i).
Using (13) we have ρS ≥ 0 for all S ∈ Ω(r, n− 2). 
unionsq
Let BALn be the cone of balanced games ν ∈ GN and BALnr ⊂ BALn be the
subcone generated by conditions in Theorem 2 . Since each inequality in (12) follows
from corresponding inequality in (13) and balancedness-inequality (8) then
BALn0 ⊂ BALn1 ⊂ . . . ⊂ BALnn−2.
The next example show that BALn0 = ∅.
Example 3. Consider 5-person game :
ν(i) = 0 for all i ∈ N = {1, . . . , 5}, ν(N) = 10,
ν(12) = ν(13) = ν(14) = ν(15) = 2,
ν(23) = ν(24) = ν(25) = ν(34) = ν(35) = 1,
ν(123) = ν(124) = ν(125) = ν(134) = ν(135) = 5,
ν(234) = ν(235) = ν(345) = 4,
ν(1234) = ν(1235) = ν(1245) = ν(1345) = 8, ν(2345) = 7.
The core have ﬁve extreme points
ext(C(ν)) = {(2, 2, 2, 2, 2), (3, 1, 2, 2, 2), (3, 2, 1, 2, 2), (3, 2, 2, 1, 2), (3, 2, 2, 2, 1)}.
This is monotonic, superadditive, but non-convex even for the grand coalition
(ν(1234) + ν(1235) > ν(N) + ν(123)) game. Players marginal contributions to the
grand coalition are:
ν∗(1) = 3, ν∗(2) = ν∗(3) = ν∗(4) = ν∗(5) = 2.
Take r = 0. Since the players 2-5 are symmetric it is suﬃcient to verify:
|S| = 1 =⇒ ν(N)− ν(1) ≥ 4ν∗(2), ν(N)− ν(2) ≥ ν∗(1) + 3ν∗(2),
|S| = 2 =⇒ ν(N)− ν(12) ≥ 3ν∗(3), ν(N)− ν(23) ≥ ν∗(1) + 2ν∗(4),
|S| = 3 =⇒ ν(N)− ν(123) ≥ 2ν∗(2), ν(N)− ν(234) ≥ ν∗(1) + ν∗(2).
All inequalities hold. From (10) we obtain
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xB = (2.75, 1.75, 1.75, 1.75, 1.75).
As ν(N)− xB(N) = 0.25 then xB ∈ C(ν). But we have ﬁve core allocations associ-
ated with basis B:
x1 = (3, 1.75, 1.75, 1.75, 1.75), x2 = (2.75, 2, 1.75, 1.75, 1.75),
x3 = (2.75, 1.75, 2, 1.75, 1.75), x4 = (2.75, 1.75, 1.75, 2, 1.75),
x5 = (2.75, 1.75, 1.75, 1.75, 2).
Next theorem provides the suﬃcient condition corresponding to basis
B = ((A{i})i∈H , (AN\i)i∈(N\H)\i∗ , AN )T
where H ∈ (2N \ {N}) \ {i∗}.
Theorem 3. Let ν ∈ GN . Let also i∗ ∈ N , H ∈ (2N \ {N}) \ {i∗} are ﬁxed and
Ω2H = {S ∈ Ω2| S = {i} for i ∈ H, S = {N \ i} for i ∈ (N \ H) \ i∗}. The
following two conditions
ν(S) ≤
∑
i∈S∩H
ν(i) +
∑
i∈S\H
ν∗(i), S ∈ Ω2H , i∗ /∈ S, (14)
ν(S) ≤ ν(N) −
∑
i∈H\S
ν(i)−
∑
i∈(N\H)\S
ν∗(i), S ∈ Ω2H , i∗ ∈ S, (15)
imply that C(ν) = ∅.
Proof. Consider the vector xBH determined by
(xBH)i =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
ν(i), i ∈ H,
ν∗(i), i ∈ (N \H) \ i∗,
ν(N)− ∑
j∈H
ν(j) − ∑
j∈(N\H)\i∗
ν(N \ j), i = i∗.
If i∗ ∈ S then xBH(S) coincides with right side of inequality in (14). If i∗ ∈ S then
xBH(S) =
∑
i∈S∩H
ν(i) +
∑
i∈S\H\i∗
ν∗(i) + ν(N)−
∑
i∈H
ν(i)−
∑
i∈(N\H)\i∗
ν(N \ i)
is equals to the right side of of inequality in (15). Since xBH(S) = ν(S) for all
S ∈ Ω1 \Ω2H we have xBH ∈ C(ν). 
unionsq
Corollary 2. The system (14)-(15) characterizes such class of TU games that at
least one extreme point of imputation set I(ν) or dual imputation set I∗(ν) or core
cover CC(ν) belongs to core.
Proof. Let H and i∗ be the same as in Theorem 3. If H = N \ i∗ then xBH is deﬁned
by
(xBH)i =
{
ν(i), i ∈ N \ i∗,
ν(N)− ∑
j∈N\i∗
ν(j), i = i∗.
Therefore xB(H) = f i
∗
(ν) ∈ ext(I(ν)). If H = ∅ then
(xBH)i =
{
ν∗(i), i ∈ N \ i∗,
ν(N)− ∑
j∈N\i∗
ν∗(j), i = i∗,
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and xBH = g
i∗(ν) ∈ ext(I∗(ν)). Let mow H ∈ Ω2 \ {N \ i∗}. The core cover CC(ν)
is deﬁned by the system
xi ≥ ν(i), xi ≤ ν∗(i), i ∈ N, x(N) = ν(N).
The vector xBH satisﬁes as equality n − 1 linearly independent inequalities in this
system and xBH(N) = ν(N). So x
B
H ∈ ext(CC(ν)). 
unionsq
Now we give example to illustrate the conditions in Theorem 3.
Example 4. Let ν ∈ G{1,2,3} and (without loss of generality) i∗ = 3. The conditions
in Theorem 3, corresponding to all possible choices for coalition H ∈ (2N \ {N}) \
i∗ are given in the following table. For each H the inequalities listed in the last
H S ∈ Ω2H inequalities in (14), (15) transformed inequalities
{3} ν(12) ≤ ν(1) + ν(2)
{12} {12} ν(3) ≤ ν(N)− ν(1)− ν(2) ν(1) + ν(2) + ν(3) ≤ ν(N)
{13} ν(13) ≤ ν(N)− ν(2) ν(2) + ν(13) ≤ ν(N)
{23} ν(23) ≤ ν(N)− ν(1) ν(1) + ν(23) ≤ ν(N)
{1} ν(1) ≤ ν∗(1) similar H = {12}, S = {23}
∅ {2} ν(2) ≤ ν∗(2) similar H = {12}, S = {13}
{3} ν(12) ≤ ν∗(1) + ν∗(2) ν(12) + ν(13) + ν(23) ≤ 2ν(N)
{12} ν(3) ≤ ν(N)− ν∗(1)− ν∗(2) ν(13) + ν(23) ≥ ν(N) + ν(3)
{2} ν(2) ≤ ν∗(2) similar H = {12}, S = {13}
{1} {3} ν(12) ≤ ν(1) + ν∗(2) ν(12) + ν(13) ≤ ν(N) + ν(1)
{12} ν(3) ≤ ν(N)− ν(1)− ν∗(2) ν(1) + ν(3) ≤ ν(13)
{23} similar H = {12}, S = {23}
{2} similar H = {1}
column of table are balancedness-inequalities, convexity-inequalities ore concavity-
inequalities only.
Consider the game:
ν(1) = 1, ν(2) = −1, ν(3) = 2, ν(12) = 0, ν(13) = 6. ν(23) = 4. ν(N) = 6.
It is monotonic, superadditive, but non-convex even for the grand coalition (ν(13)+
ν(23) > ν(N) + ν(3)) game. Players marginal contributions to the grand coalition
are: ν∗(1) = 2, ν∗(2) = 0, ν∗(3) = 6. We have
ext(Web(ν)) = {(2,−1, 5), (2, 2, 2), (4, 0, 2), (1,−1, 6), (1, 0, 5)},
ext(I(ν)) = {(5,−1, 2), (1, 3, 2), (1,−1, 6)},
ext(I∗(ν)) = {(0, 0, 6), (2,−2, 6), (2, 0, 4)},
ext(C(ν)) = ext(CC(ν)) = {(2,−1, 5), (1, 0, 5), (1,−1, 6), (2, 0, 4)}.
For every coalition T ∈ Ω1 the given game is not T -simplex and dual simplex
because ext(C(ν)) ⊆ ext(I(ν)), ext(C(ν)) ⊆ ext(I∗(ν)). It do not satisfy the CoMa-
property because ext(C(ν)) ⊆ ext(Web(ν)). The conditions (14), (15) are satisﬁed
for all H ∈ (2N \ {N}) \ {3}. We have
xB{1,2} = (1,−1, 6) ∈ ext(I(ν)), xB{∅} = (2, 0, 4) ∈ ext(I∗(ν)),
xB{1} = (1, 0, 5) ∈ ext(CC(ν)), xB{2} = (2,−1, 5) ∈ ext(CC(ν)).
Remark 1. The set of games satisfying (14)-(15) contains T -simplex games, dual
simplex games with T  i∗, zero-normalized monotonic games with V eto(ν)  i∗,
clan games with CL  i∗, big boss games with player i∗ as big boss.
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Remark 2. For basis containing the rows AN , A{π1}, A{π1,π2},...,A{π1,π2,...,πk},
where 2 ≤ k ≤ n− 1, the conditions (6) deﬁne TU games with some convexity be-
haviour. For k = n−1 we obtain condition that determines such class of games that
at least one extreme point mπ(ν) of Weber set belongs to core, i.e. permutationally
convex games (in particular, convex games and games satisfy the CoMa-property).
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